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ABSTRACT 
 
The second half of the 18
th century saw the formation of the first establishments 
to provide formal training to officers prior to receiving their first commission.  
The first school, the Royal Military Academy, was formed in 1741 by the Board 
of Ordnance to train Artillery and Engineer Officers.  It was 1800 before the 
army formed a similar establishment and the building blocks were in place for 
the creation of the Scientific Soldier. 
 
This thesis will look at the formation of the Royal Military Academy and look at 
the  training  that  officers  received  with  a  focus  on  those  officers  destined  to 
serve during the Peninsular War.  The complementary roles and training of the 
Royal  Military  Artificers  and  the  eventual  formation  of  the  School  of  Military 
Engineering will be described. 
 
A  thorough  review  will  then  be  undertaken  of  the  officers  in  the  Royal 
Engineers, the numbers, their background, the locations they served in and the 
tasks they carried out. 
 
A new review of the sieges during the war will be completed using unpublished 
material.  The other roles undertaken by the Royal Engineers in the Peninsular 
War  will  be  fully  investigated  and  described.    These  roles  are  more 
comprehensive than has been commonly understood and will demonstrate the 
contribution of the educated officer to the war. 
 
The thesis will conclude by looking at the impacts of the post-war peace on 
military education. 
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SECTION 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Context 
The  middle  of  the  18
th  century  saw  the  establishment  of  the  Royal  Military 
Academy  which  introduced  professional  training  for  British  officers 
commissioned by the Board of Ordnance.  By the start of the 19
th century, the 
Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers were populated by ‘Scientific soldiers’ who 
received  formal  training  and  usually  had  to  pass  examinations  before  they 
received their first commissions.  In contrast it was not until 1800 that the British 
army  established  the  Royal  Military  College  to  provide  similar  education  for 
army officers.  Even the United States, which did not have the European history 
of centuries of war, established their military academy at West Point in 1802.
1  
Up to this time the British army was characterised by ‘wretched negligence, lack 
of  discipline,  and  ignorance  of  officers  who  gained  commissions  and 
promotions, not by military talent or good service, but by political favour, by 
money, and by intrigue’.
2  Henry Bunbury, who was Aide-de-Camp to the Duke 
of York in Flanders in 1799, and later became Under-Secretary of State for 
War, described the army as ‘lax in its discipline, entirely without system and 
very weak in numbers. The colonels of each regiment managed it according to 
his  notions,  or  neglected  it  altogether.  There  was  no  uniformity  of  drill  or 
movement; professional pride was rare; professional knowledge still more so’.
3  
The Adjutant-General commented even more forcefully ‘of the fifteen cavalry 
and  twenty-six  infantry  regiments  …  twenty-one  are  commanded  literally  by 
boys or idiots.’
4 
 
But  was  there  in  practice  a  great  difference  in  professionalism  between  the 
army and the Ordnance?  Was the training of the Ordnance officers appropriate 
                                            
1 S. Forman, ‘Why the United States Military Academy was established in 1802’, Military Affairs, 
vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 16-28. 
2 R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation : The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 
1963),  p. 117. 
3 D. Gregory, No Ordinary General : Lt. General Sir Henry Bunbury (1778-1860) : The Best 
Soldier Historian (Cranbury, New Jersey, 1999), p. 21. 
4 C. Barnett,  Britain and her Army  (London, 1970),  pp. 256-257, quoted in  A. Clayton,  The 
British Officer (Harlow, 2006), p. 56. Section 1. Introduction. 
  2 
for their needs?  Were the Ordnance officers any better at their profession when 
they  were  faced  with  operational  problems  and  difficulties?    Did  the  strict 
adherence to promotion by seniority strangle the Ordnance and ensure that its 
senior  officers  were  too  old  to  serve  in  the  field,  and  too  far  removed  from 
current demands to make appropriate decisions at home?   
 
This thesis will address two main areas.  Firstly it will consider the introduction 
of education and training in the military with a focus on military engineering.  It 
will  analyse  in  detail  the  structures  that  were  set  up  within  the  Board  of 
Ordnance and compare them with what was being done in the British army.  
Whilst formal training establishments had been established in the Ordnance in 
the mid-18
th century, the debate about the need for pre-commission education 
in the army raged on until the mid-19
th century when formal exams were finally 
introduced for army officers.  One common error, which appears in a number of 
recent published works, is attributing the formation of the Royal Sappers and 
Miners to Wellington, usually as a result of his letter after the third siege of 
Badajoz in April 1812.
5  This view is not supported by the facts and the thesis 
will describe the actions that occurred within the Board of Ordnance to address 
known problems within their organisation. 
 
Secondly, the present study will revisit the operational activities of the Royal 
Engineers during the Peninsular War and take a fresh look at their performance 
to determine how well they contributed to the war effort.  It will ask if the training 
they received was adequate and investigate if there is any evidence of learning 
through experience during the period.  It will also consider the role the Royal 
Engineers undertook in supporting the command structure of the army. 
 
A review of literature will show that when historians consider the role of the 
Royal  Engineers  in  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  the  tendency  is  to  think  of  the 
construction of the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810 and the sieges that occurred 
                                            
5 Examples are : ed. I. Fletcher, The Peninsular War : Aspects of the struggle for the Iberian 
Peninsula  (Staplehurst,  1998),  p.  58;  I.  Fletcher,  In  Hell  before  Daylight  (Tunbridge  Wells, 
1984), p. 117; ed. P. Griffith, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814  
(London, 1999), p. 111; F. Myatt, British Sieges in the Peninsular War (London, 1987), p. 117. Section 1. Introduction. 
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in Spain between 1811 and 1814.  All the sieges and blockades carried out by 
the British army during the Peninsular War account for less than 15% of the 
time. There was never more than a third of the total number of Royal Engineer 
officers present in the Peninsula.  This raises the question, what were the Royal 
Engineers actually doing during the Napoleonic Wars?  The thesis will show 
that much of their work involved maintaining and supporting the various stations 
in Great Britain, Ireland and across the world.  The distribution of the Royal 
Engineers around the world will be outlined in section three, but this thesis will 
concentrate on their role in the Peninsular War. 
 
This thesis will address three primary questions : 
−  Were the Royal Engineer officers suitably trained and provided with the 
necessary resources to undertake their roles? 
−  If a small percentage of engineer time was spent on the sieges during 
the Peninsular War, what roles did the Royal Engineer officers perform 
for the remainder of the time? 
−  How well did they perform in their operational roles? 
1.2.  The Military in the Age of Enlightenment 
One possible side effect of the Glorious Revolution was that the strict controls 
placed  on  the  military  stifled  the  growth  of  professionalism.    There  was  a 
reluctance  to  establish  military  colleges,  partly  because  of  the  cost  but  also 
because there was uncertainty amongst the military leadership of the benefit of 
prior education.  Clayton comments that ‘professional zeal was not respected or 
fashionable’ in the mid-18
th century.
6  The dispersion of troops at home to keep 
civil  order  also  made  practical  training  difficult  to  organise.    There  was  a 
growing  recognition  amongst  enlightened  officers  that  professionalism  in  the 
military had to improve and that it had to come through training and education. 
The general standard of education in the country was improving and one of the 
arguments put forward for improving officer education was that there was a real 
possibility that subordinates could be better educated that their superiors.  For 
the first time the rank and file in some infantry regiments were being taught to 
                                            
6 Clayton, The British Officer (Harlow, 2006), p. 43. Section 1. Introduction. 
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think and act independently rather than wait for orders and this meant that they 
had to be trained to carry out these roles.  Their officers needed to be better 
trained in order to ensure that soldiers would have confidence in them.
7  
 
The growing size of the armies in Europe meant that ad-hoc education of junior 
officers  at  the  regimental  level  was  becoming  more  difficult.    Similarly,  the 
growth of the British Empire meant that troops were dispersed far and wide and 
any form of consistency or co-ordination across units was difficult.  With the 
increase in the size of the standing army, there was a greater need for staff 
officers  to  manage  the  forces  both  in  peace  and  war.    There  was  some 
evidence of military reform in Britain through the 18
th century but progress was 
very slow,
8  and at the end of the 18
th century none of these issues had really 
been addressed in the army and for men who wanted a military education prior 
to joining the British army, there was no alternative but to enrol at one of the 
military schools in Europe or to seek out private tutors from mainland Europe.  
Wellington, Beresford, Moore, Craufurd, Hope, Cole
9, Baird and Picton
10 are 
examples of officers who followed this route.    
 
In Europe the situation was different.  The greater progress of Enlightenment in 
Europe was one of the drivers of military reform, as were the more immediate 
prospects of conflict that always existed in mainland Europe. Writers such as 
Guibert, Cognazo, Morogues, Saxe, Folard and Teil were putting forth ideas on 
strategy and tactics which can be readily seen in the actions of the revolutionary 
French armies.
11   
 
                                            
7 D. Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm, c1790-1815 (London, 1987), pp. 95-99. 
8 Clayton, British Officer, pp. 38-73. 
9  Wellington,  Royal  Academy  of  Equitation  at  Angers;  Beresford,  Military  Academy  at 
Strasbourg; Moore, Craufurd and Hope through private tuition across France and Prussia; Cole 
In Stuttgart. 
10 F. Myatt, Peninsular General; Sir Thomas Picton 1758-1815 (Newton Abbott, 1980), p. 16.  
Picton did not actually go abroad, but was taught at a private military academy in London run by 
a Frenchman, de Lachee.  A. Haley, Our Davy (Liverpool, N.D.), p. 13. David Baird appears to 
have  attended  the  same  school,  his  biography  noting  attendance  at  an  academy  run  by  a 
refugee called Lochie. 
11 Ed. J. Black, European Warfare 1453-1815 (London, 1999), pp. 224-227. Section 1. Introduction. 
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At the start of the 19
th century there was almost no military material in print in 
English.  Engineer officers remarked that most of the material they read came 
from Europe and many of the military engineering terms were French, without 
any attempt to translate them into English.  The situation was little better for 
army  officers.    The  only  recent  British  writer  of  note  was  Henry  Lloyd,  a 
Welshman who started his military career as an engineer in the Spanish army 
as he did not have the status or personal wealth to join the British military.  
Lloyd worked as a mercenary officer across Europe, taking part in the War of 
Austrian Succession, the Seven Years’ War and the Russo-Turkish War.   He 
believed  that  war  was  a  science  and  could  be  taught  and  mastered.    His 
experiences, particularly during the Seven Years’ War, led to the development 
of his views on military science and ultimately to the publication of his history of 
the war in 1766.  In his history he laid out his primary principles.  First, ‘analyses 
of the political events that sparked the war as well as a geo-political survey of 
the belligerents’.  Second, ‘the limitations imposed on operations by geography 
… without geographic knowledge, Lloyd, an engineer by training, considered it 
impossible to understand the nature of war’.  Third, an understanding of the 
goals of the belligerents was essential.
12  Lloyd’s ideas on military science were 
well received both in Britain and in Europe and were certainly read by the more 
enlightened of the engineer officers.  There was a small number of publications 
designed to provide some military education, for example, Simes’ Military Guide 
for  Young  Officers,  published  in  1772,  but  generally  there  was  a  dearth  of 
material available for officers who wanted to improve themselves. 
 
The very end of the 18
th century and the start of the 19
th century saw the first 
steps to speed up military reform in Britain.  The appointment of the Duke of 
York as Commander-in-Chief was significant in that for the first time in many 
years the head of the army was committed to improve standards and eradicate 
the abuses that had been occurring.  This was partly driven by the Duke of 
York’s personal experiences in the Low Countries where he was let down by 
almost all components of the military.  Dundas’ regulations of 1792 formed the 
                                            
12 P.J. Speelman, Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth Century Europe 
(Westport, New Jersey, 2002), pp. 123-128. Section 1. Introduction. 
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first serious attempt to standardise the drill across the army.  The experiments 
at Shorncliffe with light infantry led to what were probably the best trained and 
most  effective  soldiers  in  the  British  army,  the  Light  Division.    Le  Marchant 
published  his  Rules  and  Regulations  for  the  Sword  Exercises  of  Cavalry  in 
1796,  and  established  the  Royal  Military  College  in  1800.  The  Senior  Staff 
College had been established under Jarry a year earlier.  
 
These changes are not attributable to one particular event.  There had been no 
step change in the technologies used.  Battlefield tactics had evolved but were 
still centred on the basic building blocks of manoeuvring masses of men armed 
with smoothbore muskets.  Enlightenment drove the review of past policies and 
the search for a more efficient mode of war.  The differences in the Napoleonic 
War  were  twofold.    First,  the  scale  of  operations  was  much  larger  than  in 
previous wars
13 and second, the realisation from the British perspective that the 
war with Napoleon was a war to the end.  Previous wars throughout the 18
th 
century had never seriously threatened the British mainland.  Britain’s survival 
depended more than ever before on the performance of its army and the first 
engagements in the 1790’s were not encouraging.   John Brewer’s work on the 
Fiscal-Military state describes the changes in Great Britain that allowed more 
effective generation of government income than other states in Europe.  Whilst 
most European powers elected to keep large standing armies, Britain chose to 
keep its army as small as possible as a direct result of the fear of the military 
which had arisen from the civil war and the Glorious Revolution and also to free 
funds  to  maintain  its  powerful  navy  which  protected  home  shores  and  trade 
routes.  Britain also used some of this wealth to hire mercenaries and support 
foreign armies rather than expand its own land forces.
14  The consequence of 
these actions was that experience and specialist skills were limited within the 
British military. 
 
Over  this  period  there  were  no  material  changes  in  the  structure  of  the 
education  that  had  been  given  to  the  Ordnance  Corps  cadets  since  the 
                                            
13 Ed. L. Stone, An Imperial State at War 1689-1815 (London, 1994), p. 9. 
14 Stone, An Imperial State at War, p.10; Also J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, War, Money and 
the English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989), p. 31. Section 1. Introduction. 
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formation of the Royal Military Academy.  It was 1811 before the most effective 
changes began with respect to the training of junior officers and artificers.  The 
officers  of  the  Ordnance  were,  however,  much  more  proactive  than  their 
predecessors.  The Royal Engineer, Captain Charles William Pasley’s military 
experiences in the early years of the 19
th century led him to believe that there 
were some fundamental flaws in the way Britain was conducting its defence.  
Following  his  injury  during  the  Walcheren  campaign  he  concentrated  on  his 
writing and in 1810 published his Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of 
the British Empire, Part 1.  The book was very well received and ran to four 
editions over the next few years.  Pasley’s original intention was to publish a 
second  part,  which  would  describe  what  was  wrong  with  the  Board  of 
Ordnance, an action that was sure to cause great anger amongst his superiors.  
In the end this was never published as Pasley obtained approval to establish 
the  School  of  Military  Engineering  in  1812,  that  remedied  many  of  his 
complaints.  Captain John Birch R.E. a peer engineer of Pasley had previously 
published the less well known Memoir on the National Defence, in 1808.  What 
is  remarkable  about  these  works  is  that  they  were  not  accounts  of  military 
campaigns but works of a more strategic nature.  Their authors were not senior 
generals but relatively junior captains in the Royal Engineers who were showing 
an attention and appreciation of the challenges that lay ahead for Britain.  Apart 
from these published works the officers were freely discussing these issues and 
forming opinions on what needed to be done. 
 
The demand for better education and information led to informal arrangements 
like the formation of the Society for Procuring Useful Information in the Royal 
Engineers but also to more formal responses for the military in general.  1810 
saw  the  publication  of  the  Royal  Military  Chronicle,  which  was  published 
monthly  through  the  Napoleonic  Wars  and  was  a  predecessor  to  the  long 
running  United  Service  Journal,  which  was  first  published  in  1829.    The 
dedication in the first issue of the Royal Military Chronicle was ‘To the real and 
permanent good of the British army … being an anxious effort … to infuse into 
the younger officers a professional zeal’.
15   The focus of this publication was to 
                                            
15 Royal Military Chronicle (London, 1810), vol. 1, Nov 1810, Dedication. Section 1. Introduction. 
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inform the military on the progress of the war, to provide information that would 
be of use to officers who were to embark on operations (the first issue had two 
maps of Portugal and contained a description of the Portuguese army) and to 
provide military education to junior officers.  For the first time in English there 
were military manuals being printed, although it should be noted that the first 
course on tactics was a translation of material used ‘in the Polytechnic School 
of France’.
16  The course was described as having three parts : 
−  Course of Tactics covering field and permanent fortifications 
−  Practical  Engineering  covering  military  surveys,  planning,  taking  up 
ground and artillery 
−  Strategy  covering  general  details  of  war,  duties  of  generals  and  staff 
officers, principals of military movements etc.
17 
 
In the May 1813 edition a new series of articles began, entitled ‘Elements of the 
art of war’.  The focus was once more heavily on the military engineering side, 
being a translation from the French of the work of St Paul, the French Chief 
Engineer.
18  The dedication stated that the translation had been done for the 
use of the officers of the Foot Guards.   
 
The easy access to these journals made large amounts of information readily 
available to officers for the first time.  As there were no official manuals for 
officers in the British army, the printing of such educational information must 
have been extremely valuable.  Equally valuable was the current information on 
the  ‘Seat  of  the  War’,  which  provided  officers  (probably  French  as  well  as 
British)  with  detailed  descriptions  of  towns,  topography  and  communication 
routes in Portugal and Spain.  There is no doubt that any officer who wanted to 
learn was able to obtain useful information prior to his arrival in the theatre of 
operations.  
                                            
16 Royal Military Chronicle, vol.1, Nov 1810, p. 40. 
17 Royal Military Chronicle, vol. 1, Apr 1811, p. 459. 
18 Royal Military Chronicle, vol. 6, Jul 1813, p. 213. Section 1. Introduction. 
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1.3.  Historiography of military engineering during 
the Peninsular War 
Literature on the Board of Ordnance is relatively limited and the records in the 
National Archives are very patchy.  The first significant published account of the 
role of the Board of Ordnance was in Clode’s Military Forces of the Crown.
19  
Forbes’ three volume work
20 also covered the general structure with the more 
specific military elements being covered in the histories of the Royal Artillery
21 
and  the  Royal  Engineers.
22    More  recently  the  Ordnance’s  role  within  the 
military  hierarchy  is  briefly  described  in  S.G.P.  Ward’s  book,  Wellington’s 
Headquarters,
23  and  a  more  detailed  commentary  is  contained  in  Richard 
Glover’s book on the period leading up to the start of the Peninsular War.
24 
 
Commentaries on military education and training in the Ordnance tend to be 
restricted  to  the  establishment  and  running  of  the  schools  themselves,  the 
primary  works  being  by  W.D.  Jones,
25  B.R.  Ward,
26  and  F.G.  Guggisberg.
27  
There has been no review of the operational effectiveness of the training that 
the officers received.  This thesis will undertake such a review. 
 
There is a recent trend to look beyond the operational aspects of war during this 
period.  Christopher Chilcott, in the introduction to his recent thesis, remarks 
that there is a gap between historians such as Stone, Emsley and Black who 
have  written  on  state  support  for  the  military  and  Griffiths  [sic]  Fletcher  and 
Haythornthwaite who have written on military operations.  This gap includes 
staff, logistics and intelligence.  Chilcott comments that ‘the attitude of historians 
… has often been apathetic’ in these areas.
28  Charles Esdaile has written at 
                                            
19 C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (2 vols, London, 1869). 
20 A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (3 vols, London, 1929). 
21 R.A. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 1874) 
22 History of the Royal Corps of Engineers (12 vols, Woolwich, 1889). 
23 S.G.P. Ward. Wellington’s Headquarters (Oxford, 1957). 
24 R. Glover. Peninsular Preparation. The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 
1963). 
25 W.D. Jones, Records of the Royal Military Academy (Woolwich, 1851).   
26 B.R. Ward, The School of Military Engineering 1812-1909 (Chatham, 1909). 
27 F.G. Guggisberg, The Shop, The Story of the Royal Military Academy (London, 1900) 
28 C. Chilcott, ‘Maintaining the British Army; 1793-1820’, unpub PhD thesis, University of the 
West of England, 2005, p. 3.  Chilcott does not mention the earlier PhD by T. Redgrave on a Section 1. Introduction. 
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length on the role of guerrillas during the Peninsular War and has widened the 
understanding of the important role they played in tying up French resources.
29  
Chilcott’s  thesis  looks  at  logistical  support  and  another  recent  addition  is 
Romans’ thesis, which describes the role of staff officers in gathering military 
intelligence, especially in the area of topographical surveying.
30 
 
Works on Military engineering, artillery and sieges. 
 
There  are  no  publications  specifically  about  the  Royal  Engineers  during  the 
Napoleonic  Wars.    This  topic  is  covered,  somewhat  briefly,  in  around  one 
hundred and fifty pages of volume one of the Corps’ twelve volume history.
31  
This  is  still  the  best  single  source  of  information  on  the  history  and  the 
operations of the Corps.  The focus, as with all published work on the activities 
of the Royal Engineers is on sieges and defence work.  There has been no 
evaluation of the wider role of the engineer officers in the Peninsula and this is 
an area that will be addressed for the first time in the thesis. 
 
There is a great deal of material written by the officers of the Royal Engineers 
which reflect their professional training in encouraging accurate record keeping 
as part of their daily activity.  This material falls into four categories.  Firstly, a 
number of the officers wrote on wider strategic and military matters showing 
their awareness of the contemporary issues.  These include Charles Pasley’s 
Essay on Military Policy in Britain and the Empire
32 and John Birch’s Memoir on 
the National Defence,
33 as mentioned above. 
 
                                            
similar subject.  ‘Wellington’s Logistical Arrangements : 1809-14’, unpub PhD Thesis, King’s 
College London, No Date. 
29  C.  Esdaile,  Fighting  Napoleon:  Guerrillas,  Bandits,  and  Adventurers  in  Spain,  1808-1814 
(Cumberland, Rhode Island, 2004). 
30  M.  Romans,  ‘Professionalism  and  the  Development  of  Military  Intelligence  in  Wellington’s 
Army 1809-14’. Unpub PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2005.  
31 W. Porter,  History of the Royal Corps of Engineers (Woolwich, 1889) , volume 1. 
32 C.W. Pasley, Essay on Military Policy in Britain and the Empire (London, 1810). 
33 J.F. Birch, Memoir on the National Defence (London, 1808). Section 1. Introduction. 
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Secondly, there are general military histories.  Lieutenant-Colonel J.T. Jones 
R.E. published his two volume history of the Peninsular War in 1821,
34 seven 
years before the first volume of Napier’s classic work was published.
35  Captain 
John Squire R.E. wrote a history of the Walcheren campaign, which included 
both topographical and operational commentaries.
36 
 
Thirdly, there are technical works.  The most important of these is J.T. Jones’ 
comprehensive work on the British sieges during the Peninsular War.
37  Most 
writers on the subject of the sieges use this as the primary source.  There is 
also a similarly detailed French equivalent by Belmas, which also covers the 
British sieges.
38  Pasley wrote many works for use as training material at the 
School of Military Engineering.
39  
 
Fourthly, there is a wealth of primary material in the form of personal letters, 
diaries  and  correspondence  some  published  and  many  not.    The  most 
significant published work is Wrottesley’s Life of Burgoyne,
40 also useful are 
works by Rice Jones,
41 George Landmann
42 and Charles Boothby.
43  John T. 
Jones  privately  published  his  diary  for  his  immediate  family  only.
44    Several 
officers’ dairies or letters were also published in the Royal Engineers’ in-house 
journal. 
 
                                            
34 J.T. Jones, Account of the War in Spain and Portugal and the South of France From 1808 to 
1814 Inclusive  (2 vols, London, 1821). 
35 W.F.P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula (6 vols, London, 1828-40). 
36 J. Squire. A Short Narrative of the late campaign of the British Army under the orders of the 
Earl of Chatham (London, 1810). 
37 J.T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges carried on by the army under the Duke of Wellington in 
Spain Between the Years 1811 to 1814; with Notes and Additions also Memoranda Relative to 
the Lines Thrown Up to Cover Lisbon in 1810.   3rd edition, (3 vols, London, 1846).  
38 F. Belmas, Journaux des sieges faits ou soutenous par les francais dans la Peninsule, de 
1807 a 1814  (4 vols, Paris, 1836). 
39 For example, C.W. Pasley. Course of instruction originally composed for the use of the Royal 
Engineer Department (3 Vols, Chatham, 1814-17.)  See bibliography for other works by Pasley. 
40 G. Wrottesley, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshall Sir John Burgoyne (2 vols, London, 
1873). 
41 H.V. Shore, ‘Letters from the Peninsula during 1812-14. Letters of Rice Jones R.E’,  Royal 
Engineer Journal, vol. 17, July 1912. 
42 G. Landmann, Recollections of Military Life 1806-1808  (2 vols, London, 1854). 
43 C. Boothby, A Prisoner of France, (London, 1898); Under England’s Flag from 1804-1809  
(London, 1900). 
44 J.T. Jones, The Military Autobiography of Major-General John T. Jones. Twelve copies only, 
privately published for family use, (London, 1853). Section 1. Introduction. 
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The unpublished primary material is held in various archives including the Royal 
Engineers  Museum,  the  British  Library,  the  National  Army  Museum  and  the 
National  Archives.    Much  of  this  material  has  not  been  used  before  in 
publications.  This thesis will make significant use of this unpublished material. 
 
The  involvement  of  the  Royal  Artillery  in  the  sieges  is  covered  in  two  main 
works: Duncan’s History of the Corps
45 and the Dickson Letters.
46  Alexander 
Dickson’s diaries contain large amounts of detail and complement J.T. Jones’ 
book on the sieges, particularly as Dickson was heavily involved in most of the 
sieges.  Hughes also briefly discusses the Peninsular sieges in his book on 
artillery tactics.
47 
 
In terms of general military histories, there has been no serious review of British 
sieges in the Peninsular War since the multi-volume histories of Oman
48 and 
Fortescue
49 appeared at the start of the 20
th century.   There have been three 
single-volume works on the Peninsular War in the last twenty years, by Gates,
50 
Esdaile,
51 and more recently by Robertson.
52  None had the space to go into 
military engineering events in significant detail, and generally they pass quickly 
over them following the lines taken by Oman or Fortescue.  Two compilation 
works  on  the  Peninsular  War,  edited  by  Fletcher  and  Griffith  have  been 
published in the last ten years.
53  Both contain articles on various topics by 
recognised experts and both have chapters on sieges.
54  There are also works 
                                            
45 R.A. Duncan, History of the Royal Artillery (2 vols, London, 1874) 
46 ed. J.H. Leslie, The Dickson Manuscripts  (5 vols, Woolwich 1905-8). 
47 B.P. Hughes, Open Fire : Artillery tactics from Marlborough to Wellington  (Chichester, 1983). 
48 C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Peninsular War (7 vols, Oxford, 1902-1930). 
49 J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army  (13 vols & 7 map vols, London, 1899-1930). 
50 D. Gates, The Spanish Ulcer. A History of the Peninsular War (London, 1986) 
51 C. Esdaile, The Peninsular War, (London, 2002). 
52 I. Robertson, A Commanding Presence : Wellington in the Peninsula 1808-1814 : Logistics-
Strategy-Survival (Stroud, 2008). 
53  Ed.  I.  Fletcher,  The  Peninsular  War  :  Aspects  of  the  struggle  for  the  Iberian  Peninsula 
(Staplehurst, 1998) and ed. P. Griffith, Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-
1814  (London, 1999). 
54 In Fletcher, The Peninsular War, the article on sieges is by P. Haythornthwaite and in Griffith, 
Modern Studies, the article is by D. Chandler. Section 1. Introduction. 
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that  cover  the  non-British  Peninsular  sieges,  including  those  by  Horward,
55 
Lamare,
56 and Rudorff.
57 
 
There have been four recent works on specific elements of British Peninsular 
military engineering operations.  Myatt
58 wrote on the British sieges, and worked 
mainly from well known published sources.  Grehan wrote about the Lines of 
Torres Vedras.
59  The work focuses more on Wellington’s campaign prior to the 
retreat  into  the  Lines  and  adds  nothing  new  to  what  was  already  known.  
Fletcher has written twice on the third siege of Badajoz in 1812.
60  Both works 
pull together, in a convenient format, the common information on the siege, but 
they do not add any new information. 
 
All  of  the  above  works  contain  factual  errors,  which  would  suggest  that  this 
subject  area  has  been  treated  as  an  issue  of  secondary  importance  and 
consequently has not received the attention to detail that has been given to the 
primary  thread  of  the  publications.    Two  examples  are  given  below  as  an 
illustration, although other errors will be addressed at the appropriate place in 
this thesis. 
 
Chandler’s  chapter  on  siege  warfare  refers  to  ’36-pounder  or  larger  pieces 
being the norm’.
61  Such a size was not used in any of the major sieges and the 
use of larger guns was very rare.  The ‘norm’ was 18 or 24-pounder guns.  On 
the  same  page,  Chandler  writes  about  ‘century  old  Portuguese  iron  guns’ 
developing  muzzle  droop.    The  old  Portuguese  guns  were  almost  invariably 
brass, and it was these brass guns not iron guns that were prone to muzzle 
droop.    He  then  refers  to  rank  and  file  from  the  Royal  Military  Artificers  as 
belonging to the Royal Engineers. 
                                            
55 D. Horward, Napoleon and Iberia, The Twin sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, 1810 
(London, 1994). 
56 J.B. Lamarre, Relation des Sieges et Defences D’Olivenza, de Badajoz et de Campo Mayor 
en 1811 et 1812  (Paris, 1825).  Lamarre was the Chief engineer at the sieges of Badajoz. 
57 R. Rudorff, War to the Death: The Sieges of Saragossa 1808-1809 (London, 1974). 
58 F. Myatt, British Sieges of the Peninsular War . 
59 J. Grehan, The Lines of Torres Vedras (Staplehurst, 2000). 
60  I.  Fletcher,  In  Hell  before  Daylight  (Tunbridge  Wells,  1984),  and  Badajoz,  1812 
(Wellingborough, 1999). 
61 Fletcher, The Peninsular War, p. 58. Section 1. Introduction. 
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Oman  states  that  men  from  the  Royal  Military  Artificers  were  used  to  train 
soldiers from the Third and Seventh Divisions in sapping and mining before the 
second siege of Badajoz.  The engineers recorded that they had to train both 
the artificers and the soldiers, as neither had any prior knowledge.
62 
 
There is much material that was not available one hundred years ago and it is 
time for a re-evaluation of military engineering in the Peninsular War.  Uffindel 
has contributed to this through his evaluation of primary material held in the 
National  Army  Museum.
63    This  thesis  will  review  this  new  material  and 
determine  if  it  alters  the  common  perceptions  as  documented  in  previous 
publications.  
 
Key officers mentioned in thesis. 
 
Below are the names of officers that will feature prominently in the thesis. 
 
The most frequently mentioned is Richard Fletcher who commanded the Royal 
Engineers from August 1808 until he was killed in August 1813 (apart from a 
three  month  period  at  the  start  of  1813).    He  was  replaced  by  Howard 
Elphinstone for the remainder of the war.  Elphinstone also commanded briefly 
at the start of the campaign, being wounded at the battle of Vimiero, although 
he was about to be superseded by Fletcher anyway.  The three other most 
common  names  from  the  Peninsula  are  John  Thomas  Jones,  John  Fox 
Burgoyne and John Squire, who were some of the most senior engineers below 
their  commander.    Between  them  they  had  twelve  years  service  in  the 
Peninsula.  Burgoyne was there for the whole of the war, Squire until he died in 
May 1812 and Jones until he was wounded at the siege of Burgos in October 
1812.  Stephen Chapman is also mentioned before he returned to England at 
the  end  of  1811.    He  was  a  friend  of  Henry  Torrens  and  was  liked  by 
Wellington.  Charles William Pasley only served briefly in the Peninsula in 1808, 
                                            
62 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, p. 420. 
63 A. Uffindel, The National Army Museum book of Wellington’s Armies.  Britain’s Campaigns in 
the Peninsula and at Waterloo 1808-1815 (London, 2003). Section 1. Introduction. 
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but is mentioned regularly throughout the period due to his correspondence with 
the officers in the Peninsula and his work at home to improve the training of the 
engineers and artificers. 
 
Apart  from  these  seven  officers,  there  are  only  fleeting  mentions  of  other 
officers, usually specifically related to some specific event or activity.  The final 
name that will be mentioned frequently is Alexander Dickson, who commanded 
the artillery at many of the sieges and went on to command the artillery in the 
Peninsula from mid 1813. Appendix I gives further details on the key officers 
who are mentioned. 
 
1.4.  Structure of Thesis 
One of the major challenges in undertaking this thesis has been the lack of 
published material on the Royal Engineers themselves.  Due to their role being 
primarily supportive and often away from the major centres of activity, they are 
often  only  mentioned  in  passing,  or  not  at  all.    To  enable  a  comprehensive 
analysis of their organisation and operations a great deal of archival work has 
been required to access the necessary information and this has prompted the 
creation  of  important  resources.  The  first  is  a  comprehensive  electronic 
database of all the officers who served during the Napoleonic Wars.  It contains 
information on their background, family history, ranks, the locations they served 
in and the activities they carried out.  This information has not been compiled 
before and will be a valuable new source available for future researchers. The 
second item is the analysis and cataloguing of many of the unpublished letters 
of these engineer officers covering specific engineering related material but also 
wider comments on the strategy, operations and battles during the war. The 
collection  includes  several  thousand  digital  images  of  the  original  primary 
documents. 
 
Section two of the thesis will describe the political and military background in 
the  long  18
th  century  and  comment  on  the  relationship  between  the 
government, the army and the Board of Ordnance.  The Royal Engineers were Section 1. Introduction. 
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not  part  of  the  army  at  that  time  and  were  not  directly  responsible  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  These  relationships  are  still  not  well  understood  and 
confusion  is  evident  even  in  the  latest  works.    For  example,  the  diagram  in 
Stephen Ward’s book
64 is misleading and Chilcott’s description of the structure 
of the Board of Ordnance is incorrect.
65 
 
Section three will describe the introduction of education, undertake an analysis 
of the military engineering resources and the effectiveness of the education of 
the engineers.  It will also carry out an analysis of the officers who made up the 
Corps and finish with a detailed investigation of command and seniority in the 
Corps. 
 
Section  four  will  undertake  a  wide  ranging  investigation  of  the  roles  and 
activities carried out by the Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War and will 
conclude with an assessment of their performance. 
 
Section five will briefly describe the progress of military education and military 
engineering after the Peninsular War through to the start of the Crimean War. 
 
Section six will provide a summary of the research and outline the findings. 
 
                                            
64 S.G.P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters (Oxford, 1957), p. 7. 
65 Chilcott, ‘Maintaining the British Army’, Introduction. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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SECTION 2.  HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT. 
2.1.  Britain in the Long 18
th Century 
 
The  17
th  and  18
th  centuries  had  seen  a  change  in  the  importance  of  nation 
states in Europe.  There had been a growth in the status and power of England 
from insignificant player to a world power. England’s rise in importance was 
partially due to the growth in world trade on the back of the many territorial 
acquisitions.  Over the same period there was a decline in the status of Spain 
and a rise in the power of France.  
 
Through the long 18
th century Britain’s population grew significantly driving the 
growth  in  national  wealth.    The  population  growth  and  the  increasing 
international trade led to increasing military demands both to keep public order 
at home and to protect the trade routes and colonies.  The growth in wealth 
allowed the necessary increase in the size of the army and the navy.  The army 
was partly funded by keeping a significant number of troops in Ireland.   
 
Following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 the power base in England moved 
from the monarchy to Parliament.  The stability that ensued and the growth in 
trade provided the environment that allowed the development of the strongest 
Fiscal-Military  state  in  Europe  and  allowed  Britain  to  fund  the  war  against 
Napoleon.   The end of the 18
th century and start of the 19
th century was a 
period  of  tremendous  change  in  Europe.    Throughout  Europe,  revolutionary 
ideas were being voiced and traditional values being challenged.  The French 
Revolution had frightened the monarchs across the continent into realising that 
their power was not absolute.  Britain found herself at odds, first with France, 
and then, as Napoleon swept across Europe, with more and more counties as 
they fell into step with his demands. The war with France and the Continental 
blockade were intended to destroy England as a world power. 
 Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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The British military successes of the 18
th century had been achieved by small 
‘professional’ armies supplemented by mercenaries from her larger European 
Allies.  Britain found herself involved in a struggle where armies were measured 
in tens, if not hundreds of thousands of men and she could not compete with 
these vast sizes.  At the start of the Napoleonic Wars in 1793, the effective 
strength of the regular army amounted to no more than 40,000 troops.   By 
1808, this had risen to around 200,000.
1  This total had to police Britain, defend 
the many colonies across the world, and control the continually difficult situation 
in Ireland before any thought could be given to offensive operations.  Britain 
could pay for war across Europe, but had limited ability to fight it.   
 
Even  Napoleon  recognised  the  power  of  the  Royal  Navy  to  dominate  the 
waves, but a ship of the line exerted limited power away from the coast, and 
that was where Napoleon operated.  The Royal Navy could strangle trade and 
movement but could not take or hold land, and land was the commodity that 
was being fought over.  The Royal Navy also had problems of it’s own as the 
continental blockade and the growth in overseas colonies increased demands 
on  resources,  and  this  was  made  worse  when  the  argument  with  America 
turned to war in 1812. 
 
Britain approached the Napoleonic wars as the wealthiest country in Europe, 
with the biggest navy in the world, a standing army much smaller than the other 
major European states and a political stability that allowed the highest taxation 
in Europe.  Britain also approached the Peninsular War with an unimpressive 
recent military history that included the Low Countries in 1793 and 1799, Egypt 
in 1800, Copenhagen and South America in 1807.  The professionalism of the 
British army was on trial. 
 
                                            
1  R  Glover,  Peninsular  Preparation  (Cambridge  1963),  p.  7.    Originally,  taken  from  J.W. 
Fortescue’s History of the British Army (13 volumes, London, 1899-1930), vol. 4, part 2, p. 940.  
The number of British troops remained quite static from 1808 to 1815 only rising from 189,000 
to 207,000; Foreign troops in British service rising over the same period from 37,000 to 54,000.  
These figures are taken from : J.W. Fortescue, County Lieutenancies and the Army 1804-1814 
(London, 1909) pp. 291-294. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
  19 
In  Britain  the  organisation  of  the  military  was  spread  across  a  number  of 
different groups.  The King, Parliament, the Cabinet, the Commander in Chief 
and  the  Master-General  of  the  Ordnance  all  held  part  of  the  power  and 
responsibility.  This mix of responsibility and decision making had a major effect 
on  the  operations  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  military.    To  understand  the 
operation  of  the  British  army  through  the  Napoleonic  Wars  requires  an 
understanding of these various roles and relationships.  The following section 
will  outline  how  the  various  components  fitted  together  and  how  well  they 
worked together. 
 
2.2.  The British Government during the 
Napoleonic Wars 
Whilst Napoleon fought across the plains of Europe, another battle was under 
way on the banks of the Thames.  A whole generation of orators and politicians 
lived  and  died,  fighting  for  control  of  Britain,  where  Whigs,  Tories  and  the 
Monarch manoeuvred in the corridors of Westminster.  At stake was control of 
probably  the  richest  country  in  the  world,  a  country  that  was  fighting  for  its 
independence, if not survival.  Had Napoleon taken Britain, he could not leave 
such a powerful enemy intact. 
 
Even in Britain, the power of the people was growing to the detriment of the 
King.  It was a period of increasing infirmity of the monarch coupled with an 
ineffectual heir to the throne.  It was also a period of great instability for the 
British  government.    The  political  scene  was  a  mixture  of  strong  individuals 
fighting for power and weak individuals who were unable to hold a government 
together.  The names of the politicians who battled in the Houses of Parliament 
reads like the who’s who of British History including Pitt, Fox, Grey, Liverpool, 
Castlereagh and Canning. 
 
Between 1783 when Pitt formed his first Government, and 1815, there were 
seven  separate  Governments  in  Britain.    There  were  six  different  Prime 
Ministers  with  Pitt  serving  two  terms.    The  longest  serving  government  was Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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Pitt’s first from 1783 to 1801 the shortest being the Ministry of the Talents, for a 
period of only 13 months from February 1806 to March 1807.  There were six 
different Governments between 1801 and 1815, which averages slightly over 
two years each.  Some measure of stability did commence as the Peninsular 
War started with only two Governments covering the period from 1809 to 1815, 
but the previous years of turmoil took some time to settle.  Throughout this 
period, forming an efficient government was extremely difficult due to the many 
rivalries that existed between the key players.  The King disliked Fox; Canning 
and Castlereagh would not serve together (after the duel); Sidmouth would not 
serve with Canning and Mulgrave would not work with Chatham.
2 
THE CABINET IN 1808. 
In 1808, the Government was led by the Duke of Portland.  The Cabinet was 
made up of the following ministers :  
 
−  Prime Minister 
−  Chancellor of the Exchequer 
−  Lord Privy Seal 
−  Lord President of the Council 
−  Lord Chancellor 
−  Foreign Secretary 
−  Home Secretary 
−  Secretary of State for War and the Colonies 
−  First Lord of the Admiralty 
−  Master-General of the Ordnance 
−  President of the Board of Trade 
 
Two further cabinet members were added, the Secretary at War (June 1809) 
and the President of the Board of Control (July 1809).  The Secretary at War 
was not normally of cabinet rank, and did not appear in subsequent cabinets 
when Portland resigned in October 1809. 
                                            
2  These  points  extracted  from  C.D.  Hall,  British  Strategy  in  the  Napoleonic  War  1803-15 
(Manchester, 1992), pp. 52-70. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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Several of these cabinet ministers had responsibilities for different components 
of  the  military  machine  at  that  time.    This  division  of  responsibility  seems 
illogical today, but had its origins in the country’s desire never to let the army 
gain sufficient power to threaten the legitimate government of the country.  The 
legislation of the country laid responsibility for internal management of the army 
with the Commander-in-Chief; financial control rested with the Treasury and the 
Mutiny Act ensured that Parliament always had overall control.  Overlaid over 
this  understandable  control,  was  an  evolutionary  division  of  responsibilities, 
which were never considered at the operational level.  This led to a situation 
where most senior members of the cabinet had a partial role in the funding, 
movement or supply of the army, both at home and abroad.  Once power had 
been given, no department would willingly give it up to another department for 
the sake of efficiency, so these inefficiencies were never properly addressed 
until after the Crimean War. 
 
The  importance  of  the  military  to  the  government  at  this  time,  can  be 
understood by looking at total government spending.  Military expenditure in 
1804 was around £30m, rising to £42m in 1808 and £71m in 1813.  In the same 
periods,  total  government  expenditure  was  £40m,  £66m  and  £77m.
3    As  a 
percentage in these three years military spending accounted for 75%, 65% and 
92%  of  the  total  expenditure.    Government  borrowing  also  increased 
significantly over this period, both to run the country and to provide financial 
support  for  Britain’s  Allies.    Looking  at  these  figures  it  is  clear  that  the  war 
against France WAS the primary business of the British government through 
the period.  
 
Clode confusingly described the responsibilities of departments like this :  
 
The Treasury continued to be primarily responsible (1) for all estimates 
submitted to the Crown, and, (2) for all monies voted [by Parliament] to 
the  Crown;  but  in  framing  the  one,  and  in  disbursing  the  other,  the 
Ministers in charge of the Ordnance and the War Office [Secretary at 
                                            
3 Hall, British Strategy, pp. 15-16.  Hall is quoting from works by Siberling and Mitchell & Deane. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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War], each in degree, were responsible to Parliament for these financial 
services.
4 
 
This structure still confuses historians today, but can be explained as follows.  
Ultimate control for all military expenditure rested with the Treasury.  Day-to-day 
responsibility for the financial management of the army was under the Secretary 
at War; the Ordnance Department was under the Master-General and the Navy 
was  under  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.    All  had  direct  Parliamentary 
responsibility for their roles but ultimately could not undertake any new activity 
which increased their budget without the approval of the Treasury.  The above 
control  also  encompassed  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  no  financial 
authority in his own right and had to submit all finance requests through the 
Secretary at War.  
 
The  major  military  responsibilities  of  the  various  cabinet  ministers  will  be 
outlined below and in the following section the roles of other senior, non-cabinet  
officers will be described. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer – The Treasury 
Whist  command  of  the  army  rested  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  true 
power was held by Parliament who tightly controlled both the purse strings and 
the movement of troops.  Wars were hugely expensive undertakings and this in 
part explains the desire to reduce the size of the army as quickly as possible 
following any conflict.  Within the Treasury, the most important functions, from a 
military perspective were  : 
Paymaster General 
The Paymaster-General was responsible for payment of the troops.  This was, 
until 1783, probably the most profitable of all the sinecures available in Britain.  
Up  to  that  point  the  Paymaster-General  withdrew  the  sums  approved  by 
Parliament to pay the army and held these huge sums in separate accounts 
where he obtained the benefit.  As part of Burke’s reforms, this practice was 
                                            
4 C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (2 vols, London, 1869), vol. 2, p. 187. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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stopped and the Paymaster-General could only withdraw sums from the Bank 
of England against warrants for specific payments.   
 
The  Paymaster-General  worked  through  each  regimental  agent  who 
communicated  directly  with  the  regimental  paymasters.    The  regimental 
paymaster  was  appointed  by  the  regimental  colonel  up  to  1797  and  again 
gained much income through his management of the money.  From 1797, the 
situation  became  more  complex  with  the  Regimental  Paymaster  having  joint 
and  conflicting  responsibilities;  military  responsibility  to  his  colonel,  and  civil 
responsibility to the Secretary at War. 
Commissary General  
The Commissary-General was responsible for the transport and supply for the 
army whilst on campaign and for the issue of government funds abroad.  These 
were civilian employees of the Treasury who handled all business abroad under 
instructions from the Treasury
5 and were fully independent of military control.  
The commissaries had the unenviable task of standing between the demands of 
the army who wanted the materials to wage a war and the demands of the 
Treasury who wanted both thrift and full records of every transaction. 
 
Even  when  they  were  following  the  regulations,  they  attracted  the  anger  of 
military officers and certainly in the early campaigns in the Peninsula there were 
several who did not know their job and attracted complaints from Wellington.  
Christopher  Hall  quotes  Wellington  complaining  that  ‘the  men  in  the 
commissariat were incapable of managing a counting house’.
6  Wellington wrote 
home many times on matters concerning the commissariat including reporting 
one individual who had previously being dismissed the service for theft,
7 and on 
another occasion asking for an individual to be removed.
8  Wellington was not 
always negative.  On a further occasion, Wellington wrote to the Commissary-
General recommending a Mr Ogilvie for promotion because of his ‘abilities and 
                                            
5 Clode. Military Forces of the Crown, vol. 2,  p.193. 
6 Hall, British Strategy, p. 34. 
7 WD, To Col. Gordon, 17 Apr 1810. 
8 WD, To Col. Gordon, 18
 Apr 1811. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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services’.
9    The  commissariat  were  in  a  very  difficult  position.    Because 
Wellington was campaigning on ‘friendly’ territory he had to abide by the rules in 
terms of paying for his supplies.  This meant that Wellington could only move 
when he had sufficient supplies for his army or money to pay for them.  When 
supplies failed, such as during the Talavera and Vitoria campaigns, then his 
whole strategy was thrown into chaos. 
 
The scale of the work of the commissariat should not be underestimated.  The 
average  daily  consumption  in  Wellington’s  army  in  1813  was  100,000  lb  of 
biscuit; 200,000 lb of forage corn and 300 cattle.
10  Obviously the cattle could 
move themselves but this set the pace of the army.  If you pushed the animals 
too hard, they had insufficient time to feed and consequently they lost weight.  
This then led to needing more animals to feed the army.  The typical capacity of 
a peninsular cart was 500 pounds, which meant that six hundred carts were 
needed  to  carry  the  one  hundred  and  thirty  tons,  which  made  up  one  days 
supply.  Much of the actual delivery was by mule and the numbers present with 
the army ran to several thousand.  Whilst the inland waterways could be used 
to move supplies in bulk, eventually they had to be loaded on carts and mules 
for  final  delivery.    The  commissariat  was  responsible  for  all  this  as  well  as 
making sure stores were in the right places and in the right quantities. 
Storekeeper-General.  
This  position  was  established  in  1807  to  bring  under  government  control,  a 
private enterprise which was managing storage depots on behalf of the army.  
This had been run (quite successfully according to Forbes, but not everyone 
agreed) since 1794 by Messrs Trotter & Co. and peaked at one hundred and 
nine  stores  around  the  world.
11    Its  purpose  was  to  ‘be  Storekeeper  of  all 
military  stores  in  the  departments  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  the 
Commissary-General    …  and  of  all  such  stores  as  had  been  theretofore 
                                            
9 WD, To Earl of Liverpool, 13 Sep 1810. 
10 Hall, British Strategy , p. 34. 
11 A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (3 Volumes, London, 1929),  p. 171.  
Conversely, J.S. Watson in  The Reign of George III, Oxford History of England (Oxford, 1960), 
pp. 418-419 describes complaints in the House of Lords about Trotter withdrawing large sums 
of money from the Bank of England, ‘mingling’ government monies with his own and Dundas 
not addressing the issue. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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provided  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  at  War’.
12    The  Storekeeper-
General’s  responsibilities  were  restricted  to  services  in  Britain.    Abroad,  the 
Commissary-General  was  responsible  for  distribution  of  stores  and  money, 
although from 1812 staff from the Storekeeper-General’s department were sent 
abroad to operate the stores on campaign.  These stores were in addition to 
those managed by the Ordnance department which held and dispensed warlike 
materials (guns and ammunition) to the army and navy. 
Comptrollers of Army Accounts. 
These were employed by the Treasury to audit army expenditure through the 
Paymaster-General  and  Commissary-Generals  offices.    All  extraordinary 
expenditure  (sums  not  approved  by  Parliament)  had  to  be  reviewed  by  the 
Comptrollers.  A special Auditor-General was appointed for the first time during 
the Peninsular War to go out to the Peninsula and undertake local audits on 
behalf of the Treasury. 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. 
Clode described three key components of the responsibilities of the Secretary 
of State for War and the Colonies : 
−  the number of the military forces to be maintained; 
−  the appointment of officers duly qualified; 
−  the employment of the army.
13 
 
It was the Secretary of State for War who gave orders to generals on campaign 
and corresponded with them.  He was responsible for proposing the size of 
standing army and the movement of troops abroad.  The Secretary of State for 
War was also responsible for all the British colonies.   
Foreign Secretary 
Whilst the Foreign Secretary had no specific responsibilities within the military, 
he  had  a  great  interest  in  when  and  where  armies  were  employed.  The 
                                            
12 Clode, Military Forces, vol. 2, p. 212. 
13 Clode, Military Forces, vol.2, p. 316. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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employment  of  armed  forces  abroad  should  have  always  been  for  some 
strategic purpose and it was the Foreign Secretary through his ambassadors 
who collected information on the intentions of the other European powers.  With 
this information he could suggest where Britain’s military forces should be used 
and consider how this could be co-ordinated with its Allies. 
Home Secretary 
The Home Secretary was responsible for the defence of the United Kingdom 
and all military personnel present in the country.  This included approving all 
movement  of  troops  on  British  soil.    Requests  for  troop  movements  in  the 
United Kingdom were made by the Home Secretary to the Secretary at War 
who issued the appropriate ‘route’.  Without this route, troops were forbidden to 
move. 
 
Apart from the regular forces he was also responsible for raising and control of 
the extensive militia and volunteer forces.  During the height of the invasion 
scare in 1804-1805, the Home Secretary presided over the raising of a huge 
volunteer force which peaked at 360,000 in 1803-4 but as the invasion threat 
receded, it dropped substantially, to less than 70,000 by 1812.  Over the same 
period, the militia forces which had peaked at 85,000, dropped to 71,000.
14  At 
times during the Napoleonic Wars, the Home Secretary commanded a paper 
force larger than the army and navy combined. 
 
The other major impact that the Home Secretary had on military strategy was 
his concern for internal order in the country.  This was maintained by having 
small bodies of troops dispersed at all centres of population.   Concentration of 
these troops for military purposes (for example, training), or for use abroad was 
never  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Home  Secretary  who  had  to  deal  with  the 
incoming complaints of disorder from local authorities. 
                                            
14 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, p. 294. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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Master-General of the Ordnance 
Theoretically, the Master-General was the military advisor to the cabinet.  The 
constitutional  safeguards  that  excluded  the  Commander-in-Chief  from  the 
government left the cabinet bereft of professional military advice from within 
their numbers.  The different governments through the period rarely asked for 
military advice from the Commander-in-Chief, the Master-General or the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, often presenting their decisions as a ‘fait accompli’.  This 
situation changed as the Napoleonic Wars continued, with particularly Canning 
and Liverpool showing greater willingness to consult and seek advice. 
 
The Master-General was responsible for the supply and issue of all arms and 
ammunition  on  both  land  and  sea.    This  included  small  arms,  artillery  and 
gunpowder.      He  was  also  responsible  for  construction,  maintenance  and 
supplies in fortifications both at home and abroad.  He commanded both the 
Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers which were not part of the army and 
therefore not under the control of the Commander in Chief.  Further details of 
the role and responsibilities of the Master-General will follow below. 
First Lord of the Admiralty 
Whilst the army was viewed with suspicion by the government, the navy was 
seen as the right and proper tool to project British power abroad.  However, the 
Royal Navy did not win wars, no more than air superiority can today.  There is 
no doubt that Wellington succeeded in the Peninsula partly through the British 
naval superiority which kept French forces restricted to the land and through the 
effective supply of material to his army. 
 
Apart from the well understood responsibilities for building, and operating the 
ships and men of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty had other responsibilities.  The 
movement  of  troops  and  materials  involved  the  Royal  Navy  in  two  separate 
activities; the arrangement of naval protection for convoys and the hiring and 
equipping  of  civilian  ships  to  transport  troops.    The  Admiralty  was  also Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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responsible for the movement and the care of all Prisoners of War, and the care 
of sick and wounded seamen.
15  
 
Like the Commissariat, the scale of these duties should not be underestimated.  
Often  with  little  warning,  they  were  required  to  gather  a  large  number  of 
privately  owned  vessels  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  government.    These 
vessels  were  generally  quite  small  and  consequently  large  numbers  were 
required.  For example, the 1807 expedition against the Danish fleet required 
three  hundred  and  seventy-seven  transports,  and  the  Walcheren  campaign 
needed about five hundred.  Trials were made using the larger ships of the line 
to move troops, but the navy simply did not have such vessels to spare. 
2.3.  Military responsibilities outside of the Cabinet 
Secretary at War.   
Kenneth Bourne’s recent work on Palmerston includes the following description 
of the role of Secretary at War : 
 
The  office  of  Secretary  at  War  is  not  merely  difficult,  it  is  almost 
impossible to describe.  It was not responsible for military policy; that 
was the business of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.  It 
was not in charge of personnel and discipline; they were the sphere of 
the  Commander  in  Chief.    It  did  not  control  the  supply  of  arms  and 
equipment;  these  were  the  functions  of  the  Ordnance  and  the 
Commissary-General.  It did not even pay the army; that was the job of 
the Paymaster-General.  But it was concerned primarily with finance and  
with acting as a sort of constitutional buffer between the army and the 
public, and the complex nature of these responsibilities, together with the 
curiously complicated structure of Army organisation, deeply involved the 
War Office one way or another in virtually all aspects of military policy 
and  administration,  and  its  interference  and  authority  therefore 
overlapped  in  widely  varying  degrees  with  responsibilities  that 
supposedly were centred elsewhere.
16 
 
The Secretary at War was responsible for obtaining Parliamentary approval for 
the funding for army; for day-to-day management of military expenditure and for 
the  setting  of  pay  scales.    He,  and  not  the  Commander-in-Chief  authorised 
                                            
15 Morriss, Royal Dockyards, p. 8.   
16 K. Bourne,  Palmerston ,the Early Years 1784-1841 (London, 1982), pp. 90-91. Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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troop movements at home, ostensibly as part of the controls on the army.
17  The 
request for the movements originated from the Home Secretary to whom the 
Commander-in-Chief had to make his request. 
 
The role of the Secretary at War was much more than a keeper of the purse 
strings.  In 1809 there started a protracted dispute between Sir David Dundas, 
the Commander-in-Chief and Palmerston, the Secretary at War.  The issue was 
whether  the  Secretary  at  War  was  subordinate  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.   
The output of this debate is covered at length in Clode.
18  There are different 
views today on the importance of this debate, particularly as it happened at the 
height  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  when  the  senior  officers  of  the  government 
should have been concentrating on more important issues.  But, there was an 
important  constitutional  question  being  considered.    This  question  revolved 
around who controlled the army.  The Secretary at War was directly responsible 
to  Parliament  and  controlled  the  finances  of  the  army.    If  this  position  was 
subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, then the army would gain some control 
over  its  spending.    This  was  the  big  constitutional  question  of  whether 
Parliament controlled the army or vice-versa.  On a number of occasions during 
the  18
th  century  there  had  been  no  Commander-in-Chief,  and  on  these 
occasions  the  Secretary  at  War  took  full  control  of  both  civil  and  military 
decision making.  The outcome of the debate was sensibly to conclude that the 
Secretary at War was independent of the Commander-in-Chief and owed his 
allegiance  to  Parliament.    It  also  agreed  that  the  Secretary  at  War  should 
consult with the Commander-in-Chief on planned changes which would have an 
effect on the army, and where there was disagreement these would be brought 
to the cabinet for their consideration.  Clode described the reality of the situation 
which existed between the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief when 
he wrote ‘no minister doing his duty faithfully to the civil community, was so 
certain to be unpopular with the army as the Secretary at War.  How could it be 
otherwise?’
19 
 
                                            
17 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 35-36. 
18 Clode, Military Forces, vol. 2, pp. 687-723. 
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The  Secretary  at  War  ran  the  War  Office  which  was  one  of  the  largest 
government departments at that time.  The War office was perceived to be very 
inefficient  with  several  well  known  people,  including  Lord  Liverpool,  Colonel 
Gordon (Military Secretary to the Duke of York) and Wellington criticising its 
efficiency.
20  One has to question the efficiency of a department, which worked 
a five hour day at the start of the 19
th century!   
Commander in Chief of the Army. 
The Commander-in-Chief reported directly to the King and was responsible for 
the internal discipline and training of the army.  This was managed through the 
Horse Guards who supported the Commander-in-Chief in the execution of his 
duties.  The Commander-in-Chief had no involvement in military strategy or the 
setting  of  objectives,  his  role  was  purely  administrative.    His  only  influence 
came from his control of the armed forces and his ability to say what troops 
were, or were not available for any particular service.  However, some ministers  
during  the  period,  Pitt  particularly,  wanted  to  get  involved  in  the  detail  and 
micromanage all aspects of the military.  In Pitt’s defence, during the period of 
the invasion scare, the defence of Britain was the most important item on his 
agenda.  
 
Under the Commander-in-Chief was the Board of General Officers. This group 
was  formed  by  Royal  Warrant  in  1707  to  provide  some  sort  of  independent 
control on the actions of regimental colonels when clothing and equipping their 
regiments.
21  Any profit made from the difference between the actual cost and 
the funds provided by the government went to the Colonel and there had been 
a  number  of  instances  of  the  troops  suffering  for  the  financial  gain  of  their 
colonel. 
 
The Commander-in Chief was assisted by three senior officers : 
 
                                            
20 Muir&Esdaile, Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government (Southampton, 1996), p. 7. 
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−  Adjutant-General who was responsible for discipline, leave, dress and 
recruitment; 
−  Quarter-Master-General  who  was  responsible  for  planning 
accommodation, routes and orders of march (which had to be ordered by 
the Secretary at War); 
−  Military Secretary who was responsible for general correspondence with 
the Government, appointments and promotions.
22 
2.4.  The Board of Ordnance  
The  Ordnance  Department  was  originally  established  in  1597,  under  its  first 
Master-General, Robert, Second Earl of Essex.
23  Its responsibility covered the 
provision  of  armament  for  both  army  and  navy  and  also  the  construction, 
maintenance  and  operation  of  the  country’s  defensive  works.    In  1683,  the 
Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were formed in the military branch of 
the Board of Ordnance.  The importance of the Board of Ordnance is seen in 
the fact that, until 1828, the Master-General of the Ordnance had a seat on the 
Cabinet.
24 
 
The Board of Ordnance was made up of two distinct branches, Military and 
Civil.   The structure of the Board in 1784 was five principal officers under the 
Master-General, three of whom needed to be present for the Board to sit : 
−  Lieutenant-General who was responsible for the military branch including 
the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers; 
−  Surveyor-General who was responsible for the Civil functions, and was 
responsible for checking the quality and quantity of all stores received; 
−  Clerk  of  the  Ordnance  who  was  effectively  the  Accountant  of  the 
Ordnance, responsible for drawing up the annual estimate for Parliament 
and the monthly returns to the treasury; 
−  Principal Storekeeper who was responsible for the articles received into 
and issued from the stores.  The stores at outposts and garrisons were 
his responsible through local Storekeepers.  
                                            
22 Muir & Esdaile, Strategic Planning, p. 3. 
23 N. Skentelbery,  A History of the Ordnance Board (Woolwich, 1967), p. 12. 
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−  Clerk of the Deliveries who managed the actual issue of stores providing 
warrants to the Storekeepers and arranging delivery of the items.
25  
 
The responsibilities of the Military Branch included : 
−  The issue of all arms and ammunition (land and sea); 
−  Permanent stores at home and in the colonies; 
−  Construction and maintenance of fortifications at home and abroad; 
−  Royal Artillery under the Deputy Adjutant General of the Artillery; 
−  Royal Engineers under the Inspector General of Fortifications; 
−  Royal Military Artificers (Royal Sappers and Miners from 1812); 
−  Royal Corps of Artillery Drivers; 
−  Royal Military Academy. 
 
In  the  opening  sentence  of  Richard  Glover’s  book,
26  he  criticises  Oman  for 
being “betrayed into historical misjudgement” over a reference which suggests 
that  Oman  was  unaware  the  Royal  Engineers  were  part  of  the  Board  of 
Ordnance rather than the army.  Based on this perceived error, Glover then 
seems  to  dismiss  Oman’s  work  whilst  praising  the  great  value  of  Sir  John 
Fortescue’s.
27    However,  it  does  illustrate  the  point  that  even  at  the  highest 
levels historians still find the structure of the British military machine difficult to 
understand and communicate to the reader.  This is probably most true when 
discussing the responsibilities and operations of the Board of Ordnance, which 
in  many  books  is  simply  ignored  and  combined  with  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of the Army. 
 
The Civil branch was managed by the Surveyor-General.  Its responsibilities 
included  ‘(1)  custodians  of  public  treasure  in  land,  buildings  and  stores  (2) 
supply the army and navy with warlike munitions and equipment’. 
28  The Civil 
Branch was made up of six departments : 
−  Stores 
                                            
25 Taken from 12th Report of the Commissioners of the Public Accounts of the Kingdom upon 
the Ordnance Office. Quoted in Clode, Military Forces , vol. 2,  pp. 671-673. 
26 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 14. 
27 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. vii. 
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−  Land 
−  Survey 
−  Defensive Works 
−  Contracts 
−  Manufacture (Factories including gunpowder) 
 
The Board of Ordnance’s role and contribution to the war effort should not be 
underestimated.  Through the period they supplied all the weapons to both the 
army and navy in a period of huge growth in demand.  Not only did the army’s 
size increase five fold, but the Militia and Volunteers forces made even greater 
demands for weapons.  In addition the Board of Ordnance was responsible for 
the maintenance and provision of all permanent fortresses both at home and 
abroad.      There  were  other  conflicting  demands,  such  as  the  East  India 
Company who competed for the limited resources of the gun makers, thereby 
driving  up  prices,  or  through  surpluses  like  the  inferior  East-India  pattern 
musket  that  was  handed  out  the  British  troops  in  Europe  when  it  was  not 
possible to obtain supplies of the preferred weapon.  Through the Napoleonic 
wars the Ordnance was called upon to supply weapons not only to the Spanish 
and Portuguese but also to other European Allies.  
 
The Board of Ordnance also proved itself to be many years ahead of the army 
in  recognising  the  need  to  have  trained  officers.    All  artillery  and  engineer 
officers were not commissioned until they had proved their knowledge through 
examination.  The Royal Military Academy was set up in 1741 for this purpose.  
In comparison, at this time an infantry officer was appointed without any training 
and was expected to learn his skills on the job.  Whether he actually learnt 
anything was left up to the diligence or otherwise of his regimental commander. 
 
Throughout the war, the officers employed at the Board of Ordnance worked to 
improve  the  quality  of  the  tools  which  the  armed  forces  had  to  use.    Often 
quoted are inventions such as Shrapnel shells or Congreve rockets, although 
one more important, but less well known improvement, was in the quality and 
consistency of gunpowder.  It would be wrong to suggest that everything at the Section 2.  Historical and Political Context.. 
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Board  of  Ordnance  was  good.    If  fact,  there  are  numerous  complaints  from 
many sources throughout the war about inefficiencies in the department.   
 
This is some part was probably due to the unusual role and responsibility of the 
Master-General of the Ordnance. The Master-General of the Ordnance was one 
of the great offices of state in the early 19
th century.  He controlled an enormous 
budget, and until Burke’s Reform Act in 1780 had complete authority over how 
the sum was spent.  As mentioned above, the Master-General was a member 
of the government with a permanent seat on the cabinet.  The role entailed both 
civil and military responsibilities, and in a number of cases was also held with 
other  responsibilities.    For  example,  Chatham  was  Master-General  when  he 
commanded  the  army  at  Walcheren  and  Lord  Cornwallis  was  both  Master-
General and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.  As a member of the government, the 
Master-General was a political appointment.  This meant appointments were 
not  always  based  on  suitability  for  the  job  and  the  Ordnance  departments 
efficiency  was  dependent  upon  the  individual  who  held  the  position.  Some 
Master-Generals such as Richmond were very effective and their leadership led 
to  improvements  but  others,  particularly  Chatham,  were  seen  as  lazy  and 
incompetent and left the organisation to fend for itself.  Unfortunately, Chatham 
was in control for most of the period from 1801 to 1810 and his contribution was 
not impressive.  As a serving senior officer in the army, Chatham still wanted to 
command  in  the  field,  and  this  ultimately  led  to  his  resignation  after  the 
disastrous  Walcheren  campaign.    His  replacement,  Mulgrave,  was  more 
effective and approved the major organisational changes that occurred in the 
Ordnance in the latter part of the Peninsular War.  These will be discussed in 
detail below. 
2.5.   SUMMARY. 
Britain’s growth as a commercial and martial nation had occurred in a relatively 
short space of time.  The organisational structure of monarchy, government and 
the military was confused and responsibilities were often unclear or overlapped.  
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The  British  military  had  grown  into  a  small  professional  army  that  hired  in 
expertise as and when required.  Funding of the military was always an issue in 
peacetime  and  this  made  it  difficult  to  retain  experience  and  competence  in 
readiness for the next war.  Much of its activity through the 18
th century was in 
non-European campaigns and the army and the ordnance reflected this in their 
structures and thinking. 
 
The early campaigns of the Napoleonic wars had not been successful for the 
British  army  and,  by  1807,  almost  every  other  country  in  Europe  had  been 
defeated or threatened into submission by Napoleon.  Britain was faced with a 
situation where they could not pay for someone else to fight the French and 
needed to find opportunities where they could make direct military incursions.  
Britain was incapable of fielding an army that was large enough to face the 
French.  The chaotic structure of the military organisation faced new challenges 
in funding and supplying the resources for a first European campaign on a scale 
never faced before by Britain. 
 
Recent  thinking  has  recognised  that  understanding  the  problems  faced  by 
Wellington in the Peninsula need to look much deeper than the purely martial 
aspects.    Winning  a  battle  was  about  getting  the  right  number  of  troops, 
properly  fed  and  equipped  to  a  battlefield.    The  key  components  of  this 
statement  were  delivery,  fed  and  equipped,  not  fighting.    Most  of  these 
components were out of the direct control of Wellington, relying on civilian and 
military staff from the Treasury, Royal Navy and Ordnance.  The success of 
Wellington was dependent on the education, training and competence of these 
people.   The role of the Ordnance department is not well understood and has 
faced much criticism.   The most visible sign was the weapons used by soldier, 
ship and fortress.  Operating with the army were the key specialist troops, the 
artillery and engineers.  The role of the Royal Artillery tends to be included in 
the descriptions of campaigns and battles due to the importance that artillery 
now  had  on  the  outcomes.    Less  well  understood  is  the  role  of  the  Royal 
Engineers.    This  thesis  will  investigate  their  activities  and  evaluate  their 
performance and contribution to the war effort. 
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SECTION 3.  THE RISE OF THE SCIENTIFIC SOLDIER 
3.1  Overview. 
The need for trained specialists had been recognised in the English army since 
the invention of gunpowder.  Artillery specialists had always been present in 
very small numbers, but there was no recognition that training was required for 
army officers prior to them receiving their first commissions.  The chapter on 
tactics in the first monthly part of the Royal Military Chronicle began with : ‘It is 
often mentioned … of foreigners who have travelled in England, as a subject of 
reasonable  astonishment,  that  we  are  totally  without  any  general  school  for 
military instruction’.
1  In contradiction to many of the most senior officers of the 
day the article goes on to argue against the ‘very shallow’ objections to the 
study  of  military  science  to  allow  an  infantry  officer  to  perform  his  role 
effectively.   
 
The  18
th  century  saw  the  formation  of  the  first  military  school  in  England  to 
specifically  address  military  education.    The  opening  of  the  Royal  Military 
Academy by the Board of Ordnance in 1741 recognised the need for consistent 
training for artillery and engineer specialists to meet the growing demand for 
officers.  This section will review the formation of the school and the progress in 
providing relevant training to Ordnance officers.  The primary focus will be on 
the Royal Engineers but it will also look at the development of the Royal Military 
Artificers,  who  were  the  rank  and  file  dedicated  to  providing  support  to  the 
engineer officers.  The need for scientific soldiers was also recognised in the 
army  but  not  for  another  fifty  years.    The  introduction  of  trained  military 
specialists in the army will also be touched on, as the performance of both is 
reviewed. 
 
Because  the  number  of  Royal  Engineer  officers  was  relatively  small,  it  is 
possible to take a detailed look at them as individuals and build a picture of the 
type  of  person  who  joined,  their  background  and  their  views  on  what  was 
                                            
1 Royal Military Chronicle, vol. 1, part, 1, Nov 1810, p. 40. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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happening around them.  Due to the education and training which emphasised 
accurate recording of information, their diaries and letters contain much unused 
material relevant to the wider conflict in the Peninsula.   
 
The  question  of  effective  provision  of  training  and  resources  to  the  Royal 
Engineers is an important one.  Their activities during the Peninsular War have 
been heavily criticised by many authors and it is time for a re-evaluation of their 
performance based on the availability of new primary material and a greater 
understanding of the logistical and political challenges which they faced.  The 
focus of this section will be on the education and professionalism of the military 
engineering service and will address the question of whether the education they 
received was appropriate for the demands.  Understanding of these areas is 
necessary to allow a full review of the operational performance which will be 
undertaken later. 
3.2.  Education, Training and the rise of the 
Scientific Soldier. 
This  section  will  review  the  education  and  training  of  Ordnance  officers  and 
compare  it  with  what  was  undertaken  in  the  army.  It  will  then  look  at  the 
development of engineering artificers to support the officers and finish with a 
review of the engineer officers view of their training and leadership prior to the 
Peninsular War.  The questions to be addressed in the section are : 
−  Was  the  training  the  Royal  Engineer  officers  received  appropriate  for 
their needs? 
−  Was the engineering support they received adequate? 
3.2.1.  THE ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS ROLE IN 
THE TRAINING OF OFFICERS 
The early years of the Royal Military Academy 
The Royal Military Academy was created in 1741 to satisfy the need for better 
trained  officers  for  the  Ordnance  Department.  This  was  primarily  to  furnish 
officers for the Royal Artillery.  At this time the Royal Engineers did not exist as Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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a  distinct  corps  although  the  Ordnance  Department  retained  some  officers 
trained as engineers.  Ordnance cadets had been in existence prior to 1741 and 
had  been  attached  directly  to  the  seven  artillery  companies.    Their  military 
education was dependent upon the skills, interest and presence of the officers 
in each company, as was the case in the army until well into the 19
th century.  
 
The Royal Warrant of 30 April 1741, stated ‘that it would conduce to the good of 
our service if an Academy … was instituted … for instructing the … people 
belonging to the Military branch of this office, …to qualify them for the service of 
the artillery, and the business of engineers’.
2  The rules and procedures which 
were drafted made it clear that the original intention was wider than the training 
of new cadets. The ‘Rules and Orders’, with the associated ‘Directions for the 
Teaching  of  Theory  and  Practice’,  made  it  clear  that  the  lectures  should  be 
attended  by  ‘Engineers,  Officers,  Sergeants,  Corporals  and  Cadets’  of  the 
Royal Artillery, and also all such … as have a capacity and inclination’. 
3  The 
word ‘inclination’ suggests that the various officers and soldiers mentioned had 
some  choice  in  their  attendance,  and  it  should  be  noted  that  there  was  no 
greater onus on the cadets attendance, than there was on the others. The Chief 
Master did, however, provide monthly lists of attendees and their performance 
to  the  Master-General.    According  to  Duncan,  the  practical  lessons  were 
attended by the cadets and all the officers and soldiers who were off duty, while 
the  theoretical  lessons  were  only  attended  by  those  above  the  rank  of 
Bombardier and soldiers who had shown special talent for capacity and study. 
4 
 
The  initial  budget  approved  was  £1,000.
5    Part  of  this  sum  paid  for  the 
appointment of two teaching staff and a secretary.  The Chief Master, Mr John 
Muller, was appointed on a salary of £200 per annum, and a second master, Mr 
Derham, on a salary on £100.
6  They were each to be employed three days a 
week, providing three hours teaching daily, based in the Warren at Woolwich.  
                                            
2 F. Guggisberg, The Shop, The Story of the Royal Military Academy (London, 1900), pp. 1-2. 
3 Guggisberg, The Shop, pp. 264-265. 
4 F. Duncan, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. (2 volumes, London, 1873). vol.1, p. 
108. 
5 W.D. Jones, Records of the Royal Military Academy (Woolwich, 1851), p. 4. 
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The Governor of the Academy was the Master-General himself, who delegated 
day-to-day command of the Academy to the Commanding Royal Engineer at 
Woolwich. 
 
In 1744, it was decided that the cadets would be withdrawn from the artillery 
companies  and  formed  into  ‘The  Company  of  Gentlemen  Cadets’.    This 
decision  appears  to  have  been  made  soon  after  the  Royal  Artillery  were 
inspected by the Duke of Cumberland and the cadets were an embarrassment 
to all present.   The Company had an original establishment of one Captain, 
three Lieutenants, a Drum-Major and forty cadets.
7  Apart from attending the 
Warren for lectures and parades the cadets were left to themselves, which did 
not appear to have done much for discipline or their studies.  In many cases 
these cadets were young children, possibly away from their home or some form 
of  control  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives.    The  cadets  links  to  the  artillery 
companies was not fully severed until 1764, and it was still possible that cadets 
could be called up for foreign service, as happened when they were sent to 
Flanders in 1747 and the East Indies in 1754.
8 
 
1764,  saw  the  appointment  of  the  Lieutenant-Governor,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pattison, with direct responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the Academy.  
The  staff  size  was  increased  to  six  and  attendance  at  the  Academy  was 
restricted to cadets only, with serving officers and non-commissioned officers 
being  stopped  from  attending  lectures.    This  was  seen  as  a  benefit  to  the 
cadets as the interest and behaviour of the others often set a bad example.  
Lieutenant-Colonel  Pattison  endured  strong  resistance  from  both  cadets  and 
masters  who  were  unused  to  organisation  and  discipline.
9    His  power  was 
further  enhanced  in  1772,  when  the  first  Inspector  of  the  Royal  Military 
Academy, Captain G. Smith, was appointed.  Through their efforts, the teaching 
standards and the behaviour of both cadets and masters improved.
10  Some 
level of consistency was also achieved through there being only two Lieutenant-
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Governors at the Royal Military Academy during the period of the Napoleonic 
wars.  Lieutenant-Colonel William Twiss R.E. was in charge from 1795 to 1809 
and Lieutenant-Colonel William Mudge R.A. commanded until 1820. 
Size of Academy 
Table 3a. Size of the Royal Military Academy. 
Year  Number of Cadets  Year  Number of 
Cadets 
1744  40  1810  200 (0 for EIC) 
1746  48  1816  188 
1782  60  1819  150 
1793  90  1820  100 
1798  100 (40 for EIC)  1828  60 
1803  180 (60 for EIC)  1831  90 
1806  248 (60 for EIC)  1839  100 
1807  259 (45 for EIC)
11     
 
In 1798, the number of cadets was increased to one hundred, although this was 
actually a decrease due to an agreement with the East India Company (EIC) 
that allowed forty of its engineer cadets to be trained.  To make up the numbers 
for  the  Ordnance  Department,  ‘extra  cadets’  were  placed  in  local  schools 
around Woolwich. These extra cadets had to pass the entrance examination, 
follow, the same education plan and were included on the muster roll for the 
Academy.
12 
 
In 1803, the size was increased again to one hundred and eighty, of which sixty 
were  for  the  East  India  Company.  One  hundred  of  these  were  at  Woolwich 
(sixty for the Ordnance and forty for the EIC) and eighty were placed at the new 
Royal Military College at Great Marlow (sixty for the Ordnance and twenty for 
the EIC).
13  The numbers at Great Marlow included the transfer of all the extra 
cadets from the local schools.  
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Cadets occupied a new building on Woolwich Common for first time in 1806.
14  
One  hundred  and  twenty-eight  cadets,  from  the  top  four  academies,  were 
housed there.  The two lower academies of sixty cadets were left in the old 
building  at  Woolwich  Arsenal.    A  further  sixty  cadets  were  in  the  Junior 
Department  of  the  Royal  Military  College  at  Great  Marlow.  Of  these  two 
hundred  and  forty-eight,  approximately  sixty  were  allocated  to  the  EIC.    A 
further fifteen to twenty supernumerary cadets were housed in local schools at 
their parents expense.  
 
In 1810, the East India Company opened its own college at Addiscombe, and 
started  withdrawing  their  cadets.    Once  more  space  was  created  by  their 
removal, the Ordnance cadets located at Great Marlow were moved back to 
Woolwich, the last returning in January 1811.
15  Appointment of  supernumerary 
cadets was stopped in 1814 as the effects of the peace started to have an 
impact on the opportunities for promotion.
16  As the vacancies dried up from 
1814  onwards,  cadets  had  to  wait  two  to  three  years  for  a  commission  to 
become available.
17 
Structure of the RMA 
In 1766 the cadets were divided into two academies
18 as the less able cadets 
were so far behind the most able.  This was directly related to the lack of an 
entrance examination, which in the worst cases led to cadets arriving who could 
not read or write.  The focus of the lower school was on basic education with no 
military  subjects  being  taught.    There  were  also  four  classes  within  each 
academy to reflect the different abilities of the cadets.  In 1782, a third academy 
was added to cater for the increase in the number of cadets,
19 and by 1806, 
there  were  six  academies.    The  first  and  second  were  taught  the  ‘more 
advanced parts of mathematics, military subjects and drawing’.
20  The third and 
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fourth learnt ‘mathematics, French and drawing’.
21  The lower academies were 
taught the same as would have been taught in ordinary schools of the time.  In 
1810 the syllabus of the third and fourth academies were extended to include 
the elements of fortification.  
General Admissions process  
From 1741 to 1774 all requests for entry to the Royal Military Academy were 
made  directly  to  the  Master-General.    It  was  only  on  nomination  from  the 
Master-General that cadets were admitted.  At this time there was no entrance 
examination.  When there were no vacancies, it was possible for students to 
study  at  Woolwich  at  their  own  expense.    These  students  were  called 
‘Gentleman  Attendants’  and  were  not  included  in  the  muster-roll.    The 
admission of Gentleman Attendants was abolished in 1797. 
 
The  newly  appointed  Lieutenant-Governor,  found  on  his  arrival  that  many 
cadets on the muster-roll were not present at the Academy.  On ordering them 
to  report,  he  found  the  youngest  was  not  yet  ten.    Special  permission  was 
granted for them to remain at home until they reached the age of twelve and 
further admission before the age of twelve was stopped.
22  Because of this, in 
1764 the minimum age of entry was set at twelve but no maximum age was set.  
There were cases of cadets joining in their twenties, but generally most were 
younger  than  seventeen.    In  1774,  following  strong  representation  from  the 
Lieutenant-Governor,  the  Master-General  approved  the  use  of  an  entrance 
examination based on the ‘The first four rules of arithmetic with a competent 
knowledge of the rule of three and the elements of Latin grammar’.
23   This was 
seen as essential to improve entry standards.  Too much time was being spent 
by the masters bringing the children up to a point where their military education 
could start. 
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In 1782 the minimum age of entry was raised to fourteen, although there was 
some flexibility in its application.
24  Admission into the Academy was granted to 
applicants  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and  sixteen,  after  they  passed  the 
examination  set  by  the  masters  of  the  lower  academies.    The  general 
requirements were ‘to be well grounded in arithmetic, including vulgar fractions, 
write a very good hand, and be perfectly the master of the English and Latin 
grammars’.  In 1813, the Lieutenant-Governor, Colonel Mudge, persuaded the 
Master-General to further tighten the entry qualifications for the admission of 
Gentleman Cadets
25 : 
 
No  candidate  can  be  admitted  under  14  or  over  16  years.  Must  be 
possessed  of  (at  14)  decimal  fractions,  duodecimals,  or  cross 
multiplication, Involution, Extraction of the square root, notation and the 
first  four  rules  of  Algebra,  Definitions  in  Plane  Geometry,  English 
Grammar  and  Parsing,  French  Grammar.  At  16  add,  remainder  of 
Algebra except cubic equations, the first two books of Euclid’s ‘Elements 
of  Geometry’  or  the  first  65  theorems  of  Dr  Hutton’s  course  of 
Mathematics, construing and parsing the French language. 
26 
 
It is likely that part of the reason for tightening up the entrance requirements 
was to reduce the time the cadets would take to complete their studies and 
therefore be able to turn out officers faster.  Although from 1799 three attempts 
were allowed to satisfy the entrance requirements, as vacancies became more 
scarce towards the end of the war, the number of attempts was reduced to one.  
These new regulations also introduced a probation period of one year, after 
which  cadets  were  removed  if  satisfactory  progress  was  not  made
27  ‘as  not 
being likely to qualify for commissions in the time allowed’.
28  This did lead to a 
marked improvement in the effort of the junior cadets.  
 
The length of study at the Academy varied from one month to the maximum of 
five years. The duration depended primarily on the prior education, intelligence 
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and  application  of  the  cadet,  but  also  on  the  demand  for  officers  by  the 
Ordnance.
29 
Fees  
In 1810, the entry charge into the Royal Military Academy was twenty guineas 
to pay for uniform, books and other items, plus an additional thirty shillings for 
the cadet’s warrant.  This amount was very close to the annual pay of a captain 
in the line at that time,
30 although this was considerably cheaper than the cost 
of buying a commission which was around £400 in a line regiment and £900 in 
the Guards.
31  
Teaching. 
From the start in 1741 when the Academy was formed with two masters , there 
was a steady growth in the number of staff and the subjects covered. The list 
below, indicates the growth as each new subject was introduced : 
 
1741  Mr John Muller – Chief Master;  Mr Derham – Assistant Master; 
Mr Talbot Fulchet – Secretary 
1743   Mr Crosbie – Model Maker; Mr Abel Cassel – French Master 
1744  Mr Gabriel – Drawing Master 
1759  Mr John Palladin – Fencing Master 
1764   Rev William Green – Master for Classics, writing and arithmetic 
1772   Mr F Warre – Dancing Master 
1788   Dr Allen Crawford – Lecturer on Chemistry.
32 
 
Many of the senior masters spent their whole life at the Royal Military Academy  
including Professor Barlow who taught mathematics for forty-one years, Doctor 
Bonnycastle  who  taught  fortification  for  thirty-nine  years  (his  son  joined  the 
Royal Engineers), Mr. Landmann who taught fortification for thirty-eight years 
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(his son joined the Royal Engineers) and Messrs. Green, Gregory and Hutton 
with about thirty-five years. 
33 
 
Up to 1797 the masters were allowed to take private pupils and also provide 
extra tuition to the cadets and Gentleman Attendants. Since masters decided 
when a cadet was eligible to be promoted from one academy to another, private 
tuition was a conflict of interest.  It was also customary for masters to receive 
‘presents’  from  the  parents  of  pupils.
34  F ollowing  the  appointment  of  the 
Inspector  in  1772,  the  movement  between  academies  was  through 
examinations  in  the  presence  of  the  Inspector,  rather  than  through  the 
recommendation of the masters.
35  In February 1799, a limit was placed on the 
number  of  attempts  by  cadets  for  academy  promotion.
36    After  three  failed 
attempts,  the  cadet  was  given  two  months  for  further  study.  Three  more 
attempts were allowed before the cadet would be recommended for removal 
from the Academy.   
 
Appendix  A  shows  the  examination  syllabus  of  1792.  The  masters  were 
required to give monthly reports on the progress of cadets.  The Inspector also 
prepared reports on the attendance of the Masters. 
Academy Environment. 
In the period immediately after the foundation of the Academy :  
 
the cadets were under no discipline worthy of the name; they wore no 
uniform, and were so outrageous in study.  That one of the occupations 
of  the  officer  on  duty  in  the  Warren  was  occasionally  to  visit  the 
Academy,  and  prevent  the  Masters  from  being  ill-used,  and  even 
pelted.
37 
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Duncan went on to say :  
  
The cadets, ingenuity in evading detection [of offences] was equalled by 
their talent in inventing new methods of annoyance. This talent was too 
often  aided  by  the  connivance  of  the  newly  commissioned  officers, 
whose sympathies were more with the law-breakers, they had left than 
the law-insisters they had joined.
38 
 
Discipline was a major problem through the whole period and there were many 
documented cases of bullying for the purpose of stopping the studious cadet 
from  embarrassing  his  less  industrious  peers.
39    Bullying  was  endemic  and 
maintaining discipline was a constant problem.  Many cadets were dismissed 
for their behaviour.  One of the likely causes of poor discipline and study was 
the complete lack of extra – curricular activities, which led the cadets to provide 
their  own.      The  wide  range  of  ages  of  the  cadets,  from  twelve  through  to 
twenty, also did not help.  Similarly, the presence of commissioned and non-
commissioned  officers  was  reported  as  a  major  source  of  difficulty  in 
maintaining discipline.
40 
 
The behaviour of the masters was often no better than the cadets.  From the 
early days of the Academy little control was exercised over their activities.  The 
introduction  of  the  Lieutenant-Governor  and  then  the  Inspector  brought 
restrictions that they resented and fought against.  Duncan cited one example 
of the friction which was present :  
 
the reply … is principally to correct two essential mistakes contained in 
the four lines which compose the letter.  You say that at my request you 
have subjoined your opinion on the mode of education in the Academy, 
and desire me to present it to the Master-General in your names … I 
signified to you the Master-General’s being not well pleased at the slow 
progress  made  by  the  Gentlemen  cadets  …  you  expressed  great 
discontent  at  the  printed  rules  you  are  prescribed  to  teach  by  …  I 
required, not requested you to represent them to me in writing, that I 
might … lay them before the Master-General; not meaning as you seem 
to conceive to be merely porter of them in your names.
41 
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The  attitude  to  study  was  seriously  affected  by  the  demand  for  cadets.  
Throughout the Napoleonic wars the demand far outstripped the supply.  This 
had two effects. Firstly there was pressure on the Academy to speed up the 
education  process,  which  led  to  pressure  to  reduce  the  examination 
requirements.  Secondly, the cadets knew the situation and on occasions had 
seen cadets commissioned without having to take the examinations.  It was 
possible  that  a  cadet  who  was  ejected  from  the  Academy  for  failing  the 
examinations,  or  for  bad  behaviour,  could  still  get  his  father  to  buy  him  a 
commission in the army, which would involve the cadet in much less effort.   
Examinations and Commissions 
Public exams were first introduced in 1764, were held annually and attended by 
senior officers of the Ordnance.  In 1768 these were replaced by private exams 
held in the presence of the Lieutenant-Governor, and from 1772 the Inspector 
was also present.  Public exams resumed in 1786.
42 
 
In  1791  the  Royal  Artillery  added  two  more  companies  and  had  thirty-five 
vacancies  to  fill.  The  Lieutenant-Governor  said  the  ‘backward  state’  of  the 
cadets meant he could not fill them.  Similarly, in 1792, the Lieutenant-Governor 
announced  that  thirty  commissions  would  be  available,  but  only  six  cadets 
passed the examinations.   Public examinations were again suspended in 1794 
following the outbreak of war :  
 
The Master-General is very desirous of filling up the vacant commissions 
…  the  Professors  and  Masters  will  take  measures  for  enabling  the 
cadets in the Upper Academy to make a quicker progress, by dispensing 
for the present with some of the less essential particulars, and by making 
some other changes suitable to the occasion … but when the demand 
for  officers  becomes  less  urgent,  the  more  regular  mode  of  teaching 
must be again adopted.
43 
 
At that time, the Gentlemen cadets had to be :  
 
examined and found to be qualified in Arithmetic and logarithms; Algebra 
as far as Quadratic equations; the first four books of Euclid; Mensuration 
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including trigonometry and heights and distances; practical geometry; the 
general principles of fortification the construction of the three systems of 
Vauban  the  definition  and  explanation  of  artillery  in  general  and  the 
construction of a piece of ordnance, illustrated by 24 drawings; they must 
also be able to read and translate French.
44 
 
The Napoleonic wars made great demands for the supply of officers that the 
Academy could not meet.  From 1794 to 1811, the public examination of cadets 
was  suspended  and  the  syllabus  of  the  ‘private’  examination  under  the 
stewardship of the Lieutenant-Governor varied as the demand rose and fell.  
This  had  a  significant  effect  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  training  that  the 
cadets received.  The cadets likewise recognised the high demand for officers 
and this affected their commitment to study.  The demand was so great that on 
occasions  exams  were  held  on  an  individual  basis  as  soon  as  a  cadet  felt 
himself competent.  In 1795, the inspector was asked to recommend without 
examination, those cadets from the upper and second academies ‘who may 
appear likely to prove useful at this moment as officers’.
45 :  
 
I am directed to inform you, … that the … service requires an immediate 
supply of officers from the Royal Military Academy; his lordship therefore 
desires  that  …you  will  recommend  to  him  for  promotion  such  of  the 
cadets  …  as  may  appear  likely  to  prove  useful  at  this  moment  as 
officers, selecting those only who have distinguished themselves by their 
general  conduct.  However  as  the  persons  you  are  now  required  to 
propose are wanted for immediate service, a certain degree of height 
and  manliness  will  be  indispensably  necessary,  and  you  are  not  to 
recommend any one … who has not attained the height of five foot four 
inches.
46 
 
‘Fifteen  cadets  from  the  upper  and  twenty  from  the  Second  Academy  were 
recommended for commissions’.
47  Later that year, on 14 July 1795, the Master-
General  made  it  clear  that  this  relaxation  was  a  one-off  and  that  in  future, 
cadets must meet the current regulations. 
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In June 1798, a change was made to the way commissions were awarded. 
Previously, all commissions were awarded into the Royal Artillery, with officers 
stating their preference to be transferred to the Royal Engineers :  
 
The Master-General … thinks it more advisable that a limited number of 
such cadets as may be found to have a turn for the profession should 
(after being duly qualified at the Academy) be sent to some station where 
they may improve themselves … by acting as Assistant-Engineers until 
vacancies occur for them in the Corps. 
48  
 
In 1802 the Master-General considered the re-introduction of public exams, but 
on the strong recommendation of the Inspector he decided against as : 
 
the war had so shortened the time spent there by most cadets, that they 
were  completely  ignorant  of  all  but  the  most  elementary  parts  of  the 
subjects in the course; consequently they could not fail to bring great 
discredit  on  the  teaching  at  the  Royal  Military  Academy  if  they  were 
allowed to present themselves at a public examination. 
49    
 
The Inspector at this time had been in post for ten years and must have been 
very familiar with the masters, the cadets and the state of the education at the 
Academy.  The  concern  expressed  about  ‘discredit’  to  the  Corps,  probably 
indicates  a  high  failure  rate  was  expected  in  the  public  examinations.    It 
provides an internal view on the state of the education of the cadets against the 
syllabus.    What  it  does  not  do,  is  allow  us  to  make  any  judgement  on  the 
suitability of the syllabus at that time.  We will come back to this point later 
when the views of the officers themselves, on their education is examined. 
 
The demand for officers remained high, and in 1803, ‘In consequence of a most 
serious want of officers for the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Master-General 
‘directs that the usual summer vacation shall not take place, but that a fortnight 
be  added  at  Christmas  this  year’.
50    By  the  end  of  the  year,  seventy-seven 
cadets had been commissioned (including seventeen into the EIC).  This was a 
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very large number in view of the fact that there were only one hundred and 
eighty cadets in the Academy at this time. 
51 
 
The custom was that cadets wishing to join the Royal Engineers would remain 
at the Academy for a further six months to improve their knowledge.  On 1 
March 1803, the Lieutenant-Governor proposed that candidates for the Royal 
Engineers ‘instead of remaining at the Academy an extra six months … were to 
be sent to the Royal Military Surveyors under the direction of Major Mudge, to 
be instructed in surveying’.
52  This had the dual benefit of getting the junior 
engineers some practical experience, while also providing a trained resource for 
the urgent task of mapping the southern shores of England against the risk of a 
French invasion. 
 
Public  examinations  resumed  in  1811,  but  the  problems  with  the  education 
were still not resolved.  The whole of the Upper Academy (twenty-nine cadets) 
was  examined  in  July  1812,  with  a  maximum  of  twenty-four  to  be 
commissioned.  All the cadets failed in mathematics and were ordered to re-sit.  
This was done on 9 September 1812, and the twenty-four were then equally 
split between the artillery and the engineers.
53 
 
Throughout the period of the Napoleonic wars there was a steady increase in 
the annual number of engineer commissions.  Prior to the French Revolution, 
the  number  had  usually  been  below  five.    There  were  a  number  of  years 
between 1793 and 1807 where the number grew up to twenty, with the average 
being  about  ten.    The  average  across  the  period  1808  to  1815  was  about 
twenty per year.  Appendix E, shows the commissions into the Royal Engineers 
over the period.  
 
The Royal Engineer officers who served in operational theatres throughout the 
Napoleonic  Wars  were  the  officers  who  passed  through  the  Royal  Military 
Academy during the period when public examinations were stopped and private 
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examination requirements were variable.  The most senior officer who served in 
the Peninsula, Richard Fletcher, was commissioned in 1790, at the start of this 
period.    The  other  senior  officers  who  served  in  the  Peninsula  were 
commissioned between 1793 and 1800, and all the Captains by 1804.
54 
 
There is no doubt that the Royal Military Academy was concerned about the 
level of education that was being given to the cadets. There is no doubt that 
demand outstripped supply throughout the period. But there is also no doubt  
that even the partial training of an Ordnance officer at the Academy was far in 
excess of anything that was given to a regular army officer at that time.  Until 
the Royal Military College started producing its first recruits after 1800, there 
was no other source of officers with some education and technical training.  The 
army’s response to education and the Ordnance officers view on their education 
will be discussed below. 
 
The next section will look at the other significant gap in the supply of specialist 
services to the army, trained artificers who could provide military engineering 
support to the Royal Engineer officers. 
3.2.2.  THE ROYAL MILITARY ARTIFICERS, AND THE 
SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING. 
The Royal Military Artificers 
One of the anomalies of the Corps of Royal Engineers on its formation was that 
it was an officer only organisation.  There were no lower ranks.  Manual labour 
and tradesmen were provided from the infantry regiments whilst on campaign 
and by local civilians for static establishments. 
 
The first steps to redress this omission were taken at the garrison in Gibraltar 
around 1770 when they could not find enough local tradesmen to work on the 
fortifications.  The Commanding Royal Engineer at that time was Lieutenant-
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Colonel  William  Green  and  he  suggested  to  the  Governor,  General  George 
Augustus  Elliot  (another  ex-engineer),  that  skilled  tradesmen  should  be 
transferred  from  the  garrison  regiments  at  Gibraltar  and  formed  into  a 
permanent body to carry out military engineering work.
55  
 
A Royal Warrant was issued on 6 March 1772, to raise a ‘Company of Soldier 
Artificers’ at Gibraltar.
56   The initial strength of the unit was sixty-eight rank and 
file with the local Royal Engineer officers providing command.  The intention 
was for the unit to serve only in Gibraltar.  It performed well through the siege of 
Gibraltar from 1779 to 1783 and on 30 June 1786, a second company was 
raised with the total strength of two hundred and seventy-five men. 
57 
 
As tensions grew in Europe, and the need to defend the shores of England 
became more apparent, a further six companies of one hundred and twenty-six 
men each, were raised on 10 October 1787, under the title of the ‘Corps of 
Royal Military Artificers’ (RMA).  They were to serve at Woolwich, Chatham, 
Portsmouth, Gosport, Plymouth and the Channel Islands.  Again each company 
was destined to serve only in the one location.  The Gibraltar companies were 
also amalgamated into the RMA.  A further four companies were added on 1 
August 1806 to serve at Dover, Cork, Nova Scotia and the West Indies. 
 
The intention behind the formation of the RMA was to provide skilled workmen 
at the main ordnance locations around Britain, Europe and eventually the globe.  
There was never an intention that these troops would be mobile and available 
to travel in significant numbers with an army.  The lack of their own officers 
meant  that  they  were  never  properly  managed  and  were  allowed  levels  of 
freedom which should never have been tolerated in any military organisation. 
Captain Charles William Pasley commented on the soldiers ‘going grey’ in the 
corps, while stagnating in the same location, for life.  He also commented on 
the effects of receiving volunteers from the line regiments, which allowed units 
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to get rid of their worst troops.
58  When Pasley took command of the Plymouth 
Company in 1811, not one of the RMA companies had been employed as a unit 
on active service.  In a letter to a fellow officer he wrote :  
 
The command of the Company here gives me a greater insight into the 
nature of our establishment  … There is no guard except of a Sunday at 
the Barrack gates, which breaks up at eleven o'clock … The … backward 
spirit amongst the Non Commissioned Officers is very great, and their 
ideas of subordination are exceedingly lax … I think these companies will 
not be worth much till they are changed every two or three years, and go 
upon actual service bodily, not by detachments.
59 
 
Pasley’s role in the advancement of the RMA will be described further below.  
Another famous engineer from that period, John Thomas Jones wrote :  
 
After  …  observing  how  very  much  the  want  of  Sappers  and  Miners 
prejudiced every siege operation in Spain, it will be learnt with surprise 
that,  …  England  paid,  fed,  clothed,  and  lodged  a  very  large  body  of 
engineer  troops,  …  These  …composed  chiefly  of  mechanics,  were 
considered as more intimately intended for permanent works; and the 
most  limited  number  were  reluctantly  spared  for  field  service,  it  being 
difficult to make it understood how mechanics could be required in any 
great number with an army 
60 
 
Although it had been known for some years that the Ordnance could not easily 
put  together  troops  for  active  operations,  the  start  of  the  Peninsular  War 
highlighted  this  serious  inadequacy  both  in  the  numbers  available  and  the 
quality of the soldiers training.  Through the early years of the war, the Corps 
struggled  and  the  sieges  of  1811  brought  home  the  fact  that  the  current 
situation could not continue. 
 
The problem had been recognised at home.  Steps were being taken, but they 
would not bring immediate changes.  One significant step was taken in May 
1811  when  the  size  of  the  RMA  was  increased  to  four  battalions  of  eight 
companies with a total strength of over 2,800 men.  At the same time it was 
decided  that  in  future  the  RMA  companies  would  be  rotated  around  the 
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locations and would move as a whole body rather than in small detachments.
61  
These changes were in place by the end of the year, but in parallel, actions 
were also being taken in the Peninsula. 
 
After the second attempt to take the fortress of Badajoz, in June 1811, in an 
effort  to  reduce  the  skills  shortage,  Wellington  had  asked  Burgoyne  to  start 
training two hundred volunteers from the Third Division.
62   On 29 July 1811, 
Jones noted that Lieutenant Wright was ordered to join Burgoyne at Castello 
Branco to assist him in training the men to sap
63 and by 16 August 1811, Jones 
recorded  that  ‘Captain  Burgoyne  was  complete  with  all  the  prerequisites  to 
enable him to teach his party to sap and they are now regularly instructed’.
64  
This clearly was a serious attempt by the army in Spain to enhance its limited 
resources.  Burgoyne noted in his diary on 15 August 1811, that he commenced 
that day instructing the men.  Lieutenants Emmett and Reid were ordered to 
join Burgoyne on 25 August 1811, to assist in the training, and on 5 September 
1811, Lieutenants Skelton and Elliot also joined him. 
65 
 
Captain George Ross R.E. was ordered to carry out a similar exercise in the 
First Division,
66 and Captain William Nicholas R.E. was instructing soldiers in 
Cadiz.
67    Burgoyne  in  a  letter  to  Pasley,  written  after  the  siege  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo in February 1812, mentioned this training and stated that although little 
progress was made, there was some benefit.
68  Pasley congratulated him on 
being the first person to train ‘Sappers in the British service that acted against 
the enemy’.
69  
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Pasley,  however,  was  not  completely  right  with  his  congratulations.    The 
deficiency was known to many of the engineers and Jones made reference in 
his diary in April 1811 to ‘an arrangement made for instructing the RMA and the 
younger officers in the manner of forming a sap’.
70  A group of RMA artificers 
had just arrived at Elvas, under the command of Captain Ross and since they 
had no previous training in operational activities, it was decided to start training 
them.
71    Over  the  following  days,  Jones’  diary  noted  the  General  Order, 
allocating  one  hundred  troops  from  the  ranks  who  had  artificer  skills,  being 
brigaded with the RMA and being trained in siege works.  The instructions they 
received included physically digging a sap to learn the requirements.  It was 
Ross  who  took  charge  of  the  troops  that  were  assigned,  the  training  being 
carried out in the vicinity of Olivenza.  Clearly, all this preparation was for the 
first siege of Badajoz, and occurred before the training referred to above by 
Burgoyne.
72  This method of training troops from the ranks was tried through the 
first and second sieges of Badajoz with very limited success.  Training troops 
from the line regiments at the point to need was not going to provide the skills 
and dedication that was required.  The training also required the continuous 
involvement of the engineers and the troops, both of which proved very difficult.  
Although Burgoyne was first asked to train troops in July 1811, the order was 
repeated  in  November  1811,
73  showing  how  difficult  it  was  to  provide  any 
consistent  form  of  training  due  to  interruptions  caused  by  operational 
movements.  Burgoyne’s diary through this period, makes almost no mention of 
the instruction of troops, but makes frequent mention of part or all of the Third 
Division being moved.  There is no mention of instruction between the first entry 
on  15  August  1811,  and  the  repeat  order  in  November  1811,  this  period  of 
course  being  when  Marmont  was  manoeuvring  in  front  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  
There is then no further mention in Burgoyne’s diary through to the end of the 
year.  However, Burgoyne in a letter dated 14 September 1811 noted that : 
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My principal business now is training 200 men of different regiments to 
the duties required in a siege, which, to our disgrace and misfortune, we 
have  no  regular  establishment  equal  to,  notwithstanding  the  repeated 
experience of the absolute necessity of such a corps to act under the 
engineers  in  a  campaign.  For  want  of  such  an  establishment  we  are 
frequently  led  to  the  loss  of  valuable  officers,  and  very  undeserved 
discredit.  The undertaking I am set about will only be temporary, and will 
supply very imperfectly this deficiency.
74 
 
Burgoyne was based at Albergaria from early August to mid September 1811.  
It is very unusual that Burgoyne did not mention the training in his diary if it was 
happening.  Some comment positive or negative would be expected.  Burgoyne 
does not mention the training in any of his letters before his long letter criticising 
the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, dated 12 February 1812.  This lack of comment 
suggests that little training was in fact carried out. 
 
John Squire writing to Pasley in March 1812 wrote :  
 
Every event in this country proves more and more the necessity of our 
having  an  establishment  of  Sappers  and  Miners  …  Lately  at  Ciudad 
Rodrigo we succeeded in taking the place more from its own weakness, 
than from any means we possessed of approaching nearer with success. 
I really should dread to attack a regular fortress :- we have no men fit for 
the operation, and if we attack Badajoz again, which is something like a 
regular place, depend upon it, that our loss in officers will be severe :- it 
must  be  so,  until  we  have  men  drilled  to  this  particular  service.  Your 
efforts at Plymouth do you the greatest credit … However persevere in 
the noble work you have begun, and it is probable that their eyes may be 
opened, and they may be convinced. 
75 
 
The noble work referred to by Squire, was Pasley’s proposal to form a school to 
train soldiers in military engineering, who could effectively support the Royal 
Engineer officers in the field. 
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The school of Military Engineering and the formation of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners 
The start of the 19
th century saw the emergence of a new breed of engineer 
who faced new challenges of a type that had never been faced before by British 
engineers.  These engineers cut their teeth in sieges in Egypt, Turkey, South 
America,  the  Low  Countries,  and  Holland.  They  had  seen  first  hand  the 
consequences  of  not  having  trained  specialists  to  help  with  the  attack  and 
defence of places and had started commenting on the need for the situation to 
be rectified.  Initially these comments were addressed to each other, but the 
more forward thinking and in some respects, braver officers started writing to 
their  superiors  making  suggestions  on  how  the  corps  could  be  made  more 
effective.  Their views did not always receive a good reception from some of the 
senior officers in the corps : ‘some of the old officers such as General Mercer; 
who objected that they could not see why this innovation should be introduced, 
since  they  themselves  experienced  no  difficulties  in  the  American  War‘.
76  
General Morse, the Inspector General of Fortifications ‘threw cold water on it 
[the proposals] from the first in all its stages’.
77   
 
The need to make changes became more public, primarily due to the actions of 
two people. The first was the Duke of Wellington who suffered through four 
sieges  in  1811  and  early  1812  and  wrote  home  on  a  number  of  occasions 
expressing his view that changes in the engineering service, which were not 
part of the army, were required.   On the 11 February 1812, Wellington wrote to 
Lord Liverpool :  
 
I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the 
Engineer  establishment  a  corps  of  Sappers  and  Miners.  It  is 
inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege 
for want of assistance of this description. … we are obliged to depend …  
upon  the  regiments  of  the  line;  and  although  the  men  are  brave  and 
willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many 
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casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is 
lost at the most critical period of the siege.
78 
 
Wellington’s letter after the third siege of Badajoz, in April 1812, made his views 
explicitly clear and could not be ignored any longer.  This letter, which was 
addressed privately to the Earl of Liverpool was lost for many years and was 
not  printed  in  Wellington’s  Despatches.  It  was  found  in  1889  amongst 
Liverpool’s papers : 
 
My  dispatches  of  this  date  will  convey  the  account  of  the  capture  of 
Badajoz,  which  affords  as  strong  an  instance  of  the  gallantry  of  our 
troops as has ever been displayed. But I anxiously hope I shall never 
again be the instrument of putting them to such a test as that to which 
they were put last night. I assure your lordship that it is quite impossible 
to expect to carry fortified places by vive force without incurring great 
loss and being exposed to the chance of failure, unless the army should 
be provided with a regular trained corps of sappers and miners. I never 
yet knew a head of a military establishment or of an army undertaking a 
siege without the aid of such a corps, excepting the British Army. … I 
earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of Sappers and 
Miners formed without loss of time. 
79 
 
Writing  the  day  after  Wellington,  John  Squire,  who  was  one  of  the  senior 
engineers at the siege, said nearly the same, ‘This siege has served to confirm 
an opinion, which I have long since entertained - that constituted as our Corps 
is - we are decidedly not equal to the attack of a place ... Sappers and Miners 
are as necessary to engineers during a siege, as soldiers to the General’.
80 
 
The second person working for changes was Charles William Pasley.  Pasley 
was a promising and intelligent young engineer officer who had seen service on 
a number of campaigns.  He also had very strong views on what was necessary 
to make the Royal Engineers more effective.  As a twenty-nine year old Captain 
serving during the Walcheren campaign, he felt so strongly that he wrote to 
Colonel  Fyers,  Deputy  Inspector  General  of  Fortifications,  on  12  May  1809, 
enclosing his ideas ‘on making the Corps more efficient’.
81  Tragically for his 
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operational career, but luckily for the service, he suffered a serious back injury 
on  14  August  1809,  at  the  Siege  of  Flushing.    After  a  lengthy  period  of 
convalescence,  Pasley  took  up  duty  again,  commanding  the  Royal  Military 
Artificer company at Plymouth in 1811.  Pasley then set his mind to the task of 
improving the training and effectiveness of this RMA company and over several 
months  made  huge  improvements.    He  believed  that  artificer  soldiers  were 
required to support engineer officers on operational duty and the RMA in its 
current state was not capable of providing this.  Pasley wrote bluntly and at 
length on his findings and proposed that a school should be set up to train 
soldiers who could be deployed with the army to assist in military engineering 
activities.  In August 1811, John Rowley, Secretary to the Inspector General of 
Fortifications wrote to Pasley :  
 
on the subject of training the R.M. Artificers to their duties in the field. … 
General Morse forwarded the letter you sent him, to the Master-General, 
with his recommendation … I … hope that his Lordship will think proper 
to call upon you to superintend and carry on the system of instruction 
you have so well pointed out.
82 
 
Not waiting for any official sanction for his activities, Pasley continued with what 
he believed was right, but kept his superiors informed of his actions :  
 
Since I last wrote to your lordship upon this subject, I have employed my 
spare time entirely in digesting a system of instruction for the use of the 
young officers of engineers and for the non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers of the department.  When complete, it will be, to the engineer 
department, what General Dundas’ book is to the army. And, though I 
have no model to follow, …  I have practically proved the efficacy of it by 
the  rapid  improvement  of  the  Royal  Military  Artificers  under  my 
command. … they now not only make no difficulty in marking out field 
works according to a plan, but are themselves capable of drawing plans 
and sections of any kind of work.  As it will be much more gratifying to 
my feelings to contribute … to the improvement of the department … 
than  to  lay  its  deficiencies  open  to  public  view,  I  have  determined  to 
proceed  no  further  with  the  second  part  of  my  essay  until  I  have 
completed the system of instruction in question 
83 
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Pasley’s  reference  above  to  the  ‘second  part  of  my  essay’  concerns  the 
publication  in  1810  of  his  Essay  on  Military  Policy.
84    This  was  very  well 
received in both military and political circles and ran to four editions over the 
next  three  years.    It  was  certainly  read  by  Wellington  and  Beresford.    His 
original plan was to publish a second part, describing what was wrong with the 
Ordnance Department and what needed to be done to correct it.  This would 
clearly have caused some anger within the Board of Ordnance.  His offer to 
concentrate on improving the Ordnance by working within their systems was as 
an olive branch to the senior officers he was criticising.  
 
Considering  that  Pasley  was  only  a  Captain  in  the  Royal  Engineers,  his 
correspondence verged on the insubordinate. Writing to Colonel-Commandant 
Mann, the Inspector General of Fortifications, in January 1812, :  
 
I enclose a memoir upon the state of the engineers department, which 
will fully explain the grounds upon which I consider it the most inefficient 
department in His Majesty’s Service … Not long after the retreat … of the 
British troops employed under Sir John Moore, in a campaign , in which 
the defects of the department had been fully proved …  Lord Chatham 
directed General Morse to give in a plan for forming an establishment of 
trained sappers and miners, with a view to render the Corps efficient in 
the Field … Major Lefebure had declined the command in Portugal when 
offered to him, on the avowed plea; that the engineer Establishment in 
the field was so imperfect, that the officers had nothing before them but a 
prospect of certain failure and disgrace in every operation of importance. 
… At Copenhagen and Flushing, the most mortifying blunders, confusion 
and delays took place owing to the inefficiency of the department … At 
Badajoz  …  some  of  our  most  promising  officers  of  the  Corps,  either 
suffered, or actually fell a sacrifice to the defects of the system. Captain 
Dickenson lost his life [at Badajoz], because he was obliged continually 
to  expose  himself  on  the  top  of  a  parapet,  showing  the  men  of  the 
working party how to place and picket down fascines … As a proof of this 
I have learned since I wrote you last [sic], that Lord Wellington has lately 
adopted  an  expedient  for  obviating  …  the  defective  state  of  the 
Establishment.  For  two  or  three  months  past,  a  certain  number  of 
soldiers … have been trained to sapping and other field duties of the 
engineer department.  If something of the same kind is not Established at 
home by authority of the Master-General from whom it will naturally be 
expected  that  all  improvements  of  the  engineer  department  should 
originate;  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  I  feel  thoroughly  persuaded  that  the 
Ordnance Department will soon sink into public contempt and that the 
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consequences  of  the  necessary  measures  just  stated,  to  which  Lord 
Wellington  has  been  forced  to  resort  for  the  safety  of  his  army,  may 
prove in the end highly injurious to the honour and interests of the Corps 
of  Royal  Engineers,  and  may  tend  to  set  aside  the  Royal  Military 
Artificers altogether as an [sic] useless and contemptible description of 
troops which I know that they are generally considered. 
85 
 
Although  the  tone  of  the  letter  was  very  strong,  his  views  were  obviously 
supported by some of the Ordnance hierarchy as his proposals for setting up a 
school were well received and were being seriously considered.  Two letters 
from John Rowley to Pasley show that events in early 1812 were moving fast :   
 
As  General  Mann  is  very  desirous  that  the  instruction  of  the  R.M. 
Artificers in the construction of field works, should be put in train, … he 
wishes to see you upon the subject as soon as convenient … General 
Mann wishes you would turn in your mind some outline … for him to lay 
before the Master-General, as to the best means of carrying the system 
into effect, with some idea if possible of the expense which would attend 
it upon any given scale. 
86 
 
I have made known to General Mann that you are ready for your order to 
come up to town. Your memorial [Request for promotion to brevet Major] 
has been forwarded to the Master-General with his recommendations.
87 
 
Pasley’s  ideas  were  also  being  aired  by  his  peers  who  were  serving  in  the 
Peninsula.    Richard  Fletcher  wrote  to  the  Inspector  General  of  Fortifications 
after  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  in  January  1812  ‘The  sappers  we  lately 
employed were taken from the Third Division, and had received such instruction 
as time and means afforded, under Captain Burgoyne.  They were certainly 
useful, but far from expert’.
88  This quotation is taken from Wrottesley’s work on 
Burgoyne.  In it, Wrottesley suggests that the common belief was that the first 
proposal for the formation of a trained body of sappers and miners came from 
Wellington  in  April  1812.    As  this  quote  predates  it,  this  cannot  be  true.    A 
review of the dates would show that Wellington’s letter of 7 April 1812, which 
was received in London on 23 April 1812, cannot have been the cause, since 
the Royal Warrant for the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners was also 
dated 23 April 1812.  Wellington’s letter may have been the final trigger, but it 
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was not the first proposal.   More concrete evidence can be found in a letter 
from  Rice  Jones  of  28  August  1811  where  he  records  ‘the  Royal  Military 
Artificers, called Royal Sappers and Miners very soon; and they are to be drilled 
in  the  construction  of  batteries,  trenches,  saps,  &c.’
89    Wrottesley’s  error  in 
giving full credit to Wellington for the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners 
is still common amongst some recent writers.
90 
 
Omitted from Wrottesley’s commentary, is the fact that Fletcher also submitted 
with this letter of 29 January 1812, mentioned above, a proposal for the creation 
of a corps of sappers and miners which was different from Pasley’s proposals.  
They were similar in a number of ways, but clearly developed independently.  
This leads to the question of whether Fletcher knew of Pasley’s proposal.  It 
also questions if there was any communication going on between Fletcher and 
Pasley,  as  it  seems  unusual  that  Fletcher  would  have  submitted  a  separate 
proposal  at  this  time  if  he  knew  of  and  agreed  with  Pasley’s  proposals.  
Fletcher’s main subordinates, Burgoyne, Squire and Jones certainly all knew of 
Pasley’s plans and it is inconceivable that Fletcher did not know. 
 
It  appears  that  Fletcher  was  proposing  a  quick  fix  solution  for  immediate 
implementation  by  cherry  picking  the  best  soldiers  from  the  Royal  Military 
Artificers  and  using  junior  Royal  Engineer  officers  to  command  them.    His 
proposal  made  no  reference  to  Pasley’s  plans  which  is  surprising  as  a  co-
ordinated effort was more likely to produce success.  Fletcher’s proposal would 
also appear to be a little optimistic in believing they could identify 800 suitable 
soldiers from the RMA.  At that time the total size was around 1,700 soldiers 
and only 900 were in England. 
 
Pasley’s continued correspondence with the Master-General eventually led to 
him  submitting  a  proposal  to  set  up  the  School  of  Military  Engineering.    A 
committee was formed, at the request of the Inspector General of Fortifications, 
to evaluate Pasley’s proposal and make recommendations.  The committee of 
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three  senior  engineers,  headed  by  John  Rowley  with  Alexander  Bryce  and 
George Bridges, reported on 14 March 1812 and recommended that Pasley’s 
proposals  be  put  into  action.
91    The  Inspector  General  approved  the 
Committee’s recommendation and Pasley was asked to take command of the 
new School of Military Engineering.  Unfortunately at this point the plans came 
to  a  halt  due  to  a  stand-off  between  Pasley  and  the  Master-General  over 
promotion.  Pasley believed he was entitled to a brevet rank of Major and would 
not  accept  the  position  until  it  was  granted.    The  Master-General  would  not 
agree to the promotion.
92  On 23 April 1812 the Royal Warrant was issued by 
the Prince Regent authorising the establishment of the school under Pasley.
93  
The Warrant was signed on the same day that Wellington’s despatch of 7 April 
1812 was received in London.
94  In the National Archives there is a letter from 
the Master-General, dated 8 April 1812, which seeks legal opinion on whether 
changing the name of the Royal Military Artificers would require all the soldiers 
to be attested again and whether new soldiers would be bound by the Articles 
of War and the Mutiny Act.
95  This shows that the Master-General was taking 
steps to progress the formation of the school regardless of the stand-off with 
Pasley. 
 
The RMA was reformed on 4 August 1812 under the title of the ‘Royal Military 
Artificers or Sappers and Miners’. This was shortened to the ‘Royal Sappers 
and Miners’ the following year.
96  The initial strength remained at around 2,800 
men.
97  The first soldiers from Pasley’s school were in the Peninsula before the 
end of 1812.  Though there were still complaints about their skills, they were a 
major improvement on the performance of the RMA.  Apart from training more 
suited to operational activities, they now came with their own subaltern officers, 
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which removed the problem which ruined the RMA of having no constant and 
consistent leadership. 
 
Another consequence of the formation of the school, which appears to have 
been overlooked by all writers on the subject, was that from 1812, all newly 
commissioned Royal Engineer officers were sent to the school to instruct and 
be instructed on practical field works.  The Corps monthly returns state clearly 
that officers were being sent to Chatham for this purpose.
98  Writing to his sister 
in May 1812, Pasley’s view is clearly explained ‘you know I have long had a 
plan in view of training the young officers and all the N.C. Officers and soldiers 
to  their  field  duties’.
99    He  uses  almost  identical  words  in  a  letter  to  John 
Burgoyne in March 1812.
100  Also, in a minute from the meeting of the Board of 
Ordnance dated 11 May 1812, reference is made to ‘the System of Instruction 
in the Field Duties intended for the junior officers of engineers and the Corps of 
Military Artificers Sappers and Miners’.
101  Pasley’s Memoir on the formation of 
the Royal Sappers and Miners states that the key role of the engineer officers 
was the instruction of the soldiers but goes on to say :  
 
When the officers of engineers are not occupied in military or field duties, 
they have a course of study laid down for them, calculated to improve 
them  in  the  science  of  attack,  upon  which  the  art  of  fortification  is 
founded. They are required to present memoirs relative to the various 
operations of a siege, stating the number of men, materials and tools, 
and the distribution of them.
102  
 
The junior officers typically spent a further four to six months gaining experience 
of the practical aspects of their profession and also gained valuable insight into 
the  command  of  the  first  sappers  and  miners  who  were  to  be  sent  to  the 
Peninsula.  In many cases, these junior officers would travel to the Peninsula in 
command of the soldiers they had trained with.  Pasley also used any other 
officers  who  were  available  to  come  and  teach  the  new  recruits.    A  greater 
testament to the newly formed establishment was given by Lieutenant-Colonel 
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Samuel Dickens, who wrote to Pasley requesting permission to spend a couple 
of  months  at  the  school,  ‘to  take  a  little  instruction’  before  going  out  to  the 
Peninsula.
103 
 
Pasley was keen to remove the previous experiences of poor discipline through 
attaching engineer officers permanently to each company of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners.  Whilst he acknowledged that many engineer officers were averse 
to  any  form  of  regimental  duties,  which  they  saw  as  ‘drudgery’,  he  saw  the 
introduction of the newly commissioned junior engineers immediately into the 
regimental role at Chatham as a way of reducing this view.  Pasley also put 
forward the notion that there should be one title, ‘Royal Engineers’ for both the 
officers and the soldiers.  He saw the two separate titles as causing a lack of 
concern in the engineer officers about the actions of the artificers as they took 
no pride or responsibility for their actions and reputation.
104 
3.2.3.  THE ARMY’S RESPONSE - THE ROYAL STAFF 
CORPS & THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. 
Royal Staff Corps 
The  Royal  Staff  Corps  was  formed  in  1798  by  the  Duke  of  York  partly  in 
reaction  to  the  Board  of  Ordnance’s  inability  (or  unwillingness)  to  provide 
sufficient engineers and artificers for the campaign in Holland in 1795.  The 
Duke of York had asked for engineers and heavy ordnance to be supplied to 
support the planned campaign and was told that the Ordnance could supply 
neither the officers or artillery in the quantities he required.  The Duke of York 
decided that he did not want to have to rely on the Board of Ordnance in the 
future and encouraged the Horse Guards to provide their own specialist troops 
who would be attached to the Quarter-Master-General’s department. 
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Unlike the Royal Engineers, the Horse Guards recognised that the Royal Staff 
Corps  required  both  officers  and  soldiers  to  provide  a  complete  military 
engineering service.  The life of this corps is not well documented.  From the 
General Order of 1 February 1804, it would appear that the ranks were initially 
filled by volunteers from the army.  The General Order asked for men who had 
served regular apprenticeships as carpenters, wheelers, sawyers, shipwrights, 
boat  builders,  masons,  bricklayers  or  miners.    It  also  indicated  that  the 
applicants would be tested in their trade before being accepted.
105  There is no 
evidence of a separate arrangement for training of the officers.  The Royal Staff 
Corps  received  some  officers  from  the  Royal  Military  College  and  they  also 
received  some  officers  who  transferred  from  the  Royal  Engineers.
106    The 
original establishment was only one company, but this was rapidly increased to 
five  in  1800  and  then  to  a  battalion  (10  companies)  in  1809,  giving  a  total 
strength of not much more than five hundred officers and men.
107 
 
On paper there was a distinction between the roles of the Royal Staff Corps and 
the Royal Engineers.  The Royal Staff Corps were responsible for acting as 
guides, surveying terrain and undertaking temporary works such as field works 
and  flying  bridges,  while  the  Royal  Engineers  were  responsible  for  more 
permanent fixtures like besieging and defending fortresses, and major building 
work.    In  practice,  there  was  less  distinction.    Wellington  appeared  to  use 
whatever group was available when he needed them.  The commander of the 
Royal Staff Corps in the Peninsula, Lieutenant-Colonel Sturgeon, is mentioned 
many times in Wellington’s Despatches and made a particular name for himself 
with some innovative bridges, including the repair of the bridge at Alcantara and 
the design of the bridge over the river Adour.  He died in 1814 at Vic Bigarre, it 
has been suggested, getting himself deliberately killed for incurring Wellington’s 
wrath for failures in his command of the postal service. 
 
One  of  the  major  contributions  of  the  Royal  Staff  Corps  to  the  war  in  the 
Peninsula was their work to map Spain and Portugal.  Along with colleagues 
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from  the  Quarter-Master-General’s  office,  several  staff  corps  officers  worked 
constantly  to  map  the  Peninsula  at  a  scale  of  four  miles  to  the  inch,  giving 
Wellington  access  to  mapping  information  that  was  not  available  from  the 
printed maps of the period.
108  Some of the output of this work was eventually 
printed  in  what  is  still  the  best  and  most  accurate  maps  of  the  peninsular 
battlefields, Wyld’s Atlas. 
Royal Military College 
The  Royal  Military  College  (RMC)  was  the  brainchild  of  John  Gaspard  Le 
Marchant.  He believed that there was a need for the British army to improve its 
professionalism  by  training  officers  to  provide  the  administrative  and 
organisational skills required in the Quarter-Master-General’s department.  This 
need  had  been  fulfilled  for  many  years  in  continental  armies,  but  staff 
experience in the British army was gained by trial and error.  
 
Le  Marchant  was  well  known  to  the  King  and  the  Duke  of  York,  and  his 
proposals were received favourably and strongly supported by both, as well as 
by  Dundas,  the  Quartermaster-General,  Calvert,  the  Adjutant-General
109  and 
Brownrigg, the Military Secretary.  Le Marchant’s proposals were submitted in 
January 1799, approved and the school officially opened in May 1800. 
110 
 
The  original  proposal  was  for  a  school  with  three  departments.  The  senior 
school was for those destined to serve on the staff; the junior department for the 
training of Gentleman Cadets; and the Legion was for sons of soldiers and Non 
Commissioned Officers.  The Legion was not approved due to concerns that the 
number of promotions from the ranks would be too great.
111 
 
The junior department was very much the equivalent of the Ordnance’s Royal 
Military Academy and in fact for a number of years the surplus from the Royal 
Military  Academy  was  placed  at  the  Junior  College  at  Great  Marlow.    The 
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Warrant described two purposes : to train some of those who from an early life 
were destined for the military, and to provide for the sons of officers who died or 
were  wounded  in  the  service  of  their  country.    As  with  the  Royal  Military 
Academy, there were entry requirements, with cadets having to be between 
thirteen  and  fifteen  years  old,  to  be  mentally  and  physically  fit,  and  to  have 
some mathematical knowledge and a good hand for writing.  Cadets had to 
pass final examinations within four years of entry.  Initial capacity was for one 
hundred cadets.
112  Of these one hundred, twenty were destined for the East 
India Company, thirty were the sons of officers who died or were wounded in 
the service of their country, twenty were for the sons of serving officers, and 
thirty were for the sons of noblemen and gentlemen (who paid more for the 
privilege of sending their sons to the College).
113 
 
The senior department, or Staff College, started life as a private venture by the 
French émigré, General Jarry, who set up a school at High Wycombe in 1799, 
to  teach  staff  duties  to  junior  officers.    The  numbers  present  in  the  original 
school were quite small, never exceeding thirty-four in this period.  In 1802, 
when the Staff College received its warrant, it moved to High Wycombe.  Entry 
requirements required both practical experience and a basic level of education.  
They had to be at least nineteen years old, with two years regimental service 
and a knowledge of mathematics and French. 
 
The RMC was also dogged by problems with the behaviour of the cadets.  In 
1806, Le Marchant was charged with calumny for complaining in private to the 
governor of the college that the discipline and education was unacceptable at 
Great Marlow.
114  As Great Marlow housed the additional cadets from the Royal 
Military Academy one is left to wonder if the attitude had been transferred from 
Woolwich or if it was more of a general problem.  It is difficult to understand why 
the two military colleges had discipline problems which would not have been 
tolerated in schools for gentleman and even more so, in the army. 
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Although this was a start, the impact it had during the Napoleonic wars should 
not  be  over  estimated.    The  Junior  department  at  the  college  only  provided 
about 4% of the first commissions into the army.
115 
 
3.2.4.   ENGINEERS VIEW OF THEIR TRAINING, 
CAPABILITY AND LEADERSHIP. 
The common view of artillery and engineer officers amongst the army, was of 
studious, stuffy and pedantic officers.  The ‘Scientific soldier’ was a term that 
was  used  at  this  time  and  the  training  and  education  of  Ordnance  officers 
differed  significantly  from  the  training  and  education  of  junior  officers  in  the 
army.  But was this perception based on fact?  Were the Ordnance officers 
better trained?  Were they competent to undertake the tasks they would be 
asked to perform?   Did the Ordnance even understand what the requirements 
were for modern warfare in Europe?   
 
Their  experience  in  the  18
th  century  was  almost  non-existent.    Early    18
th 
century campaigns made extensive use of officers from other European nations 
to provide the specialist engineering services in English armies.  More recent 
operations by the British army alone were focussed on colonial campaigns in 
India or America, or limited attacks on coastal fortresses often carried out by, or 
with, the Royal Navy.   There was very limited experience of siege warfare in 
Europe.  Wellington was one of the few British generals who had experience of 
siege warfare, but ‘Sepoy’ experience counted for little at home.  
Training 
The engineer officers who were involved in operations through the early years 
of  the  19
th c entury  were  not  happy  with  the  training  they  had  and  felt  that 
changes  were  required.  There  was  resistance  from  several  senior  ordnance 
officers  to  the  reforms  which  were  being  proposed  by  the  younger  breed  of 
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engineer officer like Pasley, Squire, Lefebure and Burgoyne.  Bearing in mind 
the  remarks  made  above  on  the  Royal  Military  Academy  and  the  quality  of 
training the cadets received, it is important to note that many of the officers who 
played  prominent  roles  in  the  Napoleonic  wars  passed  through  the  Royal 
Military Academy during the period when examination requirements were being 
lowered to meet the demand for officers.  
 
In almost (if not) all cases, the officers themselves complained bitterly about 
their training and their experiences.  One only has to look at the campaigns in 
which  they  fought  in  the  period  from  1793  to  1810  to  realise  that  they  had 
almost  all  had  nothing  but  bad  experiences  at  Alexandria,  Buenos  Ayres, 
Copenhagen  and  Walcheren.    There  was  a  constant  theme  of  the  lack  of 
training engineer officers had received in the practical aspects of their work.  
 
Pasley writing around 1811, described his views :  
 
I  should  have  suggested  several  improvements  that  appeared  to  me 
from my own experience and reflection to be essential, … I considered 
the British Army … to be incapable of succeeding in a siege, … without 
either  having  recourse  to  the  barbarous  measure  in  incendiary 
bombardment,  or  without  an  enormous  sacrifice  of  the  lives  …    in 
sanguinary assaults … which might be rendered unnecessary by a more 
efficient organization of the Royal Engineer department, and especially 
by  forming  a  well-instructed  and  well-disciplined  body  of  engineer 
soldiers  …    The  better  instruction  of  the  junior  officers  of  the  Royal 
Engineers appeared no less essential, for at that time they were not even 
taught the theory of the attack of fortresses … and the examinations for 
commissions  were  merely  a  matter  of  form,  and  no  genuine  test  for 
proficiency. As for practical instruction, they had none, for they were sent 
on  service  without  ever  having  seen  a  fascine  or  gabion,  without  the 
smallest knowledge of the military passage of rivers, of military mining, or 
any other operation of a siege, excepting what they may pick up from 
French writers, of which a striking proof occurred in Sir John Moore’s 
retreat, when all attempts to blow up stone bridges …  made by officers 
of the Corps, myself amongst others, failed … with the exception of only 
one, which Lieut. Davy, a very promising young officer, succeeded in 
completely destroying, but at the expense of his own life, which he lost 
from not understanding the very simple precautions necessary to insure 
the safety of the person who fires the train of the mine. For my part, I 
should not have even known how to make a battery in the attack on Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Copenhagen,  the  first  siege  in  which  I  was  employed,  but  from  the 
information I derived from a French book on the subject.
116 
 
Jones made a similar point in the preface of his book on the sieges during the 
Peninsular  War,    ‘In  the  English  language  there  exists  not  a  single  original 
treatise on sieges; all our knowledge of them is obtained from foreign writers’.
117 
 
Analysis of the movements of officers on these campaigns shows that there 
was a small number who repeatedly appeared in the operational activities and 
these officers came to know each other very well and trusted the judgement 
and discretion of their peers.  Their letters over the period on occasions display 
an  almost  incandescent  rage  at  the  bad  planning  and  organisation  of 
engineering activities.  The early years of the 19
th century saw these officers 
talking amongst themselves about what needed to be changed.  There was a 
recognition that change at home was going to be very slow and they started 
talking  about  how  they  could  make  progress  themselves.    Pasley  described 
how this small group of officers responded to the challenge :  
 
The  very  inefficient  state  of  the  engineer  Department,  strange  to  say, 
appeared  to  be  unknown,  not  only  to  the  rest  of  the  Army,  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  the  youngest  ensign,  but  even  to  the  senior 
officers  of  the  engineers  themselves  …  Young  or  in  the  prime  of 
manhood,  full  of  enterprise  and  zeal,  meeting  and  comparing  notes 
together in the metropolis after the desultory expeditions in which they 
had served, and afterwards those employed in 1810 in the construction 
of the lines of Torres Vedras, meeting from time to time in some central 
spot, they excited each other, and inspired their juniors with an espirit-
de-corps and a devotion to the service of their Sovereign and Country 
that I do not suppose was ever exceeded. Captain Charles Lefebure … 
was at first the most influential of these officers, partly from his character 
and example … He it was who first pointed out to me and other officers 
his  juniors  as  early  as  1805  the  inefficiency  of  the  Corps  for  want  of 
disciplined and instructed Sappers and Miners. 
118 
 
As mentioned above, the initial instigator appeared to be Charles Lefebure, who 
started talking about forming a group to foster ideas and knowledge.  Burgoyne 
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seems to have taken up the planning of this society.  This was no easy task at 
this time as many of the officers were placed in different locations and planning 
was  over  an  extended  period  by  letter.    In  1810  the  ‘Society  for  Procuring 
Useful Military Information’ was formed with an initial membership of six, made 
up of J.F. Burgoyne, S. Dickenson, G.C. Ross, E.R. Mulcaster, J.T. Jones and 
J. Squire,
119 Lefebure having been killed in April 1810, at Matagorda.  The aim 
was the ‘encouragement of military study and engineering’.
120  Membership was 
by invitation only and restricted to officers ‘as are inclined to be of the same way 
of  thinking  with  ourselves’.
121    The  admittance  of  the  junior  officers  was 
discussed and initially discounted, as they were not thought to have sufficient 
experience to contribute, but, it was hoped that membership would ‘particularly 
act as a forcible hint to the young men we admit how absolutely necessary it is 
to  study  and  procure  information  theoretical,  practical  and  local  in  our 
complicated profession’.
122 
 
One unexpected omission from the initial group was Charles Pasley who had 
been tirelessly campaigning for years to improve the standard of training and 
education in the Ordnance. Although Pasley was working at home to convince 
the  Ordnance  on  the  need  to  re-organise  the  Royal  Military  Artificers  and 
corresponding  regularly  with  the  likes  of  Squire  and  Burgoyne,  he  was  not 
invited to join.  Pasley had previously not been on good terms with Lefebure, 
but this was unlikely to have been the reason.  He was a logical choice for 
membership, even if it was for the sole reason of having a UK based supporter 
who  could  collate,  disseminate  and  promote  on  the  Society’s  behalf.    The 
probable  reason  why  Pasley  was  not  amongst  the  founder  members  was 
because he was recovering from the injuries he received at Walcheren.  He was 
also working to complete and complete his ‘Essay on Military Policy’, which was 
published in November 1810.  Pasley returned to service in December 1810, 
when  he  took  up  a  position  as  commander  of  the  sixth  company  of  Royal 
Military Artificers at Plymouth.  Also omitted from the group were the Senior 
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engineers  in  the  Peninsula  during  the  period,  Richard  Fletcher  and  Howard 
Elphinstone.    Elphinstone,  was  by  this  time,  back  in  England,  but  Fletcher’s 
omission is more surprising. 
 
The group grew from six to eighteen in January 1811 when Birch, Nicholas, 
Goldfinch,  Fanshawe,  Pasley,  Boothby,  Thackeray,  Parker,  Lewis,  Marlow, 
Douglas and Arnold were admitted.  Very little correspondence has survived on 
the activities of this group.  What is clear, however, is the recognition of the 
need to share experiences and to improve effectiveness in the Corps. That no 
senior officers were invited to join indicates that the membership did not feel 
they shared its views. 
Leadership 
Another driver for the formation of the ‘society’ was a lack of confidence in their 
senior  officers.    Letters  from  the  most  recent  European  campaigns  contain 
strong  language  and  emotion  as  the  performance  of  their  superiors  was 
discussed.  The Walcheren campaign of 1809 was led by the Earl of Chatham, 
who  at  that  time  was  Master-General  of  the  Ordnance.    Along  with  40,000 
troops  there  were  twenty-eight  engineer  officers  and  two  hundred  and  sixty 
Royal Military Artificers.  This was the largest contingent sent on operation in 
the history of the corps.  The engineers were under the command of Colonel 
William Fyers, who was Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications and about 
fifty-six  years  old.    The  engineering  aspects  of  this  campaign  were  as 
unsatisfactory  as  the  other  military  elements.    The  letters  of  the  engineers 
reflect their opinions on the campaign from an engineering perspective :  
 
The Corps of Engineers is disgraced and damned for ever.  The cry of 
the whole army and navy is against us.  I found Jones when I landed in a 
state of despair. Boteler wished that the first shot might take off his head 
…  We  were  offered  the  whole  army  to  act  under  us.  …  such 
circumstances would have put life into a statue … But what could we do 
with a parcel of old men or rather old women at our head, … with fellows 
old in years, poor in spirit, beardless in military experience, destitute of 
knowledge’.
123 
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Pasley had already written once on the subject in May 1809, but clearly he still 
felt so strongly that he felt further complaint was necessary. : 
 
The same melancholy disgusting system prevails in our Department, … 
our brilliant second was seized with a fit of zeal and enthusiasm : he 
represented our want of activity to D’Arcy, and proposed to undertake 
the improvement of the works of Flushing himself … but the vile system 
upon which D acts is this : - make a shew of work - never mind what you 
do – so that you do something : - can anything be more contemptible and 
absurd  than  this  :  - b ut  our  department  is  going  headlong  to  win  an 
eternal  infamy  :  the  island  it  seems  will  be  retained  …  much  now 
depends on the exertions of the engineers and their conduct now will 
most justly become a subject of severe censure hereafter : - We entered 
the place on the 16th or 17th August – we attempted no efficient repair or 
reform, until the 16th Sept; and then our operations are guided by the 
pitiful desire of pleasing the eye of an English General at the expense of 
the  real  interests  of  the  country  …  the  fine  season  has  now  slipped 
through his hands : - and the late incessant rains have almost put a stop 
to the proceedings.
124 
 
Our affairs here, I grieve to tell you , proceed worse than ever; and our 
chiefs have neither sense nor spirit enough to resist the [?] and insults 
continually offered to the Department. … I have proposed, that all the 
Captains should express their sentiments on this lamentable occasion … 
Let us not permit - that age and rank should not cover the grand defects 
of  understanding  and  experience  -  The  country  should  and  ought  to 
know in what manner it is served.
125 
 
A base exposure of facts … is quite sufficient to convince a military man 
… of the absurdity of our proceedings - But, I will go further, and say, 
that we have been criminally negligent … we have had ample means at 
our disposal … The state of indecision, in which we have been placed, 
since  the  occupation  of  the  island  has  been  our  ruin  …  A  weak  and 
vacillitating Ministry - a commander in Chief without spirit, patriotism or 
judgement  and  an  engineer  department  conducted  by  obstinacy  and 
ignorance - Such are the grievous evils under which we have laboured 
… I certainly should be glad to return to England - because the system 
pursued here in every matter is thoroughly disgusting.
126 
 
but what are we to expect from such men as these without patriotism, 
talent or energy … we must do our utmost to change our military system 
-  I  mean  the  conduct  of  our  military  operations  …  Is  D’Arcy  to  be  a 
Baronet!!!!!!! Impossible.
127 
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One other event which says much about the leadership of the Royal Engineers 
at the time is described by Jones :  
 
An  order  was  issued  by  Colonel  Fyers  [after  he  was  wounded  on  13 
August 1809] that the senior Engineer . . . should . . .deliver a written 
report . . . of anything extraordinary that might have occurred during the 
night. The first morning Colonel D’Arcy. . . refused compliance, saying he 
had other things to do, and no solicitation could prevail on him to write a 
single line. . . The third morning Colonel D again declined, saying it was 
all nonsense. . . He was requested to reconsider the matter, and on a 
decided refusal, the Brigade-Major put him under arrest.
128 
 
D’Arcy continued his refusal right up to the point of the Court Martial beginning.  
His argument appeared to be based on his skewed understanding of relative 
seniority of himself and Fyers, but does demonstrate a less that cordial working 
relationship between the senior engineers.  Another comment from Jones sums 
up his view of the leadership of the whole campaign :  
 
The nomination of Lord Chatham was forced on the Ministry by George 
III ... Lord C was a man so notoriously indolent as to have acquired the 
soubriquet  of  the  ‘late’  earl  ...  He  was  sadly  embarrassed  in  his 
circumstances,  and  if  he  should  not  attain  fame  he  was  at  all  events 
certain  to  acquire  the  means  of  paying  his  debts.    The  second  in 
command  was  a  man  of  acknowledged  gallantry  and  of  much 
experience,  but  sadly  deficient  in  headpiece,  if  not  actually  labouring 
under the aberration of intellect which shortly afterwards caused his ruin. 
Of the General officers, some were better known on the turf than in the 
field,  …  and  only  one  or  two  had  any  recent  military  experience. 
Furthermore,  the  honours  and  pensions  bestowed  on  the  captors  of 
Copenhagen two years previously drew forth from their snug abodes the 
heads  of  the  military  departments  under  the  expectation  of  similar 
recompenses. Thus a veteran who had held a snug and lucrative post at 
Woolwich for more than thirty years and who had never served in the 
field  except  as  a  subaltern,  now  reappeared  on  the  stage  as 
Commanding Officer of Artillery; and an equally old officer, precisely on 
an  equality  with  the  last  described,  with  respect  to  experience  and 
service, came forth from an office in London as Commanding Engineer 
… Such was the experience and energy brought together to command a 
force destined to invade the French territory and contend with the most 
active and intelligent troops the world ever saw. 
129 
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This was the background with which the middle-ranking engineer officers faced 
the major task ahead in the Peninsula.  Their expectation was that they could 
not rely on help from above and would have to make do with their own best 
efforts. 
3.2.5.   SUMMARY. 
The section started with two questions : 
−  Was  the  training  the  Royal  Engineer  Officers  received  appropriate  for 
their needs? 
−  Was the engineering support they received adequate? 
 
The  Royal  Military  Academy  provided  a  standard  education  to  artillery  and 
engineer cadets.  The majority of the cadets were destined to serve in the Royal 
Artillery and the education had to be tailored to meet the needs of both corps.  
Such a situation will always lead to compromises.  Engineering commissions 
were typically seen as the preferred objective and the best students usually 
chose the Royal Engineers.  Through continued attendance or secondment to 
the  Ordnance  Survey  new  engineer  officers  were  able  to  gain  some  further 
training and experience after being commissioned.  The syllabus at that time is 
shown in Appendix A.  A major part of the syllabus covered the attack and 
defence of fortifications.  What was lacking at this time was practical experience 
of the various activities.  A complaint of the engineer officers was that they had 
no real experience before they arrived at their first siege.  Whilst a complaint 
such as never having made a fascine or gabion could be easily remedied, it is 
less likely that the full challenges of a real siege could be practiced.  The major 
problems  in  actual  operations  were  dealing  with  the  limitations  of  time, 
resources and men, these would be even harder to teach.  The officers who 
were most useful in the field were those who were most able to adapt to the 
circumstances.  It should also be noted that almost all complaints about lack of 
training  were  related  to  siege  work.    As  will  be  described  later,  undertaking 
sieges was only a small part of an engineers role.  They had adequate training 
for the other roles they undertook. 
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Much of the writing on the Royal Military Academy (and also the Royal Military 
College)  focuses  on  the  negative,  the  bullying,  the  poor  discipline  and  the 
relaxing  of  examination  requirements.    These  were  all  real  problems,  but 
focussing on these elements masks the fact that cadets received education that 
did help them when they were commissioned.  Even when the examinations 
were suspended, cadets were only recommended for commissions when the 
masters thought they were capable of being useful.  One can understand that 
the purists and often the new officers themselves felt that standards were not 
good enough, but the fact is that the engineer and artillery officers who were 
commissioned  were  able  to  perform  their  duties.    Where  they  had  no 
experience, they, like the army officers had to learn as best they could.  The 
demands of war often lead to compromises and the output of the Royal Military 
Academy was not exempt from the realities of war.   
 
The  limitations  in  education  were  addressed  as  the  war  progressed,  both 
through peer education and through improvements at home.  From 1812, all 
new engineer officers received several months practical training before being 
sent abroad.  The officers in the field shared information and also prepared 
instructions which were sent home for use in the schools.   The training of the 
Royal  Engineers  was  not  perfect,  but  it  did  give  officers  a  grounding  in  the 
principles  they  needed.    As  the  war  progressed  the  training  of  cadets  and 
officers improved. 
 
The situation with regard to engineering support is less satisfactory.  Broadly, it 
would  be  true  to  say  that  there  was  no  effective  engineering  support  for 
operational  activities  at  the  start  of  the  Peninsular  War.    The  Royal  Military 
Artificers could best be described as static garrison soldiers.  Whilst this fact 
was appreciated it needed the painful experience of a major siege to bring the 
seriousness of the situation to the commanders.  Before 1812, the presence of 
engineering artificers at a siege was effectively non-existent.  The two sieges of 
Badajoz in 1811 started the impetus that eventually led to the formation of the 
School of Military Engineering in April 1812.  It should not be forgotten that the 
biggest change was the decision to make the Royal Military Artificer companies 
mobile in mid 1811.  This was the decision that allowed artificers companies to Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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be despatched into the field.  The engineer officers continued to struggle with 
the lack of support until the end of 1812, Burgos being the first siege where the 
newly  trained  sappers  were  available.    From  1813  the  number  of  trained 
sappers increased and, more importantly, they also had consistent leadership 
through nominated engineer officers and their own sub-lieutenants.  The junior 
engineer officers had also taught and trained with the sappers at the School of 
Military Engineering and they knew each other when they went on campaign.  
The work of Palsey particularly had a huge impact on turning the Royal Military 
Artificers from a liability into an effective military engineering force. 
3.3.    Analysis of Royal Engineers Officers 
The men who joined the Corps of Royal Engineers during the late 18
th and early 
19
th centuries performed a very different role from most officers in the British 
army  of  the  time.  Unlike  their  peers  in  the  line  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  the 
artillery, the engineer officer typically worked and lived with the senior officers in 
the army.  Their usefulness was often not restricted to the engineering skills and 
experience which they possessed but often encompassed wider responsibilities 
where  the  generals  needed  an  intelligent  officer  to  perform  some  activity.  
These  roles  often  overlapped  with  those  of  the  Quarter-Master-General’s 
department, the Royal Staff Corps and Aides-de-Camp.  This section will look at 
the  type  of  person  who  joined  the  Royal  Engineers  and  analyse  their 
background, their progress in the military and their personal lives.  
3.3.1.   WHO JOINED THE ROYAL ENGINEERS?  
Entrance  into  the  Royal  Engineers  was,  in  theory,  open  to  anyone,  but  in 
practice there were restrictions placed on those who could enter.  Up to 1774, 
entry was based solely on the recommendation of the Master-General of the 
Ordnance.  To gain such a recommendation, required access to the offices of 
the Master-General and also the recommendation and patronage of someone 
of note who could champion the potential cadet’s case.  
 
In 1774, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military Academy successfully 
argued that an entrance examination was required to ensure that some basic Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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level of education was received by all applicants prior to joining the Academy.  
The entrance examinations were of such a level that it was essential that the 
applicant  had  received  significant  schooling  prior  to  joining.    This  in  turn 
required sufficient wealth to allow the child to either receive private tuition or to 
attend preparatory school.  So although there were no limits based on position 
in  society,  there  were  obvious  boundaries  based  on  the  need  for  sufficient 
wealth to put the child through schooling. 
 
However,  one  difference  between  the  Ordnance  and  the  army  was  that 
commissions did not need to be purchased.  So a prospective parent could 
save the £400 price of an Ensigncy in the line, if he could get his child into the 
Ordnance.    Similarly,  because  promotion  in  the  Ordnance  was  based  on 
seniority,  the  prospect  was  there  for  steady  progression  through  the  ranks 
without further expenditure.  On the other hand, this was perceived to be much 
slower than progression in the army through the purchase system.  To reach 
the highest ranks in the Royal Engineers could take fifty years. 
 
Guggisberg suggests that there was a difference of opinion between the cadets 
themselves and their sponsors.  Many of the cadets realised that to graduate 
from  the  Academy  typically  required  two  to  four  years  of  hard  work.    Exam 
failure, or in some cases, expulsion, was likely to require the parents who had 
set  their  mind  on  their  son  entering  the  military,  to  purchase  a  commission, 
which got the son the rank without the effort.  
 
It  should  also  be  remembered,  though,  that  there  was  a  tradition  of  military 
families  in  Britain  similar  to  that  in  France,  where  positions  were  almost 
guaranteed to sons from families with generations of service.  The letters of the 
officers  of  the  British  army  through  this  period,  confirm  that  patronage  and 
connections were still important parts of the process of obtaining commissions 
and later promotion.  Even the French Revolution did not destroy this link in the 
French army.  Blaufarb describes this at some length in his recent work on the 
French Army.
130  Can this traditional link be demonstrated in the applicants to 
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the Ordnance?  The table below shows the occupation of the fathers of several 
of the Royal Engineer officers.
131  
 
Table 3b. Occupation of fathers of Royal Engineer officers. 
Background 
(Father) 
  Total 
Ordnance  TM  Dickens
132,  EW  Durnford,  F  Fyers
133,  WC 
Holloway, HD Jones, JT Jones, GCD Lewis,  
C Mann, GF Macleod,RZ Mudge
134,  
FW Mulcaster, AW Robe, CW Rudyerd,  
JMF Smith, HP Wulff 
15 
RMA staff  RH Bonnycastle, GT Landmann  2 
Army / Militia  JR Arnold, JF Burgoyne, C Boothby,  
ST Dickens
135, GH Henderson, J Jebb
136,  
R Jones, JS Macaulay
137, L Machell,  
GF Macleod
138, G Nicholls, G C Ross,
139  
C Shipley, PO Skene, GIP West,  
FW Whinyates
140 
16 
Navy /  
Royal 
Marines 
W Bennett,
141 MC Dixon
142; E Fanshawe
143,  
A Fraser
144, H Elphinstone
145; J Oldfield,  
L Peake
146, JE Portlock, JN Wells 
9 
Clergy  R Fletcher, G Gipps, W Gregory, GC Hoste,
147 R 
Morse, W Reid, RJ Shipley 
7 
Civil  Service 
& Gov’t 
J By, W Nicholas
148, A Walpole
149  3 
Royalty  J Mackelcan
150  1 
Doctor  J Carmichael Smyth, J Squire, FR Thackeray  3 
Law  J Longley, RJ Vicars  2 
Total    58 
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132 Brother Charles in RA, Brother J.T. in RN 
133 Father was Willam Fyers RE 
134 Father was William Mudge RA, third Director of Ordnance Survey. 
135 Father was Lieut-Col. Thomas Dickens, 1
st Foot. 
136 Father was Lieut-Col. in Scarsdale Volunteers. 
137 Father was a Surgeon in 33
rd Foot. 
138 Two brothers in the RA and one in the Army. 
139 Father was Uncle of Sir Hew Dalrymple. 
140 Two brothers in the Navy, one in the RA and one in the EIC. 
141 Grandfather was Admiral William Bennett. 
142 Father Admiral Sir Manley Dixon; brother Manley Hall Dixon RN. 
143 Father was Captain Robert Fanshawe RN. 
144 Father was Vice-Admiral Fraser. 
145 Father was Captain John Elphinstone, R.N 
146 Father was Sir Henry Peake, Surveyor of the Navy. 
147 Two brothers in Royal Navy. 
148 Grandfather was Admiral Sir Thomas Frankland, Bart. 
149 Sixth son of the Hon. Robert Walpole. 
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The  table  above  shows  officers  in  the  corps  for  whom  parentage  could  be 
determined and represents roughly 20% of the total number.  Of the sample, 
72%  of  the  officers  came  from  families  where  the  father  had  a  military 
connection.  The remainder came from ‘professional’ families, with no evidence 
of  cadetships  being  given  to  the  trades  or  working  classes.    As  mentioned 
above, this is almost certainly due to the high educational requirements to gain 
admittance.    The  footnotes  to  Table  3b  show,  many  officers  also  had  other 
relations in the military.  
 
The figures above suggest that there was a strong relationship between the 
cadets joining the Ordnance and previous military service in their families. It is 
also interesting to note the near equivalence of sons of ordnance and army 
officers.  As there are a great many more army officers (ten thousand against 
two  hundred),  it  suggests  a  strong  tendency  for  sons  to  follow  their  fathers 
footsteps into the ordnance. 
3.3.2.   COMPARISON WITH THE ARMY. 
As  discussed  above,  the  early  days  of  the  Royal  Military  Academy  were 
characterised by indiscipline amongst the students, but the subaltern officers 
who left the Academy had a level of education which was far above what was 
available  in  the  army.    Obtaining  a  commission  in  the  army  had  some 
similarities and some differences from the ordnance.  The major difference was 
pre-requisites  in  terms  of  education.    The  basic  requirement  to  obtain  a 
commission was to be at least sixteen years old, with the recommendation of at 
least a Major in the army as to the applicant’s character, education and bodily 
health.  
 
Against common perception, most first commissions were not purchased, but 
obtained free. Purchase of a commission was usually necessary to obtain a 
regiment of choice, and was much more prevalent in the cavalry (nearly 50% 
against an average of 20% in the army overall).  A further 70% of promotions 
were  by  seniority  with  the  remaining  10%  being  recommendations  by  the Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Commander-in-Chief.    Glover  comments  that  in  many  popular  regiments, 
promotion by purchase was not faster than promotion by seniority. 
 
The breakdown of first commissions was
151 : 
 
Table 3c. Breakdown of obtaining first commission. 
From the ranks  5% 
From Volunteers  5% 
From the Royal Military College  4% 
From the Militia, for persuading forty men to sign up  20% 
Applying for commission  65% 
 
Regulations stated that within two years of joining his regiment, an officer had to 
be  capable  of  commanding  and  exercising  a  troop  or  company  in  every 
situation.  After that, any other education was at the discretion and diligence of 
the Colonel of the regiment. 
 
Another common misunderstanding was that the officer class was populated 
from the landed gentry and nobility.  Glover records that there were only 140 
Peers or sons of Peers among the 10,000 officers in the army.  Similarly the 
representation from the great Public Schools was below 300.  The majority of 
Peers and ex-public school officers were concentrated in the Guards and the 
cavalry, the proportions being around 57% in both cases.  This left less than 
200 officers in total, spread across the rest of the army.
152 
3.3.3.   PATRONAGE & FRIENDS 
The Ordnance officers were a very close knit community.  Apart from working 
with a small number of colleagues who they got to know very well, they also 
socialised with their peers. On campaign, they usually shared accommodation, 
when  there  were  other  Ordnance  officers  present.    Several  also  married 
                                            
151 Glover, Wellington’s Army, pp. 38-41. 
152 Glover, Wellington’s Army, p. 44. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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relations  of  other  officers.    At  least  thirteen  of  these  officers  married  into  a 
military family, several of them being Ordnance families.
153  
 
The  Ordnance  officers  had  a  very  different  relationship  with  senior  army 
commanders than regular army officers. There are four reasons for this : 
 
They were not part of the army hierarchy.  As previously mentioned, the 
artillery and engineer officers were responsible to the Board of Ordnance, not to 
Horse  Guards.    This  had  both  advantages  and  disadvantages.    One 
disadvantage was that they were not eligible for staff positions with the army, a 
task that many would have filled very capably.  Army commanders had limited 
opportunities  to  recognise  their  efforts.    Generally,  an  army  officer  could 
suggest  that  an  engineer  officer  was  promoted  for  his  efforts,  but  could  not 
recommend it.
154  The award of brevet army ranks was used, but rank within the 
corps could not be altered.  However, the award of brevet ranks caused major 
issues in the Peninsula, as Second Captains in the Ordnance were not entitled 
to awards of brevet ranks.   As there were several Second Captains serving in 
the Peninsula, this caused great resentment.  It was eventually overturned in 
1813, when a group of artillery officers gained Wellington’s support and he took 
the matter up directly with the Prince Regent.
155  On the advantage side, the 
engineer officers in the Peninsula had a great deal of autonomy because the 
senior officers of the Ordnance were not present.  Most of these officers would 
have been very happy to be outside of the control of Ordnance headquarters.  
The absence of these senior Ordnance officers from the campaigns meant that 
many engineer officers got to know the senior commanders in the army, and in 
several  cases  they  had  served  with  these  generals  before  the  start  of  the 
Peninsular War.  This helped both in securing places on operational campaigns, 
and in quickly fitting in to the army or divisional headquarters when they arrived. 
                                            
153 William Bennett, Richard Bonnycastle, Ralph Bruyeres, Henry Cardew, Edward Fanshaw, 
Richard  Fletcher,  George  Gipps,  Alexander  Hall,  John  Handfield,  Charles  Holloway,  William 
Holloway, James Carmichael Smyth and Frederick Mulcaster. 
154 One example of this was Wellington’s active support for the promotion of Captain Chapman 
after  he  returned  to  England  in  1811.  Wellington  wrote  at  length  to  show  his  support  for 
Chapman’s claim for promotion.  WO5/599, pp.316-319. 
155 M. Glover, Wellington as Military Commander (London, 1973). Sphere Books edition, p. 221. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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They  had  regular  contact  with  senior  army  commanders.    Because  the 
number of engineer officers was so small, they were probably all known to the 
senior army commanders.  On campaign, many were attached to Headquarters 
or divisional command and worked directly for the senior commander.  From the 
lowest ranks in the Royal Engineers, they could receive orders directly from the 
army commanders and could make reports directly back to them.  It was this 
sort of responsibility and direct contact that got officers noticed and could have 
an impact on future assignments and promotion prospects.  One example is 
Burgoyne using his prior involvement with Sir John Moore to write to him and 
secure a place on the planned campaign in Sweden in 1808.
156 
Greater  responsibility  for  their  rank.  Most  officers  in  the  Royal  Engineers 
undertook tasks that would normally have been entrusted to much more senior 
officers  in  the  army.    The  Commanding  Royal  Engineer  for  most  of  the 
Peninsular War was Richard Fletcher.  When he first joined the Peninsular army 
in 1808, he held the Corps rank of Captain.  He was promoted to Lieutenant-
Colonel in 1809, but like the artillery officers was still very junior compared to 
the officers in the army.  This level of responsibility at low rank applied equally 
across  the  Royal  Engineers.    One  other  example  was  Lieutenant  Reid’s 
attachment  to  General  D’España’s  Spanish  army  in  a  staff  liaison  role  in 
1811.
157 
Engineer officers were usually part of a General’s family. As a general rule, 
engineer officers were included in the ‘families’ of the various headquarters, 
whether they were Wellington’s, divisional or in some cases Spanish. They lived 
within the command structure, often working with the staff and ADC’s to carry 
out the general’s orders. This wider role will be examined in more detail later.  
Because  of  this  close  relationship,  they  developed  friendships  and  working 
relationships with the senior officers in the army. 
 
Apart from the particular Ordnance related differences, the officers still operated 
within  the  normal  19
th  century  conventions  of  friendship  and  patronage.  
Because  of  the  points  mentioned  above,  many  engineer  officers  did  form 
                                            
156 Wrottesley, Life of Burgoyne, vol. 1, pp. 17-18. 
157 REM, 4601-72, f. 1811/80 Burgoyne to Squire, 15 Dec 1811. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
  85 
friendships with army officers who they had served with.  It was normal to help 
friends and relations get positions by using contacts and friendships.  Some 
examples are given below. 
 
Pasley was related to the Malcolm family who were great friends of Wellington. 
In 1811,  Captain Pulteney Malcolm RN, wrote to Wellington, asking if he could 
employ Pasley in the Peninsula.   
 
John Burgoyne was made Commanding Royal Engineer of the 1807 expedition 
to Egypt by General Fox, brother of Burgoyne’s godfather.   
 
George Ross was educated by Sir Hew Dalrymple after his own fathers death.  
Ross wrote regularly to Dalrymple up to his death at Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812. 
 
John Squire was a great friend of Henry Bunbury, Under-Secretary for War.  
They  had  served  together  previously.    The  correspondence  of  Squire  and 
Bunbury is another rich source of information.  Several of Squire’s letters were 
used by Napier in his history of the war.  Squire was also not above blatant 
attempts to use his contacts to better his position.  In one of his first letters to 
Bunbury after he arrived in the Peninsula, he asked Bunbury to see if he could 
get him transferred into another role which would be ‘very agreeable’.
158 
 
Stephen Chapman was a great friend of Henry Torrens, Military Secretary to 
the Commander-in-Chief.  Torrens was appointed by Wellington as his Military 
Secretary during the 1808 campaign in the Peninsula.  Torrens, was a confidant 
of Wellington, and their letters show the trust they had in each other.  Torrens 
wrote  to  Wellington  twice,  seeking  his  support  for  obtaining  promotion  for 
Chapman.
159  Torrens in this correspondence also notes that he had raised the 
matter with the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
                                            
158 BL, ADD63106, Squire letters, Letter dated 7 Apr 1810. Squire had been left in charge of 
building work at the fort of St Julian in Lisbon. He wanted Bunbury to request that he made a 
reconnaissance on Cartagena with a view to making it a second stronghold like Cadiz. 
159 National Archives, W05/599 ff. 316-319, 3 Jun 1811 and W03/602 ff. 60-63, 28 Apr 1812.  
Details provided by Rory Muir. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Attempts to use connections were also used outside of family and friendship.  
During Pasley’s stand-off with the Master-General about his promotion in 1812, 
he even wrote to General Eyre Coote asking him for a testimonial based on his 
services at Walcheren.  This is surprising due to the very critical comments 
Pasley made at the time about the command of this expedition. 
 
Because of the small number of officers in the Peninsula and their high profile 
around the senior officers, a significant proportion of them were mentioned in 
official correspondence.   It is likely that this high profile caused some jealousy 
back  in  England.    The  officers  themselves  felt  that  their  efforts  were  not 
appreciated  and  that  there  was  a  distinct  lack  of  support  from  Ordnance 
headquarters in the award of brevet ranks.  This is maybe not surprising, since 
the  active  officers  during  the  Peninsular  War  obtained  their  brevet  ranks  of 
Major and Lieutenant-Colonel much quicker than their superiors, in some cases 
in half the time.
160  In most cases these brevet awards were for service in the 
field, which is exactly the same reason why many were awarded in the army.  
The awarding of brevet army ranks did not follow the same sequence as corps 
rank and this did cause some confusion.  There were a number of occasions 
where  questions  were  asked  about  whether  corps  or  army  rank  took 
precedence when deciding on command.  This will be considered below. 
3.3.4.   LATER POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The  inability  to  sell  an  engineer  commission  and  the  promotion  by  seniority 
meant that most officers remained with the corps.  Of the two hundred and 
eighty officers who served in the corps during the Peninsular War, only twenty-
four went on to Half-Pay.  Ten of that number went on to Half-Pay around 1824 
when the Ordnance was trying to reduce the huge backlog of cadets waiting for 
commissions.  A further officer went on Half-Pay in 1813 as a result of losing his 
leg  at  the  battle  of  Talavera.
161    Only  five  of  these  twenty-four  officers 
subsequently retired, the remaining nineteen staying on half-pay until they died. 
                                            
160 Pasley, Burgoyne, Goldfinch and Jones made brevet Lieut.-Colonel in 14-15 years. Gother 
Mann, the Inspector-General of Fortifications at that time took 34 years. See Appendix J for a 
sample of the times taken for various officers. 
161 Charles Boothby. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Seventy-eight officers retired (including the five mentioned above).  Seven of 
these  retirements  were  around  the  1824-25  period  of  restructuring.    Of  the 
remainder the majority had around forty years service with very few of them 
having  less  than  thirty  years.    This  would  mean  that  most  of  these  officers 
would  still  have  been  serving  past  fifty  and  some  would  have  been  in  their 
sixties.  William Twiss served until he was sixty-five, Nepean to sixty-seven, 
Morse to sixty-eight, Charles Holloway until seventy-five and Samuel Dickens 
until  eighty-three.    The  longest  serving  and  oldest  was  Gother  Mann  who 
served as Inspector General of Fortifications until his death at the age of eighty-
four, by which time he had served for sixty-seven years. 
 
This  leaves  around  one  hundred  and  eighty  officers  who  remained  with  the 
Corps until their death.  Deaths on active service account for about thirty of this 
number, so around one hundred and fifty, which is over half of the total served 
with the corps until they died. 
 
Of the two hundred and eighty officers, one hundred and one remained to make 
Colonel  and  forty  continued  through  to  the  highest  rank  of  Colonel-
Commandant.    This  shows  the  resilience  of  the  officers  as  there  were  only 
around  five  posts  as  Colonel  Commandant  and  ten  as  Colonel,  in  the 
establishment of the corps. 
 
The summary above shows that most engineer officers remained in the Corps 
for the whole of their career and in many cases the whole of their life.  Some did 
make the transition to positions of responsibility outside of the Corps.  Several 
went to hold senior positions of responsibility in the empire.  In almost all cases 
it was their education as an engineer that led to their future appointments.  The 
following section highlights some of the future activities of these officers.  It is 
also worth noting that several of these positions were held whilst still retaining 
their Royal Engineer commissions.   
 
−  George Barney made Lieutenant-Governor of North Australia in 1846.  Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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−  John By supervised the construction of the Rideau canal in Canada from 
1826-32 and founded Bytown, which later became Ottawa. 
−  Stephen Chapman was Governor of Bermuda 1832-9. 
−  Thomas Colby spent his whole career working on Ordnance Survey and 
was one of the founder members of the Royal Astronomical Society. 
−  George Gipps was Private Secretary to first Lord of the Admiralty from 
1834 and Governor of New South Wales and New Zealand from 1838-
46. 
−  George Graydon was Lieutenant-Governor St Lucia from 1841. 
−  Francis Bond Head was Lieut.-Governor of Upper Canada from 1835-37. 
−  George Harding was Lieutenant-Governor Guernsey from 1855. 
−  George H Henderson was founder/Director of London & South Western 
Railway Company & Southampton Gas and Light Company.  
−  Joshua Jebb was made Surveyor-General of prisons in 1837 and in 1844 
he was made Inspector General of military prisons.  
−  William Reid was Governor of Bermuda from 1838-46 and Governor of 
Windward Islands in 1846. He was knighted in 1851 for his service as 
Chairman of the Great Exhibition.  He was then Governor of Malta from 
1851-1858. 
−  Charles Shipley was Governor of Grenada from1813-15. 
−  James Carmichael Smyth was Governor of the Bahamas from 1829 and 
Governor of Guyana from 1833. 
−  James  Vetch  was  appointed  to  the  commission  for  settling  the  Irish 
boundaries.  From 1836-1840 he was the Chief Engineer for Birmingham 
and  Gloucester  Railway.  He  designed  the  drainage  system  for  Leeds 
and Windsor, including Windsor castle. 
3.3.5.   SUMMARY 
The conclusions from this research is that there is a strong family tradition of 
service in the military shown in the officers who served in the Royal Engineers.  
There  is  no  evidence  of  the  introduction  of  officers  from  the  new  class  of 
business men that were emerging in England at this time.  The majority of the 
officers completed their whole life in the Corps.  Therefore, being an engineer Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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was  seen  as  a  lifetime’s  occupation  and  not  as  a  career  step  to  something 
‘better’. 
 
In many cases the officers took an active interest in science and engineering 
outside of their profession and in most cases they belonged to local and major 
interest groups.  Membership of the Royal Society, the arts, Civil Engineers and 
the Astronomical Society were quite normal.  They clearly were well respected 
in  society.    One  example  was  Thomas  Colby,  who  was  nominated  to  the 
Institute of Civil Engineers by Thomas Telford. 
 
Several  officers  moved  on  to  civil  positions  in  their  later  careers.    It  is  not 
surprising  that  many  of  these  posts  were  in  distant  locations  of  the  British 
Empire.  These officers had served abroad and understood what was required.  
Often  the  officers  are  better  known  abroad  than  they  are  at  home.    The 
Dictionary of Canadian National Biography has information on several officers, 
because  of  the  important  roles  they  played  in  the  formation  of  that  country. 
There are similar entries in a number of Australian publications.
162  This small 
group of engineer officers had a material effect on many countries around the 
globe and they have a lasting legacy to the good work of the Royal Engineers. 
3.4.  Careers of the Engineer officers  
Between  1808  and  1815,  there  were  two  hundred  and  eighty  officers  who 
served at some point in time in the Corps of Royal Engineers.  This number of 
officers had to provide engineering support to the whole of the British Empire, 
with the exception of India, which was separately resourced by the East India 
Company.  This section will review the distribution of the officers around the 
globe  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  Empire,  and  the  growing  and  conflicting 
needs of the wars in Europe and worldwide. 
 
Seniority  was  as  great  a  source  of  comment  and  concern  in  the  Corps  of 
Engineers as it was in the army, which is perhaps surprising when promotion in 
                                            
162  A.J.  Smithers,  Honourable  Conquests  :  An  account  of  the  enduring  work  of  the  Royal 
Engineers throughout the Empire (London, 1991); recounts some of the better known examples. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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the  engineers  was  fixed  by  seniority.    The  different  methods  of  promotion 
between the Corps and the army will be described followed by and examination 
of  the  time  taken  to  reach  the  higher  ranks  and  an  analysis  of  whether 
promotion by seniority was strictly followed.  This will lead in to a review of the 
command of the engineers in the Peninsula and the issues that seniority and 
brevet promotions brought. 
 
The analysis will continue by looking at the officers’ operational experience and 
consider what experience they brought to the campaigns in the Peninsula from 
1808  to  1814.    The  number  of  officers  with  significant  experience  was  very 
small, but many of them wrote a great deal through this period and much can 
be learnt from their correspondence.  The  casualty rates for the period will be 
reviewed and compared with those of the army. 
3.4.1.   SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORPS OF 
ROYAL ENGINEERS 
Officer Numbers 
Between  1808  and  1815,  there  were  two  hundred  and  eighty  officers  who 
served in the Corps of Royal Engineers.  The largest number in any one year, 
during  this  period,  was  two  hundred  and  twenty-nine  in  1815.
163    The  total 
number of engineer officers had risen steadily from one hundred and forty-three 
in 1808, constantly trying to train enough new officers to reach the approved 
establishment  level,  which  peaked  at  two  hundred  and  sixty-two  in  1813.
164  
The actual number of officers continued to rise after the war to a maximum of 
two  hundred  and  sixty-one  in  1817,  as  cadets  already  in  the  system  were 
commissioned, before the effect of the peace caused the establishment to be 
slashed. 
 
                                            
163 Calculated from Army List 1815. 
164 Establishment levels from W. Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers (Chatham, 
1977), vol. 1, p. 400.  Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Table 3d.  Actual and Establishment levels in the Royal Engineers.
165 
Actual  1796  1800  1802  1806  1808  1809  1810  1811  1812  1813  1814  1815 
Colonel 
Comm.  1  1  1  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  5  5 
Colonel  5  5  6  5  6  6  6  7  9  8  9  9 
Lieut.-Col.  6  6  6  10  12  12  15  15  16  16  22  22 
Captain  16  17  20  24  30  30  35  35  40  40  45  45 
2nd Captain  14  19  20  25  31  31  36  36  41  41  47  46 
1st Lieut.  27  30  41  46  51  61  67  71  80  77  77  89 
2nd Lieut.  14  13  2  4  9  29  18  24  0
166  14  12  13 
Brigade 
Major  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0 
Total  85  93  98  118  143  173  182  193  191  201  217  229 
Establishm’t  94  114  113  157  172  201  201  229  229  262  262  262 
% of Lieuts  48%  46%  44%  42%  42%  52%  47%  49%  42%  45%  41%  45% 
% of Capt’s  35%  39%  41%  42%  43%  35%  39%  37%  42%  40%  42%  40% 
 
The number of engineer officers nearly trebled between the French Revolution 
and Waterloo, reflecting the increasing demand for skilled officers.  Over the 
same  period  that  size  of  the  army  grew  from  around  40,000  in  1793
167  to 
around  230,000
168  and  the  artillery  grew  from  around  4,000
169  to  27,000.
170  
Although  at  first  glance  there  was  a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of 
engineers,  the  Royal  Engineers  grew  less  quickly  than  the  other  parts  of 
Britain’s military establishment. 
The Location of Engineers at Home and Abroad 
The Corps of Royal Engineers had to provide resources across the whole of the 
British Empire, with the exception of India.  The Napoleonic Wars put a massive 
strain  on  the  Corps  in  trying  to  meet  this  demand  from  their  very  limited 
resources.    The  expansion  of  the  British  Empire  during  this  period    placed 
                                            
165 Actual numbers taken from the appropriate years, Army List. Establishment numbers from 
Porter, Vol.1.  The establishment was the approved manpower level for the Corps. 
166 Army List shows no Second Lieutenants, which is odd. The Corps returns, WO54-252 shows 
25 Second Lieutenants. The previous years commissions were promoted to 1
st Lieutenant in 
June  and  the  next  batch  were  commissioned  in  August,  so  the  army  list  may  have  been 
produced in the intervening period. I have left at zero to be consistent with other figures taken 
from Army Lists. 
167 Fortescue, British Army, vol. 4, part II, p. 940. Figure for 1793. 
168 Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, p. 292. The September 1813 total for infantry and cavalry 
was used. 
169 Fortescue, British Army, vol. 4, Part II, p. 938. 
170  Fortescue,  County  Lieutenancies,  p.  293.  Although  Glover  in  Wellington’s  Army,  p.  92, 
shows artillery officer numbers growing slower from 247 in 1791 to 727 in 1814. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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additional strain on the establishment.  The conflict with the United States led to 
further demand which in the short term was difficult to meet. 
 
The geographical spread of these officers was as follows : 
 
Table 3e. Royal Engineer Officers by Location. 
Location  Jan 1809
171  Jan 1811
172  Jan 1813
173 
Great Britain  77  67  77 
Ireland  14  22  17 
North America  16  15  15 
Caribbean  10  10  10 
Africa & Asia  8  9  7 
Mediterranean  24  30  32 
Iberian Peninsula  25  42  39 
Others  2  2  3 
Total  176  197  200 
 
This table highlights a number of points.  Through the whole period, around half 
of all engineer officers were based in the United Kingdom.  Many of these were 
newly commissioned officers and assigned to local districts or the Ordnance 
Survey  whilst  they  gained  experience.    From  1812  onwards,  all  newly 
commissioned  engineer  officers  spent  time  at  the  School  of  Military 
Engineering.  Table 3f shows the number of junior engineers in the corps, in 
selected years. 
 
Table 3f. Newly Commissioned Engineer Officers 
  1809  1811  1813 
Commissioned previous year  26  14  13 
Total 2
nd Lieutenants  29  24  14 
Total 1
st Lieutenants  61  71  77 
 
The proportion in the United Kingdom dropped over the period from 52% in 
1809 to 47% in 1813, showing that more officers were being posted outside of 
the United Kingdom, which was inevitable during a war.  The percentage of 
engineers who were not in the Peninsula or Mediterranean averaged around 
                                            
171 WO54-251. Taken from Returns for 1809. 
172 WO54-252. Taken from Returns for 1811. 
173 WO54-252. Taken from Return for 1813. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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65%.  It can be generalised that this group was involved in garrison duty.  So, at 
any  one  time  during  the  Peninsular  War,  two  thirds  of  the  corps  were  not 
involved in the war.  The percentage is actually higher than this, as the majority 
of  the  engineers  serving  in  the  Mediterranean  were  not  involved  in  active 
operations (the exceptions being Gibraltar and Cadiz).  
 
The  increase  in  the  engineer  establishment  during  this  period  was  used  to 
supply officers for the operations in the Peninsula with the proportion of the total 
rising  from  14%  through  to  20%.    Towards  the  end  of  1813,  the  proportion 
peaked  at  25%.    There  was  also  an  increase  in  the  officers  serving  in  the 
Mediterranean.    The  actual  numbers  serving  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Americas and elsewhere remained static throughout the period with almost all 
spare staff being directed to operations in Europe. 
 
Table 3g. Officer numbers summary
174 
  1809  1811  1813 
Great Britain and Ireland  91  89  94 
Americas and Caribbean  26  25  25 
Peninsula and Mediterranean  49  72  71 
Others  10  11  10 
Total  176  197  200 
 
Further  analysis  reveals  that  many  of  the  officers  who  were  located  at  the 
remote stations around the world did not move often, if at all.  This was partly 
due to the accumulation of local knowledge, but was also, in part, due to the 
very  serious  travel  limitations  during  the  age  of  sail.    Whilst  passage  of  the 
Atlantic was usually a voyage of a few weeks, the journey to far flung outposts 
like Ceylon could take up to nine months.  
Engineers in the Peninsula 
Eighty-six (31%) engineer officers served at some point during the Peninsular 
War  with  the  Duke  of  Wellington.    This  number  increased  to  ninety-seven 
officers  who  either  served  in  the  Peninsula  with  Wellington  or  during  the 
Spanish  east  coast  campaign  of  1812  to  1813,  which  is  roughly  35%  of  all 
                                            
174 Source is the same as table 3e. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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engineer officers.
175  Sixty-six officers served in the Mediterranean, the Spanish 
fortresses  or  the  campaign  on  the  east  coast  of  Spain  (this  covers  Cadiz, 
Gibraltar,  Tarifa,  Sicily,  Minorca,  Malta,  Madeira,  Genoa,  Ionian  islands  and 
Corsica).    In  total,  one  hundred  and  thirty-four
176  different  engineer  officers 
served at some time in the Peninsula or the Mediterranean between 1808 and 
the end of the war, which is 48% of the total of Corps of Royal Engineers over 
that period. 
 
The maximum number in the Peninsula at any one time peaked at forty-five in 
the summer of 1813.  The number had been growing steadily through the war, 
with roughly fifteen in 1809, twenty in 1810, thirty in 1811 and 1812 and forty in 
1813 and 1814. 
 
The longest serving officer was Captain Frank Stanway who served the full six 
years from summer 1808 to summer 1814, with John Burgoyne serving only a 
few  months  less.    The  average  length  of  service  in  the  Peninsula  was 
approximately twenty-one months.
177  Many of the officers spent a significant 
time in the Peninsula and their knowledge and experience must have grown 
over the period.  Nineteen officers served more than three years and thirty-four 
served over two years. 
 
The  number  in  the  Peninsula  was  never  enough  to  meet  the  operational 
demands.  There were occasions when Wellington said that he did not have 
engineer officers for a particular task.  Through the peak years of 1811 and 
1812, the casualties were particularly high and the influx of new officers did not 
lead to an overall increase in numbers. 
 
                                            
175 Michael Glover in ‘Wellington’s Army’ wrote there were 102 officers served in the Peninsula, 
but does not give his source. I am confident the numbers used above in this are correct. 
176 This differs from the totals above, as some officers served in both the Peninsula and in the 
Mediterranean. 
177  Appendix  C,  provides  a  month  by  month  breakdown  on  the  service  of  engineers  in  the 
Peninsula. Full details can be obtained from the database which I have prepared. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Table 3h. Officers killed and wounded in the Peninsula 
Year  Killed  Wounded
178 
1808    1 
1809  1  2 
1810  2   
1811  6  4 
1812  9  17 
1813  5  8 
1814  2  2 
Total  25  33 
 
Reacting to the demand, Wellington wrote to Liverpool on 31 March 1811,
179 
forwarding a letter from Fletcher and asking for more engineers to be sent out.  
Several new officers did come out later in the year, but the total number of 
officers  available  did  not  change  due  to  the  casualties.    Whilst  some  of  the 
wounds suffered by officers were minor and did not have any long term effect, 
some were much more serious. Boothby lost a leg at Talavera in 1809.  In 
1812, J.T. Jones, W.C. Holloway and Macleod were wounded; in 1813 G.C. 
Lewis lost a leg and Barry was wounded.  None of these officers returned to the 
Peninsula. 
 
Throughout most of the war there was a fairly consistent presence of a small 
number of senior engineer officers.  Between 1809 and 1813, Wellington dealt 
almost exclusively with Fletcher, J.T. Jones and Burgoyne.  Jones was injured 
at the end of 1812 and returned to England.  When Fletcher was killed in 1813, 
he  was  replaced  by  Elphinstone  who  was  present  until  the  end  of  the  war.  
Burgoyne  was  present  throughout.    This  gave  Wellington  a  stability  in  his 
dealing  with  the  Royal  Engineers  that  he  never  achieved  with  the  Royal 
Artillery,  until  he  appointed  Dickson  in  mid  1813.    He  may  not  have  liked 
Fletcher or Elphinstone, but he could work with them.  Wellington certainly had 
confidence in Burgoyne and Jones.   
                                            
178 These are reports of officers being wounded. An individual officer may have been wounded 
more than once during this period. 
179 WD, vol. 7, p. 423. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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3.4.2.  SENIORITY AND COMMAND 
Comparison of Promotion in the Ordnance Department and Horse Guards 
Very  different  systems  were  used  by  the  army  and  the  Ordnance  for  the 
promotion  of  officers.    The  army  followed  a  process  based  on  the  historical 
precedent of the regiment being the personal possession of its colonel.  The 
regiment was a business, in which the colonel, if he ran it efficiently (or some 
would say negligently) could make a profit.  Britain got a body of trained and 
equipped men partly funded at someone else’s expense.  Officers bought their 
rank and saw it as an investment, which could be cashed in or exchanged at a 
later date.  The system of purchase was seen as discriminatory and favouring 
those with money.  It was claimed to introduce those who had no interest or 
talent  into  the  army  to  the  detriment  of  its  effectiveness.    The  period 
immediately  preceding  the  wars  with  France  from  1793  reinforced  this  view 
through an ineffective or non-existent British Commander-in-Chief, who allowed 
permanent rank to those with no military experience.  The arrival of the Duke of 
York in 1794 slowly brought about a change which eventually put some order 
into the system.  One of the major changes was the introduction of minimum 
periods  of  service  at  a  rank  before  an  officer  was  allowed  to  purchase  a 
promotion  to  the  next  rank.    This  was  set  at  two  years  in  the  regular  army 
before a Lieutenant could purchase a Captaincy, and six years for a Majority.
180  
The purchase system could only be used up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. 
 
The  Ordnance  followed  the  more  equitable  policy  of  promotion  by  seniority.  
Each officer was promoted to the next rank based on his length of service in the 
Corps with no exceptions.  There was also no opportunity to sell the rank and 
no pension, except for injury
181, so officers often remained until death.  Whilst 
this system appeared fairer, it led to almost complete stagnation in the upper 
ranks  and  the  consequent  lack  of  opportunities  for  younger  officers.    More 
seriously, the development of the Corps was stifled by these same old men who 
saw no need to change the way they had operated through the second half of 
                                            
180 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 154. 
181 Glover, Wellington’s Army, p. 91. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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the  18
th  century.    Most  of  these  officers  had  no  operational  experience  in 
mainland  Europe  and  their  knowledge,  if  they  had  any,  was  based  on 
operations in North America, the Caribbean and India.  Generally though, the 
Ordnance  officers  accepted  the  process  and  knew  that  persistence  would 
eventually gain them the senior ranks and the benefits that went with them. 
 
With  the  added  complexity  of  brevet  ranks  in  the  army,  there  was  still 
opportunity  for  tensions  and  disagreements.  One  example  occurred  in  early 
1812  following  the  successful  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo.    Burgoyne  was  the 
siege  director,  under  the  Commanding  Royal  Engineer  in  the  Peninsula, 
Richard  Fletcher.    Jones  was  the  Brigade-Major  and  Macleod,  one  of  the 
engineers  at  the  siege.    In  Wellington’s  despatch  after  the  siege,  dated  20 
January 1812,
182 Macleod got a mention in passing and Jones got a thanks 
from  Wellington  along  with  Fletcher  as  the  Senior  Engineer.    Through  an 
oversight, Burgoyne was not mentioned.  Based on them being mentioned in 
despatches, Jones and Macleod received their brevet army rank of Major.  Less 
than two weeks after Wellington wrote his despatch, Charles Pasley was writing 
from England to Burgoyne :  
 
You have been unlucky in having two junior officers promoted over you, 
who were employed on the same service. Macleod’s case in particular is 
a great shame, his father took advantage of the mere mention of his 
name, and settled the matter in a moment.
183 
 
Macleod  and  Jones  were  below  Burgoyne  in  the  corps  seniority  list  and  by 
getting  their  brevet  army  rank  first  could  have  a  claim  to  seniority.    Jones’ 
promotion was justified but it appears Macleod got his because his father was a 
Major-General in the Royal Artillery.  Wellington realised the mistake and it was 
quickly resolved, with Burgoyne also receiving a brevet army Majority with the 
same effective date as Jones and Macleod.
184  The imbalance was restored, a 
                                            
182 WD, 2
nd Edn, vol. 5, p. 472. 
183 Wrottesley, Life of Burgoyne, vol. 1, p. 166. Letter from Pasley to Burgoyne, 2 Mar 1812.  
Jones, one of the two recipients of promotion did not find out himself until 8 Mar 1812, REM, 
550159-3, Jones, Diary. 
184 See WO 3 /601,  p. 276-79. Torrens to Wellington, 21 Feb 1812, where Torrens informs 
Wellington that HRH has approved Burgoyne’s promotion. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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few months later, when Burgoyne and Jones got their brevet army promotion to 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Macleod not getting his until 1817. 
 
Pasley was embroiled in a similar argument with the Ordnance at the same time 
as  described  above.    He  had  been  asked  to  form  the  School  of  Military 
Engineering, which he had been arguing for years was desperately needed.  
However,  he  expected  to  receive  his  brevet  Majority  for  this  role  and  the 
Master-General would not agree.  Pasley refused to take up the role until the 
issue  was  resolved.    Along  with  the  issue  of  rank  in  the  Portuguese  army, 
brevet  army  ranks  caused  a  number  of  problems  during  the  war  in  the 
engineers, the artillery and the army. This will be discussed further below. 
 
Though the system of purchase was seen as unfair, in practice it did produce 
some good results and wealth was not necessarily a barrier to talent.  In some 
ways the purchase system followed in principle the system in use in France up 
to  the  start  of  the  Revolutionary  wars,  where  families  (often  gentry)  with 
generations of service held key posts and were admitted to the ecole militaire in 
preference to their poorer countrymen.  This is discussed at some length in 
Blaufarb’s book on the French army.
185  There is similar evidence in this country 
of families with generations of military service providing excellent officers. 
 
The Duke of York reformed the purchase system, but recognised that it could 
not be replaced easily due to the sums invested in it by the officers.  He advised 
against the introduction of purchase for the East India Company and did not 
allow it in the Royal Staff Corps.
186  His preference, based on the advice he 
gave to the East India Company was for promotion by seniority up to the rank of 
Captain,  and  then  by  merit.    This  was  a  compromise  solution  between  that 
which operated in the army and that which operated in the Ordnance.  
 
In December 1814, the Master-General broke the hallowed seniority tradition for 
the highest rank of Colonel-Commandant, arguing :  
                                            
185 R. Blaufarb, The French Army 1750-1820. Careers, Talent, Merit (Manchester, 2002). 
186 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 154. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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he cannot conceive that the possibility of breaking the routine of seniority 
by  succession  in  consequence  of  distinguished  services,  can  hurt  the 
emulation or break the spirit of the corps.
187 
 
This change was strongly opposed by the officers themselves who saw their 
guaranteed (but slow) promotion prospects being eroded.  The Master-General 
went on to explain that he could not change his decision, particularly as he had 
received the Prince Regent’s ‘pleasure’ to make this change.  The officers saw 
it  differently.    As  brevet  army  promotions  had  shown,  promotion  based  on 
performance could give an advantage to those in the right place at the right 
time, which some would argue was unfair.  Garrison and headquarters duty was 
not as exciting (or dangerous!) but it was still a necessary task. 
Time taken to gain promotion in the Corps
188 
Earlier,  the  different  methods  of  promotion  between  the  Ordnance  and  the 
Horse Guards were described.  In this section, the time taken to rise through 
the ranks within the Royal Engineers will be reviewed.  For the analysis, the 
time to rise from an officers’ first commission as 2
nd Lieutenant, to the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel has been used.  Of the officers who were still active during 
the Peninsular War, there were forty-eight who reached the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel.  The earliest was Robert Morse in 1783 and the last, John Burgoyne in 
December 1814. 
 
Twenty-one were appointed before the Peninsular War started (that is twenty-
one, in the twenty-five years between 1783 and 1808), with twenty-seven being 
appointed in the following six years between 1809 and 1814.  It was not just the 
volume of appointments that changed during the period.  The time taken to 
reach the rank also decreased at the periods of maximum demand for officers.  
The  longest  time  was  Gother  Mann,  who  obtained  his  rank  in  1793,  nearly 
thirty-one  years  after  being  commissioned.
189  The  shortest  was  between 
                                            
187 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 402. 
188 Full details of the information comes from Appendix F, unless otherwise specified. 
189 Mann, went on to become Inspector General of Fortification in 1811, and served in this role 
until 1830, when he died at the age of 84! This was the effect of having no pension and no way 
of selling your commission in the Ordnance. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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sixteen and seventeen years for six officers promoted in the years 1806 and 
1814.  The time taken dropped from an average of around twenty-seven years 
before 1800, to twenty-one years, up to the start of the Peninsular War and then 
down to around eighteen years during the war.  The surplus of officers after the 
war, immediately pushed the average time back up to twenty-five years.  The 
officers  who  gained  much  faster  promotion  to  Lieutenant-Colonel,  were 
fortunate to be able to take advantage of the rapid increase in the size of the 
corps.    The  number  of  Lieutenant-Colonels  on  the  establishment  grew  from 
eight in 1805, to ten in 1806 (this is the 1806 blip in time to reach Lieutenant-
Colonel  mentioned  above),  and  on  to  the  peak  of  twenty-two  in  1814  (the 
second blip in time to reach Lieutenant-Colonel mentioned above). 
 
In the later years of the war, the time taken to rise from 2
nd Lieutenant to 1
st 
Lieutenant was about a year; to rise from 1
st Lieutenant to 2
nd Captain about 
four years.  Both of these times were significantly reduced from averages of five 
years and eight years respectively around 1780.  Further promotion came to a 
complete  stop  after  the  war  with  no  promotions  to  Captain  or  Lieutenant-
Colonel between 1817 and 1824. 
 
There is no evidence of alteration in the principal of seniority which was used in 
the  Royal  Engineers.    Officers,  whether  on  active  service,  employed  at 
headquarters or on garrison duty were promoted in turn.  Two officers spent the 
whole  period  as  prisoners  of  war,  and  still  kept  their  place  in  the  seniority 
lists.
190  Recognition for exceptional effort came through brevet promotions and 
these invariably, but not always, went to officers on active duty.  Charles Pasley 
received his brevet promotions for his work in the training and education of the 
Sappers and Miners.  The difficulties caused by brevet ranks will be discussed 
below. 
 
                                            
190 M.C. Dixon and A. Fraser were captured in 1808 and spent the rest of the war to 1814 at 
Verdun. They both received promotions to 2
nd Captain, when they were due in 1810/11 even 
though they were prisoners. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Michael Glover’s analysis across the army showed an average time to reach 
Lieutenant-Colonel in the infantry, of 24.8 years by seniority and 17.6 years by 
purchase.  The figures for the cavalry, were not significantly different.  
 
Table 3i. Time taken to reach Lieutenant-Colonel In the Army.
191 
(Years)  Infantry by 
seniority 
Infantry by 
purchase 
Cavalry by 
seniority 
Cavalry by 
purchase 
Time to Lieut.-
Colonel 
24.8  17.6  24.2  16.7 
  
Comparing the time to reach Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Engineers with the 
same event in the army, shows a unexpected finding.  Although the common 
view was that promotion by seniority was slower, there does not actually appear 
to be any significant difference in the time to move through the ranks in the 
army and the Ordnance.  The fastest promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in the 
Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War was Charles Pasley in 16.4 years.  
This is actually better than the average by purchase in the army.  An army 
officer who purchased all his promotions up to Lieutenant-Colonel would have 
spent £8,200
192 to obtain an annual salary of just over £300.
193 
 
The  problem  with  slow  promotion  was  more  apparent  above  Lieutenant-
Colonel.  There were just not enough positions at the top of the Corps.  In 1815, 
there were only fifteen posts as Colonel or Colonel-Commandant.  This dropped 
to twelve posts in 1819, when the size of the Corps was reduced by 25%.  The 
young, recently appointed Lieutenant-Colonels had no promotion prospects for 
the foreseeable future. 
Command of the Engineers in the Peninsula 
The highest ranking engineer officers in the field in the Peninsula were Richard 
Fletcher  and  Howard  Elphinstone.    Fletcher,  who  did  not  make  Lieutenant-
Colonel until June 1809, was a lowly twenty-fourth in seniority in the Corps, and 
Elphinstone,  a  Captain  until  1813,  was  nine  places  lower.    It  would  seem 
                                            
191 Glover, Wellington’s Army, p. 84. 
192 Glover, Wellington’s Army, p. 76. 
193 http://www.napoleon-series.org/ British Officer's Pay, Per Diem (1815). Viewed 14 Jan 2008. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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unusual that such a junior officer was sent to command the biggest military 
operation that the British army was mounting in the world.  The questions which 
needs to be considered are : was Fletcher the first on the seniority list who was 
available and able to go to Peninsula?; was the selection based on previous 
operational experience? or was there some other reason for the choice?  A 
review of  Fletcher’s superiors provides the following information :  
 
Table 3j. Royal Engineer Officers by seniority, Part A. 
Name  Role/Location in 1809  Age  in 
1809
194 
Last  Active 
service
195 
Morse  Headquarters. Inspector General of 
fortifications. 
66  1763 
Mercer  Headquarters  70est  1779 
Mann  Headquarters  62  1793 
Twiss  Lieut-Gov. Royal Military Academy.  64  1799 
Evelegh  CRE Portsmouth for at least 4 years  58est  nk 
Fisher  Ireland for at least 4 years  56  nk 
Nepean  Headquarters  61  1794 
Shipley  West Indies for 30 years  54  nk 
Fyers  Headquarters – Deputy IGF  56est  1783 
Johnson  West Indies for at least 16 years  53est  1794 
Kersteman  CRE  Severn  district  for  at  least  6 
years 
53est  1794 
Holloway  CRE Gibraltar   60  1800 
Humfrey  CRE Jersey for at least 4 years  53est  nk 
D’Arcy  CRE Chatham for at least 4 years. 
Went to Copenhagen in 1807. 
53est  1807 
Bridges  CRE Ceylon for 7 years  53est  1795 
Dickens  CRE Malta for 9 years  45  nk 
Mackelcan  No record of his responsibilities
196  50  nk 
Bruyeres  CRE Canada for 9 years  44  1799 
Rowley  Headquarters  41  1793 
De Butts  CRE Guernsey  39  1794 
Fenwick  Ireland for 2 years  41est  nk 
Bryce  CRE Sicily for 4 years  40  1800 
Pilkington  CRE Weedon Stores for at least 4 
years (Main engineer stores) 
44  nk 
Fletcher  Portsmouth for 5 years 1802-7  40  1807 
                                            
194 Estimated ages are where date of birth is not known and I have made an assumption that 
the officers in question were 20 years old when they were commissioned. 
195 ‘nk’ (Not Known) in the Last Active Service column, means that I have found no information. 
In most cases this is likely to mean that the officer had no active service. 
196 He was court martialled in 1808 for accounting irregularities related to his command of the 
Guernsey depot, which ended in Jan 1808. There is no record of his service after this date, until 
he retired in 1815.  Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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There are not many obvious candidates above Fletcher in the seniority list.  If 
the most senior officers who were based at headquarters are removed; then 
remove  officers  with  long  residences  at  locations;  then  remove  officers  at 
remote locations; then remove officers who had no recent military experience, 
and then look at the age of the senior officers, there are a small number of 
potential candidates.  These would include D’Arcy and Fletcher, with Bryce, De 
Butts and Rowley as less obvious candidates.  D’Arcy did not go out to the 
Peninsula,  but  did  go  out  to  Walcheren,  where  he  was  court  martialled  for 
refusing  to  accept  orders.    He  did  not  serve  abroad  again.    Bryce  had  just 
returned from nearly four years in the Mediterranean.  De Butts never left the 
United  Kingdom  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.    Rowley  was  attached  to 
headquarters  for  most  of  his  career,  being  Deputy  Inspector  General  of 
Fortifications from 1812.  Fletcher was the first in the seniority list who did not 
have a substantive command, had the most recent operational experience and 
had the most operational experience.  This makes Fletcher, the logical choice, 
but  it  is  still  surprising  that  no  senior  officer  wanted  to  take  the  command. 
Fletcher  was  a  mere  Captain  when  he  first  took  command  in  August  1808, 
although he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in June 1809. 
 
One of the complaints about the Walcheren campaign was that many senior 
officers  were  present,  because  those  who  went  to  Copenhagen  made 
substantial  financial  benefits  and  officers  were  expecting  the  same  for  the 
Walcheren campaign.  The conclusion is that the view of many senior Ordnance 
officers was the same as their juniors’, that the campaign would be swiftly over 
when Napoleon pushed the British out of the Peninsula. 
 
Working further down the seniority list from Richard Fletcher, again there are 
few candidates. 
 Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Table 3k. Royal Engineer Officers by seniority, Part B. 
Name  Role/Location in 1809  Age in 
1809 
Last 
Active 
service 
Evatt  At Gibraltar for 4 years  37  1799 
Hayter  At  Woolwich  for  at  least  4  years. 
Inspector of buildings and stores. 
37(est)  1793 
Ford  Southern  District  for  at  least  4 
years 
36(est)  1800 
Mulcaster  Command of Gunpowder works at 
Faversham for 6 years. 
37  1798 
Gravatt  Gravesend for at least 4 years. In 
poor health. Transferred to Invalid 
Engineers in March 1812. 
38  1797 
Rudyerd  Portsmouth  for  2  years,  with 
previous 2 years being in Canada. 
36(est)  1799 
Lefebure  Recently  returned  from  five  years 
in Mediterranean.  
36(est)  1806 
Hughes  Canada for at least 8 years  36(est)  1794 
Elphinstone  Some operational experience over 
past 10 years 
36  1807 
 
The two most obvious, with recent experience, Lefebure and Elphinstone, both 
went out to the Peninsula in 1808.  Elphinstone arrived in the Peninsula first, in 
July 1808, and took overall command as the senior engineer.  He was wounded 
the following month and returned home.  By that time, he had been superseded 
by Fletcher, who arrived in August 1808.  Lefebure did not arrive until August 
1808, and missed his opportunity to command before Fletcher arrived.  Had he 
not been killed in 1810, it was Lefebure who would have taken command in the 
Peninsula when Sir Richard Fletcher was killed in 1813.  Lefebure was a great 
loss to the Corps.  He was well respected by his peers, and was the instigator 
of  the  formation  of  the  ‘Society  for  the  Procurement  of  Useful  Military 
Knowledge’ mentioned above.  Lefebure had been the cause of some major 
disagreements  with  other  officers  a  few  years  earlier  during  his  time  in  the 
Mediterranean, particularly with Pasley, but these had been resolved and there 
was  a  sense  of  comradeship  in  the  letters  amongst  the  officers  who  were 
involved in operational activities. 
 
The conclusion from reviewing the senior Ordnance officers is that it was the 
middle  ranking  officers  who  were  available  to  command  the  operational Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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activities and also were more likely to have had recent operational experience.  
The most senior officers were in static posts, commanding the major districts, 
garrisons  or  managing  the  Corps.    Fletcher  and  Elphinstone  (along  with 
Lefebure, who did not survive the war) were the most senior of this group.  The 
officers who made the biggest names for themselves during and after the war, 
came further down in the seniority lists again.  These include John Burgoyne, 
John T. Jones and Charles William Pasley. 
Investigation on the issue of command of the Corps in the Peninsula 
From the very first days of the Peninsular War, there was ‘discussion’ about 
seniority  in  the  Corps.    In  August  1808,  Elphinstone  was  certainly  unhappy 
about Fletcher replacing him and this may have had some part in his decision to 
return home after he was wounded at the battle of Vimiero : 
 
I have this day written for leave to return to England so you may expect 
me daily after you receive this letter. I think General Morse having sent 
out Fletcher over my head as shabby a thing as ever was done. Luckily 
he did not arrive until after both actions had taken place so that in all 
events I have secured the credit . . . I am just going to write a Jesuitical 
letter to General Morse in hopes of securing a good station upon my 
return.
197 
 
Clearly his wound was not serious, as he took the post of Commanding Royal 
Engineer at Gravesend on his return to England in September 1808, a post he 
held  until  his  return  to  the  Peninsula  in  February  1813.    Elphinstone  was 
ordered back out to the Peninsula at a time when Fletcher had been granted 
temporary leave of absence to return home.  Judging by Elphinstone’s letters, 
he  was  clearly  expecting  to  take  command  of  the  engineers,  but  was  very 
concerned that Fletcher would return and take the command from him again.
198  
Fletcher wanted to return home as his wife had died in May 1808, and with five 
young  children,  he  wanted  to  make  long  term  arrangements  for  their  future.  
This included, according to Elphinstone’s ‘gossipy’ letters, returning to England 
to find a wife to look after them.  Fletcher did return in April 1813 and was killed 
in August at the siege of San Sebastian.  Wellington subsequently wrote to Lord 
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Liverpool  in  October  1813  asking  for  a  provision  to  be  made  for  Fletcher’s 
family.
199 
 
When  Richard  Fletcher  went  home  in  December  1812,  Burgoyne  wrote  to 
Wellington seeking clarification on who was the senior engineer.  Goldfinch held 
the seniority in the Royal Engineers, but Burgoyne held the senior army rank of 
brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel.    Wellington  found  in  favour  of  Goldfinch.
200    This 
exchange is important at a number of levels.  
 
Firstly, Wellington had no authority over such matters, it being an Ordnance 
Department concern.  It would have been expected that the engineers would 
write to the Board of Ordnance for clarification of seniority.  There is no doubt 
that the Board would also have found in favour of rank in the Corps.  
 
Secondly,  was  Burgoyne  trying  to  gain  advantage  by  playing  on  his  good 
relationship with Wellington?  It is difficult to see why Burgoyne would believe 
that army rank would take precedence.  In a similar debate a few years earlier, 
which Burgoyne was aware of, the Board had clearly stated that even seniority 
within the Ordnance (that is, Royal Artillery against Royal Engineer) did not hold 
and  the  senior  engineer  present  would  always  command.
201  According  to 
Jones, a similar situation occurred on the east coast of Spain in 1812, where he 
believed he should have command over Thackeray based on his brevet army 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, but an ‘amicable’ settlement was made where he 
was  transferred  to  the  Quarter-Master-General’s  Department  and  Thackeray 
commanded the engineers.
202  
 
Thirdly,  Wellington’s  response  stated  that  the  senior  engineer  would  take 
command when there were officers from different armies present.  Burgoyne’s 
claim for command was based on the need to command engineers from the 
British, Portuguese and Kings German Legion. Wellington’s response that the 
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202  J.T.  Jones,  The  Military  Autobiography  of  Major-General  J  T  Jones,  Privately  printed, 
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senior would take command could have led to a situation in which the senior 
Portuguese Engineer officer would lead.  This was not a situation he was willing 
to allow in the army.  Yet, Wellington used exactly this route to appoint Dickson 
to command the artillery in 1813, he being the senior on the basis of his rank in 
the Portuguese artillery. 
 
The situations highlighted above recurred throughout the Peninsular War.  They 
were  usually  featured  in  private  letters  rather  than  official  correspondence.  
Burgoyne’s  letter  to  Wellington  was  unusual  in  that  it  was  done  formally.  
Burgoyne’s  own  explanation  was  that  this  was  so  that  he  could  show  the 
correspondence  to  Goldfinch  to  demonstrate  that  his  intentions  were 
honourable.
203 
 
When  Fletcher  was  killed,  Burgoyne  took  over  as  temporary  Commanding 
Engineer  at  Headquarters.    Elphinstone  was  the  senior  engineer  in  the 
Peninsula at this time.  He was based in Lisbon, having been ordered there 
from  Headquarters  when  he  arrived  in  the  Peninsula.    It  would  appear  that 
Wellington  was  in  no  hurry  to  call  up  either  Elphinstone  from  Lisbon  or 
Goldfinch who was at Pamplona.  He was surprised when Elphinstone, on his 
own  initiative,  got  a  sea  passage  and  arrived  at  headquarters  on  13  Oct 
1813.
204    Elphinstone  had  some  very  real  concerns  about  his  taking  over 
command  after  Fletcher’s  death.  Wellington  had  recently  caused  great 
consternation in the Royal Artillery by keeping Alexander Dickson, as his senior 
representative of the Royal Artillery in the Peninsula, over the head of more 
senior artillery officers.  Elphinstone’s letters to his wife suggest that he thought 
the same might happen again, in favour of John Burgoyne.  In letters to his wife, 
he wrote :  
 
My coming up will I fancy make some little bustle at Woolwich, as Ld W. 
has sent away two Lt. Col's and put Dickens [Sic, should say Dickson] in 
command upon his brevet rank over the heads of four senior officers in 
                                            
203  REM,  5501-139-3,  Private  note  to  Fitzroy  Somerset  attached  to  the  formal  request  for 
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the country, all of whom are mean enough to remain and serve under 
him.
205  
 
And, 
 
I heard rather a moderate man say he thought if any officer senior to 
Dixon [Sic, Dickson] remained to serve under him after my coming up 
they ought to be sent to Coventry by the regiment.
206 
 
Wellington  had  suffered  with  problems  with  his  relationship  with  the 
Commanding  Officer  of  the  artillery  and  had  developed  a  close  working 
relationship and trust in Dickson going back two or three years.  Following the 
injury to Colonel Robe at Burgos, Colonel Fisher was sent out to replace him.  
Wellington and Fisher fell out and in May 1813 and Fisher asked to resign the 
command  and  return  to  England.    Wellington  then  appointed  Dickson  to 
command the artillery, over several other officers who were his senior in the 
regiment,  based  on  his  local  rank  in  the  Portuguese  artillery.    Although 
Elphinstone’s letter would suggest that the officers in the artillery were against 
Dickson, there were other officers who recognised his merit and were willing to 
serve under him,
207 although they all recognised the sensitivity of the situation.  
In fact there had already been a precedent set two years earlier, when Dickson 
commanded at the first siege of Badajoz over more senior officers in the Royal 
Artillery.
208 Dickson did his bit to play down the situation by always wearing his 
Portuguese army uniform.
209 
 
Elphinstone also commented in one of his letters that Burgoyne had indicated to 
him that he would refuse the command if it was offered to him by Wellington.
210  
This would fit in with the picture of Burgoyne as someone who would not ask 
for, or take anything that he was not entitled to.  The justification for keeping 
Burgoyne  in  command  would  have  been  very  tenuous,  as  the  only  obvious 
reason would be using Burgoyne’s brevet army rank over Elphinstone’s corps 
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210 REM, 4201-274, Elphinstone to Bridges, 16 Oct 1813. Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
  109 
rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel.    Elphinstone  could  clearly  see  parallels  between 
Dickson and Burgoyne who had both been with Wellington for some time and 
commanded his respect. 
 
Wellington  had  tried  on  a  number  of  occasions  before  to  keep  officers  he 
trusted, near to him, with varying levels of success.  One example was Robert 
Craufurd, who commanded the Light Division, when there were more senior 
officers available.  By 1813, Wellington’s successes, gave him more power to 
influence decisions on officer appointments, but it must have caused him some 
concern that he officially had no say over Ordnance appointments (artillery and 
engineers).  Wellington was working in a very sensitive area.  The early years of 
the  Peninsular  War  were  difficult  because  many  general  officers  refused  to 
serve under Wellington for the very same reason of seniority.  It was not until he 
was appointed Field Marshal that the issue was resolved. 
 
The issue in the engineers was made slightly more difficult by the awarding of 
brevet army ranks.  Whilst there is no evidence to back up suggestions that 
officers  were  promoted  out  of  turn  within  the  corps,
211  there  was  a  clear 
difference around brevet ranks.  Outside of the routine awards of brevet ranks, 
almost  all  the  more  senior  engineer  officers  who  served  in  the  Peninsula 
received their brevet ranks earlier, generally through being mentioned in the 
official  despatches  of  army  commanders.    They  included  Lefebure,  Birch, 
Chapman, Squire, Jones and Pasley.
212  This created an issue around brevet 
ranks which had not occurred before, as there had been limited use of them in 
the  past.    Situations  now  were  occurring  regularly  where  there  was  debate 
about  whether  Corps  or  army  rank  took  precedence.    The  evidence  of  the 
letters of these officers show that the lack of clarity did have an effect on morale 
and relationships. 
 
                                            
211 A detailed analysis of the promotion dates of all corps officers, shows no instance where an 
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All the situations described above do appear to follow a common thread, and it 
appears  that  Wellington  was  applying  the  rules  consistently.    Although  a 
number of officers including Burgoyne and Jones tried to use brevet army rank 
to claim command, the fact is that Wellington did not recognise this within the 
Ordnance  corps.    Wellington  in  responding  to  Burgoyne  and  in  appointing 
Dickson, made the senior artillery or engineer officer the commander, whether 
he was in the British, Portuguese or Kings German Legion.  The issue of brevet 
was  not  taken  into  account.  Wellington’s  view  could  not  have  been  put  any 
clearer : 
 
In  the  event  however  of  the  British  officers  meeting  either  with  those 
belonging to the King's German Legion, or with Portuguese officers, the 
Marquess of Wellington would then look upon the senior officer of the 
Corps of Engineers, whether Portuguese, British or German, as the one 
to have command of the whole.
213 
 
It  would  appear  that  Wellington  was  acting  in  a  consistent  manner  in  his 
dealings with officers.  Although Wellington tried very hard to avoid situations 
where an officer from the Portuguese or Spanish armies could claim seniority, 
he did recognise the principle.  One example was at the battle of Albuera when 
General Long was replaced as commander of the Allied cavalry by General 
Lumley as there was a Spanish cavalry commander who was senior to Long.  In 
this  case  Wellington  was  not  willing  to  allow  the  British  cavalry  to  be 
commanded by an officer from any other nation. 
3.4.3.   OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SELECTION 
Experience of Officers Prior to the Peninsular War 
An analysis of operational activity between 1790 and 1809 paints an interesting 
picture of the breadth of experience that the officers in the Royal Engineers 
could provide.  Only sixty-nine officers had any operational experience during 
this period (see Appendix B).  This was approximately a quarter of the Corps 
total.  The majority of these had only served in one campaign (forty-four of the 
sixty-nine officers) leaving only twenty-five officers who had served in more than 
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one  operational  campaign  (10%).    The  Walcheren  campaign  of  1809  saw  a 
number of officers going on their first campaign.  Omitting this campaign would 
reduce  the  number  of  officers  with  operational  experience  down  to  fifty-two, 
which is only 19% of the Corps.  Including Walcheren only twenty-five or 10% 
had served in more than one campaign and only ten officers had served in 
more than two operations.  Whilst these numbers show that there was only a 
small proportion of engineers with operational experience it is also true that the 
same situation would be present in the army and the proportion of army officers 
with operational experience would have been similarly small.  The final point to 
note is that the majority of the officers with experience continued to serve in the 
field  through  the  Napoleonic  wars,  so  the  most  experienced  officers  were 
present. 
Allocation of Officers for Active Duty 
It is not clear how officers were selected for operational appointments.  The 
diaries of engineer officers suggest that selection was, in many cases, by them 
actively canvassing for operational employment.  This was not only achieved by 
writing to the senior officers in the Royal Engineers, but also by writing directly 
to  general  officers  who  they  knew,  had  served  with  previously,  or  who  they 
knew were about to embark on some expedition.  
 
For example, in 1802, Burgoyne served as the Aide-de-Camp to General Fox, 
the brother of the politician Charles James Fox, who was also his Godparent.  
This connection led to him being appointed  to be Commanding Royal Engineer 
in  the  expedition  to  Egypt  in  1807  organised  by  General  Fox.    Burgoyne, 
unfortunately suffered eye trouble and was replaced by Thackeray.  During this 
campaign, Burgoyne became acquainted with Sir John Moore, and this in turn 
led to his appointment to the planned expedition to Portugal in late 1807, which 
was  abandoned  when  the  French  Marshal,  Junot,  entered  Lisbon  and  the 
Portuguese royal family fled to South America.  Burgoyne was again requested 
by Moore for his expedition to Sweden in early 1808, and remained with the 
expedition  when  it  was  subsequently  diverted  to  Portugal,  although  Richard 
Fletcher joined as Commanding Royal Engineer in July, before they reached Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Portugal.    Boothby  was  another  engineer  officer  who  went  on  the  Swedish 
expedition  and  the  connections  he  made  with  Sir  John  Moore  led  to  his 
appointment on the expedition to Portugal.
214  Clearly, patronage could have a 
significant impact in the selection of officers for specific duties. 
 
Burgoyne served throughout the Corunna campaign, before embarking with the 
Light Division at Vigo, thereby missing the battle of Corunna.  On returning to 
England, Burgoyne noted in his diary on 19 February 1809 that he ‘Wrote to 
General Morse to request to be employed on active service’.
215  Clearly there 
were  events  in  the  planning  stage,  as  Morse  replied  only  three  days  later 
advising  Burgoyne  to  be  ready  to  embark  at  the  shortest  notice.    Burgoyne 
noted that Squire, Boothby, Pasley and Mulcaster were also going.
216 
 
Although these officers were keen to go on active service, there appears to 
have been great reluctance by some officers to go to the Peninsula.  Burgoyne, 
writing in his diary on 8 March 1809, noted that ‘Squire and Pasley had, by their 
solicitations, been countermanded from the service’.
217  He made the reason for 
their action clearer when he went on to write ‘there is little doubt we are going to 
Lisbon, and our prospect is only that of remaining quiet in a dull quarter, and 
returning to England if the French approach’.
218  Other officers with experience 
were ordered for this foreign service and accepted their position.
219 
 
In Pasley’s case this was a decision that prematurely truncated a potentially 
glorious active career, but turned one of the best minds in the Royal Engineers 
to improvement in the Corps’ efficiency. 
 
This extract above raises several questions about the allocation of officers.  It is 
likely that the officers mentioned were actively canvassing to be appointed to 
expeditions. Their appointment is understandable in the context of enthusiastic 
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volunteers being appointed to positions, when there was a significant number of 
officers who could not go, or did not want to go.  It is surprising that they also 
appear to have had some say in which expeditions they were appointed to, as 
the  implication  is  that  they  were  appointed  to  the  Peninsular  expedition  and 
then managed to get their names removed. 
 
There is little evidence to prove that serving in previous campaigns made an 
officer more likely to be selected for a successive campaign.  As discussed 
above, when looking at the selection of command in the Peninsula, there were 
a limited number of the senior officers who were not attached to some ongoing 
responsibility,  such  as  command  of  an  engineer  station.    The  officers  who 
became available, on completion of one piece of operational activity were the 
easiest to allocate to the next operation.  The only exception during the period 
appears to be the Walcheren campaign, which was different for two reasons.  
Firstly, it was close to England, so many UK based officers were allocated to 
attend.    It  was  certainly  convenient,  and  the  campaign  was  expected  to  be 
short.  Secondly, the Earl of Chatham, who was Master-General at the time, 
commanded the expedition.  The potential for advancement, through serving 
directly under the eyes of your commander, was not lost on the officers.  There 
was possibly a third, reason, suggested cynically by one officer, that there were 
so many senior officers there at the prospect of prize money, as had been given 
at Copenhagen.  
 
It is clear that once officers were selected for an operation, they tended to stay 
there until the end.  There are very few situations where an officer left part way 
through a campaign. Chapman and Rice Jones went home when they were 
appointed to staff positions in the Ordnance and Edward Fyers was sent home 
with mental problems.  Other than these three officers, the only other officers 
who went home were injured.  Fletcher briefly went home at the end of 1812, 
but this was an exceptional circumstance, and it was temporary leave not a re-
assignment. 
 
It  was  unusual  for  newly  commissioned  officers  to  be  sent  straight  out  on 
campaign.  In almost all cases they were appointed to stations in the UK or Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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Ireland to gain some experience before they were sent abroad.  From 1812, all 
new  officers  spent  time  at  the  School  of  Military  Engineering  to  gain  some 
practical experience of operational skills. 
Casualty Rates of Engineers on Active Operations 
As shown in Table 3g above, twenty-five officers died on active service during 
the Peninsular War, which is roughly 27% of the officers who served in that 
theatre.    Two  more  were  killed  in  1814,  one  at  Bergen-op-Zoom  in  the 
Netherlands and the other at New Orleans.  The sieges account for nineteen of 
these deaths with Badajoz’s three sieges alone accounting for nine.
220  
 
Engineer officers were also reported as having been wounded thirty-three times 
during the period.  Combining the two groups, there were forty-eight officers 
who were wounded or killed during the Peninsular War.  This amounts to a 
casualty rate of 36% of officers in the Peninsula or 17% of the whole corps.  In 
addition to the twenty-seven officers who were killed in operations, a further 
twenty-three died, worldwide, of other causes making a total of fifty.
221 
 
Without any attempt to increase the size of the Corps, seventy new officers 
were required to keep the strength constant through this period. 
 
The engineer officers were unhappy about the casualty rate, particularly as they 
felt they were having to take unnecessary risks to compensate for the lack of 
support from the artificers, the lack of trained soldiers from the army and the 
lack  of  attention  to  duty  by  the  army  officers  whilst  on  garrison  duty.      The 
casualty rates though high, were not substantially higher than those suffered by 
many units in the army.  For example, officer casualties (killed and wounded) at 
the battles of Fuentes d’Onoro, Albuera and Salamanca were roughly 7%, 36% 
and 13%.  At the third siege of Badajoz, the officer casualties were over 50%.  
Compared with these numbers, the engineer casualties look quite normal.  
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Apart from the sieges where the engineers were thrust into the front line of 
events, they were generally well protected and looked after.  Their role was to 
be at the front leading during sieges and that is why their casualties were high 
at  those  times.    Overall  an  engineer  officer  probably  had  a  better  life 
expectancy that the average infantry officer. 
3.4.4.  SUMMARY OF CAREERS OF OFFICERS. 
The key points from this section confirm some common understandings but also 
highlight a number of unexpected conclusions. There were two key differences 
between the army and Ordnance.  In the Ordnance, promotion was by seniority 
and officers were unable to sell their commissions.  This led to stagnation at top 
of the Corps with the most senior officers serving over sixty years until their 
death in their eighties!  Partly for this reason, no senior Corps officer went out to 
the  Peninsula.    Most  were  based  at  Headquarters  or  in  charge  of  major 
garrisons.  
 
The  numbers  of  engineer  officers  trebled  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.    The 
majority of these remained on static duty in garrisons and fortresses around the 
world.    As  the  number  of  officers  increased  there  was  a  larger  proportion 
allocated to the war in Europe.  Analysis of promotion within the Corps identified 
two main points, that promotion during the war was much quicker with officers 
reaching Lieutenant-Colonel in about sixteen years rather than the thirty years it 
took before the Napoleonic War.  The unexpected finding was that promotion by 
seniority in the Corps did not appear to be slower than by purchase in the army. 
 
Another unexpected finding was that Wellington appears to have applied his 
rulings on command consistently.  He said that the most senior officer of any 
corps would command.  In the case of the engineers (and artillery) that would 
be the most senior, be they British, Portuguese or KGL.  Dickson was appointed 
on the basis of his rank in the Portuguese army although this did cause great 
concern at the time.  Based on Wellington’s decisions in the army, for example  
the replacement of Long by Lumley at Albuera, he also applied this ruling to 
include  Spanish  officers.    Wellington  made  sure  the  situation  of  a  Spanish  Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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officer commanding never happened in the army by moving officers around.  
This  situation  never  came  up  in  the  Ordnance  corps.    There  was  some 
challenging around command based on Brevet rank, but again Wellington was 
consistent with Corps rank taking precedence. 
 
In  terms  of  prior  experience,  about  25%  of  officers  had  some  operational 
experience  at  the  start  of  the  Peninsular  War  with  only  ten  having  been  on  
more than two operations.  This shows that there was limited experience but 
this small number of officers had served in Egypt, South America, Copenhagen 
and Walcheren so they had what little operational experience it was possible to 
get. 
 
The final point to note was that casualty rates were high but the analysis has 
shown that they were no higher than was being suffered in the army.   
 
3.5.  Conclusion from Section 3 
The Napoleonic Wars saw the widespread use of British soldiers in mainland 
Europe for the first time in many years.  Significantly different from previous 
campaigns was the fact that Britain was fighting alone and could not call on 
specialist skills such as engineers and artillery from their Allies.  At the start of 
the Napoleonic Wars the army and the Ordnance had to move from a reduced 
peace time establishment to a full wartime strength and this was not without 
problems. 
 
The  Royal  Engineers  struggled  to  supply  the  demand  for  trained  officers 
throughout the war and this did affect the training given to officers.  Both the 
need for formal examinations and the syllabus were adjusted as the demand 
rose but officers were still given a reasonable grounding in the skills required 
and  although  the  test  was  subjective,  they  were  not  commissioned  until  the 
academy  thought  they  were  ready.    As  the  war  progressed  the  situation 
improved through new officers being sent to the School of Military Engineering 
to  finish  their  training  and  by  the  commissioned  officers  actively  sharing Section 3.  The Rise of the Scientific Soldier. 
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experience and mentoring each other.  The provision of artificers to support the 
engineer officers was similar.  Effectively, there were no artificers available for 
operational  service  at  the  start  of  the  war.    This  deficiency  was  complained 
about by both the army and engineer officers.  By 1812, with the opening of the 
School  of  Military  Engineering  there  was  now  a  formal  mechanism  for 
consistently  training  artificers  and  this  complemented  by  the  changes  in  the 
organisational  structure meant that there were trained units of artificers being 
deployed from the end of 1812.  There is no doubt that the professionalism of 
the engineer officers and artificers improved greatly during the war. 
 
The officers who served in the field during the Napoleonic Wars were a sub-set 
of the Corps.  Generally they were from the middle or lower levels of seniority 
and in many cases showed personal initiative to get assigned .  The dedication 
and  persistence  they  showed  led  to  them  being  well  known  to  army 
commanders and this sometimes assisted in more rapid promotion.  Although 
there  are  many  comments  by  officers  throughout  the  war  about  relative 
seniority, there is no evidence that the normal rules as applied across Corps, 
brevet and army rank were broken is determining command status. 
 
In terms of the officers themselves, there is strong evidence of them coming 
primarily from military and professional families.  There is no evidence of an 
influx from the families of businessmen or tradesmen.  Promotion by seniority 
and the inability to sell commissions meant that for many officers the Corps was 
a lifelong career, literally until death.  Many exhibited a desire to learn the skills 
of their profession and these skills assisted a number who in later life went on to 
use their skills in the civil engineering arena.  A number built on their colonial 
experience to take up roles as governors or administrators in the British Empire. 
 
Having looked at the education of the officers and the officers themselves, the 
next section will undertake a review of the operational activities and determine 
how effectively the officers carried out their role in the field. 
 
 Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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SECTION 4 – OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
4.1.  Overview of Section 4 
This section will investigate the operational roles and performance of the Royal 
Engineers  in  the  Peninsula  and  describe  their  wider  operations.    Previous 
writing on the Royal Engineers’ role has tended to focus on their involvement in 
sieges.  The time spent on sieges during the Peninsular War was fifty-six days
1  
for the four major sieges in 1811-12 and less than one hundred and forty days 
for all the sieges.
2  There were Royal Engineer officers in the Peninsula from 
July 1808 through to September 1814, which is six years and two months or 
approximately 2,250 days.  Based on these numbers, engineers were employed 
in sieges for a maximum of 6.2% of the time.  Even if the blockades, such as 
that at Pamplona are included, this time spent on sieges still comes to less than 
15% of the total time.  Not all engineers in the Peninsula were employed at the 
sieges, so the actual involvement of Royal Engineer in sieges is much lower 
than these figures.  This naturally leads to the question, what were the Royal 
Engineer officers doing the rest of the time? 
 
An analysis will be undertaken on the various tasks that the engineer officers 
performed and give a more comprehensive picture of their activities during the 
war.  It will start by undertaking a fresh review of the major sieges to evaluate 
the performance of the Royal Engineers and also to consider the engineers’ 
own  view  of  their  performance.    A  neglected  area  of  research  is  the  other 
activities  that  engineers  were  involved  in.    This  will  be  addressed  by 
investigating and analysing the activities that took up the bulk of the engineers’ 
time during the Peninsular War.  The activities of the Royal Staff Corps and the 
Royal  Engineers  will  be  compared  to  determine  the  commonality  and 
differences in their roles and also to look at how the two separate corps were 
used by the army commanders.  This section will conclude with a review of the 
                                            
1  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  12  days;  first,  second  and  third  sieges  of  Badajoz,  11,  12  and  21  days 
respectively. 
2 Burgos, 30 days, Olivenza, 6 days, Salamanca forts, 10 days, first and second sieges of San 
Sebastian, 11 and 12 days respectively, Tarragona, 12 days . Does not include blockades of 
Almeida, Tarragona or Pamplona. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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performance  of  the  Royal  Engineers  based  on  the  tasks  identified  and  their 
success in achieving them. 
4.2.  Sieges in the Peninsula   
4.2.1.  INTRODUCTION TO SIEGES IN THE PENINSULA 
The Peninsular War did not follow the previous Napoleonic trend, as it had a 
significant  number  of  sieges.    As  David  Chandler  described,  the  operational 
doctrine had changed, certainly in Napoleon’s eyes, to crushing the enemy in 
battle and not getting involved in major sieges.
3  
 
The  Iberian  Peninsula  had  four  groups  of  fortresses,  which  commanded  the 
main  communication  routes.  These  fortresses  could  not  be  ignored,  as 
bypassing  them  would  leave  supply  routes  open  to  disruption.    Routes  into 
Portugal were guarded by Badajoz and Elvas in the south with Almeida and 
Ciudad Rodrigo in the north.  The western route into France was commanded 
by Pamplona and San Sebastian with the eastern route guarded by Gerona, 
Figueras  and  Perpignan.    These  towns  were  the  locations  of  almost  all  the 
sieges during the war.
4 Chandler noted fifteen
5 sieges during the war, and Philip 
Haythornthwaite,  twenty-nine.
6    A  comprehensive  analysis  shows  thirty-nine 
sieges  or  blockades,  the  other  writers  having  ignored  some  of  the  smaller 
events.  The complete list of sieges and blockades is detailed in Appendix K. 
 
Apart from the strategic importance of these places, the sieges had one other 
important effect, particularly on the Allied army.  This was the cost in terms of 
casualties.    Compared  with  some  of  Wellington’s  major  battles,  these  were 
significant not only in terms of the actual numbers but also more importantly in 
the  loss  of  experienced  troops  and  officers  who  tended  to  fare  worse  in 
assaults. 
 
                                            
3 Fletcher, Peninsular War, p. 47. 
4  This  explanation  is  given  in  both,  Fletcher,  Peninsular  War,  p.  49,  and  Griffith,  Modern 
Studies, p. 213. 
5 Griffith, Modern Studies, p. 48. 
6 Fletcher, Peninsular War, p. 419. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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Table 4a. Casualties at sieges and major battles.
7 
Siege  Killed  Wounded  Total 
Sieges of Badajoz  1,263  4,889  6,152 
Siege of Burgos  509  1,555  2,064 
Sieges of San Sebastian  ?  ?  3,500 
Battle  Killed  Wounded  Total 
Talavera  801  4,562  5,363 
Fuentes d’Onoro  241  1,563  1,804 
Albuera  984  3,564  4,548 
Salamanca  896  3,866  4,762 
Vitoria  751  3,843  4,594 
 
Between  1811  and  1813,  Wellington  lost  about  13,000  troops  during  sieges 
compared  with  about  15,500  in  the  major  battles.    The  French  were  more 
successful  because  many  fortresses  surrendered  to  them  thus  avoiding  the 
need for a costly assault.  The French were also in a better position to absorb 
their casualties, whereas Wellington was badly affected by the loss of Allied 
troops. 
 
It is not intended to go through the sieges in detail.  This has been thoroughly 
done by Jones, Oman, Myatt and Fortescue amongst others.  The investigation 
will initially compare the sieges carried out by the French and the Allies with a 
review of the specialist resources that each had available to them.  It will then 
focus  on  the  Allied  sieges,  evaluating  the  reasons  for  decisions,  the 
effectiveness of those decisions and in some cases, who made the decisions.  
A  key  question  is  :  who  was  making  the  decisions?  Wellington  was  not 
renowned  for  listening  to  other  officers’  views,  even  those  of  his  senior 
generals.  The engineer officers were blamed for poor choices at some of the 
sieges.    This  section  will  examine  evidence  about  who  was  making  the 
decisions  and  the  relationships  between  the  various  officers  involved.    The 
investigation will also focus on whether the materials, resources and training 
were appropriate and consider if there were any other external factors to take 
into account (for example, time). 
 
                                            
7 The battle figures are taken from Oman’s Peninsular War and the siege figures from Jones’ 
Journal of Sieges.  The exact breakdown of killed and wounded across the two sieges of San 
Sebastian cannot be determined. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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The  Allied  army  was  involved  in  thirteen  sieges  and  blockades  during  the 
Peninsular War : 
−  Olivenza in April 1811 
−  1
st Siege of Badajoz in April/May 1811 
−  2
nd siege of Badajoz in May/June 1811 
−  Blockade of Almeida in May 1811 
−  Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812 
−  3
rd Siege of Badajoz in April 1812 
−  Salamanca Forts in June 1812 
−  Burgos in September 1812 
−  1
st siege of San Sebastian in July 1812 
−  2
nd siege of San Sebastian in August 1812 
−  Blockade of Pamplona in 1813 
−  1
st siege of Tarragona in June 1813  
−  Blockade of Tarragona in July 1813 
 
The table below summarises all the sieges and blockades and their outcome. 
 
Table 4b. Comparison of sieges and blockades.
8 
Nation  Number  Surrendered  Stormed  Other  Failed 
British  13  3  3  1  6 
French  24  14  3  2  5
9 
Spanish  2  0  1  1  0 
 
Looking at the raw statistics, the British failure rate was 46%, against a French 
failure  rate  of  21%.  The  six  British  failures  include  the  abortive  siege  and 
blockade of Tarragona.  The other four, the first and second sieges of Badajoz, 
Burgos and the first siege of San Sebastian were all abandoned on the threat 
from approaching French armies, although some were progressing very badly 
at  the  time  they  were  abandoned.    These  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail 
below. 
 
                                            
8 Sieges and blockades as listed in Appendix K. 
9 Cadiz, two sieges of Gerona, Tarifa and the first siege of Saragossa. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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A much greater proportion of the French sieges ended in surrender, with only 
three fortresses being stormed; Saragossa, Gerona and Tarragona. Looking at 
the other sixteen French successes (apart from storming the three fortresses), 
they have been broken down as follows : 
 
Table 4c. Sieges : Reasons for surrender to the French. 
Reason  Total 
Breach practicable for an assault  7 
Ran out of food or ammunition  3 
Garrison escaped   2 
No good reason (i.e. too early)  3 
French bombarded civilians  1 
 
Time does appear to have made a big difference.  The average duration of 
successful  Allied  sieges,  excluding  the  blockade  of  Pamplona,  was  sixteen 
days.  The average time for the French, excluding the siege of Cadiz was forty-
five days.  If the very short French sieges of Campo Mayor, Castro-Urdiales, 
and Lerida are removed,
10 the average duration of the sieges rises to fifty-two 
days.  The French typically took three times as long as the Allies to take a 
fortress.  The French usually had less time pressure, as there was no effective 
relief force.  In some cases, they defeated the relieving force, leaving no hope 
for the besieged.  The only French siege that was stopped by the approach of a 
relieving force was the second attempt on Gerona in August 1809.  In most 
cases there could be no rescue and all the governor could do was resist as long 
as  possible.    Several  sieges  appeared  to  have  ended  sooner  than  was 
expected, but it is not difficult to have some sympathy for the defenders who 
knew that there was no chance of relief and every chance of death.  
 
Another important factor was that the Spanish and Allies were defending towns 
containing a friendly population, who would suffer in an assault.  In many cases 
the loss of the fortress was inevitable, and inflicting additional hardship on the 
civilians  would  seem  unnecessary.    The  French  when  defending,  had  less 
concern about the fate of the civilians, and their soldiers could also expect fair 
                                            
10 Where the governor surrendered because the French were bombarding the town rather and 
killing large numbers of the civilians.  There was no French attempt to make an assault. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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treatment from the enemy during a storm.  The French had much less to lose by 
resisting to the end.  The final difference was that Napoleon had made it clear 
that he did not approve of surrender, except as a last resort and the French 
governors knew that they would receive no sympathy from Napoleon if they 
surrendered too early.  The gentlemanly conduct of sieges in the 18
th century 
was not present in the Peninsula. 
 
A constant theme throughout this thesis is the number of trained engineers and 
artificers available.  In comparison with the limited resources available to the 
Allied  army,  the  French  armies  had  an  established  organisation  which  was 
assigned to the larger French formations as a matter of course.  A French corps 
would typically have one or more companies of sappers and a body of miners 
as well as dedicated engineers.  An early example during the Peninsular War 
was  at  the  second  siege  of  Saragossa  where  the  French  engineer  park 
consisted  of  forty  engineers,  two  hundred  and  thirty-eight  miners  and  1,082 
sappers.
11  The engineer stores establishment for a French corps amounted to 
one  hundred  and  twenty  men  with  fifty  waggons  carrying  5,000  entrenching 
tools, 1,700 cutting tools and various other items of engineering and bridging 
equipment.
12    British  armies  had  no  established  engineer  resources  and 
consequently had to make do with much less throughout the Peninsular War.  
The situation was improving towards the end, but the first British army to take 
the field with a proper engineering establishment was Wellington’s army for the 
Waterloo campaign.  The table below shows that during the early part of the 
Peninsular War, a significant portion of available Royal Engineers had to be 
drafted in for siege work. 
 
Table 4d. Engineers present at sieges. 
Siege  Engineers present 
at siege 
Total number of 
engineers in Peninsula 
1
st siege of Badajoz  21  31 
2
nd siege of Badajoz  21  32 
Ciudad Rodrigo  19  33 
                                            
11 Fletcher, Modern Studies, p. 222, quoting from Belmas, Journaux des sieges,  vol. 2, pp. 337-
339. 
12 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 2, p. 386. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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3
rd siege of Badajoz  24  33 
Burgos  5  33 
San Sebastian  18  45 
 
4.2.2.  SIEGES OF BADAJOZ IN 1811. 
There were three sieges of Badajoz carried out by the Allied army.  The first two 
sieges were between April and June 1811 and were both aborted due to the 
approach of French armies.  The third siege in April 1812 ended successfully 
with the fortress being stormed, but at a high cost in casualties.  
 
Figure 4.1. Map of Badajoz 
 Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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4.2.2.1.  First Siege of Badajoz, April 1811 
This was the first major siege that the British conducted during the Peninsular 
War.  They had just successfully completed the siege of Olivenza where the 
French  had  surrendered  on  15  April  1811.    However,  Olivenza  was  a  poor 
fortress with only four hundred troops to defend its one mile perimeter.  The 
governor surrendered soon after the attackers’ guns opened fire, as he had no 
realistic chance of being able to resist.  
 
Table 4e. Timeline for first siege of Badajoz. 
20 April 1811  Wellington visits and agrees plan for siege. 
23 April 1811  Bridge at Jerumenha swept away. 
29 April 1811  Bridge at Jerumenha restored. 
4 May 1811  South side of Badajoz invested. 
8 May 1811  North side of Badajoz invested. 
8 May 1811  Trenches started that night. 
10 May 1811  French sortie against Fort St Christoval. 
11 May 1811  Allied  guns  opened  fire  against  Fort  St  Christoval 
and Fort Picurina. 
11 May 1811  All  stores  moved  to  north  bank  in  preparation  for 
raising siege. 
11 May 1811  Work started on attack against castle at night and 
stopped in early hours of 12 May 1811. 
13 May 1811  Siege raised. 
 
The unexpected loss of Badajoz to the French changed the face of his whole 
strategy for 1811.  Wellington’s  intention when Masséna retreated from the lines 
of  Torres  Vedras  was  to  advance  and  re-take  the  fortresses  of  Almeida  and 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  then,  having  secured  the  northern  passage,  turn  his 
attention to the south.  The loss of Badajoz left both the southern and northern 
routes  into  Portugal  in  French  control,  and  put  Wellington on  the  defensive.  
Replying to a question on his priorities from Lord Liverpool on 7 May 1811, he 
wrote that retaking Badajoz was his first priority as it dictated his whole strategy 
for the rest of the year.
13  Speaking to Earl Stanhope in October 1836, Wellington 
said  ‘Had  it  not  been  for  the  last,  [The  surrender  of  Badajoz]  I  could  have 
                                            
13 WD, To Liverpool, 7 May 1811. It is interesting to note that Wellington did not have any great 
desire to take Almeida at this time.  It was circumstance, not planning that led to the blockade. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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blockaded Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo at once; and when I had taken them 
carried  the  war  to  the  south’.
14  Strategically,  it  was  vital  that  Wellington 
recovered the fortress as quickly as possible. 
 
Operationally, Badajoz was a major fortress with a strong garrison and an able 
governor.  The problem Wellington faced was, because the loss of Badajoz was 
unexpected,  no  provision  had  been  made  for  siege  equipment  in  that  area.  
Oman  criticised  the  British  Government  for  not  providing  a  siege  train  for 
Wellington’s use writing, ‘The British army in Portugal was absolutely destitute 
of artillery destined for and trained to the working to siege guns’.
15  On this point 
he is wrong.  At that time, there was a brand new British siege train stored in 
transports at Lisbon.  Wellington knew it was there and planned to (and did) use 
it for the future siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  There was simply no practical way to 
move it quickly from Lisbon to Badajoz, even if its safety could be guaranteed.  
Similarly, Wellington was short of bridging equipment, as the only large pontoon 
train in the south had just been lost at Badajoz.  
 
Wellington made a quick visit to the area, leaving the north on 15 April 1811. 
With  him  came  Lieutenant-Colonel  Richard  Fletcher  R.E.  who  was  to  take 
command of the siege, taking over from Captain John Squire R.E. who was 
attached to Beresford’s force and had just successfully completed the siege of 
Olivenza.  Wellington’s visit required a three hundred mile round trip by horse 
which demonstrated the importance he placed on recapturing Badajoz.  The 
purpose of his visit was not just to make arrangements for the siege.  He also 
needed to resolve issues around command and seniority between Beresford 
and the Spanish commanders.  It was likely that the French would come to the 
relief of Badajoz and a battle might have to be fought to stop them.  The senior 
Allied commander in the area was the Spanish general, Castaños.   
 
On Wellington’s arrival at Elvas on 20 April 1811, he spoke to Major Alexander 
Dickson,  the senior artillery officer and to Squire.  He was informed that the 
                                            
14 Earl Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington (London, 1938), p. 90. 
15  Oman,  Peninsular  War,  vol.  4,  p.  274.    More  recently,  I.  Robertson,  A  Commanding 
Presence, also suggests that Wellington did not have access to a siege train. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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siege guns and stores used at the siege of Olivenza were ready to move when 
Badajoz  was  invested.  As  there  was  a  shortage  of  gun  carriages,  the  gun 
carriages from Olivenza would then be used to collect further guns from Elvas.  
Squire also reported that he had sufficient tools to start the siege.  Wellington 
made a personal reconnaissance around Badajoz on 22 April 1811, and the 
following day wrote three memorandum.   
 
The first was a letter to Beresford outlining the strategy he should follow for the 
siege and how he should respond if a French relief force was sent.  The most 
important point in this letter was that Wellington authorised Beresford to fight a 
battle if he felt it was appropriate.  
 
The second memorandum detailed Wellington’s recommendations on the siege 
operations  for  Beresford,  Dickson  and  Fletcher.
16    The  two  key  points  in 
Wellington’s instructions for the siege were : 
−  All three outlying works, San Christoval, Picurina and Pardaleras were to 
be attacked simultaneously; 
−  Only  when  all  three  works  had  been  taken  would  the  attack  on  the 
fortress itself begin.  Wellington suggested that the most likely point of 
attack would be the south face, but left the decision to Beresford. 
 
The third memorandum was a letter to three senior Spanish generals in the 
area,  Castaños,  Blake  and  Ballasteros,  asking  for  explicit  acceptance  of 
Wellington’s operational plan.  Any move against Badajoz was dependent upon 
their agreement.
17  Wellington made his views absolutely clear to Beresford on 
6 May 1811, writing : ‘If Gen. Blake does not positively agree to everything 
proposed  in  my  memorandum,  and  does  not  promise  to  carry  it  strictly  into 
execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz’.
18   
The following day he informed Liverpool that he had told Beresford to delay the 
siege  until  agreement  had  been  received  from  the  Spanish  generals
19    It  is 
                                            
16 WD, All three memorandum were dated 23 Apr 1811, pp. 490-496. 
17 WD, Memorandum 23 Apr 1811, vol 8, pp. 494-496. 
18 WD, To Beresford, 6 May 1811. 
19 WD, Wellington acknowledged Castanos’ acceptance in a letter to him dated 13 May 1811. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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significant that Beresford did not take any positive steps to start the siege until 8 
May 1811 when the Spanish generals agreed to the proposals in Wellington’s 
memorandum.  Beresford could have started a few days earlier and the artillery 
and engineer officers were puzzled by the delay.   
 
Overall the siege was not off to a good start.  The lack of siege stores at Elvas, 
the loss of the temporary bridge at Jerumenha, which provided their primary 
means of communication across the river Guadiana and the delays in resolving 
the command issues meant that eight weeks had passed since the French took 
Badajoz.  Beresford heard that Soult was marching to relieve the fortress on 10 
May 1811, before the first gun had even opened fire.  The day the first gun 
fired, on 11 May 1811, Beresford was already making preparations to raise the 
siege. 
 
The Plan of attack on Badajoz.  
 
There are a number of points that need examining in relation to the plan : 
−  Why was this particular plan chosen and who decided? 
−  Were the resources available?  
−  Was the plan followed? 
 
Why was this particular plan chosen and who decided? 
 
According to John Jones R.E., when Wellington arrived at Elvas on 20 April 
1811, he was : 
 
determined to lay immediate siege to Badajoz, if any plan of attack could 
be  offered  which  should  not  require  more  than  sixteen  days  open 
trenches, as in that period, and the time required to make the necessary 
preparations for the siege, it was calculated that Marshal Soult would be 
able to collect a force equal to its relief.
20 
 
                                            
20 J.T. Jones, Journal of Sieges carried on by the Duke of Wellington in Spain during the years 
1811  to  1814,  3
rd  Edition,  (3  vols,  London,  1844),    vol.  1,  p.  12.    Unless  otherwise  started 
references to Jones will be from this edition. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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The preference of most of the officers, including Wellington, was for an attack 
on the southern face.  No plan could be developed that would meet the sixteen 
day  target,  normal  calculations  for  such  an  attack  indicating  that  twenty-two 
days  would  be  required.    Jones  continued  that  ‘it  was  of  the  greatest 
consequence  to  the  future  operations  of  the  army  that  Badajoz  should  be 
retaken’.
21  Probably under pressure from Wellington, Fletcher proposed a plan 
that he felt could be achieved within the sixteen days.  The plan was to take the 
fort of St Christoval which overlooked the castle and once it was taken, to form 
batteries to batter the old castle walls which would then be stormed when there 
was a practicable breach.  It was also proposed to make simultaneous false 
attacks on the other two outworks to mask the real intentions.  According to 
Jones’ diary, these discussions occurred before Wellington’s  reconnaissance 
on 22 April 1811, and Wellington approved this plan after he had examined the 
fortress.  
 
There is a confusing difference in the accounts at this point.  Jones’ published 
Journal described Fletcher’s plan above.  This Journal also printed Wellington’s 
memorandum  of  23  April  1811,  but  crucially  left  out  Wellington’s  last  point, 
which stated that all three outworks must be taken before the attack on the 
fortress started.  Wellington’s instructions made no mention of false attacks and 
suggested  an  attack  on  the  southern  side.    Wellington’s  instructions  do  not 
appear to be the same as Fletcher’s plan.  Jones’ original diaries, which he kept 
at the time, do not specifically detail Fletcher’s proposal.  He did however, detail 
Wellington’s memorandum including the crucial last point, which was not printed 
in his published Journal.  On 8 May 1811, he noted in his diary ‘Fletcher marked 
out a work against the Picurina redoubt and to conceal from the enemy the real 
point  of  attack,  it  was  decided  to  carry  out  a  false  attack  against  the 
Pardaleras.’
22  Later in the diary entry for that day, he noted troops breaking 
ground  for  the  false  attack  against  the  Pardaleras  fort,  but  no  mention  was 
made of the attack on the Picurina being false.  In his published Journal, and in 
                                            
21 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 1, p. 13. 
22 REM, 5501-59-1, Jones diary, 8 May 1811. The original diaries are very difficult to read.  
Copious notes from them were taken by John Hancock, the ex-Curator of the Royal Engineers 
Museum.  My comments are from his notes, not the original diaries. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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his  original  diary,  Jones  made  continued  reference  to  false  attacks  on  the 
Pardaleras.
23 
 
Alexander Gordon, who was one of Wellington’s Aides-de-Camp, travelled with 
him to Badajoz.  His comment on 23 April 1811, the day Wellington inspected 
Badajoz, was that he expected the attack would come from the south side, after 
opening against the three outworks.
24  A later letter still talked about taking all 
three outworks.
25  
 
Oman was highly critical of the decision to attack St Christoval and puts the 
blame  firmly  on  the  shoulders  of  Fletcher,  the  commanding  engineer.    He 
criticised the decision to make it a requirement to capture all three forts before 
attacking the castle, noting that ‘none of these were to be mere false attacks’.
26  
In Oman’s work there is no mention of Jones as a source for the first siege 
although he does use Jones for the subsequent sieges of Badajoz.  Although 
Oman’s  text  is  explicit,  the  map  of  Badajoz  in  his  book  marks  both  the 
Pardaleras and Picurina forts as ‘False attacks’.
27  It is possible that Oman did 
not have, or chose not to use the comprehensive third edition of Jones’ work 
when writing about the first siege.  The original first edition of Jones’ Journal, 
published  in  1814,  had  a  shortened  account  of  the  first  siege.    This  edition 
described the attack on St Christoval, but did not mention the false attacks on 
the Picurina or Pardaleras. 
 
Fortescue  used  Jones’  Journal  and  recognised  that  the  engineers  had  a 
preference  for  taking  St  Christoval  over  the  other  two  outworks.    He  also 
criticised the decision to attack St Christoval rather than follow the French lead 
and attack the southern face. 
 
The above analysis leaves two unanswered questions : 
                                            
23 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 1, p. 22, 26; REM, 5501-59-1 Jones diary, various entries from 
8 to 14 May 1811. 
24 R. Muir, At Wellington’s Right Hand (Stroud, 2003), p. 193. 
25 Muir, At Wellington’s Right Hand, p. 205. 
26 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, pp. 282-283. 
27 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 4, facing p. 286. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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−  Was  the  decision  to  attack  St  Christoval  due  to  time  constraints 
reasonable?  
−  Why did Jones’ published account completely ignore Wellington’s final 
instruction to take all three outworks before attacking the fortress? 
 
In answer to the first question, it is necessary to acknowledge the experience of 
the engineers.  Their judgement was that twenty-two days would be necessary 
to attack from the south.  This did not meet Wellington’s requirement of sixteen 
days.  The plan proposed by Fletcher was certainly risky, but quickly taking the 
outwork  would  have  given  the  army  a  great  chance  of  meeting  the  short 
timescale.  Certainly, the strength of St Christoval had been underestimated by 
everyone,  Dickson noting that St Christoval ‘might easily be taken’.
28  On 26 
April 1811, Wellington sent Beresford copies of the French plan of Badajoz and 
their  plan  of  attack  which  had  been  intercepted  by  Castaños.    With  this 
information, there was time to change the Allied plan of attack, but no change 
was made.  In the end it was the limited resources that led to failure against St 
Christoval, not the decision to attack it. 
 
The answer to the second question is more difficult.  The plan followed by the 
engineers, which is clearly reported in Jones’ Journal, was to attack all three 
outworks, but only the attack on Pardaleras was meant to be false.  The map in 
Dickson’s Diaries shows the attack on the Cerro del Vinto (Pardaleras) as being 
a ‘false’ attack.
29  Rice Jones similarly talks about only this attack as being 
false.
30  These do not match Fletcher’s original proposal described in Jones’ 
Journal.  Neither does it appear to follow Wellington’s instructions of 23 April 
1811.  Wellington’s instruction to take all three outworks, does not appear to be 
logical  when  time  was  critical.    It  would  have  taken  significantly  longer  to 
capture all three outworks, where the possession of two or even one would 
allow the start of an attack on the fortress.  The plan that was actually followed 
will be discussed below. 
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Were the resources available? 
 
The  biggest  problem  Wellington  faced  with  the  loss  of  Badajoz  was  getting 
together the resources to try and re-take it.  Both Oman and Fortescue criticise 
Wellington’s  preparations  but  neither  are  accurate.    Fortescue  stated  that 
Wellington  did  not  ask  about  resources  at  Elvas  until  6  April  1811,  with 
deficiencies  being  made  up  from  the  ‘English’  battering  train  at  Lisbon.
31  
Wellington  did  not  actually  write  ‘English’  battering  train,  but    ‘our’  battering 
train, probably just referring to resources at Lisbon.  Wellington was reluctant to 
use the new English battering train, writing that it would ‘cripple’ future siege 
operations.
32  He did subsequently send a number of siege guns from Lisbon, 
but these were not from the new English battering train. 
 
Oman wrote that Wellington did not start preparations for collecting the guns 
until 18 April 1811, when he sent Dickson to Elvas.
33  Dickson, the commander 
of the artillery, was writing as early as 21 March 1811 that the artillery would 
come from Elvas.
34  Wellington’s first letter to Beresford on the subject of the 
siege was written on 27 March 1811, where he stated : ‘Elvas must supply the 
means [for the siege of Badajoz], if possible : if it has them not, I must send 
them  there;  this  will  take  time,  but  that  cannot  be  avoided’.
35  Writing  to 
Beresford on 6 April 1811, Wellington explained ‘In respect to Badajoz, the first 
thing to do is to blockade it strictly … and I am most anxious to receive the 
accounts  of  what  Elvas  can  supply  for  this  purpose’.
36  Beresford  sent  for 
Dickson on 2 April 1811, and asked him to prepare a return of the ‘ordnance, 
ammunition  etc’  in  Elvas  for  Wellington.
37    Clearly  the  answer  Wellington 
received, was that Elvas could not provide the necessary resources,
38 because 
on 9 April 1811 Wellington was ordering siege material to be sent up to Elvas 
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37 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 3, pp. 374-375. 
38 REM, 4601-71 Misc Letters, f. 13.  Squire writing on 11 Apr 1811 dates that ‘there are no 
means at Elvas, and we have not a single platform at our disposal.’ Section 4. Operational Performance. 
  133 
from Lisbon.
39  At the same time, Wellington also ordered heavy guns to be 
sent  from  Lisbon  to  replace  the  guns  that  were  being  moved  from  Elvas.
40  
Writing to Beresford the next day, Wellington provided a list from Fletcher of the 
ordnance and ammunition that Elvas should supply for the siege of Badajoz and 
informed him about the stores he had ordered from Lisbon.
41  Beresford wrote 
to  Squire,  who  was  the  senior  engineer  present  at  that  time,  asking  him  to 
consider what materials could be obtained or made locally and what tools would 
be required.
42  Squire responded the next day saying that timber would be a 
problem but he could see no difficulty in obtaining tools or making gabions and 
fascines.  
 
The  criticisms  of  Oman  and  Fortescue  mentioned  above  appear  to  be 
unfounded.    Similarly,  Fortescue’s  comment  that  Beresford  must  have  told 
Wellington that Elvas could supply the stores appears similarly unfounded.
43 
Heavy material for a siege took time to get together and Wellington had no 
warning that this would be required for Badajoz.  In comparison, it took from 
May to October 1811 to transport the siege train by sea and land to be ready for 
use at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.  
 
There were also problems with the delivery of the requested stores.  Wellington 
was informed that there was insufficient transport to move all the stores he had 
requested from Lisbon and on 23 April 1811, he reduced the amount of stores 
to be brought forward.  The stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive at Elvas 
until 12 May 1811, and the first items did not get to Badajoz until that evening, 
by which time the siege was effectively over. 
 
There  were  similar  difficulties  with  the  availability  of  guns.    There  were  no 
modern siege guns immediately available for this siege.  The guns that were 
used were supplied from Elvas and as has been widely recorded elsewhere 
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they were generally old and in poor condition.  Through the efforts of Dickson, a 
siege train of thirty guns was put together.
44  Some of these were the guns used 
at the siege of Olivenza and were still located there.  Once again, the more 
immediate  problem  was  transport.    Dickson  reported  on  22  April  1811,  that 
there were only three carriages at Elvas for transporting guns.  To get the guns 
to Badajoz would require moving the six guns at Olivenza as soon as possible 
so that their carriages could then be sent to Elvas to move the remainder. 
 
Apart  from  the  physical  resources,  the  engineers  were  concerned  about  the 
availability of experienced soldiers.  Although this became more prominent in 
the later sieges, the concern was there from the very first siege.  Squire raised 
concerns before the siege started about the lack of sappers and miners and the 
need for men who ‘know how to carry on an approach under fire’.
45  He knew 
that the French in their siege of Badajoz, sapped right up to the glacis and this 
required trained and experienced sappers.  Squire’s view was that if the British 
had to do the same, there would be significant casualties.  
 
Was the plan followed? 
 
Wellington was impatient to get started on the siege of Badajoz.  As early as 30 
March 1811, he wrote to Beresford asking him to make arrangements for the 
attack,  commenting that ‘the breach can be barely more than stockaded’.
46  He 
wrote again on 6 April 1811, stating that Badajoz must be blockaded as soon as 
possible.  Writing to Liverpool on 9 April 1811, he mentioned that he ‘hoped’ 
Beresford  would  have  been  blockading  Badajoz  from  3  April  1811.    These 
timescales  all  appear  unrealistic  as  there  had  been  problems  establishing  a 
crossing point over the river Guadiana in early April due to the river level rising 
unexpectedly.  Beresford also had to take Olivenza before he could move on 
Badajoz.  At that time he also did not know the exact whereabouts of Soult. 
Wellington also wrote to Beresford on 21 April 1811, when he heard that Soult 
was fortifying Seville.  He saw this as indicating that Soult could be planning an 
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operation to relieve Badajoz.  He explained that it was even more urgent that 
not a moment was lost in starting operations against Badajoz.
47  
 
Immediately after the siege of Olivenza was concluded, Dickson and Squire 
were ordered to start preparing for the siege of Badajoz,
48 and from 19 April 
1811 they were preparing the siege train of thirty guns and howitzers.  On 27 
April 1811, Beresford issued an order for one hundred troops to be permanently 
assigned to the engineers as artificers.  In addition, eighty-four carpenters and 
miners from the British divisions and twelve officers were to serve as assistant 
engineers (who were officer volunteers from the army).  Squire had requested 
these on 10 April 1811, and Beresford confirmed he could have them on 20 
April 1811.
49  The men arrived at Olivenza on 2 May 1811, and some were 
immediately put to work cutting timber and making the siege materials.  The 
remainder were given some basic training in siege craft along with the small 
number of Royal Military Artificers who were present, none of whom had any 
previous training in siege works.
50 
 
Beresford  told  Wellington  in  a  letter  of  3  May  1811  that  he  was  waiting  for  
Fletcher  to  confirm  that  all  the  stores  were  ready  and  would  then  order  the 
investment  of  the  north  side  of  the  river  Guadiana.
51    Dickson  and  Squire 
certainly thought everything was ready to start the investment of Badajoz before 
this date.
52  The final delays were likely to have been caused by waiting for 
confirmation that the bridges had been restored at Jerumenha; that the troops 
allocated to assist were present; and that the additional shovels had arrived 
from Abrantes.  All these events happened on or around 2 May 1811. 
 
Following the investment of the fortress on the south side of the river Guadiana 
on 4 May 1811, the guns at Olivenza were moved up and placed in the park 
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behind the Cerro del Vinto on 6 May 1811.  The carriages were then sent off to 
Elvas to be available to bring up the next batch of guns.  The guns for the attack 
on St Christoval had been available since 5 May 1811, and were only waiting 
for the north side of the river to be invested.  Dickson recorded that it would 
take two trips (that is, two days) to transfer the eight guns required for the north 
side.  In the same letter he mentioned he was still waiting for two companies of 
Portuguese artillery, who were essential to progress the siege on the south side 
of the river.
53 
 
Dickson expressed his confusion on 1 May 1811, and again on 7 May 1811 as 
to why the siege had not commenced.
54  Similarly, there were a number of 
comments  from  engineer  officers,  the  earliest  being  25  April  1811.
55    The 
engineers believed that arrangements had been made for the right bank of the 
river  Guadiana  to  be  invested  on  4
  May  1811.    They  moved  stores  and 
pontoons up and had to make rapid arrangements for their protection when no 
troops arrived on the right bank.  Jones commented on 8 May 1811 that the 
stores for the attack on St Christoval had been waiting on carts for two days.
56 
 
There appears to have been a change of plan around this time.  Jones’ diary 
recorded that the plan of attack was put ‘on paper’ on 5 May 1811, and agreed 
by  Beresford  on  7  May  1811.    Wellington’s  earlier  memorandum  had  not 
specified exactly how the attack was to be carried out, noting that after taking 
the  three  outworks,  Beresford  was  to  decide  where  to  attack  the  castle.  
Although Wellington had suggested the south side of the fortress, he had not 
ordered it.  The engineers had a clear preference under the time constraints for 
an attack on the castle, rather than the south side.  It may have been the lack of 
trained sappers and miners that influenced the decision to attack St Christoval 
and breaching the walls from a distance.  Such an attack would require fewer 
sappers and miners.  Based on the comments at the time from the engineers, it 
is  probable  that  the  plan  Fletcher  presented  to  Beresford  on  7  May  1811, 
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included a proposal to start the attack on the castle before St Christoval was 
taken. It was necessary to attack the Picurina outwork to do this; it was not 
necessary  to  take  the  Pardaleras  outwork.    This  was  earlier  than  had  been 
proposed in Fletcher’s original plan as documented in Jones’ Journal.  Fletcher 
would have been looking for quicker ways to take the fortress to mitigate the 
impact of the additional delays since the original plan had been agreed.  It was 
now  two  weeks  since  Wellington  had  sent  his  memorandum  to  the  Spanish 
generals (and eight weeks since the French took Badajoz) and as yet, there has 
been no answer from them.  That there was a change in the plan is indicated by 
the numerous comments from engineer officers which refer to attacks on St 
Christoval and Picurina and false attacks on Pardaleras.  These include :  
 
It had however been previously decided to attack the castle at the east 
extremity of the town … the intention was to breach the castle, while 
batteries were established on the right bank of the Guadiana to take in 
flank and reverse. With this view it was necessary to take Fort Christoval 
… The whole was intended to be a simultaneous operation, so as to 
have divided the attention of the enemy. If we had had sufficient tools it 
was also proposed to make a fake attack to the westward by re-opening 
the trenches of the enemy.
57 
 
On the 8th … we broke ground on this side against Fort Christoval in 
earnest and they in joke opened the old French parallels on the other 
side.
58 
 
The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle having its 
right on the river, and to attack that part, the castle being like most others 
on a hill accessible and the wall not covered; at the same time attacks 
were to be carried on against the fort of St Christoval on the opposite 
side of the Guadiana.
59 
 
The attacks to be directed against the castle and Fort Christoval.
60 
 
On  the  same  day  that  Beresford  approved  the  plan  (7  May  1811),    Jones 
recorded that a working party was preparing materials near the spot where it 
was intended to start the battery against fort Picurina.
61  This would suggest an 
acceptance of the plan to attack the castle.  Significantly, Jones also noted that 
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Lieutenant Forster R.E. was employed that night to cross the Rivellas stream 
and ascend the height to the castle wall to determine the feasibility of British 
troops approaching the walls.  It is difficult to think of any reason to carry out 
such a dangerous reconnaissance unless the plan was to attack the castle at 
this point.  It is probable that the actual plan followed by the engineers was what 
had been agreed with Beresford, but it has not subsequently been recorded in 
that way.  It is inconceivable that the engineers would have been allowed to 
alter Wellington’s plans without his or Beresford’s agreement. 
 
Fletcher was marking out the positions for the trenches against the Picurina 
during the day on 8 May 1811 and Squire was doing the same on the other side 
of the river against St Christoval. The trenches were started against all three 
outworks on the night of 8 May 1811.  Jones started marking out the ground for 
the  attack  on  the  castle  the  following  morning  with  the  expectation  that  the 
trenches would be started that night.  However, Beresford ‘forbade’ any work to 
start.  Jones then wrote that the noon reliefs on 10 May 1811, for the attacks 
against the Picurina and Pardaleras were ‘nominal’ to make a ‘show of work’.  
Beresford  agreed  to  start  the  attack  on  the  castle  on  10  May  1811,  but  on 
hearing news of the French plan to move against him, he deferred the work 
again.
62  At the evening relief on 10
 May 1811, because ‘Beresford was still 
forbidding’ work against the castle, ‘it became necessary to devise some means 
to amuse the enemy’,
63 and further trenches were dug against the Picurina and 
Pardaleras.  Jones  again  mentioned  small  parties  working  against  the  two 
outworks on 11 May 1811.
64  
 
The delay in starting the attack against the castle also had a major impact on 
the attack against St Christoval in that the fire from Badajoz was almost wholly 
directed against the St Christoval attack.  On the morning of 10 May 1811, the 
French made a sortie against the works around St Christoval.  They briefly had 
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control over the trenches and did minor damage before they were repulsed, but 
the British covering party rashly chased them up to the very walls of the fort and 
suffered four hundred needless casualties.  The delays caused by Beresford 
not  allowing  work  to  start  against  the  castle  was  causing  some  frustration 
amongst the engineers :  
 
Still we were urged on … with the reason … that we were to take the fire 
off the main attack … by attracting it to ourselves!!!!!!  … The daylight of 
each succeeding day however affording us the mortification of seeing 
that our promised support from the main attack had been withheld ... 
Marshall Beresford not allowing the original plan to go on.
65 
 
The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle … at the 
same time attacks were to be carried on against the fort of St Christoval 
…  This  latter  one  however  only  was  commenced,  Marshal  Beresford, 
who commanded saying he would take that first, the consequence was 
that that small attack [on St Christoval] … had to support for three days 
the whole fire and efforts of the place and fort.
66 
 
On the evening of 10 May 1811, Beresford finally gave permission to start work 
against the castle on the following evening but insisted that work must not start 
until Fletcher could guarantee that the workmen would be fully protected from 
French fire by the morning.  To achieve this the tools ordered from Lisbon were 
needed, and these were expected to arrive during 11
 May 1811.  The batteries 
finally opened against St Christoval on the morning of 11 May 1811.  D’Urban 
and Oman, both suggested that the battery on St Christoval started too early
67 
and took all the return fire from Badajoz.  Ross, one of the engineers working at 
St Christoval wrote clearly that ‘on the 11th by order, our battery of three 24-
pounders and two 8-inch howitzers opened upon Christoval having [the whole 
of] Badajoz opposed to it’.
68 
 
The battery against the Picurina had been ready since 9:00am on 10 May 1811.  
There  is  no  specific  comment  on  when  this  battery  opened,  but  Jones 
commented that the Picurina battery fired one hundred and sixty rounds on 11
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May 1811, hitting the target only four times.
69  This would strongly suggest that 
the battery had been firing for most of the day. 
 
Dickson said that his and Fletcher’s wish ‘was not to begin the fire from any one 
battery until the whole attack should be more advanced’.
70  Their view was that 
the Picurina battery was not sufficiently far forward to support St Christoval.  
The effect of the two batteries fire was negligible due to the inexperience of the 
artillerymen and the faults in the guns.  The battery against St Christoval was 
overwhelmed by fire, with four of the five guns being disabled by mid-afternoon.  
It was decided to build another battery next to the one that had been badly 
damaged, and this was started on the night of 11-12 May 1811.  This battery 
did not open fire before the siege was raised.  
 
At 5:00pm on 11 May 1811, Fletcher received news that the tools required to 
begin  the  attack  against  the  castle  would  not  arrive  that  night.    He  told 
Beresford that the works against the castle could not start until the following 
night.  When the new tools finally arrived, the trenches were started against the 
castle on the night of 12 May 1811.  Good progress was being made, when at 
1:00am an order was received from Beresford for the work to stop immediately 
and for the troops to be withdrawn. 
 
Activities over the next 48 hours became very confused, with most of 13 May 
1811 being spent removing stores.  However, work was still continuing against 
the forts of St Christoval and Pardaleras.  According to Jones, at 6:00am on 14 
May  1811  Beresford  wrote  to  Fletcher  and  suggested  that  the  attack  could 
continue  against  St  Christoval,  as  he  believed  the  French  were  only 
manoeuvring.  Fletcher had started recalling the stores when he was informed 
that orders had been issued to the army to raise the siege and he then had to 
countermand  his  orders.    On  the  night  of  14  May  1811,  the  batteries  were 
dismantled and any remaining stores that could not be removed were burnt.  
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The final covering forces did not leave Badajoz until the night of 15-16 May 
1811. 
 
Comments on the First Siege of Badajoz. 
 
Oman’s account of the siege is flawed in a number of areas.  He claimed that 
Wellington’s orders were for the siege of Badajoz to begin the moment that the 
guns and material were ready.
71  This is not true.  Wellington had told Beresford 
not to start the siege until the Spanish generals had agreed to his memorandum 
of operations.  This did not happen until 8 May 1811.  The evidence shows that 
the siege was ready to start before that date.  Oman states that the south side 
was invested on the 6 May and the north side on 7
 May 1811.
72  He also wrote 
that Beresford only invested the south side after Fletcher and Dickson said all 
the stores were ready on 5 May 1811.
 73  These dates should be 4 and 8 May 
1811, respectively.  Wellington’s only comment on the investment dates are in a 
letter to Liverpool on 15 May 1811, where he said both sides were invested on 
the 8
 May 1811. Beresford writing to Wellington on 3 May 1811, stated that he 
intended to invest Badajoz on 4 May 1811 but this did not happen.
74  
 
Oman’s summary of the strategy accurately reports Wellington’s memorandum 
of 23 April 1811.  Oman goes on to say that none of the attacks were to be false 
attacks  and  that  the  engineers  had  given  Wellington  ‘bad  counsel  as  they 
certainly did to Beresford during the subsequent weeks’.
75  He then concluded 
by saying that planning three attacks when the engineers knew they had limited 
resources was inexcusable.  Oman’s criticisms are based on the premise that 
the engineers were following the plan described by Wellington on 23 April 1811.  
The diaries of the engineers show that they were not.  A more plausible solution 
is that the engineers were operating to a plan based on that originally proposed 
by Fletcher, but with a change to bring forward the attack on the Picurina and 
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castle to make up some of the additional lost time and this is what was agreed 
with Beresford on 7 May 1811. 
 
Without even looking at the actual work undertaken during this first siege, the 
timescales for its completion were unrealistic. The whole operation started too 
late and was too hurried.  Wellington was desperate to recover Badajoz, as his 
whole  strategy  was  dependent  on  it  being  in  Allied  possession.    Wellington 
pressurised the engineers to come up with a plan to meet his tight timescale.  
The plan was risky, but could have worked.  The strength of St Christoval was 
certainly  underestimated  but  at  the  time  both  the  engineer  and  artillery 
commanders believed it was possible to take the fort in a few days.  
 
There is real confusion both at the time and amongst writers about which plan 
was being followed.  The plan Wellington wrote up was not that proposed by 
Fletcher.  The plan implemented was not that proposed by Fletcher either, but 
was much closer to it.  The engineers believed they were working to a plan that 
Beresford would not let them implement fully, after he had approved it.  Their 
frustration comes through clearly in several of their letters.  
 
The  resources  required  were  not  available,  either  in  terms  of  guns  or  siege 
materials.  The siege train was too small and ineffective.  Although thirty-two 
guns  were  available  for  the  siege,  only  thirteen  of  these  made  it  into  the 
batteries.  Five guns
76 opened against St Christoval on 11 May 1811, four of 
which were damaged the same day and were not replaced before the siege 
was raised, although a new battery for four guns was started.  The eight guns 
for the attacks on the two outworks on the south side were too far away to 
cause any significant damage.  During the whole siege there were only five 
siege guns firing to make a breach from 7:00am to around noon on 11 May 
1811.  The stores in terms of tools, shot and powder were insufficient and had 
to be shipped in from Lisbon.  Even the reduced stores ordered from Lisbon did 
not arrive until 12 May 1811. 
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There were too many delays in starting the siege.  It appears that the decision 
to besiege Badajoz had developed a level of momentum and rather than stop it, 
each  problem  just  delayed  the  start,  with  no-one  re-evaluating  the  risk  and 
benefits of continuing with the siege.  Most of the delays were not the fault of 
the  engineers.    These  included  the  problems  with  the  bridging  across  the 
Guadiana,  getting  the  stores  to  Badajoz  and  getting  the  agreement  of  the 
Spanish  commanders  to  Wellington’s  operational  plan.    The  loss  of  a  week 
between 24 April and 1 May 1811, due to the river rising was the last in a series 
of  delays  that  severely  affected  the  plan  to  attack  Badajoz.    Wellington’s 
correspondence shows that the deciding factor for starting the siege was the 
agreement  of  the  Spanish  commanders  to  Wellington’s  memorandum.  
Beresford did not want to commit to starting the siege until he knew he would 
have their full support.  Neither Oman, Fortescue or later historians pick up on 
this. 
 
Beresford knew on 10 May 1811 that Soult was advancing to relieve Badajoz.  
He was in a difficult situation.  There was no way that there would be sufficient 
time to complete the siege before Soult arrived.  But if Soult was just making a 
demonstration, or decided that his force was not strong enough and retired, 
Beresford would be criticised for raising the siege too early.   
 
The engineers all wanted to start the attack on the castle on 9 May 1811, but 
Beresford would not allow them.  From 11 May 1811, Beresford was trying to 
protect the siege materials and conduct the siege at the same time.  The impact 
was  that  neither  was  done  successfully.    The  siege  was  half-hearted  in  its 
application and many stores had to be destroyed when the siege was raised.  A 
better strategy would probably have been to suspend the siege and keep a tight 
blockade around Badajoz until Soult’s intentions were clear and then restart 
with all the materials and resources immediately at hand.   
 
In the end there was no way that the siege could have succeeded.  There were 
only five days between the investment of the fortress and the raising the siege.  
It was impossible to take the fortress in that time.  It should be remembered that Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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the French took forty-two days to take Badajoz and that was through surrender.  
It would have taken them longer to take the fortress by storm. 
 
One impact of the first siege of Badajoz was the effect it had on Beresford’s 
reputation.  There was a growing lack of confidence in Beresford’s leadership 
which had started with the action at Campo Mayor.  Gordon, Wellington’s ADC 
had very little good to say about Beresford before they rode down to sort out the 
problems.    Squire  described  the  leadership  as  all  ‘doubt  and  indecision’.
77  
Boutflower, the surgeon of the 40
th Foot complained that they were ‘victims of 
some shameful mismanagement’.
78  Following the battle of Albuera, there were 
many other officers who were complaining about Beresford’s leadership. 
 
The first siege resulted in nearly seven hundred and fifty casualties with no 
visible benefit, although the bulk of the casualties were caused by the reckless 
pursuit  of  the  French  sortie  on  10  May  1811.    Of  the  twenty-one  engineers 
present, two were killed and three wounded, all on the St Christoval attack.
79  
The troops were despondent, and after the bloodbath at Albuera were to come 
straight back to Badajoz to try again.   
4.2.2.2.  Second Siege of Badajoz, May 1811 
Following the battle of Albuera, there was a stand-off between the armies for 
two days when Beresford was not sure if Soult was going to renew his attack.  
On 18 May 1811, when it was clear that Soult was retiring, Beresford ordered 
Hamilton’s  Portuguese  Division  and  Madden’s  cavalry  Brigade  to  re-invest 
Badajoz, while he followed Soult south. Hamilton completed the investment on 
the  south  side  of  the  river  on  the  morning  of  19  May  1811.    Dickson  and 
Fletcher were immediately ordered to prepare to restart the siege.  In the period 
since the siege had been raised, Phillipon the governor, had worked hard to 
make repairs.  He also ordered the soil to be removed from the area where the 
batteries would be sited for any subsequent attack on St Christoval.   
                                            
77 BL, ADD63106, Squire Letters, f. 31, Squire to Bunbury, 17 May 1811. 
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Table 4f. Timeline for second siege of Badajoz. 
19 May 1811  South side of Badajoz invested by Hamilton. 
25 May 1811  North side of Badajoz invested by 7
th Division. 
25 May 1811  Flying bridge installed at the mouth of the Caya 
27 May 1811  3
rd Division joined investment on south side 
29 May 1811  Work started on false attack against Pardaleras 
30 May 1811  Work started against St Christoval & Picurina 
3 June 1811  Guns opened fire on both sides 
4 June 1811  7 guns moved forward to new battery on night 4-5
th June 
5 June 1811  7 Guns opened from Battery No 6, south side 
6 June 1811  1
st assault on St Christoval, night 6-7
th June 
7 June 1811  3 guns opened from Battery No 7, south side. 
8 June 1811  10 guns opened from Battery No 7, south side, including 
6 Iron 24-pounder guns which had arrived from Lisbon 
9 June 1811  2
nd assault on St Christoval, night 9-10
th June 
10 June 1811  Siege raised and guns removed by that evening 
 
Wellington also arrived on 19 May 1811, and established himself in Elvas to 
command the siege personally.  Jones noted that it would take around eleven 
days  to  have  the  guns  ready,  primarily  because  the  gun  carriages  needed 
significant repairs after the first siege.
80  
 
Wellington  now  considered  the  plan  to  be  followed  for  the  second  attempt.  
Jones noted that Wellington ‘After much consideration, determined … to follow 
the plan … for the last attack’.
81  This infers that the plan that the engineers 
actually followed for the first siege was known to Wellington, even though it was 
not documented, as discussed above.  The plan was for attacks against the St 
Christoval  and  Picurina  outworks  (which  would  ultimately  become  the  attack 
against the castle), with a false attack against the Pardaleras outwork.  Some 
changes  were  made  to  the  overall  plan,  to  increase  the  number  of  guns 
available, to set up counter-battery fire and to start both attacks simultaneously.  
There was one major boost to the planning, in that the stores that Wellington 
had ordered from Lisbon in April 1811, for the first siege, had eventually arrived 
at Elvas and were now available for use.  But there were still not enough tools 
                                            
80 Jones, Journal of Sieges, vol. 1, pp. 30-31. 
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for the planned activities as 1000 more picks and shovels were ordered from 
Lisbon on 22 May 1811.
82  
 
The siege train that Dickson put together comprised thirty 24-pound cannons, 
four  16-pound  cannons,  eight  8-inch  howitzers  and  four  10-inch  howitzers.  
These were still all supplied from Elvas and were still of the same age and poor 
quality as those used previously.  To bolster these limited resources, orders 
were sent to expedite the arrival of the six iron guns that had been ordered from 
Lisbon  around  10  April  1811  and  also  to  assign  a  company  of  British 
artillerymen to support the Portuguese artillerymen.  Wellington, clearly still had 
no intention of using the new English battering train that was at Lisbon.  As 
early as 14 May 1811, he was arranging for it to be moved north for the planned 
siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  Fletcher also requested that Beresford assign two 
hundred  and  sixty-five  soldiers  to  the  engineers  and  that  the  assistant 
engineers who volunteered for the first siege would be made available again. 
 
All  the  officers  knew  that  this  was  going  to  be  another  race  against  time.  
Dickson writing on 29 May 1811, wrote ‘Reinforcements are on their march from 
Massena’s  army  to  the  south,  so  that  we  must  soon  take  Badajoz,  or  we 
probably will be interrupted again’.
83  Similarly, Jones’ view was ‘anything to be 
undertaken against Badajoz, must therefore be of a rapid nature’.
84  As with the 
first siege, collecting men and material together with the limited resources that 
were immediately available proved time consuming and it was not until 30 May 
1811 that everything was in place to start the attacks.  
 
Between  30
  May  1811,  and  the  morning  of  3  June  1811,  the  batteries  and 
trenches were formed for the attacks against St Christoval and the castle.  The 
attack against St Christoval suffered the same problems as before, through the 
lack of soil and the incessant bombardment from the French.  Due to the limited 
number of workmen available on the south side, the parallel was not a long as 
proposed and on the night of 31 May 1811 it was decided to prepare the main 
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battery at the end of the current parallel rather than wait a further twenty-four 
hours  for  the  parallel  to  be  extended  nearer  to  the  walls.  The  decision  was 
made to accept the extra distance for the sake of speed.
85  The batteries were 
completed and opened fire on the morning of 3 June 1811. 
 
Table 4g. Comparison of the ordnance at the start of the sieges of Badajoz. 
  1
st Siege  2
nd Siege 
Attack on St Christoval  5
86  23
87 
Attack on Castle  8
88  20 
  
There  was  an  impressive  increase  in  the  number  of  guns  brought  forward.  
Compared with the first siege, three times the number of guns were available 
on the morning the firing commenced. 
 
On the north side, there were four batteries in action.  On the south side all the 
guns  were  initially  placed  in  one  large  battery.    Fletcher  had  written  to 
Wellington on the evening of 3 June 1811, stating that as ‘the guns employed 
are so uncertain in their effects it may become necessary to push yet further 
forward’.
89  He told Wellington that he had ordered work to be started that night 
on the second parallel and a new battery that would bring the range to the 
castle walls down to six hundred and fifty yards.  This work was completed and 
seven guns opened fire on the morning of 5 June 1811.  Again that night, the 
parallel was extended further to the right and another battery was started at five 
hundred and twenty yards from the castle.  This battery opened with three guns 
on 7
 June 1811, and that night the six iron 24-pounders, which had eventually 
arrived from Lisbon were installed with one other gun, bringing the battery up to 
ten guns on the morning of 8 June 1811. 
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Table 4h. Guns available each morning of the 2
nd siege of Badajoz.       
  3 Jun  4 Jun  5 Jun  6 Jun  7 Jun  8 Jun  9 Jun 
Attack on St 
Christoval 
23  21  15  14  13  20  17 
Attack on Castle  20  18  19  17  18  13  13 
 
The table above shows the number of guns that were available each morning.  
The old brass guns continued to exhibit all the problems that had been apparent 
during the first siege.  Most were made inoperative through use rather than 
through enemy action.  Both Jones and Dickson remarked on the improvements 
when the first iron guns became available on the morning of 8 June 1811. 
 
As predicted by the engineers, the wall of the castle was quickly destroyed on 
the first day of firing.  However, what was not expected was that the wall was 
actually  just  a  facing  for  the  ground  behind  which  refused  to  collapse  and 
peeled  off  in  sheets  leaving  a  near  perpendicular  face  behind.    This  was 
battered incessantly until 10 June 1811, and it was only at this point that there 
was some hope that the breach might be practicable.  Captain Mulcaster R.E. 
reconnoitred the Rivellas stream on the night of 5 June 1811, and identified two 
fords where troops could cross near the proposed breach.
90  Captain Patton 
R.E. was mortally wounded making a further reconnaissance of the Rivellas 
stream and the castle walls on the night of 8 June 1811.
91 
 
The fire against St Christoval was also more successful than it had been during 
the  first  siege.    The  breach  was  declared  practicable  following  a 
reconnaissance  of  the  breach  on  the  night  of  5  June  1811,  by  Lieutenant 
Forster  R.E.    An  assault  was  ordered  for  midnight  on  6  June  1811  led  by 
Lieutenant Forster.  The assault failed, primarily due to the prompt action of the 
French who had cleared away the rubbish from the breach between dusk and 
midnight when the attack was made.  The attacking party made valiant attempts 
for nearly an hour to find a way in, but eventually retired with losses of twelve 
killed and eighty wounded.  Jones noted that ‘the storming party, I am afraid, 
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did not march until midnight’, which suggests that the engineers thought the 
delay before the assault was too long.
92 
 
The siege batteries commenced firing again the following morning and battered 
the walls for a further two days, when the breach was once again declared 
practicable.  To reduce the time for the French to clear away the rubbish, the 
assault was scheduled for 9:00pm.  The size of the assault force was increased 
but a similar result occurred, with the garrison showing great energy in clearing 
the rubbish from the breach and blocking the breach itself.  The leader of the 
assault Major McGeechy and Lieutenant Hunt R.E. who was guiding the party, 
were both killed in the first minutes of the attack.  Casualties this time were fifty-
four killed and eighty-five wounded.
93 
 
At noon the following day, 10 June 1811, Wellington called together his officers 
and told them he was raising the siege.  The guns and stores were removed 
over the following two days.  The comprehensive reasons Wellington gave for 
his decision were :  
−  The poor quality of the siege guns; 
−  The even poorer quality of the gun carriages; 
−  The resistance of the castle wall (he was ‘astonished’ at the resistance); 
−  Failure to take the fort of St Christoval; 
−  The expected arrival of French relief forces; 
−  The depletion of the ordnance stores at Elvas to a point where it would 
not be able to defend itself; the lack of replacement stores from Lisbon 
and the lack of transport to deliver replacement stores; 
−  The depletion of provisions to the point where there were less than a 
fortnight of supplies for Elvas; 
−  The need for the transport used at the siege of Badajoz to replenish the 
ordnance stores and provisions at Elvas.
94 
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Comments on the Second Siege of Badajoz. 
 
This section will again concentrate on the performance of the engineers rather 
than  on  the  events  themselves.    That  the  first  two  sieges  of  Badajoz  were 
failures is not in doubt.  However, it is time, to look again at the circumstances 
and re-evaluate them. 
 
There are some common threads running through both sieges :  
−  They were carried out against time pressures; 
−  There were limited resources available: manpower, materials and guns; 
−  There were transport problems; 
−  The choice of point of attack was strongly criticised both at the time and 
later. 
 
The two most significant English writers on the war, Oman and Fortescue, are 
highly critical of the sieges, blaming the engineer officers and to a lesser extent 
Wellington.    The  same  line  is  generally  taken  by  Myatt,  but  he  is  more 
sympathetic of the problems that the Allies faced.
95  In the analysis below  both 
sieges will be treated as one, because they were effectively the same siege 
undertaken twice. 
 
Both Oman and Fortescue criticised the decision to attack St Christoval in the 
strongest terms.  Whist criticism with hindsight is always easy, the views of the 
experts who were making decisions at the time must be considered.  On two 
separate occasions the engineers advised that primarily due to time constraints, 
there was not sufficient time to carry out a regular approach.  The admittedly 
high risk attack on St Christoval and the castle was the only possible solution 
they could see to meet the time limits.
96  Their plan was agreed by Wellington 
and  Beresford  on  both  occasions.    Dickson,  the  senior  artillery  officer, 
expressed no concern about the strategy before, during or after the sieges.  On 
both occasions, the siege was raised because of an approaching army.  Oman, 
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when commenting on the second siege stated that Wellington had four weeks 
to take Badajoz.  The fact is that Wellington only had ten days from opening the 
trenches to raising the siege.  He had even less time in the first siege, just four 
days.  The remainder of the time that the Allies had available was taken up 
arranging  guns  and  stores  or  sorting  out  communications  across  the  river 
Guadiana.  If the plan chosen was believed to be the fastest, then there was 
absolutely no chance of an attack on the south side succeeding.  The French 
took seven weeks to take Badajoz and that was by surrender, not assault.  It is 
difficult to understand why most writers believe that Wellington could achieve 
the same in seven days. 
 
D’Urban  stated  in  his  diary  that  the  breach  in  St  Christoval  was  never 
practicable and noted on 10 June 1811 that a French sapper who had deserted, 
said that the castle wall could never be breached at the point chosen as it had 
solid  rock  behind  (which  was  shown  to  be  untrue).    D’Urban  wrote  the 
engineers had chosen the wrong point of attack and should have attacked the 
south side.
97  D’Urban reserved more serious criticism for the overall strategy in 
that he believed that Wellington should have focussed on destroying Soult’s 
army  first  and  then  turned  on  Badajoz  at  his  leisure.    There  is  also  an 
interesting comment by George Ross R.E. who wrote that Beresford believed 
that the siege of Badajoz should not have been undertaken.
98 
 
The  two  assaults  on  the  fort  of  St  Christoval  need  further  consideration.  St 
Christoval  was  a  small,  but  very  strong  fort,  each  side  being  around  one 
hundred yards long.  The first assault used less than two hundred soldiers and 
the second a few more. During the first assault, the French had less than two 
hundred soldiers in the fort and probably not more than four hundred during the 
second  assault.    Oman  and  Fortescue  both  commented  that  the  storming 
parties  were  too  small.
99    There  is  no  reason  why  the  size  of  the  storming 
parties could not have been larger.  With the forces Wellington had available, 
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he could have made an attempt to overwhelm the fort.  Brute force may not 
have  led  to  any  greater  casualties,  as  the  casualties  were  caused  by  these 
small groups spending up to an hour trying to get into the fort.  Ladders could 
have been used at different points as well as at the breach.  At no time did the 
French have enough troops in the fort to defend all the faces at the same time.  
When Wellington finally took Badajoz in 1812, it was the secondary attacks that 
succeeded,  not  the  main  attack.    A  similar  approach  attacking  at  multiple 
locations  should  have  been  used  in  the  assault  St  Christoval  in  1811, 
particularly due to Wellington’s strong desire to re-take Badajoz.   
 
There is no doubt that the guns available from Elvas were not up to the task of 
performing siege work.  There is no doubt that the lack of trained sappers and 
miners had an effect in that there were no experienced troops who could take 
the sap forward.  There is also no doubt that the transport problems meant that 
not  all  the  materials  were  there  when  they  were  required.    But  the  single 
inescapable reason why these sieges failed was time.  None of the other factors 
would  have  prevented  the  sieges  success  had  Wellington  not  been  working 
against deadlines.  Wellington had known for days that he could not continue 
the siege past 10
 June 1811.
100  In a letter to Charles Stuart, he wrote, ‘Badajoz 
may fall; but the business will be very near run on both sides… I have never 
seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance, nor artillery so bad as those 
belonging to Elvas’.
101  He also knew that Badajoz only had supplies for two 
weeks.
102 
 
Added to the above, there were some other factors.  St Christoval proved to be 
stronger than Wellington, the artillery and the engineer officers expected.  It 
must also not be forgotten that the governor proved his skill many times during 
the three sieges of Badajoz.  With a less energetic governor, Badajoz would 
probably have fallen in June 1811.  Overall there were too many factors working 
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against the sieges succeeding, but they had to be tried because of the strategic 
importance of Badajoz. 
 
What  is  surprising  in  looking  closely  at  the  writing  of  Oman,  Fortescue  and 
many modern writers is that the sieges have been skipped over and not really 
understood by them.  Examples of this include Oman’s criticism that Wellington 
could have ordered up better guns in early May 1811 for the second siege of 
Badajoz.
103    Wellington  had  ordered  additional  guns  for  the  first  siege  of 
Badajoz  around  10  April  1811,  a  full  month  earlier  than  this.    The  lack  of 
transport made moving them very difficult.  These guns finally arrived near the 
end of the second siege of Badajoz on 8 June 1811, two months after they were 
ordered.  Fortescue gets similarly confused over the guns.  First he suggests 
that time constraints meant that Wellington would not wait for the English siege 
train.
104  Later he writes that they sent for some British iron guns from Elvas.
105 
The  iron  guns  from  Lisbon  were  actually  Portuguese  marine  24-pounders.  
They were also old and worn, but much better than the old brass 24-pounders 
that were being used prior to their arrival.  
 
In summary, the first two sieges of Badajoz were attempted with insufficient 
time and material available.  The choice of point of attack was not the preferred 
option for any officer but circumstances led them to believe that this was the 
only option that might succeed.  The engineer officers felt that they were not 
allowed to follow the plan that had been agreed.  There is no strong evidence to 
support the view that another point of attack under the same circumstances 
would have been successful. 
4.2.3.  SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO, 1812. 
The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was probably the only British siege during the 
Peninsular War that was successfully planned and executed.  Unlike the two 
earlier sieges of Badajoz, Wellington knew this siege was inevitable and could 
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plan when to commence it as part of his overall strategy.  The operation started 
a full eight months before the siege when Wellington gave orders in May 1811 
for the British siege train which was lying in transports at Lisbon to be moved 
north by sea to Oporto.
106   
 
Table 4i. Timeline for siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
14 May 1811   Wellington  ordered  siege  train  to  be  moved  from 
Lisbon to Oporto. 
1 Dec 1811  Siege Train moved up to Almeida, ready for use. 
8 Jan 1812  Fortress invested. 
8 Jan 1812  Reynaud redoubt stormed on night of 8/9 Jan 1812. 
8 Jan 1811  Trenches opened on night of 8/9 Jan 1812. 
13 Jan 1812  Convent of Santa Cruz stormed on night of 13/14 Jan 
1812. 
14 Jan 1812  French sortie from fortress. 
14 Jan 1812  Siege guns opened fire on fortress. 
14 Jan 1812  Convent of San Francisco stormed on night of 14/15 
Jan 1812. 
18 Jan 1812  New battery opens to form second breach 
19 Jan 1812  Fortress stormed on night of 19/20 Jan 1812. 
 
The  scale  of  the  planning  and  the  time  required  to  move  this  siege  train 
reinforces the reasons why it was not possible to arrange a similar event at 
short notice for the previous sieges of Badajoz.  The siege train was made up of 
thirty-eight guns, eighteen mortars and twenty-two howitzers, totalling seventy-
eight pieces of ordnance.  Wellington’s memorandum of 19 July 1811 details 
1,092 carts and an additional 768 bullocks to move the train and supplies from 
Oporto.
107  Even with this large number of carts, they were required to make 
two trips.  One hundred and fifty boats were also needed for the river passage 
of the siege guns.
108  Collecting this amount of transport together was a major 
task and keeping the carts and bullocks together for an extended period leading 
up to the siege was even more difficult.  The siege train was ordered forward to 
Almeida in mid-November 1811
109 and work started on preparing materials for a 
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bridge to be used to cross the river Agueda at the same time.
110  The troops to 
undertake the siege had been in the vicinity for many weeks and they were 
ordered to start preparing the siege materials on 18 December 1811.  On 1 
January 1812, Wellington saw an opportunity to attack the fortress and ordered 
it  to  be  invested  on  6  January  1812.    Due  to  the  shortage  of  transport  he 
decided not to wait for the howitzer ammunition to be delivered and attacked 
the fortress with cannon only.
111   
 
Engineer resources for the attack comprised of Fletcher in overall command 
with  eighteen  other  officers
112  and  eighteen  soldiers  from  the  Royal  Military 
Artificers.    A  company  of  artificers  had  been  ordered  up  from  Lisbon  on  18 
December  1811,  but  they  had  not  yet  arrived.
113    Burgoyne  and  Ross  were 
assigned as siege directors, taking twenty-four hour shifts in turn.  Additional 
support as in the previous sieges was made up of twelve assistant engineers 
and one hundred and eighty soldiers from the Third Division who had been 
given some basic training under Burgoyne in the preceding months.  
 
Heavy snow delayed the investment due to the difficulty in bringing the stores 
forward.  The fortress was finally invested on 8
 January 1812 and the same 
night  the  Reynaud  redoubt  was  stormed  by  troops  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  John  Colbourne.
114    Work  started  on  the  trenches  that  night  and 
breaching batteries the following night.  The plan was to form the breaching 
batteries  on  the  Great  Teson  hill  and  then  move  nearer  to  form  a  second 
breaching battery on the Little Teson hill.
115  Ross, one of the siege directors, 
was killed early on the night of 9 January 1812.   
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On 10 January 1812, one of the batteries being constructed was found to be 
partially  masked  by  the  Reynaud  redoubt  and  some  of  the  guns  had  to  be 
moved to another battery.  Jones remarked, possibly with some irony, ‘that it 
was thought less labour to remove five of the guns  [to another battery]… than 
to cut away the redoubt’.
116  Overall progress was good but the troops were 
suffering due to the freezing weather and because they had to march from their 
camp that was ten to twelve miles away.  On the route they had to ford a river 
so they spent most of their twenty-four hour shift cold and wet. 
 
There  was  a  change  of  plan  on  13  January  1812,  when  Wellington  asked 
Fletcher if the second, nearer, set of breaching batteries could be dispensed 
with as he had received news that Marmont was moving to relieve the fortress. 
This was agreed, although work continued on the trenches to keep Wellington’s 
options open if Marmont did not advance.  That night the convent of Santa Cruz 
was stormed as it directly threatened the second parallel.  On the morning of 14
 
January  1812,  the  French  made  a  sortie  from  the  fortress  and  briefly  took 
control  of  the  trenches,  but  limited  damage  was  done  and  the  breaching 
batteries opened later that day.  There was another error in the siting of the 
guns, as it was now found that two 18-pounders could not see the foot of the 
wall in the convent of San Fansisco which they were supposed to attack.   
 
 Two new batteries were started to open a second breach in the wall and these 
opened on 18 January 1812.  The new guns had an immediate impact and on 
19 January 1812, the wall collapsed creating the second practicable breach.  
Wellington inspected the breaches and wrote orders for an assault that night.  
The Third Division was to storm the main breach and the Light Division the 
second breach.  The assault was planned for 7:00pm that evening and both 
attacks succeeded, the troops then dissolving into a disorderly mob to ransack 
the town.  Order was restored by the morning and work commenced to make 
the fortress defensible. 
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This siege was generally seen as being very successful both at the time and by 
later  writers  with  the  fortress  taken  in  twelve  days.    However,  there  are 
circumstances that need further evaluation.   
 
Analysis of the siege. 
 
Wellington’s  decision  to  attack  on  1  January  1812  was  a  consequence  of 
intercepting orders from Napoleon reorganising the French command structure 
and simultaneously detaching troops to the east coast of Spain.
117  The impact 
being that the French forces covering Ciudad Rodrigo were reduced in numbers 
and moved further away thereby increasing the response time to any actions by 
Wellington.  The assault on Ciudad Rodrigo was clearly a snap decision, as on 
30 December 1811 Dickson wrote ‘Wellington thinks in about a fortnight we 
shall have sufficient [ammunition] here to commence operations’.
118  Two days 
later, he wrote that the ‘operation will be undertaken immediately … and … the 
trenches will be open in six or seven days’.
119  Dickson who was many miles 
away was slightly behind with the decision making.  Jones noted in his diary on 
28 December 1811 that ‘Wellington determined to start the siege instantly he 
could  get  up  the  smallest  possible  proportion  of  stores  and  ammunition’.
120  
Once  again  Wellington  was  starting  a  siege  with  a  very  small  window  of 
opportunity, which meant that the normal rules of sieges would be ignored.  The 
weather was atrocious and the stores were not ready.  One engineer remarked 
‘Lord  W  is  anxious  to  break  ground  tomorrow  night,  for  which  he  has  not 
afforded the means’.
121 
 
This quick decision meant that there was no transport to deliver the howitzer 
ammunition and Wellington took the risk of starting the siege with limited ability 
to carry out counter-battery fire.  This would explain why there was no attempt 
to  silence  the  French  guns  until  the  day  of  the  assault.    After  the  siege, 
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Wellington appeared to justify this decision as a new tactic : ‘We proceeded at 
Ciudad Rodrigo on quite a new principle of sieges. The whole object of our fire 
was to lay open the walls’.
122  The disadvantage of this principle was that many 
more Allied troops were injured through the consistent effective fire from the 
numerous French guns.  The French were certainly surprised by the lack of 
counter-battery fire.
123  Colville, commanding the Fourth Division commented 
that Fletcher had requested counter-battery fire on 18 January 1811, and that 
when the guns were directed at the French batteries just prior to the assault 
they  had  an  immediate  effect.    Colville  also  noted  that  whilst  he  thought 
counter-battery fire was necessary, Wellington did not.
124 
 
One  of  the  main  reasons  why  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  taken  so  quickly  was 
because it was a second rate fortress with nothing like the strength of Badajoz.  
Burgoyne,  after  a  visit  to  the  fortress  in  1808,  described  it  as  ‘incapable  of 
defence … its works … possessing nearly every fault a fortification can have’.
125 
Squire  in  1810  described  Ciudad  Rodrigo  as  ‘merely  a  walled  town’,
126  and 
commenting to Pasley after it was taken wrote : ‘we succeeded in taking the 
place more from its own weakness, than from any means we possessed’.
127  
Wellington took full advantage of this weakness and was able to breach the 
walls from the position of the first batteries. The governor and the garrison were 
similarly weak,  Barrie, the governor, was ‘the only general of brigade available 
at Salamanca when his predecessor, Renaud was taken’.
128  Renaud described 
Barrie as a ‘miserable fellow, perfectly unfit for the job’.
129  His performance 
matched the expectations set : ‘all British accounts agree in condemning Barrie 
for his lack of energy’.
130 There was no serious resistance to the taking of the 
redoubt, the convents or the fortress.  Barrie has to take the responsibility for 
this.   
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The greatest success of the siege and the single event that made the siege so 
rapid was Colbourne taking the Renaud redoubt on the first night.  Typically four 
to five days would have been needed to prepare and take such an outwork.  It 
is worthy of note that to take this small redoubt Colbourne used more troops 
than Wellington did during the two failed attempts on St Christoval at Badajoz.  
The outcome at Badajoz may have been different had a similar strategy been 
used.   
 
The size and quality of the guns used during the siege also had a significant 
effect on the outcome.  Wellington had none of the problems with inaccuracy 
and overheating that plagued the old brass guns at Badajoz.  Had he been able 
to  bring  up  the  howitzer  ammunition,  there  would  probably  have  been 
substantially fewer casualties before and during the assault.  
 
The performance of the engineers tells a different story from the previous two 
sieges.  At Badajoz, the engineers had neither time nor resources to complete 
their task.  At Ciudad Rodrigo they had better guns and more time, although 
time  was  still  a  constraint.    Whilst  the  result  was  positive,  there  were  some 
worrying  mistakes.    Three  significant  errors  were  recorded  :  a  battery  being 
placed  behind  the  Renaud  redoubt;  the  guns  to  attack  the  convent  of  San 
Fansisco being too low to see the base of the wall; and the embrasures for the 
main batteries being misaligned when originally opened.  The first error, the 
misplacing of the battery, was made on the night of 8/9 January 1811, when 
Ross who was siege director for the night was killed.  Burgoyne was strongly 
critical of the time and effort wasted, writing  : 
 
it was placed behind the French redoubt, it was nearly finished, some 
platforms laid, and we had worked two nights to level the parapet of the 
redoubt, when it was at length ascertained that not a single gun of the 
nine could see the object to be fired at.
131   
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He continued: ‘Our Headquarters party have sent home a journal of the siege, 
in which I presume this battery does not make its appearance – it makes a very 
ugly  one  in  my  journal’.
132    Burgoyne  and  his  comrades  do  not  specifically 
identify  who  they  thought  was  at  fault.    Fletcher  certainly  marked  out  the 
batteries  previously  at  Badajoz  and  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  he  was  not 
present when this, the most vital stage, was being carried out, even if Ross 
actually did the work.  Similarly, the failure to open the embrasures properly 
occurred after the engineer in command, Lieutenant Skelton was killed whilst 
standing on the top of the parapet encouraging the troops to perform the task.  
His death was unlikely to have helped with the troops’ willingness to expose 
themselves  to  the  French  fire.    Burgoyne  noted  that  when  the  batteries 
originally opened on 14 January 1812, many of the shots were passing over the 
top of the town.  Jones’ published Journal notes Skelton’s death but not the 
problem with the embrasures.  However, his unpublished diary noted ‘the want 
of [a] qualified … Engineer … to superintend the opening of the embrasures … 
caused such a delay that the day was lost’.
133  This problem was corrected that 
night and the guns were firing effectively from the following morning.
134  The 
loss of Ross so early in the siege probably had an ongoing effect.  Ellicombe 
who replaced him, whilst being a senior officer, had no operational experience 
and after some years in Ceylon had been in the UK for the preceding three 
years.  All three errors were avoidable and should have been identified earlier.  
Whilst Burgoyne is highly critical of the errors he took no personal responsibility 
for them, which as one of the siege directors he should.  Ultimately Fletcher 
must take responsibility as the senior engineer.  None of these errors had a 
material effect on the timescale or the outcome of the siege, but they must have 
had some effect on the reputation and confidence of the engineers.   
 
Burgoyne was critical of most elements of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, even 
though this was seen as the most successful Allied siege during the Peninsular 
War.  The Commanding Royal Engineer at the siege, Richard Fletcher, gave 
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high  praise  to  Burgoyne  who  ‘gave  me  every  assistance,  and  executed  the 
works  under  his  charge  with  great  zeal  and  ability’.
135    Burgoyne’s  initial 
comments in his diary were quite mild : ‘Our works were certainly not carried on 
with great expedition’.
136  In private letters he was much more critical.  He wrote 
lengthy letters to John Squire and Charles Pasley criticising most aspects of the 
siege including the preparation (the gabions and fascines were made too far 
away, without proper supervision, leading to poor quality and delivery problems) 
and  the  daily  operations  (the  siting  of  the  batteries  and  guns,  the  want  of 
arrangement in bringing up stores and the organisation of the working parties). 
Burgoyne  in  a  letter  to  Squire  complained  :  ‘We  go  on  most  miserably,  no 
superintendents, no arrangements, it is said that Wellington objects to give any 
assistance the Colonel proposes, but I can’t think this would be the case to a 
man of firmness’.
137  In a later letter he wrote : ‘His Lordship can have but little 
confidence in Colonel Fletcher, as it appears from what we hear that he objects 
to  nearly  every  proposal  made  by  him  ...  for  some  reason  or  other  Colonel 
Fletcher  had  not  influence  enough  to  get  the  smallest  assistance  from  the 
army’.
138    This  appears  to  be  the  first  suggestion  that  there  was  a  lack  of 
confidence  in  Fletcher’s  command  both  amongst  his  subordinates  and 
Wellington.  
 
Burgoyne’s  criticism  was  not  restricted  to  his  engineering  superiors.    He 
believed that Wellington summoned the French governor too early and that the 
French would have been much more likely to ask for terms had they had been 
summoned on 19 January 1811, just before the assault, when there were two 
significant  breaches.
139    The  commitment  (or  lack  of  it)  from  the  army  that 
became very evident at Burgos was also an object of criticism.  Burgoyne noted 
that the line officers ‘do not seem to think it a point of duty or honour to interest 
themselves in the exertions of a working party’
140 and suggested that having a 
general officer with the troops in the trenches would help to maintain progress. 
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In terms of resources for the siege, all the senior engineers, Burgoyne, Jones 
and Ross commented on Wellington refusing to provide line officers to assist.
141  
This  should,  in  fairness  to  Wellington,  be  offset  against  the  fact  that  the 
engineers had been allocated around 200 soldiers and officers from the third 
division  who  had  been  given  some  rudimentary  training  in  the  previous  few 
months.  In addition to this the division on duty each day had to furnish a further 
group of carpenters and miners. 
 
In summary, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was a great operational success that 
materially strengthened Wellington’s position and put the French firmly on the 
defensive. The success was due to three main factors : the weakness of the 
fortress, the strength of the Allied battering train and the lack of energy in the 
French governor.  Overall, the engineers had performed their duties well, but as 
Fortescue wrote ‘the engineers themselves … were by no means faultless in 
their  plans.’
142    As  mentioned  above,  the  first  signs  of  criticism  within  the 
engineers were also appearing.  This situation was not helped when, due to an 
oversight, Burgoyne’s name was omitted from Wellington’s despatch and only 
Jones and George MacLeod were mentioned.  Both received brevet promotions 
through  being  mentioned  and  only  a  subsequent  appeal  got  the  same 
recognition for Burgoyne.  The promotion of Macleod in particular would have 
caused annoyance as he was mentioned in connection with the troops from the 
Third Division who had been trained as sappers.  Burgoyne was responsible for 
their training and received no thanks for his work training these troops or for his 
performance as siege director.   
 
Casualties  among  the  nineteen  engineer  officers  were  two  killed  and  five 
wounded.  Two of the wounded sailed to England and did not return to the 
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Peninsula.
143  Three of the four fortresses covering the main routes in Portugal 
were now in Allied hands.  It was not difficult to see what was coming next. 
4.2.4.  THIRD SIEGE OF BADAJOZ IN 1812. 
As soon as Wellington had the repairs for Ciudad Rodrigo underway, he turned 
his attention to the next challenge, the retaking of Badajoz.  On 25 January 
1812, Dickson arranged for all the 24-pounder round shot and shells along with 
nine hundred barrels of powder to be moved to Oporto for onward transmission 
to  Elvas.
144    The  following  day  Wellington  ordered  sixteen  24-pounder 
carronades (howitzers) and a number of gun carriages to be moved by land 
from Almeida to Elvas.
145  On 28 January 1812, Wellington met Borthwick (the 
senior artillery officer in the Peninsula), Dickson and Fletcher to discuss moving 
the 24-pounder guns from Almeida to Elvas, but Dickson argued that the state 
of the bullocks and the availability of forage made it impossible.
146  Wellington 
then revised his plan to use sixteen 24-pounder guns that were on transports in 
Lisbon,  supplemented  by  twenty  more  which  Wellington  hoped  could  be 
supplied  by  Admiral  Berkeley  from  the  British  fleet.    On  the  same  day 
Wellington sent orders to Lisbon for the engineering stores to be collected and 
despatched to Elvas to allow the garrison to start work on gabions and fascines.  
George MacLeod R.E. was despatched to Elvas to superintend the preparatory 
work. Wellington had previously made arrangements for a pontoon train to be 
collected, ready for use to cross the river Guadiana which would be in full flow 
at that time of year.
147   
 
Table 4j. Timeline for third siege of Badajoz. 
 28 Jan 1812  Wellington  agreed  there  was  insufficient  transport  to 
move main siege guns from Ciudad Rodrigo to Badajoz.  
Arrangements made for alternative supply from Lisbon. 
5 Mar 1812  Wellington  hands  Ciudad  Rodrigo  over  to  Spanish 
Governor and sets out for Badajoz. 
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8 Mar 1812  Last guns of siege train arrive at Elvas. 
11 Mar 1812   Wellington arrives at Elvas to direct the siege. 
16 Mar 1812  Fortress invested. 
17 Mar 1812  Trenches opened night of 17/18 March 1812. 
19 Mar 1812  French launched sortie from Picurina fort. Col. Fletcher 
wounded. 
25 Mar 1812  Batteries opened fire on fortress. 
25 Mar 1812  Picurina fort stormed night of 25/26 March 1812. 
5 Apr 1812  Fortress stormed night of 5/6 April 1812. 
 
Dickson found out on 10 February 1812, that Admiral Berkeley was planning to 
provide  twenty  Russian  18-pounders  instead  of  the  hoped  for  English  24-
pounders.
148    This  caused  Wellington  and  Dickson  great  concern  as  18-
pounders were significantly less effective in siege work.  The guns were also in 
poor  condition,  which  meant  that  both  accuracy  and  power  were  further 
reduced.  Wellington complained to Berkeley, but at the time Berkeley would 
not offer an alternative.  Berkeley did eventually source ten new English 18-
pounders but Dickson argued that he did not want to mix 18-pounders (Russian 
and English) or to delay the siege to bring them up.  Myatt notes that he was  
unsure if they were used in the siege, but Jones’ journal clearly stated that they 
were not used.
149 
 
Wellington remained in Ciudad Rodrigo while all the preparations were being 
made.  The main reason for this was to keep the French guessing as to what 
his next step would be.  Although the siege of Badajoz was an obvious step, 
there were other possibilities and until Wellington signified his intention by going 
to Badajoz, the French had to keep their options open. 
 
Jones’  diary  described  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  plan  of  attack  on  Badajoz.  
There had been much criticism of the point of attack on Badajoz the year before 
and a decision had to be made on whether to follow the same plan as last year, 
the  previous  French  plan,  or  some  other  alternative.    At  the  meeting  were 
Wellington, General Castanos, the Spanish Chief Engineer and Fletcher.  Jones 
recorded  that  Wellington  and  the  Spanish  engineer  wanted  to  attack  the 
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southern face as the French had done in early 1811, while Fletcher wanted to 
attack the south-western corner from the Picurina redoubt.  Initially Fletcher was 
reluctant to admit openly that his recommendation was due to the lack of skilled 
sappers and miners to deal with the mines that the French were known to have 
placed on the southern face.  Wellington, on being reminded of the situation, 
reluctantly agreed saying ‘he regretted extremely our deficiencies and it obliged 
him to undertake an attack he did not approve, but that knowing the means he 
believed it to be the only attack in our power to get through’.  Jones added : 
‘though adopted through necessity,  … it was never for one moment approved 
by  any  one  employed  in  drawing  it  up,  or  in  the  execution  of  it’.
150    Jones 
summed up his thoughts with the comment : ‘what a reflection on those who 
have governed the engineering service for the last nineteen years of war’.
151  
Jones added further comments in his published Journal to the effect that the 
attack  on  the  southern  side  would  have  required  a  further  thirty  guns  and 
significantly more engineering stores and that this was beyond the available 
resources and transport.
152   
 
The siege 
 
The south side of the fortress was invested on 16 March 1812.  Fletcher had 
twenty-three  engineers  including  Squire  and  Burgoyne,  who  acted  as  siege 
directors, and Jones as Brigade-Major.  At least one and possibly four of this 
number did not arrive until the very end of the siege.
153  For the first time in the 
war there was a significant number of troops from the Royal Military Artificers 
present, a total one hundred and fifteen men.  A further thirty had been ordered 
up from Cadiz, but they did not arrive before the end of the siege.  Fletcher also 
had at his disposal the remainder of the soldiers from the Third Division who 
had been previously trained in sapping.  This group was now reduced to around 
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one hundred and twenty from its starting size of around two hundred.  Finally, 
there were also ten assistant engineers from the line regiments.
154  
 
Fletcher  marked  out  the  first  trenches  on  17  March  1812,  and  these  were 
commenced  that  night.    The  weather  over  the  first  few  days  was  poor  with 
constant  rain.  And  this  made  work  in  the  trenches  very  difficult.    The  river 
Guadiana rose until it swept away the pontoon bridge on 22 March 1812.  This 
was a major concern to Wellington as the bridge was both his source of his 
siege supplies and also his line of retreat.  A complete loss of communication 
across  the  river  would  require  Wellington  to  raise  the  siege,  the  nearest 
alternative bridge being at Merida, twenty miles away.  Lieutenant Piper R.E. 
was sent to investigate the damage to the pontoon bridge and reported that 
twelve  of  the  twenty-four  pontoons  had  sunk.    Two  were  subsequently 
recovered from the river, but the rest were lost.  For the remainder of the siege 
the pontoons were used as rowing boats exclusively for the carriage of powder 
and shot across the river.
155   
 
Despite the poor weather, some progress was made.  The French launched a 
sortie  at  noon  on  19  March  1812,  and  once  again  caught  the  Allied  army 
unprepared.  A small body of French cavalry made it to the engineers’ depot 
where they attacked the unarmed soldiers and captured two officers before they 
were driven off.  Little damage was done to the works, but many tools were 
carried off as the French troops had been promised a reward for every one they 
collected.  Allied casualties were around one hundred and fifty men including 
the  Chief  Engineer,  Fletcher  whose  wound  confined  him  to  bed  until  5
  April 
1812  but  did  not  stop  him  retaining  the  command.    The  routine  for  the 
remainder of the siege was for Wellington to meet with Fletcher and Jones each 
morning to discuss progress and agree the tasks for the next twenty-four hours. 
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The poor weather had probably delayed completion of the batteries by two or 
three days but they finally opened on the fortress on the morning of 25 March 
1812 and started to batter the fortress and also the Picurina and San Roque 
outworks.  No significant damage had been inflicted on the Picurina fort when 
Wellington ordered it to be stormed that night, Oman suggesting that this was to 
make up some lost time.
156  Due to the delay between the siege guns ceasing  
fire and the attack the French had time to make repairs and although the attack 
was successful, fifty-four were killed and two hundred and sixty-five wounded 
out of five hundred attackers.  Once the fort had been taken the second parallel 
and associated batteries could be started. 
 
From  27  March  1812,  the  trenches  were  extended  towards  the  San  Roque 
lunette  with  the  intention  of  taking  it  and  destroying  the  dam  that  kept  the 
ground in front of the fortress flooded.  Wellington’s intention was to launch the 
assault across this ground but until the water was drained this was not possible.  
Progress by the partially trained sappers was not fast enough and casualties 
were high.  An attempt was made without success on 2 April 1812,  to mine the 
dam near the San Roque lunette.  Lieutenant Stanway R.E. led a party forward 
and placed four hundred and fifty pounds of gunpowder on the dam, but the 
explosion did not have the desired effect.  The attack on San Roque was now 
abandoned and Wellington accepted that the attack would have to work round 
the flooded area.  The danger involved in trenching is well described in a letter 
from Lieutenant Vetch R.E. :  
 
I was employed … in advancing the approaches ; we were three or four 
officers,  at  least  half  an  hour  laying  out  the  work  not  80yds  from  the 
French parapet.  The sap was marked out with a white cord, and the 
men put down as near as they could work along the line.  They squat 
down and worked away as hard as they were able, in order to cover 
themselves … the moment we were perceived they opened a very sharp 
fire of musketry, and killed seven men in the first half hour, after which 
our men got too much cover to be hit. 
157 
 
As the days moved on into early April, Wellington once again found himself 
balancing  the  time  needed  to  batter  the  fortress  against  the  advance  of  the 
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French to relieve the fortress.  Wellington was aware that Soult was collecting 
troops and was moving north towards Badajoz.  He needed to decide between 
rapidly concluding the siege, or putting it on hold and advancing to meet Soult, 
leaving a force to guard the trenches or raising the siege.  Marmont was also 
demonstrating in the north against Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, but Wellington 
cannot have been seriously concerned about their safety at this time. 
 
By 5 April 1812, the breaches looked ready and Wellington issued orders for an 
assault that night.  Later in the day the assault was postponed for twenty-four 
hours to allow a third breach to be battered in the curtain wall.  It would appear 
that Wellington asked Fletcher to look at the breaches and give his opinion.
158  
Following his inspection, Fletcher advised that the defences the French had 
constructed behind the breaches were strong and that a third breach should be 
made where the French would have little time to prepare new defences.  The 
original plan was to make a third breach at the last moment.  The concentrated 
effort of the siege guns on 6 April 1812 quickly battered the wall and the third 
breach was ready in the afternoon.  The three breaches would be attacked by 
the Fourth and Light Divisions.  Separate attacks would also be made on the 
castle  by  the  Third  Division  and  on  the  San  Vincente  bastion  by  the  Fifth 
Division.  Sunset was just after 7:00pm.
159  The siege guns stopped firing at 
about  7:30pm  but  the  assault  did  not  get  underway  until  around  10:00pm. 
leaving the defenders with plenty of time to prepare for the assault that they 
knew was coming.  The main attacks through the breaches all failed, with huge 
casualties, due to the obstacles put across the breaches and the heavy fire 
from the garrison.  When it became clear to Wellington that they had failed he 
ordered the troops to be withdrawn and planned to make another assault just 
before daybreak.  About this time, Wellington was informed that Picton’s Third 
Division had managed to scale the walls of the castle and that the Fifth Division 
had also entered the town.  He ordered the Fourth and Light Divisions forward 
again using these footholds to break out and finally take the fortress.  As at 
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Ciudad Rodrigo, there followed an uncontrollable sack of the fortress by the 
troops and it took two days before order could be restored.   
 
Casualties from the assault were shocking with 800 killed and 2,900 wounded 
out of an overall total for the siege of around 1,000 killed and 3,800 wounded.  
As always with the sieges it was the officers and better soldiers who took more 
than their fair share of the injuries.  Engineer casualties were similarly heavy.  
Of the twenty-four officers present, four were killed and eight were wounded, 
three of whom went home.
160   
 
Wellington had taken Badajoz in twenty-one days.  His estimate before the start 
was  twenty-four  days  not  taking  into  account  the  bad  weather  that  surely 
delayed progress.  Mulcaster, one of the engineers had estimated twenty-seven 
days for the siege.
161  The French in 1811 took forty-five days to get the fortress 
to surrender and in reality it should have held out for many more days.  The 
cost of this rapid success was once again measured in casualties.  In this case 
they  were  all  from  the  very  experienced  British  divisions,  troops  Wellington 
could  not  afford  to  lose.    Although  there  were  criticisms  at  the  time  of  the 
decision to postpone the assault for another day to make the third breach, it is 
probable  that  this  decision  tipped  the  balance  by  spreading  the  defenders 
thinner which meant they were not able to resist the secondary assaults. 
 
Once order had been re-established in the town, work started immediately to 
repair the defences.  As a sign of the importance that Wellington placed on the 
speedy and effective repair, Fletcher the Chief Engineer was left to oversee the 
repairs and did not rejoin Wellington at headquarters until September 1812  
 
Analysis of the siege 
 
The  huge  casualties  at  the  siege  of  Badajoz  finally  pushed  Wellington  into 
writing a strongly worded private letter to Liverpool demanding that something 
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be done about the lack of trained soldiers available to undertake siege work.  
His criticism overflowed into a more general complaint about the skills of the 
engineers.  An analysis of his complaints will be detailed below, but first the 
other components of the siege that were not within the control of the engineers 
will be evaluated. 
 
Wellington’s strategy of keeping the French guessing about his plans by staying 
north worked well.  Soult made arrangements for Marmont to come to his aid if 
Wellington attacked Badajoz.  Soult then appears to have become distracted 
and, even though warnings had started filtering through, he was at Cadiz until 
20 March 1812.  Soult then rushed back to Seville and spent the next ten days 
pulling together a relief force which did not exceed 25,000 men, believing that 
Marmont would be doing the same.  Marmont, in the meantime, had received 
direct  orders  from  Napoleon  not  to  support  Badajoz,  this  being  Soult’s 
responsibility.    He  was  ordered  to  threaten  Ciudad  Rodrigo  instead,  which 
Napoleon believed would force Wellington to break off the siege of Badajoz and 
race north to protect it.
162  Soult did not discover until around 6 April 1812, that 
Marmont was sending no supporting force.  By that time it was too late for the 
French to relieve the fortress. 
 
The habitual problem of transport once again caused the siege train to be much 
less powerful than Wellington would have liked.  At Ciudad Rodrigo the siege 
train was made up of thirty-eight new iron English guns, thirty-four of which 
were 24-pounders.  Since these could not be transported to Badajoz, reliance 
had to be placed on a combination of sixteen new English 24-pounders and 
twenty old Russian 18-pounders in poor condition.  There were an additional 
sixteen 24-pounder carronades but these were of no use for breaching work 
and appear to have been used for enfilade fire.  Jones commented that the 24-
pounder iron howitzer (carronade) ‘should never be admitted into a battering 
train…[as] it only served to waste ammunition’.
163  General Colville commented  
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‘We have for the third time undertaken the siege … deficient of means … half 
the guns are 18-pounders. We have not a single mortar’.
164 
 
This siege train was a little better than the one used at the second siege of 
Badajoz, primarily due to the guns being made of iron, but it was much less 
powerful than that used at Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a much weaker fortress.  
The time taken to make a significant impact on the breaches was extended due 
to  this  less  powerful  siege  train.    The  lack  of  heavy  howitzers  limited  the 
besiegers’  ability  to  undertake  counter-battery  fire  and  this  led  to  greater 
casualties in the trenches and during the assault.   
 
The weather also had a material effect on the early stages of the siege.  It 
rained consistently until about 25 March 1812, and this slowed down work in the 
trenches and certainly stopped any attempt to put guns into the batteries until 
the ground had dried out.  Of more concern to Wellington was the loss of the 
pontoon bridge and the difficulties with the flying bridge as the river rose.  At 
this time, around 22 March 1812, Wellington did not have a clear picture of the 
movements of Soult and Marmont.  The loss of his only bridge was a serious 
matter.  If the French had forced him to lift the siege and retire, his army would 
have been able to do this, but the siege train would probably have been lost.  
The wet weather also ensured that the inundation around the walls of Badajoz 
caused by the damming of the Rivellas stream was higher than normal and was 
impossible to cross.  This was what made the attack on the San Roque outwork 
important.  If heavy howitzers had been available to suppress the French guns, 
it might have been possible to take the San Roque lunette, which would have 
enabled the destruction of the dam and the draining of the area in front of the 
breaches.    Wellington  could  not  reasonably  blame  the  bad  weather  for 
unexpectedly hampering his plans. He understood what the weather would be 
like at this time of year and used the poor weather as an argument to explain 
his timing of the siege, as it would hamper the movements of the French.  Of 
course there was also a chance that it would hamper his own plans and in the 
event it did. 
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The French governor, Phillipon, showed the same energy and determination 
that he had exhibited in 1811.  The garrison was made up of seasoned troops 
and the experienced chief engineer, Lamarre, had been at the fortress for some 
time and knew it well.  The defenders’ energy, particularly in clearing the debris 
from  in  front  of  the  breaches  and  in  blocking  up  the  breaches,  made  the 
assaults much more difficult.  As described above, the assaults on the breaches 
all failed with massive loss of life and it was only due to the secondary attacks 
that the fortress was taken.  With another thousand men, Phillipon would have 
probably repulsed the assault.  It is doubtful that the British troops would have 
had the energy to make a further serious assault as Wellington planned on the 
morning of 6 April 1812.  
 
One question that needs further consideration is why did Wellington decide to 
make the assault on 6 April 1812?  Wellington was clearly concerned that the 
French would try to relieve the fortress, but there does not appear to be the 
urgency that Wellington felt.  He was aware of the movements of Soult and he 
had  a  reasonable  idea  of  the  size  of  Soult’s  force.    Wellington  was  also 
reasonably certain that Marmont was not marching to the aid of Soult.  He had 
a report on 4 April 1812 that Marmont had been in front of Almeida on 3 April 
1812, which suggested Marmont was not making any immediate plans to move 
south.
165  Wellington was also clearly concerned that the breaches were only 
just practicable.  His decisions to order and then postpone the attack on the 
night  of  5  April  1812  show  a  level  of  indecision  that  is  very  unusual  in 
Wellington.  Wellington had made preliminary plans to suspend the siege and 
move to face Soult who he believed had up to 35,000 men.  When he realised 
that Soult had around 25,000 men he would have known that Soult could not 
possibly interfere with the siege without the support of Marmont.  Marmont did 
not receive permission from Napoleon to directly support Soult until 27 March 
1812, and would have needed ten to fourteen days to concentrate sufficient 
troops.  A week later he had not moved south and Wellington knew that, so the 
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earliest he could have arrived would have been the end of the second week in 
April. 
 
There are two areas where the lack of trained artificers appeared to have made 
a difference to the planning.  The first was in selection of the point of attack.  As 
mentioned above Wellington’s preference was to attack the south face, as it 
appeared to be the weakest.  This was the point that the French attacked.  The 
French, realising the same, had significantly strengthened it by reinforcing the 
Pardaleras outwork and also by placing mines in the approaches to the walls.  
The approaches to the southern wall that Wellington last saw in June 1811, 
were significantly stronger in March 1812.  The second was in the attempt to 
take the San Roque lunette and allow the destruction of the dam behind it.  This 
was  abandoned  due  to  the  high  casualties  and  poor  progress  made  by  the 
partially trained sappers from the army.  If trained sappers had been available, 
better progress would have been made and casualties should have been lower.  
But, the major difficulties were caused by the heavy fire from the defenders and 
without  some  attempt  to  reduce  this,  the  effect  might  not  have  been  any 
different.  The siege train at Badajoz did not contain weapons that were ideal for 
counter  battery  and  breach  clearing  activities.    The  24-pounder  carronades 
were the only ‘high-angle’ weapon available and as they were equivalent to the 
smallest 5.5-inch howitzer they did not carry the punch that was required. 
 
It could be argued that Wellington moved too quickly to the assault, when he 
could have waited a few more days and continued battering the defences.  This 
would have reduced his casualties although it is unlikely that Phillipon would 
have considered surrender.  Wellington’s complaint about the lack of trained 
sappers and miners causing the additional casualties was justified, but even 
with the trained artificers he would still have needed to give them time to work 
and it is unlikely that the siege would have progressed any faster.  As in all the 
previous sieges in 1811 and 1812, Wellington was pushed into attacking early 
through the need to take the fortress before the relieving force could interfere.  
Badajoz  was  no  different  and  trained  artificers  would    not  have  made  a 
significant difference. 
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On 7 April 1812 Wellington wrote his despatch informing the government of the 
success  at  Badajoz.    With  it  was  sent  a  private  letter  to  Liverpool  in  which 
Wellington complained about the lack of trained engineers and artificers and 
blamed the heavy losses at Badajoz on the lack of such troops : 
 
it is quite impossible to expect to carry fortified places … unless the army 
should be provided with a regular trained corps of sappers and miners … 
The  consequences  …  are  –  first,  that  our  engineers  although  well 
educated  and  brave,  have  never  turned  their  minds  to  the  mode  of 
conducting a regular siege, as it is useless to think of that which it is 
impossible in our service to perform.  They think that they have done 
their duty when they construct a battery, with a secure communication to 
it, which can make a breach in the wall of a place.; and, secondly, these 
breaches are to be carried by vive force by an infinite sacrifice of officers 
and soldiers ... I earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of 
sappers and miners formed without loss of time.
166 
 
His  frustration  at  his  losses  extended  his  complaints  from  the  reasonable 
towards what many engineers saw as an unreasonable attack on the whole 
engineering profession.  His complaints about the lack of sappers and miners 
were fully supported by the engineer officers themselves.  One example was 
Squire who used almost the same words as Wellington in his letter after the 
assault : ‘This siege has served to confirm … that constituted as our Corps is, 
we are decidedly not equal to the attack of a place; whose scarp is covered by 
a good counterscarp and glacis  … Sappers and Miners are as necessary to 
engineers during a siege, as soldiers to the General’.
167   
 
Wellington’s critical comments in his letter of 7 April 1812 were lost until 1889, 
but  a  subsequent  letter  on  the  same  subject  to  Major-General  Murray  was 
published in the despatches.   
 
I trust..... that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people 
necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers 
will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis and to blow 
in the counterscarp, instead of placing wherever the wall can be seen, 
leaving the poor officers and men to get into and across the ditch as best 
they can.
168 
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This was responded to in Jones’ Journal : ‘the officers … were fully equal to the 
difficult duty of crowning the crest of the glacis had they been assisted by a 
proper  trained  body  of  men’.
169    Wellington’s  complaint  about  the  casualties 
during the assault on the Picurina fort is particularly unreasonable.  The fort was 
stormed on his orders the same day the batteries opened when it was clear that 
no material damage had yet been inflicted.  Wellington rushed the assault to 
make up time lost due to the bad weather.  There is no doubt, based on the 
available  evidence,  that  Wellington’s  criticism  of  the  engineer  officers  was 
unfair.  The four sieges of 1811 and 1812 had all been arranged with limited 
resources and limited time.  This led to compromises that affected the chance 
of success and the level of casualties.  There was not sufficient time at any of 
these sieges for formal approaches to be prepared.  Complaining about the lack 
of  troops  to  deliver  formal  approaches  is  not  reasonable  when  such  troops 
would not have had the time to make the approaches anyway. 
 
However,  as  described  above,  Wellington’s  complaints  pushed  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  into  finalising  its  work  in  establishing  the  School  of  Military 
Engineering and this was in place before the end of April 1812.  Liverpool wrote 
to Wellington on 28 April 1812, informing him that the Board of Ordnance had 
been working on this issue for some time and that the first troops would be with 
him  before  the  end  of  the  month.
170    Although  the  Board  of  Ordnance’s 
response was a little dishonest, it is true that Pasley had previously started work 
on  training  artificers.    The  incorrect  understanding  of  the  causes  of  the 
formation  of  the  Royal  Sappers  and  Miners  still  appears  in  most  works.  
Oman
171 assumes that Wellington’s letter of 7 April 1812, caused an immediate 
change and the formation of the corps.  Fortescue seems even wider from the 
mark,  suggesting  that  Wellington  was  ‘beginning  himself  to  train  one  on  the 
spot’.  Myatt does not recognise that the Board of Ordnance had been working 
through 1811 to rectify the situation.
172  Similarly, in the most recent books on 
sieges in the Peninsula, there appears to be a misunderstanding of the role of 
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sappers and miners.  They would undertake the specialist tasks, like sapping up 
to the glacis or mining, but the bulk of the ‘spade work’ would still be done by 
the line infantry with the trained artificers providing the supervision.
173 
 
Fletcher was left at Badajoz to carry out the repairs and Burgoyne accompanied 
Wellington with  the army as it set out on the Salamanca campaign.  This was 
an  unusual  arrangement  as  typically  the  senior  engineer  would  travel  with 
Wellington.    Whilst  there  has  been  some  question  about  whether  this  was 
evidence  of  a  lack  of  trust  in  Fletcher,  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  this 
position.  Wellington’s decision was probably based on two points that would 
have been high in his mind.  Firstly, that losing Badajoz again was unthinkable, 
so every effort had to be made to protect it.  Secondly, Wellington had handed 
over responsibility for Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish only four weeks before 
and he had already received communications to show that little progress had 
been made to complete the repairs; the Spanish were asking for further help to 
complete them and they had already used most of the supplies left for the use 
of the garrison.  Because of this Wellington was forced to remain in a position 
where he could support Ciudad Rodrigo when one of his options would have 
been to pursue Soult south.
174  Although it was not approved, Wellington had 
also asked for promotion for Fletcher after Ciudad Rodrigo.
175   
 
In summary, Badajoz was attacked with a second rate siege train; the lack of 
sappers  and  miners  meant  that  the  preferred  choice  of  attack  could  not  be 
selected;  the  fortress  was  assaulted  too  early;  and  together  these  factors 
caused the high casualties.  Badajoz was taken due to the secondary attacks 
succeeding when all the main attacks had failed.  Wellington was lucky. 
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4.2.5.   BURGOS, 1812. 
Wellington’s  successful  start  to  1812  continued  with  victory  at  the  battle  of 
Salamanca  and  his  entry  into  Madrid.    To  take  full  advantage  of  these 
successes he had to hold his forward position, and to do this he needed to take 
Burgos.  Wellington ordered the guns collected but not used for the attack on 
the Retiro in July 1812 to be moved north.  These were three 18-pounders and 
five  24-pounder  carronades,
176  a  composition  that  was  wholly  inadequate  to 
attack anything but the most flimsy defence. Burgos did not meet this criteria 
and  the  defenders  had  significantly  more  ordnance  with  which  to  resist  the 
attack.  Of even more concern to the Allies was the very limited amount of shot, 
shell and powder, which meant that the attackers were worried about supply 
levels before they had fired the first shot. 
 
Table 4k. Timeline for siege of Burgos. 
19 Sep 1812  Burgos invested. 
19 Sep 1812  Hornwork  stormed  on  night  of  19/20  Sep  1812. 
Work on trenches started. 
22 Sep 1812  First battery armed on night of 22/23 Sep 1812. 
22 Sep 1812  Attempt to storm outer wall of Burgos failed. 
23 Sep 1812  Trenches started from suburb of San Pedro on night 
of 23/24 Sep 1812. 
25 Sep 1812  Work started on first mine. 
27 Sep 1812  Work started on second mine. 
29 Sep 1812  First mine blown and second attempt to storm outer 
wall failed on night of 29/30 Sep 1812. 
4 Oct 1812  Second  mine  blown  and  third  assault  takes  outer 
wall on night of 4/5 Oct 1812. 
5 Oct 1812  French launch sortie on Allied position. 
8 Oct 1812  French launch second sortie on Allied positions. 
10 Oct 1812  Work  started  on  third  mine  under  church  of  San 
Roman. 
18 Oct 1812  Third  mine  blown  and  fourth  assault  fails  to  take  
French second line. 
20 Oct 1812  Siege lifted. 
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Wellington  took  with  him  four  divisions  and  two  independent  Portuguese 
brigades.  The Third, Fourth and Light Divisions which had taken on most of the 
work at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz earlier in the year were not allocated for 
this siege.  The broad plan was to take the hornwork of St Michael on the first 
night and establish batteries there.  At the same time, trenches would be dug 
from the suburb of San Pedro to enable a mine to be placed under the outer 
wall that would be assaulted when the mine was blown.  The two sets of inner 
defences would then be breached using the batteries.  Engineering resources 
were only five officers commanded by John Burgoyne (Fletcher still being at 
Badajoz) with support from ten assistant engineers (five of whom had previous 
experience)
177,  eighty-one  volunteers  from  the  line  and  eight  Royal  Military 
Artificers. 
 
The  fortress  was  invested  on  19  September  1812,  and  the  same  tactic 
employed  at  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  used  with  an  immediate  assault  on  the 
hornwork that protected the preferred point of attack.  The hornwork was taken 
with heavy casualties amounting to seventy-one killed and three hundred and 
forty-nine wounded.  Oman described this as a ‘vast and unnecessary loss of 
life’.
178  Jones privately criticised the orders which were given to support the 
assault : ‘Luckily the assaulting columns carried the work and success glossed 
over this most unmilitary and inefficient mode of supporting them’.
179 
 
Work immediately started on two batteries, the first of which was fitted with two 
guns and three howitzers on the night of 22/23 September 1812.
180  Wellington 
decided to change the plan ‘with a view to abridge the attack and save the 
troops from unnecessary fatigue’.
181  He ordered an assault on the outer line of 
defences the same night, but the small group of four hundred volunteers failed 
completely  with  a  further  one  hundred  and  fifty-eight  casualties.    Wellington 
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then reverted back to the original plan to mine the outer wall.  The defenders 
kept up a continual fire of shot and shell on the attackers and the trenches were 
so close to the walls that the French could roll the shells down the hill and into 
the attackers’ trenches. 
 
The Allied battery opened for the first time on 25 September 1812.  Dickson 
commented at the end of the first day that ‘it being found from the want of 
precision in the howitzers with round shot, a greater expenditure of ammunition 
would be required… than the limited means … could afford’.
182  Ten per cent of 
the available round shot were used in one day to discover that the guns were 
highly inaccurate!  Dickson recorded that the soldiers were offered a bounty for 
every round shot they could recover and so as not to discourage them, even 
round shot of sizes which were of no use were paid for.  Wellington wrote to 
both the Royal Navy and the nearest fortresses for additional supplies. 
 
On  29  September  1812,  the  first  mine  was  declared  ready  and  the  assault 
planned for that night.  Like the previous attempt, the assault party was small, 
only three hundred men.  The mine exploded, but the assault failed due to the 
forlorn hope losing their way in the dark and missing the breach.  There is no 
mention  of  any  engineer  officer  accompanying  the  assault  party  and  this 
probably was a contributory factor to the soldiers losing their way.  Jones noted 
that the effect of one thousand pounds of powder in the mine did not have the 
impact he would have expected and this may have been caused by the mine 
being placed against old foundations rather than against the current wall.
183 
 
Work progressed on the second mine and a new battery close to the wall on the 
west side of the fortress.  The French detected it before the battery had opened 
fire and they pounded it mercilessly, damaging two of the three heavy cannons 
that Wellington possessed.  On the orders of Wellington, the two damaged guns 
were  mounted  on  temporary  carriages  and  fired  with  reduced  charges  (and 
reduced  effect)  for  the  remainder  of  the  siege.    The  second  mine  was 
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successfully blown on 4 October 1812, and finally the outer wall was taken, 
successfully led by a battalion of the twenty-fourth regiment.  Casualties during 
the  assault  amounted  to  thirty-seven  killed  and  two  hundred  and  thirteen 
wounded.  Among the wounded was John T. Jones R.E. which reduced the 
number of engineer officers present to three.  His injuries forced him to return 
home, although this did give him the spare time to publish in 1814 the first 
edition of his comprehensive work on the British sieges.
184  For the next sixteen 
days the siege staggered on.  The Allies had neither the guns nor ammunition 
to make progress and the defenders had plenty of both.  The situation reached 
its worst point on 2 October 1812, when the whole of the working party for the 
night with the exception of the Guards regiments did not turn up.  This led to a 
stinging rebuke from Wellington and some officers being arrested for neglect of 
duty.  The French launched two sorties on 5 and 8 October 1812, causing some 
damage but Wellington’s troops had just lost heart.  A third mine was started on 
10  October  1812,  under  the  church  of  St  Roman  and  blown  with  the  final 
assault on 18 October 1812, when four hundred troops assaulted the second 
line.  The defenders stood firm and the attack was repulsed with the loss of one 
hundred and sixty men.  The siege just petered out from this point until the 
siege was raised by Wellington on 20 October 1812 as the French armies finally 
started to threaten his position. 
 
Analysis of siege. 
 
There was clearly a serious underestimation of the resources required.  Burgos 
was not a strong fortress and even the smallest siege train would have caused 
severe  damage  in  very  little  time.  Jones  described  Burgos  ‘as  a  very 
insignificant fortress’.
185  Wellington must have believed that it would put up no 
defence  and  once  started  he  would  not  accept  that  there  were  insufficient 
resources  to  take  the  fortress.    According  to  Fortescue,  Wellington  had 
                                            
184 Jones in his private autobiography records  with some dissatisfaction that he was shot whilst 
standing in the open, making the agreed signal to Lord Wellington for permission to blow the 
mine.  Wellington did not acknowledge his signal despite it being repeated several times.  Jones 
wrote  that  Wellington  then  refused  to  mention  him  in  his  despatches  because  of  his  rash 
behaviour  of  standing  in  the  open  where  he  knew  he  would  be  hit.    Jones’  Military 
Autobiography, pp. 71-72. 
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‘snatched away more than one Indian fortress by escalade, he hoped to do the 
like with Burgos’.
186  Fortescue summed up the result : ‘At Burgos … he fulfilled 
his threat and tried East Indian methods with disastrous results’.
187   
 
The  three  attempts  to  assault  the  castle  were  all  made  by  small  groups  of 
soldiers who were heavily outnumbered by the defenders.
188  Whether this was 
due to Wellington’s guilt about the casualties at earlier sieges is not clear, but 
launching troops against defences that had not been seriously weakened could 
have no effect other than high casualties.  The effort of the troops and officers 
was  not  to  the  usual  standard  and  Burgoyne  particularly  singled  out  the 
Portuguese units for their lack of effort.  But it must have been obvious to all the 
troops that the resources available were insufficient.  Perhaps the troops were 
getting  sick  of  being  used  as  cannon  fodder?    Two  thousand  troops  were 
injured at Burgos with nothing to show for it.  The retreat that followed finished 
1812 with a real blow after the successes of earlier in the year. 
 
In his despatch after the siege had been raised, Wellington made it clear that he 
did  not  hold  the  artillery  or  engineer  officers  at  fault.
189    This  was  a  fairer 
statement  than  those  he  made  after  the  successful  siege  of  Badajoz.  
Considering the resources that they had to work with, it is difficult to see what 
else could have been achieved.  The engineer resources were miniscule.  The 
siege lasted thirty-five days.  From day eight they were down to four engineers 
when  Captain  Williams  was  killed  and  down  to  three  engineers  from  day 
eighteen  when  Jones  was  incapacitated.    Burgoyne  was  lucky  to  be  alive 
having been hit in the head by a musket ball and the two engineer lieutenants, 
Reid  and  Pitts,  were  also  sick  for  part  of  the  time.    Of  the  ten  assistant 
engineers, six were killed or wounded.   
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Three mines were dug and exploded without any trained miners being present. 
They had no miners’ tools and were obliged to use normal pick axes.
190  Jones 
stated  that  the  reason  for  the  unplanned  assault  on  the  outer  wall  on  22 
September 1812 was because Wellington was doubtful that the mining could be 
achieved without trained miners.
191  Jones continued that because the second 
assault failed a further five days were lost whilst the second mine was dug.  The 
mines had varying success.  The first did not do the damage expected, possibly 
due to encountering old foundations.  The second made a large breach in the 
wall as expected.  The third caused extensive damage to the terrace in front of 
the breach but did not bring down the church, which was expected.  However 
the purpose of the third mine was to provide access to the upper level and this 
was achieved by destroying the terrace. 
 
Overall, Jones was much more critical of the engineering effort than Wellington, 
although the prime thrust of his criticism was still the lack of trained sappers and 
miners.  Jones believed if there had been sufficient sappers and miners present 
then much more progress would have been made.  The decision to mine the 
defences was probably made to remedy the deficiency of ordnance.  The walls, 
as even the limited ordnance available showed, were not very strong.  A proper 
siege  train  would  have  removed  any  need  for  mining.    Burgoyne,  writing 
privately  to  Fletcher,  was  strongly  critical  of  the  efforts  of  the  troops  and  of 
Wellington’s decision to assault with small numbers of men.  Like Jones, he 
believed that Burgos could have been taken with the resources available.  One 
of Burgoyne’s final comments, which Wrottesley
192 did not publish, was ‘the last 
assault failed entirely due to the small number of the storming parties against a 
fort having 1,500 men in it – they carried the works easy but could not hold 
them’.
193  As on a number of other occasions, Wrottesley adjusted Burgoyne’s 
quotes  when  they  were  especially  critical  of  Wellington.    Burgoyne’s  final 
paragraph in his private letter to Fletcher, in the version printed by Wrottesley 
stated :  
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I have heard a hint that Lord Wellington said that the engineers told him 
“the  fort  might  be  taken  without  guns”.  This  I  do  not  believe;  first, 
because it is not like him to say that he went by other people’s advice … 
although he occasionally listened to some project or other
194 
 
Burgoyne actually wrote : 
 
I have heard a hint that Lord Wellington said that the engineers told him 
“the fort might be taken without guns”. This I do not believe because it is 
not  like  him,  as  I  believe  he  never  pays  anyone  the  compliment  to 
insinuate that he took their advice, though he may perhaps in a case of 
failure … and although he occasionally listened to some foolish project or 
other
195 
 
Overall,  Burgoyne  was  not  impressed  with  Wellington’s  performance.    The 
engineers  did  what  they  could  with  very  limited  resources  and  for  once  the 
British army did not pull a victory out of defeat despite their generals failings.  
Burgos was probably the biggest failure under Wellington’s command in the 
Peninsula. 
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4.2.6.  SIEGES OF SAN SEBASTIAN IN 1813. 
First Siege of San Sebastian. 
 
As at Burgos the year before, Wellington needed to take the fortresses of San 
Sebastian and Pamplona to capitalise on his success at the battle of Vitoria.  
The French had retreated into the Pyrenees and if Wellington could take the 
fortresses he had a much better chance of holding the line of the Pyrenees 
against any future French advance.  The castle at Burgos had been destroyed 
by the retreating French and was no longer a threat. Wellington’s original plan 
had been to attack Pamplona, but he decided to attack the weaker fortress of 
San Sebastian and blockade Pamplona into submission. 
 
Table 4l. Timeline for first siege of San Sebastian. 
11 Jul 1813  Work started on batteries against St Bartolomeo on 
night of 11/12 July 1813. 
13 Jul 1813  Work started on batteries against eastern wall. 
14 Jul 1813   Fire opened on convent of St Bartolomeo. 
17 Jul 1813   Convent of St Bartolomeo taken. 
20 Jul 1813  Fire opened on fortress. 
21 Jul 1813  Governor rejects summons. 
23 Jul 1813  Main breach practicable, second breach started. 
24 Jul 1813  Assault postponed due to fires in town. 
25 Jul 1813  Assault fails. 
26 Jul 1813  Graham  ordered  to  remove  siege  guns  but  keep 
blockade on fortress. 
 
After  the  fortress  was  invested  on  11  July  1813,  Wellington,  Major  Charles 
Smith R.E.
196 and Dickson rode around the fortress, and at the suggestion of 
Smith, the same basic plan of attack was proposed as had previously been 
used by the Duke of Berwick in 1719.  The plan was to breach the wall on the 
eastern side where it was fully visible due to the sea going right up to the base 
of the wall at high tide and not allowing any other form of defence.  At low tide it 
was possible for troops to cross the tidal estuary of the river Urumea and storm 
any breach.  It would also be necessary to take some of the outworks on the 
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land side to reduce the fire that could be brought to bear on any attack across 
the estuary and also to give access to the foot of the eastern wall.  With this aim 
in mind the convent of St Bartolomeo was to be captured and trenches thrown 
forward  to  allow  the  defences  to  be  silenced  and  for  enfilade  fire  on  the 
proposed breaches. 
 
As  at  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  Wellington  had  effective  siege  guns 
available.  A new siege train had been sent out to the Peninsula for use in 
northern Spain and with the six 18-pounders that travelled with the army and six 
24-pounders supplied by the Royal Navy, Wellington had a siege train of forty 
guns made up of : 
−  Twenty 24-pounders 
−  Six 18-pounders 
−  Four 68-pounder carronades 
−  Six 8-inch howitzers 
−  Four 10-inch mortars. 
 
Engineering resources commanded by Fletcher included seventeen engineer 
officers  and  over  three  hundred  rank  and  file  from  the  Royal  Sappers  and 
Miners.
197  This was the first siege at which there were a significant number of 
them present.  Although Jones’ published Journal does not record the use of 
assistant engineers, both Burgoyne and Fletcher mention that a number were 
used  on  the  left  attack.
198    Overall  command  of  the  siege  was  given  to  Sir 
Thomas Graham, Wellington being with the army to monitor the activities of the 
French forces. 
 
The  initial  attack  was  made  against  the  convent  of  St  Bartolomeo.    Two 
batteries were constructed and they opened fire on 14 July 1813.  The following 
day  a  force  of  Portuguese  infantry  was  sent  forward,  but  they  encountered 
strong resistance and retired.  The guns continued firing on the convent for two 
                                            
197  As  previously  Jones’  Journal  is  misleading.    He  list  the  full  eighteen  officers  as  present 
throughout the siege, but at least two did not arrive until well into the second siege.  Captain 
Collyer  and  Lieutenant  Wortham  did  not  arrive  until  19  Aug  1813  with  a  company  of  RSM.  
These are all counted in Jones’ totals. 
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more days.  It was taken on 17 July 1813, though not without considerable loss 
through another undisciplined, pointless charge by the infantry against the main 
French positions.  Two new batteries were started near the convent and the 
plan was to dig a parallel right across the isthmus. 
 
The batteries against the eastern wall opened on the morning of 20 July 1813 
and once the French realised where the main point of attack was going to be, 
they  started  work  on  establishing  defences  behind  the  wall  being  breached.  
The  same  night  the  attackers  started  work  on  the  main  parallel  across  the 
isthmus,  but  due  to  the  poor  weather  the  majority  of  the  Portuguese  troops 
allocated for the work did not appear and only a third of the planned work was 
completed.  The following night, whilst completing this parallel, a large drain 
was found which had supplied water into the town until the supply was cut off.  
This was explored by Lieutenant Reid R.E. who found it went up to the western 
side of the hornwork and it was decided to place a mine at the end of the drain 
with the intention of breaching the hornwork.   
 
The breach in the eastern wall appeared practicable on 22 July 1813, but the 
French were making great efforts to clear away the debris despite the Allies 
continually sweeping the breach with grape shot and shells.  On the following 
day, the breach was declared practicable and the guns were directed to make a 
second  breach  in  the  wall  at  a  location  that  locals  had  suggested  was 
particularly weak.  This second breach was ready that night although there were 
also numerous fires in the houses behind the two breaches from the continuous 
shelling.  Graham ordered the assault for the morning of 24 July 1813, but in 
the morning the assault was cancelled as it was thought the fires that were still 
raging  would  impede  the  assault.
199    This  delay  gave  the  French  an  extra 
twenty-four hours to improve the defences, although they were working under a 
continuous bombardment from the attackers. 
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The  plan  of  attack  was  for  troops  from  the  Fifth  Division  to  assault  the  two 
breaches, starting from the right (eastern) end of the parallel across the isthmus 
and skirting the foot of the wall until they reached the breaches.  The siege 
batteries would provide heavy covering fire from across the bay.  The plan was 
dependent upon the time of low time and daybreak, which were both expected 
to  be  around  5:00am.    The  signal  for  the  start  of  the  assault  would  be  the 
blowing of the mine in the drain by the hornwork. 
 
On the morning of 25 July 1813, the mine was blown before daylight and the 
assault commenced.  Filing out of the parallel was very slow and the first troops 
arrived at the breach in small numbers.  Although initially successful, there were 
not  sufficient  men  present  and  they  were  quickly  driven  back,  having  been 
stopped by a twenty foot drop from the breach into the town itself.  In doing so 
they  became  mixed  with  the  group  who  were  tasked  with  assaulting  the 
secondary  breach  and  all  retired  in  some  disorder.    The  assault  had  failed 
completely before there was enough daylight for the artillery across the bay to 
provide  any  support.    Casualties  from  the  assault  were  five  hundred  and 
seventy killed and wounded.  There were five engineer casualties during the 
assault.  Fletcher, Lieutenant H.D. Jones and Lieutenant Reid were wounded, 
Captain Lewis lost a leg and Lieutenant Machell was killed.  Another officer, 
Lieutenant Hammond Tapp, had been severely wounded earlier in the siege on 
13 July 1813. 
 
When Wellington heard about the failure of the assault, he rode over from his 
headquarters determined to continue the siege.  However, he accepted that it 
would  have  to  be  postponed  temporarily  until  further  shot  and  powder  were 
delivered.    In  the  meantime  as  Soult  was  still  threatening  to  attack,  so 
Wellington ordered most of the siege guns to be removed and returned to the 
boats where they would be safe until further ammunition was available.  He 
ordered a tight blockade to be kept in place. 
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Analysis of the first siege. 
 
Both contemporary and more recent writers have criticised the performance of 
the  engineers  in  a  number  of  areas.    Fortescue  leads  the  attack  with  an 
unjustifiable  apportioning  of  blame  for  the  failures  at  San  Sebastian,  while 
Oman only holds the engineers partially to blame but identifies them as the 
primary  culprit.    Their  assessments  in  both  cases  appear  to  be  led  by  the 
thoughts of one particular army officer who clearly had a dislike for the ‘scientific 
soldiers’.  The analysis below will look at the criticisms and compare them with 
to the available facts. 
 
Oman and, more recently Myatt criticised Major Smith’s proposal to follow the 
Duke  of  Berwick’s  plan  of  attack  of  1719.    Oman  wrote  that  Graham, 
Wellington,  Fletcher,  Dickson  and  Frazer  all  agreed  with  the  plan  and  they 
‘forgot’ that the Duke of Berwick did not have to assault the fortress.
200  It is 
inconceivable, even excluding the other officers, that Wellington ‘forgot’ about 
the  possibility  of  another  costly  assault.    The  strength  of  the  fortress  was 
directed against the land approaches for obvious reasons and once again the 
view was that there would be insufficient time to formally approach from the 
land side.  Fletcher’s view on the proposed attack on the eastern side was that 
‘it would certainly save much time … compared with a regular siege of the very 
powerful defences crossing the isthmus’.  An attack on the land front would be a 
‘work of great difficulty’ requiring a larger battering train and thirty to thirty-five 
days’ effort.
201  Burgoyne also supported the proposed plan although with the 
benefit of hindsight he thought that finding the drain tipped the balance in favour 
of an attack across the isthmus.  He did, however, acknowledge that this attack 
would  have  taken  more  time.    Oman  and  Fortescue  both  wrote  that  when 
Wellington  arrived  after  the  assault  he  was  insistent  that  the  siege  would 
continue and required the engineers to come up with a plan for a formal attack 
from the land side.  Burgoyne and Frazer indicate that an alternative plan of 
attack was discussed at the meeting with Wellington on 25 July 1813.  Jones, in 
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his diary entry for 25 July 1813 noted that ‘after some consideration, it was 
decided  to  persevere  in  the  same  plan  of  attack’.
202    Fletcher  also  wrote  to 
Wellington  on  27  July  1813  noting  that  Wellington’s  opinion  was  for  an 
extended attack using the original plan.
203  Lack of ammunition stopped any 
progress in the short term.  By the time the new supplies had arrived, the plan 
as Jones noted, remained the same as before, with an attack on the east-facing 
sea walls.  Any thoughts of using a different plan were clearly put aside very 
quickly. 
 
Oman’s narrative stated that when the mine was blown, the hornwork was to be 
assaulted by Portuguese troops from the parallel on the isthmus.  He continued 
that the engineers were unsure what level of damage would be caused by the 
mine and because of this no concrete proposals were made to make use of the 
explosion.  He noted that for the attack on 25 July 1813, ‘a little more attention, 
but not nearly enough, was given’, but overall described the engineers’ plans as 
‘half-hearted’.
204  Burgoyne clearly understood that the mine was to be used ‘as 
a signal only and with the chance of alarming them’ [the French defenders].
205  
Jones makes no mention of an assault on the hornwork.  Dickson’s view before 
the assault was that blowing the mine would ’create such an alarm as may 
make them evacuate … and so produce a favourable diversion’, a view shared 
by  H.D.  Jones.
206    After  the  assault  Dickson  noted,  ‘A  party  of  Cacadores 
availing themselves of the consternation produced amongst the enemy … made 
… their way into the ditch … but the defenders … commenced a fire … which 
obliged them to make … their way back’.
207  It would appear that Oman based 
his suppositions on the comment above from Dickson, which does not give any 
real indication that it was a pre-meditated action.  There does not appear to be 
any evidence to back up Oman’s claim that an attack on the hornwork was 
planned and that it was badly organised by the engineers.  It should also be 
noted that it was not the engineers’ responsibility to organise the troops for any 
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attack.  That was the responsibility of the commander of the troops, so any 
blame should have been directed at Graham, not the engineers. 
 
There are a number of criticisms of the delay between the first breach being 
practicable and the assault, thereby giving time for the defenders to reinforce 
the  damaged  areas.    These  criticisms  are  not  helped  by  some  confusion 
amongst the ordnance officers themselves.  Frazer complained in his letter of 
23 July 1813 that ‘after [making] this excellent breach, they hesitate about using 
it … I am now ordered to make another breach … by which time the original 
breach will be entrenched’.  His view was clearly that the failure of the assault 
was caused by ‘delay and indecision’.
208  According to Jones, the general plan 
as had been used in previous sieges was to open a second breach at the last 
minute to stretch the defenders.  Frazer did not appear to be aware of this, 
perhaps because this was the first siege at which he was present.  Oman and 
Fortescue both criticise the two day delay between the first breach being ready 
and the assault.  Fortescue in particular seized on Burgoyne’s remarks after the 
first siege where Burgoyne commented that the ‘whole of the batteries … were 
constructed on the right bank … giving them immediate insight into the nature 
of the attack… and the breach was practicable two days before the trenches.
209  
Careful review of the dates shows that the trenches were ready on the morning 
of 23 July 1813,
210 the breach was declared practicable the same morning and 
the  assault  was  planned  for  the  following  morning.    The  two  day  delay  is 
calculated because the assault was then delayed for twenty-four hours due to   
the  fires  behind  the  breach.    This  delay  may  have  been  unfortunate  and 
significant, but it was not due to the trenches not being ready.  It is difficult to 
see how the work on the breaching batteries could have been delayed to hide 
the point of attack.  They were started on 13 July 1813, which was four days 
before the convent of St Bartolemeo was taken.  It is unlikely that they would 
have all been ready on 20 July 1813, if they were not started until 17 July 1813, 
and  this  would  then  have  lengthened  the  siege.    In  every  siege  in  the 
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Peninsular War, time was a critical factor.  San Sebastian was no different and 
the  decisions  taken  were  designed  to  reduce  the  time.    Graham  wrote  to 
Wellington on 24 July 1813, pointing out that the artillery had nearly run out of 
24-pounder shot.  If the assault had not gone in on the morning of 25 July 1813, 
the  siege  would  have  had  to  revert  to  a  blockade,  as  there  was  insufficient 
ammunition to continue.
211  One other factor that must be taken into account is 
the problems with working parties.  The problems on the night of 20 July 1813, 
when the working parties absented themselves, lost the attackers twenty-four 
hours.  They should have been ready on the morning of 22 July, which would 
have been the day before the breaches were declared practicable.
212 
 
There were a number of criticisms around the assault itself on the morning of 25 
July 1813.  The plan required daylight so that artillery support could be given to 
the  assault.  Dickson  had  told  Graham  that  the  artillery  would  be  able  to 
suppress the defenders’ fire during the assault.  Graham’s official report stated 
that  the  attack  took  place  ‘soon  after  daylight’,  and  Fletcher  stated  that  the 
assault was given at daylight … the mine having been previously sprung’.
213  
However, the artillery officers recorded that the assault had failed before there 
was sufficient light for them to determine what was happening.  Dickson stated 
‘the column of attack certainly moved forward too early, either from a mistake … 
or from over anxiety on the part of the directors’.
214  Frazer was more forthright 
writing ‘The assault was … made … stupidly an hour before, instead of after 
daybreak’.
215  It is almost certain that the mine was blown before 5:00am as 
Graham’s letter to Wellington informing him of the failure of the assault was 
written at 5:30am.
216  Aspinal-Oglander in his biography of Graham, strongly 
refutes the claim that the attack commenced before daylight, but seems to base 
his argument on the fact that Graham’s despatch reported it was in daylight.
217  
While no account clearly stated who gave the order to start the assault, it is 
                                            
211 WSD, Graham to Wellington, 24 Jul 1813. 
212 Burgoyne complains about this in his manuscript account of the siege, but it did not make it’s 
way into Wrottesley’s account.  REM, 5501-108-4, p. 111. 
213 WD, Graham to Wellington, 27 Jul 1813; WSD, Fletcher to Graham, 27 Jul 1813. 
214 Dickson, Manuscripts, vol. 5, p. 973. 
215 Sabine, Frazer Letters, p. 204. 
216 WSD, Graham to Wellington, 245 Jul 1813. 
217 C. Aspinal-Oglander, Freshly Remembered ; The story of Thomas Graham (London, 1956), 
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likely that Graham did.  Even if he did not, he must, as commanding officer, still 
take the responsibility for the failure. 
 
General Oswald, the commander of the Fifth Division, did not plan the actual 
attack well.  Campbell of the Ninth Foot was of the opinion that the troops were 
too extended during the assault and thought that if a compact mass had arrived 
at the breach they ‘would have bodily forced through all opposition’.
218  He may 
have had a point about the organisation of the troops, but his approach would 
not have worked against the twenty foot drop that the attackers were faced with 
in the main breach.  Oswald’s plan, bearing in mind the concerns about the 
narrow area in which the assault had to take place, organised his troops so that 
those heading for the nearest breach went first followed by those who needed 
to pass the first breach to go to the second breach.  With the failure of the 
assault on the first breach, the troops destined for the second breach could not 
get past the retiring troops and were swept back into the trenches with them.   
 
A  more  contentious  issue  is  the  view  expressed  at  the  time  that  the  Fifth 
Division had not tried very hard.  Oman called this a ‘monstrous injustice’ writing 
‘everything  that  mismanagement  could  accomplish  had  been  done  to 
discourage them’.
219  He quoted statements from Frazer and Larpent who are 
generally respected commentators, but pointed out that neither was present at 
the storm.  Burgoyne, recognised by Oman as one of the authorities on the 
siege, also recorded that the officers  ‘could not get the men to follow them’.
220  
Jones  wrote  that  the  attack  was  not  pressed  energetically  but  finished 
cryptically by noting although many officers thought so, it could not be true as 
the ‘highest authority’, Graham, had stated in his despatch that the troops had 
done  their  best.
221    One  authority  not  used  by  Oman  was  Lieutenant  Harry 
Jones R.E. who led the column to the main breach and was captured there after 
being wounded.  Jones commented : 
 
                                            
218 Quoted in Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 6, p. 583. 
219 Oman, Peninsular War, vol. 6, p. 584. 
220 Wrottesley, Life of Burgoyne. pp. 269-270. 
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finding  the  descent  [from  the  breach  into  the  town]  too  great  on  the 
inside, I returned for the ladders … but upon reaching the foot of the 
breach everybody was running back with their heads between their legs 
as hard as they could.  At the foot I waited, expecting them to rally and 
come on immediately, which not being the case, the enemy's Grenadiers 
jumped into the breach sword in hand and made all prisoners who were 
able to crawl.
222 
 
Oman’s comment about the mismanagement has some validity, but this, sadly, 
was true of every other siege and the troops usually did their best despite the 
mismanagement of their superiors.  Whether the criticism of the Fifth Division 
was fair or not, this was a view held at the time and Wellington was clearly 
concerned enough to ask for volunteers from the other divisions, which the Fifth 
Division took as a clear insult.   
 
A figure who appears to have generated much of the criticism of the engineers 
was  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  Gomm,  who  was  with  the  Quarter-Master-
General’s department attached to the Fifth Division (and also an officer of the 
Ninth  Foot,  one  of  the  regiments  involved  in  the  failed  storm).    Gomm’s 
criticisms are extensively used by Oman, Fortescue and Myatt with variants of :  
 
The successes [at Ciudad Rodrigo and the third siege of Badajoz were]  
… owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops has checked the 
progress of science among our engineers… the artillery have become as 
summary in their proceedings as our engineers … providing they can 
make a hole in the wall … they care not about destroying its defences
223 
 
Of the above writers, only Fortescue uses the portion of Gomm’s letter that 
reads : ‘had we … attended to the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad 
Rodrigo or of [the third siege of] Badajoz it is possible we should have taken 
neither’.  Gomm appeared to recognise that the sieges were being undertaken 
using methods which were not typical.  Gomm commented in the same letter 
that in his opinion there were sufficient resources to attack according to the 
normal  rules  of  siege  warfare.    This  was  clearly  not  a  view  shared  by 
Wellington, the artillery officers or the engineers.  Gomm’s scathing comments 
continue in his subsequent letters with phrases such as : ‘escaping from the 
                                            
222 RE Journal, Jan 1890, p. 34. H.D.Jones’ journal. 
223 F.C. Carr-Gomm, The Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm 
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hands of those Philistines, the engineers’ and ‘when we commence [the siege] 
again, I dare say we shall do it a little less en charlatan and more en regle’.
224  
In this same letter he also notes that ‘the enemy made a sortie this morning 
upon our lines, and, as we did not expect them, gave us more trouble than was 
necessary’.  Perhaps the army officers should have been paying more attention 
to their own duties before criticising other branches of the military.  Gomm was 
not untypical of the ambitious, confident officer who had a view on everything, 
which sometimes did not match the views of their superiors or of the actual 
circumstances.    A  number  of  the  engineer  officers  would  also  fall  into  this 
category from their private letters.
225  They may be entertaining to read but that 
does not make them accurate.  It is a little more surprising that Gomm is so 
outspoken about scientific soldiers, because he was one of them, having been 
to the Royal Military College in 1805.  It is possible that there was an element of 
professional jealousy in his opinions.  
 
One final puzzling item from the first siege of San Sebastian is the complete 
lack of comment on the presence of a large body of the Royal Sappers and 
Miners for the first time.  Connolly’s history of the corps details their efforts in 
the siege and the storm,
226 but there is no mention of them by either engineer or 
army officers.  
 
Second Siege of San Sebastian. 
 
Although Wellington was busy with Soult at the end of July, he left Graham at 
San  Sebastian  with  sufficient  troops  to  maintain  the  blockade  and  keep  the 
French from recovering any of the ground that had been taken.  It was not 
possible to stop the French making repairs in the town but there was a limited 
amount they could achieve. 
 
                                            
224 Carr-Gomm, Gomm Letters, pp. 314-16. 
225 There are similar outspoken comments in the correspondence of most of the key engineers 
including, Elphinstone, Jones, Pasley, Squire, Burgoyne and Ross. 
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Table 4m. Timeline for second siege of San Sebastian. 
6 Aug 1813  Order received to land the siege guns. 
19 Aug 1813  Supply ships arrive from England. 
21 Aug 1813  Remaining supply ships arrive from England. 
24 Aug 1813   Work on batteries resumes. 
26 Aug 1813  Guns open on fortress. 
26 Aug 1813  Island of Santa Clara seized on night of 26/27 Aug. 
31 Aug 1813  Town stormed successfully, French retire to castle. 
1 Sep 1813  Bombardment starts on castle. 
3 Sep 1813  Governor refused second summons to surrender. 
8 Sep 1813  French surrender. 
 
Following Wellington’s orders, the siege guns were returned to the transports 
until it was judged safe to land them again.  Everything was on hold waiting for 
the additional guns and round shot from England.  Four transports arrived on 19 
August 1813 containing two full siege trains and a further full siege train arrived 
on 21 August 1813.  There was now sufficient round shot to consider restarting 
the siege.  For the first time in the Peninsular War, the Allied army had more 
heavy guns than it could use.   
 
All the guns were in place and fifty-seven guns opened fire on the morning of 26 
August 1813.  The plan, as mentioned above, was similar to that used in the 
first siege.  The larger number of guns on the eastern attack would attempt to 
destroy the whole south-eastern corner of the fortress.  There were fewer guns 
used on the attack on the left (isthmus) and they made poor progress due to the 
distance from the walls.  Graham complained about this on 26 and 28 August 
1813,
227  and Wellington ordered a new battery to be constructed.  Frazer noted 
that ‘Wellington wisely ordered another and more advanced battery’.
228  This 
battery had an immediate impact on the wall of the fortress when it opened fire. 
 
A false attack was made on the night of 29 August 1813, to try to get the French 
to blow any mines they had placed in the defences of the town, but the French 
were not taken in.  On 30 August 1813, the damage caused by the batteries  
formed one continuous breach in the walls, and many of the guns were turned 
                                            
227 WSD, Graham to Wellington, 28 Aug 1813 and 28 Aug 1813. 
228 Sabine, Frazer Letters, p. 228.  Burgoyne makes no mention of this advance battery being 
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to attacking any remaining defensive armament, the intention being to assault 
the town the following morning at low tide. 
 
The assault was scheduled for 11:00am on 30 August 1813. The situation with 
regard to the perceived lack of effort from the Fifth Division in the first assault 
was  resolved  to  no-one’s  satisfaction.    General  Leith,  who  had  returned  as 
commander  of  the  Fifth  Division  on  27  August  1813,  refused  to  have  the 
volunteers lead the storm and they were to be held in reserve with the Fifth 
Division  making  the  attack.    The  attack  started  on  time  and  once  again  the 
troops could not get through the breaches due to the fire and defences of the 
French.  The volunteer reserves were also thrown in without effect.  An attack 
was also made across the estuary by the Portuguese but they did not make any 
better progress.  After about an hour, Graham gave the risky order for the siege 
guns to open fire and sweep the walls and defences of the town over the heads 
of the attacking troops.  Twenty minutes later when the guns stopped firing the 
situation  had  changed  and  finally  the  assault  made  some  progress  with  the 
French retreating into the castle.  By 2:00pm, the town was in Allied hands.  It 
was also in ruins and large parts of it were on fire from the shelling.  Following 
what was now becoming the norm, many of the troops dispersed in an orgy of 
looting  and  destruction  that  took  two  full  days  to  settle  down.    Graham  and 
Wellington were genuinely concerned that if the French made a sortie from the 
castle,  the  Allies  would  be  hard  pressed  to  hold  the  town.    Fortunately  the 
French were in no fit state to do so. 
 
The Allied guns were now turned on the castle.  From 1 September 1813, they 
bombarded it for the next six days during which time the fires continued to rage 
through the town.  The French governor, Rey, refused another summons on 3 
September  1813,  and  new  batteries  were  prepared  to  attack  the  castle.    At 
10:00am on 8 September 1813, fifty-six guns opened on the castle, which had 
no covered defences for the French or their prisoners.  Rey finally accepted the 
inevitable and raised the white flag around noon. 
 
Casualties during the siege and assault were again high with nearly 2,400 killed 
and  wounded.    Engineer  casualties  were  three  killed  including  Fletcher  and Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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three wounded including Burgoyne.
229 Burgoyne’s wound was not serious and 
he took over temporary command of the engineers.
230  Across both sieges, out 
of  the  eighteen  engineer  officers  present,  four  were  killed  and  seven  were 
wounded. 
 
Analysis of second  siege of San Sebastian 
 
Over both sieges, Wellington was again pushed for time due to the very real 
threat from Soult who made two determined attempts to disrupt the siege and 
the blockade of Pamplona.  There is no doubt that there would have been fewer 
casualties  had  San  Sebastian  been  besieged  according  to  the  established 
rules, but, as Fletcher pointed out, this would have taken much longer.  In both 
sieges, the time from opening fire to the assault on the town was five days.  
This is a very short period of time which only allowed the walls to be breached 
and did not allow sufficient time to destroy the defenders’ artillery and reduce 
the garrison physically and emotionally.  Ironically, Wellington had given orders 
to limit the amount of shell fire so as to reduce the damage to the town with the 
consequent reduction in damage to the defenders.  Unfortunately the town was 
pretty much destroyed by fire and Wellington was accused by the Spanish of 
deliberately burning the town to the ground as a punishment for the Francophile 
tendencies of the population.  Like the previous three sieges at Ciudad Rodrigo, 
Badajoz and Burgos, Wellington cut corners to reduce the time required due to 
external  pressures.    The  impact  of  the  time  reduction  was  measured  in  the 
increase in casualties that occurred. 
 
The biggest single criticism of the siege concerned the strategy selected for the 
attack.  It is inconceivable that Wellington was not aware of the risk and costs 
associated  with  the  plan  selected.    He  wanted  the  fortress  taken  quickly  to 
avoid the very real chance that Soult would relieve it.  Blaming the engineers for 
the  plan  is  not  reasonable  since  they  were  producing  plans  that  met  the 
requirements given to them by Wellington.  With hindsight, it may have been 
                                            
229 Fletcher, Rhodes and Collyer killed.  Burgoyne, Barry and Marshall wounded. 
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better to go for the formal attack as the twin sieges took nearly two months in 
total,  but  that  was  not  known  or  expected  when  the  first  siege  started.  
However, the plan agreed by Wellington was to continue the same basic plan of 
attack for the second siege.
231  The criticism of the engineers and to a lesser 
extent the artillery, suggesting that they were indifferent to the casualties in the 
army, is unfair and ignores the fact that it was usually an engineer officer who 
was leading these desperate attacks and their casualties reflect this.  The high 
casualties in the besieging army were caused by rushing the sieges and the 
responsibility for that rests with the commander.  This was compounded on the 
first assault by the assault happening before daylight, an action that Wellington 
had strongly discouraged. 
 
In  terms  of  the  operations  of  the  engineers,  both  sieges  were  managed 
reasonably well.  There were some problems with the use of short navy 24-
pounders,  the  supply  of  working  parties  and  the  distant  positioning  of  some 
batteries, but the breaches were still made very quickly despite these issues.  
Neither assault would have been quicker if these events had not occurred, as 
there  were  other  tasks  that  had  to  be  completed  before  the  assault  could 
happen.  The siege was under the control of Graham who corresponded with 
Wellington daily.  In some of these letters Wellington was personally critical of 
Fletcher and Dickson, particularly of their demands for working parties.
232  Such 
criticism must have undermined the credibility of these officers with Graham.  
Wellington  knew  them  well,  trusted  them  and  had  worked  with  them  for  a 
number of years, but Graham did not know them and such criticism must have 
affected Graham’s view of their competence.   
 
The availability for the first time of significant numbers of troops from the Royal 
Sappers and Miners does not appear to have had any material effect.  There is 
a  surprising  lack  of  comment  on  their  presence  by  both  engineer  and  army 
                                            
231 Wrottesley, Life of Burgoyne. p. 273.  The footnote on this page suggests that Burgoyne did 
not like the original plan and offered an alternative to Wellington on 25 Jul 1813, presumably 
after the failed assault.  I can find no details of this alternate plan, but as mentioned above both 
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officers.  H.D. Jones makes one comment about the lack of training : ‘sappers 
and  miners  who  have  never  seen  a  gabion  made!’,
233  but  this  is  in  a  letter 
complaining about the number of engineer and sappers present at the siege, 
which is full of errors.  Neither Jones nor Burgoyne make any comment, but it is 
telling  that  when  Burgoyne  was  asked  to  carry  out  some  mining  activities 
between  the  sieges  he  requested  volunteers  from  the  line  regiments.
234  
Though  most  of  the  sappers  present  were  troops  who  had  been  in  the 
Peninsula for some time, the company that arrived on 15 August 1813 was the 
first  to  have  been  through  Pasley’s  School  of  Military  Engineering.  
Unfortunately, the company arrived too late to have any real impact. 
 
The first assault on San Sebastian was a very poor attempt that was never 
going to succeed, mainly through the bad planning on the day of the assault.  
The second assault on the town barely succeeded and could very easily have 
failed again.  The pin point artillery fire during the second assault just tipped the 
edge in the attackers’ favour.  It could easily have gone either way.  Wellington 
was lucky, again. 
 
4.2.7.  EFFECTIVENESS AND REPORTING OF SIEGES. 
Of all the aspects of the British involvement in the Peninsular War, the sieges 
are  the  least  impressive  in  terms  of  the  outcomes  and  also  the  most 
controversial in terms of the reasons for these outcomes.  It has been both 
common and convenient to blame the Royal Engineers for the failures and the 
high casualties and this view still persists today.  Richard Glover is particularly 
vocal in his criticisms :  
 
No just estimate of the greatness of Wellington can be made except by 
those who have studied … the deficiencies of the Ordnance corps … On 
sheer ignorance of these matters rests the supposition that Wellington 
was bad at sieges … the most sensible line for the modern student … is 
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to  consider  seriously  only  those  criticisms  …  by  the  few  …  who 
possessed the knowledge for making a valid judgement.
235 
 
Glover’s  opinion  is  as  flawed  as  his  criticism  of  the  alleged  failings  of  the 
Ordnance.  There is evidence to support the view that the fault did not lie fully 
with  the  Ordnance.    The  analysis  above  has  reviewed  the  particular 
circumstances  associated  with  each  siege  and  reviewed  the  actions  of  the 
engineers involved.  There is justification to question the handling of sieges by 
Wellington, Beresford and Graham which is supported by criticism by officers 
who  possessed  the  knowledge  for  making  a  valid  judgement.    Many  other 
commentators have also cited the lack of engineers and trained sappers and 
miners for causing some of the difficulties.
236  There is no doubt that the sieges 
would have been better run had there been more of these soldiers.  But, and it 
is a big but, the lack of engineers and artificers was known before each siege 
started and actions should have been tailored to utilise the resources that were 
available.  Wellington was known as a defensive general and would not take 
unnecessary risks in manoeuvre or battle.  He appears to have had an entirely 
different  approach  to  sieges,  where  because  of  the  strategic  importance  of 
these places he was willing to take huge risks and accept huge losses to take 
the fortresses.  The failures and losses at the sieges in order of impact were : 
−  Not enough time to use regular methods of besieging; 
−  Insufficient or poor quality guns and ammunition; 
−  Insufficient Transport; 
−  Insufficient engineering resources. 
 
Applied  to  the  sieges  reviewed  above,  we  can  summarise  the  outcomes  as 
follows : 
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Table 4n. Summary of outcomes of sieges. 
Siege  Enough 
Time? 
Enough 
guns and 
ammunition? 
Enough 
engineering 
resources? 
Result 
1
st siege of Badajoz  No  No  No  Failure 
2
nd siege of Badajoz  No  No  No  Failure 
Ciudad Rodrigo  Yes?  Yes  No  Success 
3
rd siege of Badajoz  No  No  No  Success 
Burgos  Yes  No  No  Failure 
1
st siege of San Sebastian  Yes  No  No  Failure 
2
nd  siege of San Sebastian  Yes?  Yes  No  Success 
 
The engineers were criticised for poor advice, particularly at the first two sieges 
of Badajoz and at San Sebastian.  In each case the plan for the siege was 
based on time constraints not on best engineering practice.  There is a clear 
case to argue that the deciding factor in the success or failure at each siege  
was having to work against time due to the constant threat of larger relieving 
forces.  The French could almost always concentrate a larger force to meet a 
major threat.  Neither the British nor the Spanish had the resources to do this.  
The French generally had the time to undertake sieges in the formal manner.  
Even with sappers it is unlikely that Wellington would have been able to wait for 
them to follow normal siege craft.  It is difficult to look at the sieges described 
above and conclude that there would have been a different outcome at any of 
them had there had been a greater number of engineers and artificers present.  
The military engineering resources were not the root cause of the difficulties 
encountered. 
 
Of the three successes, Ciudad Rodrigo was the best managed from the Allied 
side and the worst defended from the French side.  The third siege of Badajoz 
came within a whisker of failing because the assault was rushed.  The second 
siege of San Sebastian also came close to failing through being rushed.  In 
each of these sieges casualties were high because Wellington did not wait for a 
more effective reduction of the defences.   
 
Wellington took Badajoz in twenty-one days in 1812.  The French in 1811 took 
forty-five days to get the fortress to surrender.  In reality it should have held out 
for many more days and probably should never have been taken.  The cost of Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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this  rapid  success  was  measured  in  men.    There  were  some  faults  in  the 
engineering,  but  there  were  also  faults  in  the  army  (rash  attacks,  poor 
leadership  in  trenches),  in  logistics  (transport)  and  in  the  command.    The 
casualties were caused by attacking prematurely to meet time constraints.  It is 
possible that Wellington was strong enough to hold off or attack Soult and then 
return to siege.  Marmont was not strong enough to pose a significant threat 
either in the north or south.  Wellington did not learn from the resolute defence 
of 1811.  The same governor was there in 1812 with more experienced troops. 
Wellington’s strong complaint of 7 April 1812 about the engineers’ inability to 
sap to the glacis was not justified at Badajoz.  Where the attack was made, no 
sap could be done due to the Rivellas stream.  If Wellington had his way and 
attacked  from  the  south,  he  would  not  have  had  enough  guns  and  other 
resources for the attack at that point and the defences had been significantly 
strengthened since he last saw them.   
 
Wellington complained regularly throughout the Peninsular War about the lack 
of support from the government at home, the lack of support from the Spanish 
and Portuguese governments, the lack of money for his operations, the lack of 
support from the navy, the lack of British troops to carry out his operations, the 
poor  quality  of  the  Spanish  generals  and  troops,  the  lack  of  good  British 
generals to support him, the poor supply situation and the lack of engineering 
resources.    Wellington’s  complaints  about  the  engineers  were  part  of  this 
pattern and in many cases were unjustified.   
 
The  army’s  commitment  to  sieges  deteriorated  through  the  war.    Numerous 
diarists record the general antipathy of the troops and their officers to siege 
work.  This was not seen as real soldierly activity and there was no glory in 
being killed in a siege.  The later sieges, particularly Burgos and the first siege 
of  San  Sebastian  show  clear  evidence  of  this  dislike  translating  into  poor 
behaviour. This is also demonstrated by the number of times that French sorties 
were more successful than they should have been through inattention and poor Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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leadership on the Allied side.
237  The Allied forces seemed to get caught time 
and time again and never learnt.  It is easy to understand the feelings of the 
soldiers on storming fortresses as they took part in a succession of butcheries.  
Whatever the moral feelings today about the troops’ behaviour after the storm, 
the troops were of the belief that they deserved their excesses as payment for 
the huge risks they took.  Fortescue comments on the troops being weary.
238  
The troops’ appetite for siege work diminished every time they were involved so 
that by the time of Burgos and San Sebastian they were not interested.   
 
What should have been of more concern to Wellington was that there also a 
general degradation in the troops’ behaviour.  Starting with the sack of Ciudad 
Rodrigo and Badajoz followed by the undisciplined retreat from Burgos.  After 
Vitoria,  Wellington  was  unable  to  follow  up  his  victory  because  many  of  his 
troops disbanded to plunder.  At San Sebastian the troops were out of control 
while the French were well within striking distance.  Wellington made a mistake 
in  not  clamping  down  on  this  bad  behaviour  much  earlier.    Even  at  San 
Sebastian  he  wrote  a  naïve  letter  to  Graham,  hoping  that  the  troops  would 
behave  and  focus  on  the  French  rather  than  plunder.
239    It  is  difficult  to 
understand why he would have any belief that the troops would act in this way. 
 
The more recent works on these subjects leave a general feeling that sieges 
were  of  secondary  importance  and  the  reporting  often  contains  errors  that 
would not have crept into discussions of the main campaigns.  Some examples 
have been included in the Introduction above but there are many more.  Myatt, 
in his biography of Picton at the third siege of Badajoz wrote that the ‘Picurina 
had been battered into ruins’,
240  whereas all other reports indicate that there 
was no visible sign of damage.  Esdaile, describing the same siege, stated ‘the 
British guns needed so little support; so heavy was the weight of fire that the 
new  siege  train  could  bring  to  bear  that  the  defenders  were  quickly 
                                            
237 Examples include the French sorties at Badajoz on 10 May 1811 and 19 March 1812, at San 
Sebastian on 17 July 1813 where numerous Allied casualties were caused by rash charges.  
Also the capture of two hundred Portuguese soldiers who were surprised in their trenches at 
San Sebastian on 27 July 1813. 
238 Fortescue, British Army, vol. 9, p. 232. 
239 WD, To Graham, 20 Jul 1813, 2:00pm. 
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overwhelmed,  and  no  fewer  than  three  separate  breaches  blown  in  the 
defences’.
241  This is an overstatement as the siege train was not that ‘heavy’, 
nor were the defenders overwhelmed as was seen when the assault was made. 
 
In summary the story of the British sieges in the Peninsular War does not make 
good reading.  There is some criticism directed at Wellington, but the Royal 
Engineers and the Board of Ordnance have come in for particular criticism over 
the quality and quantity of resources available.  Whilst this was a contributory 
factor, the main causes of the poor performance were the time constraints that 
Wellington faced and the logistical difficulties in getting quality guns safely to 
the points of need.  The accusation from Wellington that the Royal Engineers 
had no knowledge of the skills necessary to undertake sieges is unfair.  The 
senior officers there knew what they had to do but they were unable to do it 
because  of  the  resource  and  time  constraints.    The  frequent  claim  that  the 
French were more effective at sieges is also debatable.  They certainly had 
more troops, and their success rate was more impressive, but the reasons were 
generally not tied up with the skills of the French engineers.  Their successes 
were often due to poor defence and the desire of the Allied governors to avoid 
inflicting the horrors of a storm on the population, or both.  The story of sieges 
in the Peninsular War would be very different had the magazine not blown up 
unexpectedly at Almeida in 1810, or Badajoz had not surrendered prematurely 
to the French in 1811.  To fully understand why the sieges were planned in 
particular ways and the high casualties that were inflicted, it is important to keep 
the wider strategic context in mind.  Wellington believed that he was working 
under severe time constraints at every siege and therefore the attacks had to 
succeed quickly regardless of the cost.  Having more engineers or artificers 
there would have made little or no difference under this constraint. 
 
The  management  of  the  sieges  was  only  one  aspect  of  the  activities  of  the 
Royal  Engineers  during  the  Peninsular  War.    Richard  Glover’s,  Peninsular 
Preparation  takes  a  typically  critical  and  restricted  view  of  the  role  of  the 
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engineers.  His analysis of their work only covers offensive siege operations.
242  
Whilst  this is without doubt the area that has received the most public attention, 
it does not adequately reflect the work they undertook.  The following sections 
will take a more complete view on the roles and responsibilities undertaken by 
the corps.  These other roles ultimately had a more material impact on the war.   
4.3.  Torres Vedras and other defences 
The fortified Lines of Torres Vedras were probably the most significant piece of 
military  engineering  undertaken  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.    John  Grehan 
rightly  describes  it  as  the  cornerstone  of  Wellington’s  strategy  in  the 
Peninsula.
243    It  gave  Wellington  a  solid,  defensible  position  from  which  he 
could launch his campaigns against the French.  Torres Vedras was more than 
just the construction of one hundred and thirty forts, although that in itself was a 
significant  piece  of  engineering.    The  defensive  position  also  included  the 
destruction  of  bridges  and  roads  that  would  be  of  use  to  the  enemy,  the 
construction  of  signal  posts,  the  flooding  of  ground,  the  construction  or 
improvement of roads behind the Allied lines and in the last extreme fortified 
positions from which to evacuate the army. 
 
Wellington had planned these defences well in advance.  Having ridden the 
ground  with  Fletcher  during  October  1809,  comprehensive  instructions  were 
written  asking  Fletcher  to  estimate  the  work  required  to  make  the  Lisbon 
peninsula defensible.
244  Work started in November 1809 and continued without 
interruption until the Lines were manned for the first time as the army retreated 
into them following the battle of Bussaco.  However, even at this time the work 
was not complete and for the next two years additions and repairs were made 
to the Lines.  The detailed construction of the Lines is described elsewhere and 
will not be covered here.
245 
                                            
242 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp.94-104. 
243 Grehan, The Lines of Torres Vedras, front cover. 
244 Jones, Journal of the Sieges, vol. 3, p. 115. 
245 The primary source is volume 3 of Jones, Journal of the sieges. It is also covered in Grehan, 
The Lines of Torres Vedras; Oman, Peninsular War, vol, 3 and Fortescue, British Army, vol. 7. 
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Many Royal Engineer officers did not think the Lines would work.  Grehan noted 
that  Ross  and  Goldfinch  thought  they  would  be  useless.
246  Squire  also  had 
major concerns and was highly critical of Wellington’s decision not to defend the 
Portuguese frontier.
247  Some of this pessimism may have arisen because none 
of these officers really wanted to be working on the Lines, they all wanted to be 
with the army on active operations.  Working on the Lines was seen as being 
left in a back water with no opportunity for gaining honour and glory and this 
could have clouded the officers’ judgement. 
 
Despite their reservations, there were a significant number of Royal Engineer 
officers involved in the construction.  Their role in many cases was to design the 
works and then to manage the construction using militia and locally procured 
peasant  labour.    Between  November  1809  and  March  1810,  at  least  ten 
engineer officers were working on the Lines and by July 1810 this number had 
risen to seventeen.
248  This was over half the total of Royal Engineers in the 
Peninsula at that time.  When the Lines were occupied in September 1810, 
twelve engineer officers were allocated to the six districts making up the Lines 
with  Jones  keeping  overall  command  (under  Fletcher).    Royal  Engineer 
resources were allocated to the maintenance of the Lines for the remainder of 
the war, but as more officers became available the proportion allocated to the 
Lines was reduced, although the actual number did not decrease. 
 
Keeping the Lines secret from the French was a great success and Massena  
had no warning at all before he first saw them from Sobral.  Considering the 
security around these defences and Wellington’s strong views on information 
being leaked in the English newspapers, it is very surprising that the January 
1811 edition of the Royal Military Chronicle,
249 lists the artillery present in the 
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Lines.  It was far too early to be making such information publicly available as 
Massena was still in front of the Lines at this time. 
 
The Lines of Torres Vedras were the most visible evidence of the defensive 
work carried out by the Royal Engineers during the Peninsular War, but there 
were  many  other  places  where  essential  work  was  carried  out  to  support 
Wellington’s  strategies.    Through  the  early  months  of  1810,  Wellington’s 
despatches  mention  several  places  that  were  being  strengthened.    These 
include Abrantes,
250 where Captain Patton R.E. was present for many months 
supervising  the  work,  Peniche,  Palmella  and  Setuval.
251    Burgoyne  was  at 
Almeida from May to July 1810, first strengthening Fort Conception and then 
mining it for destruction on the advance of the French. 
 
Wellington’s  strategy  from  1810  to  1812  was  partially  dependent  upon  the 
security  of  his  southern  flank,  which  the  continued  defence  of  Cadiz  and 
Gibraltar  contributed  significantly  towards.    1810  saw  an  influx  of  Royal 
Engineer  officers  into  Cadiz.    Thirteen  officers  arrived  during  that  year  with 
twenty-one different officers serving there at some point during the war. Captain 
Lefebure  R.E.  the  commanding  engineer  at  Cadiz,  was  killed  as  the  fort  at 
Matagorda (near Cadiz) was being evacuated.  Similarly there was a significant 
presence at Gibraltar.  In January 1810, Landmann destroyed the forts in front 
of  Gibraltar  to  save  them  from  falling  into  French  hands.
252    At  some  point 
during the Peninsular War, thirty-three different Royal Engineer officers served 
at Gibraltar.  There was a similar sized presence in Sicily and officers were also 
present at Malta and the Ionian islands.  This continued presence of the Royal 
Engineers  was  not  particularly  visible  but  it  helped  to  deny  access  to  key 
locations to the French, provided sortie points to the Allies and tied up many 
thousands of French troops who would otherwise have been freed to threaten 
the various Allied armies.   
 
                                            
250 WD, To Hill, 2 Jan 1810 and 14 Feb 1810 
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The other significant defensive work carried out by the Royal Engineers was in 
the repair of fortresses.  When fortresses were taken it was vital to quickly make 
them defensible so as to protect them from future French advances and also to 
allow  them  to  be  used  as  storage  depots  and  staging  points.    This  was 
particularly relevant at Ciudad Rodrigo, where the fortress was in a sufficiently 
good state of repair in March 1812 to resist Marmont’s threatening behaviour 
while Wellington was undertaking the siege of Badajoz. 
 
A significant proportion of the resources of the Royal Engineers was allocated 
to  defensive  work  throughout  the  Peninsular  War.    This  work  was  typically 
unrecognised by the military at the time and by modern writers.  The work was 
never high profile and often forgotten, but it made a significant contribution to 
the success of Wellington by keeping his lines of communication secure and by 
tying down large number of French troops. 
4.4.  River and Road Communications. 
River Crossings 
 
The  nature  of  the  terrain  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  with  numerous  mountain   
ranges made access to bridges vitally important for the movement of armies.  
The loss of a bridge could entail a detour taking several days.  In many areas 
the rivers were wide and deep all year and made effective barriers to those who 
did not have access to crossing points.  Secondly, the rivers could be used as 
communication routes to move men and materials quickly to the point of need.  
This was particularly important to Wellington who used the rivers throughout the 
war to move his resources.  
 
The rugged nature of the terrain and the unpredictability of the rivers, which 
could rise or fall by many feet in hours, meant that control of the permanent 
bridges and access to bridging equipment was a vital part of every movement 
carried  out  by  both  sides  in  the  conflict.  The  importance  of  the  fortresses 
commanding the major routes is well understood, but the control of a bridge on Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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a major river was as effective a defence as the walls of Badajoz or Ciudad 
Rodrigo.   
 
Wellington took great care to protect his river crossings but also used rivers to 
his  advantage  during  his  campaigning.    One  example  was  in  1812,  when 
Wellington ordered the repair of the Roman Bridge at Alcantara over the river 
Tagus, which had been destroyed in May 1809.  At the same time, he also 
ordered General Hill to destroy the French pontoon bridge at Almaraz.  The 
repair of one bridge for his use and the destruction of the French bridge meant 
that the distance Wellington’s troops had to cover between Ciudad Rodrigo and 
Badajoz was about 250 kilometres whilst the distance the French had to travel 
increased by 650 kilometres.
253 
 
Research into the strategic and practical aspects of river crossings has been 
limited.  A recent study by Burnham has opened up this subject for the first time 
but has also demonstrated the limited availability of information.
254  Bridging, 
more than any other area, has shown the confusion that existed and still exists 
in historians understanding of the roles of the Royal Staff Corps and the Royal 
Engineers.  Published material on bridge building is restricted to Douglas’ work 
on  military  bridges,  first  published  in  1816.
255    There  are  unpublished 
manuscript notebooks on the subject from West, Scott and Burgoyne.
256  All of 
these  documents  tend  to  focus  on  the  two  bridges  built  by  the  Royal  Staff 
Corps, the suspension bridges at Alcantara and Almarez and also describe the 
boat bridge over the Adour.
257  This has led to a perception that most bridging 
work  in  the  Peninsula  was  carried  out  by  the  Royal  Staff  Corps.    The  only 
chronicler of this corps stated ‘It is an undisputable fact that the Royal Staff 
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Corps  were  responsible  for  the  building  of  military  bridges’.
258    Appendix  M 
below, is a comprehensive (but still incomplete) list of bridging operations in the 
Peninsular  War.    Of  the  sixty-five  bridging  events  listed,  only  eleven  were 
carried  out  by  the  Royal  Staff  Corps  with  fifty-one  carried  out  by  the  Royal 
Engineers.
259  Twenty-one of the events were destruction of bridges and these 
were all carried out by the Royal Engineers.  The Royal Engineers carried out 
75% of the build and repair operations, with the Royal Staff Corps completing 
the remaining 25%. 
 
Looking at the bridging events, it can clearly be seen that they played a major 
contribution  in  all  of  the  Peninsular  campaigns.    The  strategically  important 
bridges at Abrantes, Punhete and Villa Velha were first constructed in late 1808 
and were in position for most of the rest of the war.  At least two bridges were 
blown up during the retreat to Corunna to delay the French.  The inexperience 
of some of the engineers at that time was demonstrated by Lieutenant Davy 
R.E. who managed to blow himself up along with the bridge at Betanzos.  Many 
bridges were mined in preparation for the retreat to the Lines of Torres Vedras, 
although  not  all  of  them  were  destroyed  when  the  route  of  the  French  was 
finally known.  When Massena retreated from the Lines of Torres Vedras in 
March 1811, a number of bridges were built or repaired to maintain the pursuit.  
In 1812 the two strategic bridges were repaired at Almarez and Alcantara by the 
Royal Staff Corps and several were destroyed during the retreat from Burgos.  
In 1813 and 1814 a pontoon bridge travelled with the army and was used on 
several occasions along with the repair of other key bridges.  The final stages of 
the  war  saw  Wellington  needing  to  cross  several  major  rivers  around  the 
Pyrenees  and  into  France.  Between  October  1813  and  March  1814, 
Wellington’s  troops  crossed  the  Bidassoa,  the  Nive,  the  Adour  and  the 
Garonne.    The  first  three  were  successfully  bridged,  but  there  were  major 
problems  bridging  the  Garonne  and  Wellington  was  very  unhappy  with  the 
delays  that  were  caused.    This  demonstrated  that  without  effective  bridging 
facilities Wellington had real difficulty in his operations. 
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Apart from using bridges to support the army’s operations, there were also a 
number of bridges built to support Allied siege operations.  The most notable of 
these were for the three sieges of Badajoz and for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.  
These sieges could not continue without the bridges and the temporary loss of 
the bridges at Badajoz in 1811 and 1812 severely affected the operations.   
 
There does not appear to be any pattern as to why the Royal Engineers or the 
Royal  Staff  Corps  were  used  to  build  specific  bridges.    It  is  probable  that 
Wellington  used  the  most  appropriate  resource  based  on  expertise  or 
availability.  The Royal Staff Corps constructed temporary bridges during the 
Talavera campaign and at the battle of Fuentes d’Onoro because they were 
present with the army at that time.  On most occasions though, troops were 
borrowed from the line regiments to work under the supervision of an engineer 
officer.  This was also true of the Royal Staff Corps, one example being the 
building of the trestle bridge at Marialva in November 1811. 
 
The important point to note is the extensive role the Royal Engineers played in 
the construction and destruction of river crossings throughout the Peninsular 
War.  Like the Royal Staff Corps, the Royal Engineers had to come up with 
innovative designs based on available materials, as often there was a complete 
lack of local raw materials.  A number of bridges were created during the war by 
dismantling  buildings  and  using  roof  beams,  floor  boards  and  doors  for  the 
construction.  Along  with  their  colleagues  in  the  Royal  Staff  Corps  the  Royal 
Engineers  gave  Wellington  an  operational  flexibility  that  the  French  do  not 
appear to have achieved.  On the retreats to Corunna and from Burgos, the 
losses of the Allied army would have been much worse if key bridges had not 
been denied to the French.  Conversely the French losses following the retreats 
from Oporto in 1809 and Torres Vedras in 1811 were both much worse due to 
the  successful  crossing  of  river  barriers.    The  final  months  of  the  war  saw 
Wellington successfully cross a number of major river barriers in the face of the 
French.   
 Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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Bridging  activity  played  a  vital  role  in  Wellington’s  offensive  and  defensive 
operations, and the activities and outcomes could have been very different had 
skilled engineers not been on hand to carry out this work. 
 
Pontoon Train. 
 
In  the  early  part  of  the  Peninsular  War,  Wellington  had  limited  access  to 
pontoon equipment.  This was not an immediate problem in the defensive years 
of 1809 and 1810 but with the retreat of Massena, Wellington moved on to the 
offensive and the deficiency became more problematic.  In southern Spain, the 
only  pontoon  equipment  readily  available  was  lost  when  the  French  took 
Badajoz in early 1811.  On 31 March 1811, which was the day the make-shift 
bridge  across  the  Guadiana  for  the  siege  of  Badajoz  was  swept  away, 
Wellington  wrote  asking  for  an  extensive  pontoon  train  to  be  sent  out  from 
England.
260  Jones noted in his diary on 1 July 1811 that twenty-four pontoons 
had arrived in Lisbon from England.  Jones also subsequently noted the arrival 
of  artificers  to  be  specifically  attached  to  the  pontoon  train.
261    Though 
Burnham
262 suggested that Dickson of the Royal Artillery was responsible for 
the  pontoon  train,  it  is  clear  that  the  Royal  Engineers  were  primarily 
responsible.    Lieutenant  Piper  R.E.  was  in  charge  from  the  pontoon  train’s 
formation in 1812 and Captain English also joined when there were sufficient 
pontoons to form two trains.
263  The Royal Artillery were tasked with maintaining 
the unreliable carriages and providing the resources to pull the train, a situation 
which  caused  considerable  resentment  when  artillery  horses  were 
commandeered to pull the pontoon train at key points in the war.  Wellington 
made  a  mistake  when  he  asked  for  the  pontoon  train,  stating  it  was  not 
necessary to send out horses, as bullocks would be provided locally.  The size 
and weight on the pontoons made them very difficult to move and the lack of 
motive power was a constant problem.  By June 1812 the pontoon train had 
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grown to thirty-six pontoons.
264  As more soldiers from the Royal Sappers and 
Miners  became  available,  companies  were  permanently  attached  to  the 
pontoon train.  In 1813 three companies were attached to the pontoon train for 
the Vitoria campaign.  In a rare case of joint operation, troops from the Royal 
Staff  Corps  were  also  attached  and  they  worked  together  through  the 
campaign.
265 
 
River and road communication 
 
Another unseen aspect of the role of the Royal Engineers was their work on 
improving communications for the army.  This was for the purposes of better 
troop  movement  and  more  efficient  supply  lines.    As  mentioned  above,  an 
integral part of the lines of Torres Vedras was the improvement to the roads 
behind the lines that allowed Wellington to rapidly concentrate troops against 
any  French  threat.    Conversely,  Wellington  had  ordered  several  roads 
approaching Torres Vedras to be destroyed to impede the movement of the 
French.  While Massena was stationary in front of Torres Vedras the engineers 
were busy on the south side of the Tagus repairing roads and bridges, including 
those from Chamusca to Aldea Gallega.
266 
 
Preparation  for  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  the  subsequent  campaign 
included  work  to  improve  the  navigability  of  the  river  Douro.    Two  Royal 
Engineers were employed in late 1811 improving the upper reaches of the river 
up  to  the  border  at  Barca  d’Alva.
267    After  the  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
Lieutenant  Marshall  R.E.  was  sent  to  continue  the  improvement  work.  
Following complaints from the commissary who brought supplies up in early 
1812, Burgoyne was asked to go and review the river and spent three weeks in 
May and June 1812 carrying out a further survey of the river.
268 
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4.5.  Surveying and Reconnaissance 
Henry Lloyd commented in his theories on military science that : 
 
The next, and indeed most important object of any, to those who aspire 
to the command of armies, is geography; not only that which consists in 
a  general  knowledge  of  a  country,  but  a  local  one:  a  man  must  be 
thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country.
269 
 
Up-to-date topographical information on the Peninsula was not available in the 
early stages of the war to either the French or the British commanders.  Both 
sides relied on old and often inaccurate maps and this led to some serious 
operational errors.
270  From the arrival of British troops in the Peninsula in 1808, 
Royal  Engineer  officers  were  tasked  with  surveying  and  reconnaissance 
activities in support of both defensive and offensive operations.  
 
Comprehensive standing orders were issued to Royal Engineer officers on their 
duties when attached to the army : 
 
The Engineer … will observe the general features of the country through 
which they pass … Rivers should be particularly attended to …bridges, 
whether of wood or stone, … whether capable of bearing artillery … the 
population of towns and villages, their distances from each other, and 
their means of supply .. In general whatever can facilitate or retard the 
march of the army … must be digested into a written report.
271 
 
This  instruction  went  on  to  specify  that  sketches  were  to  be  made  of  any 
position the army took and any fortification that they passed.  These activities 
were part of a wider operation involving officers often (but not always) under the 
control of the Quarter-Master-General’s (QMG) department.
272 The surveying 
and reconnaissance activities were carried out by four groups : specific officers 
appointed for the purpose within the QMG’s department, officers from the Royal 
Staff  Corps,  Royal  Engineer  officers  and  volunteer  officers  from  the  line 
regiments.  It is not clear how well co-ordinated these activities were.  Romans, 
has noted the development of military intelligence within the Quarter-Master-
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General’s  department,  but  also  recognises  that  divisional  commanders  often 
carried out their own reconnaissance primarily to meet their local needs.
273  This 
was not always appreciated by Wellington, who was insistent that intelligence 
should be routed through his staff to ensure he always had the best information.  
On  occasions  Royal  Engineer  officers  worked  with  QMG  staff  officers  on 
reconnaissance,
274  but  more  often  than  not,  their  orders  came  direct  from 
Wellington or the Commanding Royal Engineer in the Peninsula.  The impact of 
this work was that, through much of the war, Wellington had better information 
on  the  topography  than  the  French,  which  while  due  partly  to  the  better 
relationships  with  the  Spanish  was  also  due  to  continuous  work  by  British 
officers to map and describe the terrain and the towns. 
 
George Landmann R.E. recorded as early as June 1808 that he was employed 
surveying enemy positions around Ayamonte.
275  Over the following months, he 
was used to survey the area of operations and potential retreat routes for Sir 
John Moore.
276  But he was not alone in being used extensively in these early 
operations.  Pasley  was  ordered  to  reconnoitre  the  mountains  in  Asturias  for 
General Leith in September 1808,
277 and was present throughout the retreat. 
Boothby was ordered in October 1808 to inspect the Spanish frontier around 
the  river  Tagus  at  Alcantara.
278    He  continued  surveying  roads  and  towns 
through  November  and  December  1808  before  being  employed  on 
reconnaissance duties during the retreat to Corunna.
279  Burgoyne was sent to 
assess  the  capability  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  defend  itself,
280  and  Captain 
Carmichael-Smyth  R.E.  reconnoitred  the  country  between  Astorga  and  Villa 
Franca in December 1808.
281  While the British army under Sir John Moore was 
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retreating, Burgoyne was sent to Vigo,
282 and Fletcher sent to Corunna
283 to 
report on their suitability for evacuation.  Moore’s decision to retreat to Corunna 
was based on these reports.  
 
Engineer officers were working through the start of 1809 as planning began for 
defending Portugal from the French.  In March 1809, Lieutenants Rice Jones 
and  Stanway  R.E.  were  ordered  to  reconnoitre  ground  around  Thomar  and 
Leyira.
284    Two  engineer  officers  were  captured  when  Soult  took  Oporto, 
although both were released when Wellington ejected Soult in May 1809.
285  
Wellington immediately ordered surveys of the surrounding areas.  Burgoyne 
and other Royal Engineer officers spent much of May to July 1809 on such 
work.  Initially they provided detailed reports on the River Douro from Oporto to 
the  Spanish  frontier.  Details  included  distances,  road  condition,  river  details, 
terrain, size and defensibility of towns, number of boats, bridges, ferries and 
fords.
286    Later  their  work  focussed  on  surveying  towns  on  the  northern 
Portuguese border.  Detailed reports were provided on Caminha, Villa Nova, 
Valenca, Tuy, Moncao, Melgaco, Chaves, with further notes on possible routes 
to Oporto. 
 
John Squire, who for much of 1810 and 1811 was attached to General Hill’s 
corps in the south, noted in August 1810 that he was ‘constantly employed by 
General  Hill  in  reconnoitring’.
287    Later,  in  1810,  Squire  was  ordered  to 
reconnoitre  Salvatierra  and  Punhete  following  reports  of  the  French  having 
many boats there and concern that they might try to cross the river Tagus.
288 
Similarly, Rice Jones noted making almost daily excursions either alone or with 
General Craufurd in late 1811. 
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During  the  retreat  in  front  of  the  French  in  summer  1810,  Burgoyne  and 
Fletcher  were  surveying  defensive  positions  that  Wellington  could  potentially 
use depending upon the route the French took.  The position at Bussaco was 
one  of  those  surveyed.
289    Once  the  French  were  static  in  front  of  Torres 
Vedras, Burgoyne was despatched to survey the river Mondego from Coimbra 
to the mouth of the river.
290  In the same period, Lieutenant Reid was ordered to 
survey the area from Ota to the river Tagus.
291   
 
There are also examples of other types of survey work.  In November 1811, 
Burgoyne  was  asked  to  identify  positions  to  bivouac  troops  out  of  sight  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  prior  to  the  siege  commencing.
292    Through  May  and  June 
1812,  Burgoyne  was  surveying  the  river  Mondego  with  a  view  to  improving 
communications.  In August 1813, Wellington asked for an officer to be sent to 
Guertaria to evaluate the possibility of building wells and estimate the size of 
garrison required there.
293 
 
The activities listed above are just examples and are not an exhaustive list of 
such  events.  Evidence  from  the  engineer  diaries  shows  that  survey  and 
reconnaissance  work  was  a  significant  part  of  the  duties  of  the  engineer 
officers.    Whether  based  at  headquarters,  with  divisional  commanders  or  at 
static  locations,  engineer  officers  were  frequently  employed  collecting 
topographical  information  to  assist  in  the  operations  of  the  army  and  the 
defence of the Peninsula.  Romans comments : 
 
Staff  reconnaissance  was  related  to,  rather  than  distinct  from  the 
functions of the two technical services [Artillery and Engineers].  Staff 
Officers  were  expected  to  report  in  detail  on  features  such  as  river 
crossing  points,  but  once  potential  locations  had  been  identified,  it 
usually  fell  to  the  Royal  Engineers  to  provide  a  specialist  report.  
Similarly,  while  Assistant  QMG’s  or  their  deputies  reported  on  the 
suitability of roads for wheeled transport, such initial observations were 
frequently referred to artillery officers for a second opinion.
294 
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Based on evidence from the engineer officers’ letters and diaries it appears that 
their involvement in reconnaissance was more widespread.  Apart from official 
requests to carry out survey or reconnaissance work, many engineer officers 
routinely kept detailed journals of their travels, noting terrain, town and weather 
details.  There is no doubt that this information was shared with their peers in 
the ordnance, but it was also used to provide topographical information to army 
commanders on request.  The inference, based on the lack of requests for work 
coming  from  the  Quarter-Master-General,  is  that  there  was  not  direct  co-
ordination, but there is no reason to assume that survey reports delivered to 
Wellington from the Royal Engineers did not find their way into the global pool 
of intelligence. 
4.6.  Activity with the Army on Operations  
The officers from the Royal Engineers were no different to the officers from the 
army in their aspirations.  Most wanted to serve with the army on operations 
and were unhappy when they were given tasks that kept them away from this 
centre of activity.  Although the majority of engineer officers were involved in 
static  activities,  building  and  strengthening  defences,  there  was  a  core  that 
worked and travelled with the army when it was on operations.  The evidence 
below  shows  that  they  were  generally  welcomed  into  the  general  officers’ 
‘military family’ and were used extensively by them.  Wellington may have had 
an  extensive  staff  around  him,  but  the  other  generals  had  fewer  staff.    The 
Royal  Engineer  officers  represented  a  skilled  resource  that  all  the  generals 
including Wellington gratefully accepted and used.  Below are some examples 
of the roles and activities that engineer officers carried out when assigned to the 
army.  The examples build on the previous sections and show that the engineer 
officers  had  a  much  wider  role  than  historians  have  previously  realised  and 
were  used  by  military  commanders  often  in  roles  that  would  have  been 
expected to be given to line officers. 
 
In the early stages of the Peninsular War a number of engineer officers were 
employed  as  Aides-De-Camp  (ADC)  and  staff  officers.    Captain  Edward Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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Fanshawe R.E. accompanied Sir Hew Dalrymple to Portugal in 1808 acting as 
his  Military  Secretary  during  that  time  and  during  the  negotiation  of  the 
Convention of Cintra.
295  Pasley was used as an extra ADC first by Sir David 
Baird  and  then  by  Sir  John  Moore  during  the  Corunna  campaign.    He  was 
ordered to attach himself to Blake’s army in November 1808, to ‘report its state, 
position and operations’.
296  Pasley wrote a lengthy report on his findings to 
Baird in early Jan 1809.
297  In December 1808 he was writing to Moore with 
reports from a spy in Burgos.
298  Pasley was clearly considered to be part of 
Moore’s family as he was present when he died and also at the burial, which 
was  only  attended  by  Moore’s  senior  officers  and  ADC’s.
299    During  the 
Corunna campaign, Burgoyne was used to transmit key orders to General Hope 
and to act as a guide in the required operations.
300  Captain Lefebure R.E. was 
‘employed as a missionary on affairs of very particular importance’, being sent 
to Bilbao with a message to the leaders in the Biscay regions.
301  In September 
1808,  Captain  Birch  R.E.  was  ordered  by  General  Leith  to  join  the  Spanish 
headquarters to ‘enquire into the force, disposition and intended movements of 
that army’.  He met Castaños and Blake and accompanied them to visit Palafox 
at  Saragossa.
302    Landmann  was  sent  from  Lisbon  to  Seville  carrying 
despatches for the British Minister there.
303 
 
From Wellington’s first campaign in 1809, engineer officers were allocated to 
each  of  his  divisions  whilst  they  were  on  operations.
304    These  allocations 
tended to be semi-permanent for much of the war.  Up to his death, Squire was 
always  attached  to  General  Hill’s  Corps,  Burgoyne  was  attached  to  Picton’s 
Third Division and Rice Jones to the Light Division.  As illustrated above, a 
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primary role for these officers was in carrying out survey and reconnaissance 
activities. 
 
Engineer officers also were regularly involved during military operations being  
present at almost every battle in the Peninsular War.  Boothby described the 
role  of  an  engineer  officer  in  battle  :  ‘he  is  always  acceptable  in  the  field  if 
mounted,  because  he  is  generally  a  good  sensible  smart  fellow  ..  and  is 
trustworthy  in  the  communication  and  explanation  of  orders  …  we  generally 
offer our … services as aides-de-camp’.
305 
 
Elphinstone  was  wounded  at  the  first  battle  at  Rolica  in  August  1808.
306  
Landmann  was  also  present  at  the  battle  and  describes  it  in  detail  in  his 
recollections.
307  He was with Wellington for part of the action and was sent to 
assist General Fergusson.  Lieutenant Wells R.E. was used as an ADC at the 
battle of Vimiero and was captured due to his poor eyesight, spending much of 
the  remainder  of  the  battle  with  the  French  general,  Junot.
308    Lieutenant 
Edmund Mulcaster R.E. was also with Wellington’s party and after expressing 
concern about the nearness of some French skirmishers was ordered to collect 
some soldiers and drive them off.
309 
 
Lieutenant  Hamilton  R.E.  was  wounded  at  the  taking  of  Oporto  on  12  May 
1809.    He  had  been  sent  to  place  some  riflemen  in  position  when  he  was 
caught between charging British dragoons and the enemy.  He chose to charge 
with the dragoons and was shot through both legs.  He never recovered from 
these  wounds  and  died  later  that  month  in  Lisbon.
310    In  the  same  action, 
Burgoyne and Rice Jones were employed collecting boats to cross the river 
Douro.
311 
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Active involvement in battles continued throughout the war.  The commanders 
of  detached  corps  also  used  the  engineer  officers  in  a  similar  way.    One 
example was General Graham after the battle of Barossa in 1811, when he 
praised Captains Birch and Nicholas personally for their contribution during the 
battle.
312 
 
Wellington’s  trust  in  some  of  the  engineer  officers  was  demonstrated  at  El 
Boden  on  25  September  1811,  when  he  asked  Burgoyne  to  stay  with  a 
Portuguese regiment which was under heavy fire and assist in keeping it under 
control.
313  Burgoyne, like Dickson in the artillery, was particularly trusted by 
Wellington.    He  was  often  involved  in  tasks  that  would  normally  have  been 
carried out by staff officers.  For example, he took in the summons for surrender 
to the French governor at the first siege of San Sebastian in 1813 and carried 
out the negotiations with the French to conclude the ceasefire at Bayonne in 
April 1814.
314  In a similar vein, Fletcher was ordered to command a force that 
was sent to  take the cattle belonging to the French that were grazing outside of 
Almeida on 11 April 1811.
315   
 
There  were  also  occasions  when  engineer  officers  supported  the  Spanish 
forces.  Lieutenant Reid spent some time with Don Carlos D’Espana in late 
1811.  Burgoyne noted that Don Carlos wrote to Wellington asking for Reid to 
be  allowed  to  stay  with  him  and  Reid  was  also  keen  that  this  would  be 
allowed.
316  On another occasion, Lieutenant Wells R.E. was seconded to assist 
the Spanish attack on Santona.
317 
 
Another area of activity which did not conform to the engineers’ official role was 
the construction of field works.  This was clearly the responsibility of the Royal 
Staff Corps.  In another example of the blurring of responsibilities, there are 
numerous examples where the Royal Engineers were ordered to construct field 
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works.  This became more evident later in the Peninsular War when there was 
a greater number of Royal Sappers and Miners present.  After the second siege 
of Badajoz, Fletcher went to Campo Mayor on 22 June 1811 to lay out two 
redoubts for the defensive positions that Wellington took up to face Soult and 
Marmont.
318  Burgoyne,  Rice Jones and Stanway joined to assist.  Jones’ diary 
noted in September 1811 that he was ordered by Wellington to lay out positions 
for the army at El Boden and Fuente de Guinaldo.  He also noted that the work 
was started on these positions by four hundred and fifty troops from the Fourth 
Division.
319   
 
There  are  numerous  references  to  the  building  of  field  works  during  the 
Pyrenees campaign of 1813.  These include orders to construct defences at the 
bridge  over  Bidassoa  on  13  October  1813;
320    Lieutenant  Pitts  R.E.  and  a 
company of Royal Sappers and Miners built several field works around Vera 
after  the  action  there  on  7  October    1813;
321  and  Smith  prepared  defences 
around Irun.
322  
 
These  examples  show  that,  though  small  in  number,  the  Royal  Engineers 
played an important part in the operation of divisional and headquarters staff 
with the Allied armies.  Early in the Peninsular War it is clear that the lack of 
educated and intelligent staff officers meant that Royal Engineer officers were 
given many responsible tasks to assist their commanders.  There is also clear 
evidence  that  they  played  an  important  role  with  the  army  whilst  on  active 
operations.  Apart from their training in surveying and sketching, which made 
them useful for intelligence work, their knowledge of languages must have been 
very useful for communication with Spanish, Portuguese and French officers.  It 
is important when looking at the command staff activities in the Peninsula that 
the presence of engineer officers is not overlooked.  Their presence gave a 
significant boost to the resources available.  There is also clear evidence that 
they played a full part in the operations of the staff groups at the divisional level. 
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4.7.  Relationship with the Royal Staff  Corps  
The  presence  of  the  Royal  Staff  Corps  and  the  Royal  Engineers  in  the 
Peninsula had the potential to create difficulties.  The Royal Staff Corps were 
part of the Quarter-Master-General’s department under the control of the Horse 
Guards  and  the  Royal  Engineers  were  part  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance.    On 
paper their roles were separate, the Royal Engineers focussing on permanent 
works and sieges while the Royal Staff Corps worked on communications and 
temporary works.  In practice, as has been shown above, this distinction was 
not  evident,  with  both  groups  carrying  out  tasks  that  in  principle  were  the 
responsibility of the other group.  For most of the Peninsular War there were 
simply  not  enough  of  either  group  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  army  and  a 
pragmatic  approach  appears  to  have  developed  that  whoever  was  available 
was used.   
 
Although on most occasions the two corps worked on separate tasks, there 
were a number of occasions when they worked together.  These include Royal 
Staff  Corps  artificers  erecting  a  telegraph  station  at  Celorico  under  the 
directions  of  Captain  Chapman  R.E.  in  1809,
323  Royal  Staff  Corps  artificers 
being  attached  to  the  reserve  artillery  in  1812,
324  and  Royal  Sappers  and 
Miners and Royal Staff Corps artificers being attached to the pontoon train in 
1813.
325  The most notable occasion was the massive bridging operation across 
the river Adour in February 1814.  The scale of the operation meant that all 
available resources had to be pulled together and there was also a significant 
input  from  the  Royal  Navy.    There  has  been  some  criticism  that  the  Royal 
Engineers  unfairly  claimed  the  credit  for  this  construction,  when  in  fact  the 
Royal  Staff  Corps  built  the  bridge.
326    Officially  the  command  of  the  bridge 
construction  was  entrusted  to  Elphinstone  of  the  Royal  Engineers.    He  was 
certainly of the opinion that it was built under his command. In a letter home, he 
noted receiving a letter ordering him to make the bridge and ‘that the staff corps 
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were to be under my orders’.
327  Sir John Hope who was in local command 
while Wellington was with the army, noted that Elphinstone was in charge of the 
task and that Burgoyne and Sturgeon (Royal Staff Corps) were following his 
orders.
328  Similarly, Larpent describes it as ‘Elphinstone’s bridge’, and recorded 
that he had seen Elphinstone’s plans and drawings.
329  There is no doubt that 
Sturgeon and Major Tod of the Royal Staff Corps were involved in the design of 
the bridge.
330  Wellington sent Tod to discuss the design with Admiral Penrose 
on 7 February 1814, but Wellington was corresponding with Elphinstone on the 
planning and construction of the bridge.
331  It is unusual that in Wellington’s 
official despatch on the crossing of the Adour, he did not mention the Royal 
Staff Corps or the Royal Engineers, although several Royal Naval officers are 
mentioned.
332 
 
Generally though, relationships between the two groups of officers themselves 
appeared cordial.  Sturgeon, the senior officer of the Royal Staff Corps had 
transferred from the Royal Artillery.  He would have known and trained with 
some of the senior Royal Engineer and Royal Artillery officers.  Burgoyne, in his 
diary makes criticisms of Sturgeon’s attempts to destroy a bridge and his design 
for ladders at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, but these complaints are no more 
frequent  than  his  negative  comments  on  the  performance  of  his  fellow 
engineers.   
4.8.  Improvements in Training and Experience 
Though  some  of  the  Royal  Engineer  officers  admitted  that  they  had  limited 
practical experience at the start of the Peninsular War, there were instructions 
in place to assist inexperienced officers on their first campaigns.  Rice Jones’ 
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diary
333 contains instructions to officers on active operations outlining the sort of 
information they should be collecting as part of their normal daily movements. 
Examining the diaries that still exist, there are detailed descriptions of towns, 
roads  and  terrain  with  comments  on  people  and  the  weather.    There  are 
sketches to provide further detail and hand drawn maps which give information 
on roads and distances.  Assuming that much of this information found its way 
back to the operational leadership, then over the course of the Peninsular War, 
the level of knowledge must have increased significantly. 
 
One  thing  that  does  become  apparent  when  looking  through  the  letters, 
notebooks  and  diaries  of  the  operational  officers,  is  that  they  did  share 
information.  For example, the notebooks of George West R.E.
334 and Charles 
Rochfort Scott, R.S.C.
335 contain almost identical hand-drawn images and notes 
explaining how a bridge was repaired or a pontoon was installed.   
 
Figure 4.2. The notebooks of G.I.P. West. R.E. and C.R. Scott. R.S.C. 
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It is evident that the professional courtesy of the scientific soldiers meant that 
they  were  willing  to  share  their  knowledge  and  experience  with  their  peers.  
Burgoyne’s notebook on bridging also has similar diagrams and he recorded 
that his notes on bridging using casks were taken from experiments carried out 
by Pasley at Chatham in 1813.  The same notebook also provides information 
on  how  the  French  repaired  bridges  (for  example  the  bridge  at  Ponte 
Murcella),
336 and describes notes made by Lieutenant Piper on the operation of 
the pontoon train.  Burgoyne wrote lengthy notes on bridging in August 1814 at 
the request of Ordnance headquarters for use at the Royal Military Academy 
and School of Military Engineering.
337 
 
There is evidence that such information was being circulated at an individual 
level.  Writing to Squire in October 1811, Burgoyne enclosed a letter from a 
fellow  officer  with  information  on  the  destruction  and  repair  of  bridges.  
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Burgoyne asked for the letter to be returned after Squire had read it.
338  The 
formation of the unofficial ‘Society for Procuring Useful Military Information’ in 
1810  which  is  described  above  showed  that  the  engineer  officers  on  active 
campaign were taking their professional responsibilities seriously.  Moving more 
slowly, the Board of Ordnance was also working to improve officer competence.  
The establishment of the School of Military Engineering in 1812 gave a further 
opportunity to ensure that junior officers had some practical experience prior to 
their first active appointment : 
 
Since that period [the formation of the School of Military Engineering], 
the junior officers of the Royal Engineers, and all the non-commissioned 
Officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Department,  in  addition  to  the  studies 
requisite for their respective stations, have been diligently exercised, not 
only  in  the  execution  of  parallels,  approaches,  batteries,  saps,  mines, 
and other works of siege; but also in the manoeuvres of pontoons, and in 
the formation of military bridges in general.
339 
 
Apart from the training and education of the engineer officers, the engineers 
were also very aware of the limitations caused by the lack of trained artificers to 
support  them.    This  deficiency  led  to  the  small  number  of  engineers  being 
constantly stretched due to them having to teach and monitor the activities of 
the soldiers from the line regiments who were drafted in to help.  Usually there 
was  little  assistance  from  the  officers  of  the  line  regiments,  who  universally 
loathed  siege  work.    The  second  consequence  of  this  deficiency  was  the 
number of engineer officer casualties that occurred as a direct result of the first.  
Many  officers  lost  their  lives  while  demonstrating  to  untrained  soldiers  the 
nature of their duties.  This was a constant theme of correspondence during 
1810-1813 when siege operations were undertaken.  A trickle of artificers were 
sent out to the Peninsula but even when they were present, their training often 
proved inadequate and complaints about them came home with great regularity.  
A typical example was :  
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One company of artificers were up who knew nothing and were made no 
use of except 3 or 4 individuals.  The officers of Engineers consequently 
had everything to arrange and do themselves.
340 
 
A number of officers regularly wrote home asking for more artificers to be sent 
out  and  one,  John  T.  Jones  was  reprimanded  in  1812  for  writing  about  the 
unwillingness  of  the  Inspector  General  of  Fortifications  to  risk  artificers  on 
campaign, writing : ‘Nero fiddled whilst Rome Burned’.
341  
 
But despite these problems and complaints, the Royal Engineer officers were 
working to improve the situation.  Through most of 1811 and 1812, groups of 
Royal  Military  Artificers  and  volunteers  from  the  line  were  being  trained  by 
engineer  officers  when  time  permitted.    These  efforts  continued  for  the 
remainder of the war.  Lieutenant Matson, R.E. was assigned to train the Royal 
Sappers and Miners artificers in the winter season prior to 1813 campaign.
342  
 
The efforts of Pasley in England and several officers in the Peninsula and the 
complaints by Wellington, eventually led to the formation of the Royal Sappers 
and Miners.  By the end of the war, there was both an increase in quantity and 
quality of the specialist troops to support the engineer officers. 
 
On a wider level, there was also evidence of the increased awareness of the 
need for improved professionalism in the army.  Whilst the output of officers 
from the Royal Military College was still small, the first military journal appeared 
during the Napoleonic Wars.  The Royal Military Chronicle was first published in 
November 1810 and was designed to provide both up-to-date organisational 
information (promotions, despatches) and also material designed to improve the 
knowledge of the officer.  This included military histories, current information 
from campaigns around the world and material on the duties of officers. There 
was a surprising amount of material on offensive and defensive fortifications 
that possibly reflected the ready availability of material and officers willing to 
                                            
340 REM, 5501-139, JFB to CWP Ciudad Rodrigo, 12 Feb 1812. 
341 Kealey, p. 12. This quote is from Jones’ private autobiography. 
342 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol.1, p.193 . Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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contribute.    After  the  war,  the  United  Service  Journal  became  a  major 
contributor to military thinking in England and a major campaigner for changes. 
4.9.  Review of performance during the Peninsular 
War. 
What this section shows is that the role of the Royal Engineer officer was much 
more wide ranging than is currently thought.  The activities carried out by the 
Royal Engineers made a vital, but often unseen, contribution to the war.  They 
were not just brought out of storage and ‘dusted off’ when sieges were needed 
but played an active and useful role with the army through its operational and 
static phases.  Unlike most officers in the army, they were busy during the non-
operational seasons carrying out tasks such as improving static defences and 
communications,  training  soldiers  or  undertaking  survey  and  reconnaissance 
work. 
 
The safety of Lisbon, Cadiz and Gibraltar were ensured by the continuous work 
carried out in those locations.  Although they were never tested by the French, 
the formidable Lines of Torres Vedras had enormous strategic significance for 
the  Allied  cause,  giving  a  safe  defensive  position  for  Wellington’s  army,  a 
secure delivery point for the supply chain and a base from which to launch his 
offensive  campaigns.  There  was  a  large  engineer  presence  in  these  areas 
throughout the war and this gave the Allied armies safe havens from the French 
and tied up large numbers of their troops.  The quick repair of fortresses made 
them safe against the French and provided staging points for the Allies and the 
guerrillas.  By their strategic location on the communication routes, they also 
made the movement of French troops, messengers and supplies more difficult.  
The  analysis  above  has  also  demonstrated,  for  the  first  time,  the  major 
contribution that the Royal Engineers made to bridging in the Peninsula.  This 
role is not fully appreciated by historians and needs further work to build on the 
useful first study by Burnham. 
 
Another point that has not been noted in previous studies is the wider role that 
Royal  Engineer  officers  played  in  supporting  the  command  structure  of  the Section 4. Operational Performance. 
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army.  Although some of the information used above has been available in print 
for many years, it is only when these various comments are brought together 
with unpublished material that a clearer picture emerges of the frequent and 
comprehensive effort by engineer officers to support the needs of divisional, 
corps and army command.  Particularly in the early stages of the Peninsular 
War, the Royal Engineer officers were used extensively in staff roles to support 
their commanders, sometimes travelling large distances and working with the 
Spanish armies.  Recent studies, such as that by Romans, are beginning to 
explain how military intelligence was collected and used, but this only touches 
on the complementary roles of the Royal Engineers and the Royal Staff Corps. 
 
The review of the Allied sieges has shown that they were generally believed to 
be badly planned and executed.  The Royal Engineers came in for particular 
criticism on both the strategies employed and actual operations.  Much of this 
criticism is unjustified and the problems were often caused by poor equipment , 
limited  resources  or  time  constraints.    Mistakes  were  made,  but  there  is  no 
evidence to suggest that they had a material effect on the outcome of any of the 
sieges.  With hindsight it is always easy to conclude that a particular plan of 
action would have been better than the one selected, but whether this would 
really have made a difference to the outcome is debatable.  
 
There were some major deficiencies, particularly the lack of trained sappers 
and miners.  This was recognised both in England and in the Peninsula.  The 
Board of Ordnance was moving slowly to address the issue, the biggest change 
being in mid-1811 with the expansion on the Royal Military Artificers and the 
decision to rotate the locations of the companies .  There is no doubt that the 
pressure applied by Wellington did contribute to the earlier introduction of some 
changes, particularly the establishment of the School of Military Engineering.  
While  these  changes  were  being  introduced  the  engineers  in  the  Peninsula 
were taking steps themselves.  These included the training of volunteers from 
the line and any available sappers.  This was carried out from mid 1811 until the 
end of the war.   There is also evidence that the senior Royal Engineer officers 
were mentoring the recently qualified officers and also sharing information with 
their peers both informally in letters and through the ‘Society’ mentioned above. Section 4. Operational Performance. 
  231 
 
Did their training make a difference and was there was any improvement in 
performance during the war?  There is no doubt that the engineer officers had 
limited  practical  experience  of  siege  craft.    Only  a  small  number  had  been 
involved in previous sieges.  But these officers knew the principles and applied 
them as well as circumstances permitted.  There is no evidence that the results 
of the sieges were caused by repeated bad decisions by the engineers.  The 
improvement  in  the  supply  of  sappers  and  miners  is  evident  in  the  number 
available in the later sieges and in the Waterloo campaign. 
 
There  is  also  no  doubt  that  the  training  the  engineer  officers  received  was 
valuable in their wider staff roles supporting the army command structure.  Their 
knowledge  of  survey  and  drawing  was  very  useful  for  reconnaissance  and 
intelligence work.  Their mathematical  and engineering training allowed them to 
work effectively on the construction of defensive works and on the making and 
breaking of river crossings.  Their general intelligence and language skills made 
them useful as messengers, emissaries and liaison officers.  The dairies and 
letters  of  the  engineer  officers  make  it  clear  that  the  officers  were  very 
enthusiastic to be involved in staff work and most of the senior generals in the 
peninsula speak kindly of the engineers who were allocated to them.  Sources 
detail only one occasion when a request was made for an engineer officer to be 
removed from a particular post, but this officer was subsequently mentioned in 
despatches for other tasks he successfully completed. 
 
In summary, the Royal Engineer officers played an important but often unseen  
role in the Peninsula.  Their major contribution was not the sieges but in the 
various other roles which they performed to support the army on offensive and 
defensive  operations.    There  is  also  clear  evidence  that  there  were 
improvements in the quantity of resources and the quality of resources through 
the Peninsular War. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
  232 
SECTION 5.  AFTER THE PENINSULAR WAR 
5.1.  Introduction 
The end of the Peninsular War saw many of the officers from the Peninsula 
being  transferred  to  the  remaining  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  and 
America.    The  majority  of  engineer  officers  remained  where  they  were 
continuing their work in the major garrisons around the world.  After Waterloo, 
many  engineer  officers  were  involved  in  survey  and  reconstruction  work  in 
Europe until 1818.  This section will outline the changes that occurred over the 
next forty years and describe how military reform and education fared during 
the peace.  The next major conflict in the Crimea was not a success and the 
end of this war saw major changes in the structure of the military in this country 
with the end of the Board of Ordnance and the formation of a single military 
engineering corps. 
5.2.  1814-15, Holland, America and Waterloo 
The final stages on the Napoleonic Wars saw three more campaigns outside of 
the  Iberian  Peninsula  each  of  which  included  the  involvement  of  Royal 
Engineers and the Royal Sappers and Miners. 
 
Following a request from the Dutch, a makeshift expeditionary force was sent to 
Holland under the command of Sir Thomas Graham.  This force landed at Tolen 
on 17 December 1813
1 and included a complement of nine Royal Engineers 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Carmichael-Smyth and eighty-three 
artificers from the Royal Sappers and Miners.
2  All six junior engineer officers 
had spent time at the School of Military Engineering before their deployment.  
 
These officers and men played an active part in the following campaign starting 
with the construction of a disembarkation point for the cavalry.   A battery was 
built for the Prussians to protect the flying bridge at Tholen and another battery 
                                            
1 Aspinal-Oglander, Freshly Remembered, p. 264. 
2 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 206-207. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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was repaired at Ford Frederick. A boat bridge was constructed using locally 
obtained boats at Zandwarbrieten on 31 December 1813.
3  In February 1814, 
batteries  were  constructed  to  bombard  the  French  fleet  in  Antwerp  using  a 
range  of  antiquated  guns  that  were  found  in  the  area.    Five  batteries  were 
constructed, but the inferiority of the guns meant that no significant damage had 
been done when the bombardment had to be stopped on 6 December 1813 
when the supporting Prussian troops were withdrawn.  Without the Prussians, 
the Allied force was not strong enough to threaten Antwerp.  Graham decided 
that  a  surprise  attack  on  Bergen-Op-Zoom  might  succeed  and  launched  an 
attack on the night of 8 March 1814.  Whilst initially successful, the attackers 
were driven out in the morning by a counter-attack.  Three Royal Engineers 
officers  with  forty  sappers  led  the  various  columns  forward,  Captain  Hoste, 
Lieutenants, Sperling and Abbey being involved with Abbey being killed during 
the  night.    Of  the  forty  sappers,  their  officer,  Sub-Lieutenant  Adamson  was 
killed, two artificers were killed, thirteen wounded and ten made prisoners.  The 
skills  and  bravery  of  the  sappers  was  recorded  by  both  Graham  and  the 
commanding  engineer,  Carmichael-Smyth.
4    The  first  peace  in  Europe  was 
declared  soon  after  with  the  abdication  of  Napoleon,  although  many  of  the 
ordnance officers and artificers remained in Holland.  
 
The cessation of hostilities in Europe enabled another expeditionary force to be  
put together to make an attack on the American mainland at New Orleans.  The 
force  collected  was  a  mixture  of  locally  based  troops  and  some  veteran 
regiments  from  the  Peninsula  commanded  by  Sir  Edward  Packenham.  
Included was twelve Royal Engineer officers and over one hundred artificers 
from the Royal Sappers and Miners all under the command of Burgoyne.
5  The 
attack on New Orleans was a failure with Packenham losing his life and the 
council formed to decide on the next action choosing to abandon any further 
attempt.  Connolly  wrote  that  ‘both  companies  [of  the  Royal  Sappers  and 
                                            
3 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 367-368. 
4 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 206-208. 
5 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 359-360; Connolly, History of the Royal 
Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 210-212. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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Miners] were of great service during the operations and assault’,
6 but provided 
no details of their actions.  One engineer officer, Lieutenant Wright was killed 
during the assault, which was ironic as he had been in the Peninsula since 
1811 and had served at all the major sieges.  The final event in the American 
war was the attack on Fort Bowyer near Mobile in February 1815.  At this attack 
the two companies of artificers were present and their effective work in digging 
the approaches led to an early surrender of the fort.  
 
The final event in the Napoleonic Wars was the one hundred days campaign 
which  culminated  in  the  battle  of  Waterloo.    There  were  numerous  Royal 
Engineer officers present, the total was about sixty in June 1815 along with 
seven companies of Royal Sappers and Miners.  Many officers and artificers 
from the Royal Sappers and Miners were already in the Low Countries working 
on surveying and repairing fortresses and other engineering activities.
7  As the 
news of Napoleon’s return spread efforts increased on preparing defences.  For 
the first time, Wellington had proper engineer resources available and these 
were used extensively during the campaign. 
 
every  division  of  the  army  had  one  engineer’s  brigade  attached  to  it; 
each brigade consisting of a complete company of well-trained Sappers 
and Miners, with drivers horses, and wagons, carrying intrenching tools, 
sufficient  to  employ  a  working  party  of  500  men  …  A  Captain  and  a 
number  of  subalterns  were  attached  to  each  brigade,  and  were 
responsible for the discipline of the men and the efficiency of the horses 
etc … Five companies of Sappers and Miners were employed with the 
Pontoon  train,  which  consisted  of  30  pontoons  …  The  number  of  
Engineers officers serving with the army in France was only 41 ... They 
had under their command upwards of 800 Sappers and Miners, and 550 
drivers, and had charge of 160 waggons (pontoon carriages included) 
and more than 1000 horses.
8 
 
At  the  battle  itself,  there  were  eleven  Royal  Engineer  officers  present.    A 
number had been employed a few days before, sketching the ground to prepare 
maps  for  Wellington.      As  described  above  their  role  was  to  work  as  staff 
                                            
6 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, p. 212. 
7  Connolly,  History  of  the  Royal  Sappers  and  Miners,  vol.  1,  p.  216,  says  at  least  three 
companies were on the continent. 
8 Pasley, A Course of instruction, vol. 1, p. xii. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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officers  supporting  the  commanders  but  as  they  day  wore  on  many  were 
scattered across the battlefield.  The commanding engineer, Carmichael-Smyth 
remained with Wellington through most of the battle. 
 
The  three  campaigns  outlined  above  demonstrate  a  material  change  in  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  engineering  resources  available.    Compared  with  the 
early years of the Peninsular War, there were greater numbers of engineers 
and artificers present.  More importantly, the training received by both groups 
was  beginning  to  show  dividends  in  their  capabilities.    The  scale  of  the 
engineering  resources  during  the  Waterloo  campaign  would  have  made  a 
difference if they had been available in the Peninsula.  This change was the 
culmination of effort over several years to highlight and then introduce much 
needed changes within the military engineering capability of the British army. 
 
5.3.  From the Napoleonic to Crimean wars 
In the immediate aftermath on the Napoleonic Wars, large numbers of officers 
and artificers were engaged in surveying and repairing fortresses.  Proposals 
were  prepared  by  August  1815  and  a  budget  of  £6.5m  was  allocated  for 
building and repair work.  The budget was under the direct control of Wellington 
and  he  appointed  John  T.  Jones  R.E.  as  his  assistant.    Many  engineers 
remained through to 1818 working on these projects. 
 
In line with the army, the peace also brought the need to reduce the size of the 
corps.  The first cut came in 1817 when the corps was reduced by twenty-nine 
to two hundred and thirty-three.  1819 saw a further cut down to one hundred 
and ninety-three.  The reduction was made by the most junior officers at each 
rank  being  put  on  half-pay  until  a  vacancy  occurred.    The  establishment 
remained at this level until 1825 when it was increased to two hundred and fifty-
one as part of the decision to undertake the ordnance survey in Ireland.  The 
establishment remained at this level until 1846 when it was increase to two 
hundred and ninety-eight and on the threat of war in 1854 up to three hundred Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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and thirty-six.
9  The effect of the reductions in the establishment in 1817 and 
1819 was to stifle any promotion prospects in the corps and officers had to face 
many years on the same rank with no prospect of promotion.  There were no 
promotions to Captain or Lieutenant-Colonel between 1817 and 1824.   
 
In that year it was decided that a one-off restructure was required.  Nineteen 
officers were appointed to Lieutenant-Colonel.  The number of cadets waiting 
for commissions had reached over one hundred.  The problem was becoming 
impossible  to  manage.    A  decision  was  made  to  reduce  the  backlog  by 
implementing  a  one-off  commissioning,  promoting  twenty-eight  to  the  Royal 
Artillery, twenty-six to the Royal Engineers and over fifty were transferred to the 
line regiments.  Those who refused the offer of the transfer to the line had all 
allowances stopped.
10  
 
The reductions in the establishment also had an effect on the Royal Military 
Academy. As the number of cadets dropped, the fifth and sixth academies were 
abolished in 1820, and the fourth in 1823.
11  
 
There were similar reductions in the Royal Sappers and Miners.  In 1816 the 
establishment was reduced from 2,861 to 2,061.  Further reductions in 1817 
took the establishment down to 1,258 and in 1819 down to 752.
12  Like the 
Royal  Engineers,  in  1824  the  establishment  was  increased  to  814  with  the 
formation of an extra company for ordnance survey work in Ireland. 
 
Although  the  reductions  above  made  a  significant  impact  in  the  size  of  the 
engineer and artificer corps, the key learning points were not lost.  The Royal 
Military  Academy  continued  to  train  cadets  in  the  necessary  skills  before 
commissioning  and  the  School  of  Military  Engineering  continued  to  train  the 
artificers  and  provide  post  commissioning  education  for  the  newly  qualified 
officers.  The growth of the ordnance survey from 1824 had two advantages.  
                                            
9 Porter, History of the Royal Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 406-408. 
10 Guggisberg, The Shop, p. 53. 
11 Guggisberg, The Shop, pp. 67-68. 
12 Connolly, History of the Royal Sappers and Miners, vol. 1, pp. 230-232 Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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Firstly, it allowed officers to gain practical experience in surveying and secondly 
if increased the pool of engineer officers who could be called on in times of 
need.  There were still concerns about the education given.  The 1840’s saw 
attacks  on  the  syllabus  as  being  ‘too  narrowly  theoretical’.
13    Strachan’s 
comment that it was only in 1846 that practical elements were added to the 
syllabus  is  misleading  as  cadets  had  been  receiving  practical  instruction 
through the School of Military Engineering since 1812.
14 
 
The approach of the Crimean War, triggered an increase in the establishment of 
the Royal Engineers.  Strachan’s criticism of the ‘inbuilt slowness to adjust to 
the demands of war’ seems particularly harsh as the size of the Academy was 
constrained by the funding available.
15  The inbuilt slowness was the typical 
function of the government in having to balance the cost of the military in peace 
against the needs in war. The military engineering aspects of the Crimean War 
were not impressive and brought reminders about some of the problems faced 
during the Peninsular War.  This must have been particularly galling for the 
senior engineer officers, some of whom were present forty years before.
16 
 
Rightly or wrongly, the Crimean War saw the end of the Board of Ordnance.  
They were judged responsible for some of the failures and in 1856 the Board of 
Ordnance was amalgamated with the War Department to form the War Office.  
At the same time the Royal Sappers and Miners were absorbed into the Royal 
Engineers to form a single military engineering corps, an action that Pasley had 
argued for forty years earlier. 
                                            
13 H. Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy : The Reform of the British Army 1830-54 (Manchester, 
1984), pp. 124-125. 
14 Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy, p. 127, noted that in 1829 the Royal Sappers and Miners 
were providing practical instruction to army cadets at the Royal Military College.  It is difficult to 
believe that the ordnance were providing this instruction to army cadets whilst not providing it to 
their own. 
15 H. Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy, p. 125. 
16 Including Burgoyne, H.D. Jones and Tylden. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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5.4.  The Army’s response to education 
Britain came out of the Napoleonic wars with a small but highly effective army.  
The realities of peace soon led to the downsizing of the army with regiments 
disbanded and officers placed on half-pay. 
 
The impacts were also felt in the Royal Military Academy and the size was cut 
back.  By 1829 the size of the staff in the Junior Department was reduced to a 
point where they could not provide the education and it was only by becoming 
self funding that the college survived at all.
17  The Horse Guards view of military 
education  was  still  undecided.  The  Royal  Military  College  had  only  been  in 
existence for fifteen years and Wellington was still not convinced of its value.  
Wellington firmly believed that officers should be educated, but his opinion was 
that the education should be that provided by public schools and appropriate for 
a ‘gentleman’ and that military education should be delayed until the officer had 
received  his  first  commission.    This  was  seen  to  give  the  best  relationship 
between officer and soldier,  the (country) gentleman knowing how to lead men 
whilst the noveau riche did not. 
 
The  British  Army  provided  those  aristocrats  with  the  temporary 
environment of camp life which was simply the continuation of life on a 
country estate. War was like any other outdoor sport, only rougher and 
more dangerous.
18 
 
The Victorian era saw this position gradually eroded and there was a greater 
demand for education led by publications like the United Service Journal.  This 
pressure for military reform led to the growth of the relationship between the 
military and the public schools as described in Worthington’s paper.
19 
 
It was just before the Crimean War when it was finally accepted that military 
education had a part to play and this saw the growth of the military colleges, the 
                                            
17 Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy, p. 125 
18 R.L. Blanco, ‘Reform and Wellington’s Post Waterloo Army, 1815-1854’. Military Affairs, vol 
29, No. 3, p.128. 
19  I.  Worthington,    ‘Antecedent  education  and  officer  Recruitment  :  the  Origins  and  Early 
Development of the Public School – Army relationship’. Military Affairs, vol. 41, No. 4. Section 5. Changes after the Napoleonic Wars. 
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setting of minimum education standards for officers and ultimately the end of 
the purchase of commissions. Section 6. Conclusions. 
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SECTION 6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction to this thesis the purpose was outlined and the three primary 
questions were listed : 
−  Were the Royal Engineer officers suitably trained and provided with the 
necessary resources to undertake their roles? 
−  If a small percentage of engineer time was spent on the sieges during 
the Peninsular War, what roles did the Royal Engineer officers perform 
for the remainder of the time? 
−  How well did they perform in their operational roles? 
 
This thesis has provided answers to each of the questions set, although some 
difficulties were encountered during the study.  One of the main difficulties was 
the limited information available on the Royal Engineers and its activities.  In the 
early stages of the research a significant amount of time was spent building a 
comprehensive database on the Royal Engineers during the Napoleonic Wars.  
The  number  of  officers  was  small  enough  to  treat  them  as  individuals  and 
gather information at that level.  There were two hundred and eighty officers in 
total and by combining published and unpublished material a comprehensive 
understanding has been developed of their careers and operational activities.  
The  material  collected  includes  several  thousand  digital  images  of  original 
unpublished  documents,  which  have  been  used  extensively  during  the 
research.  This information, which has been collected together for the first time, 
has  enabled  a  thorough  analysis  to  be  carried  out  on  the  role  of  the  Royal 
Engineers.
1    The  availability  of  this  information  was  a  pre-requisite  to 
completing the study. 
 
Some unexpected findings have come out of the research.   
−  The common perception of the Allied sieges, that they were hampered 
by  bad  decisions  and  mismanagement,  has  been  challenged  and  an 
                                            
1  A  similar  exercise  had  been  undertaken  by  John  Hancock  the  ex-Curator  of  the  Royal 
Engineers  Museum,  but  tragically  the  electronic  copy  has  been  mislaid.    Two  paper  copies 
exist, but their value as a research tool is limited due to the inability to undertake any form of 
electronic analysis. Section 6. Conclusions. 
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alternative suggested of poor results primarily through time and resource 
constraints; 
−  The role of the Royal Engineer officers was much wider than has been 
previously thought.  They played a more active role in supporting the 
command structure than has been previously recognised; 
−  There  were  more  engineers  actively  involved  in  the  Napoleonic  Wars 
than  historians  have  appreciated.    Many  were  involved  in  relatively 
unseen  defensive  activities  across  the  Iberian  Peninsula  and  the 
Mediterranean islands; 
−  There  was  a  significant  effort  to  maintaining  communications  for 
Wellington’s operations.  This involved improving road and river access 
and also the construction and destruction of river crossings.  Previously, 
the perception was that much of this work was carried out by the Royal 
Staff Corps, but the facts do not support this position. 
 
These points will be picked up below. 
 
TRAINING 
 
The education of the Ordnance officers had been developed over a period of 
fifty years since the formation of the Royal Military Academy in 1741.  As shown 
by Appendix A, the syllabus was comprehensive providing a scientific rather 
than  classical  education.    Up  to  1812  the  syllabus  was  primarily  theoretical 
although there were limited opportunities to put some of the learning to practice.  
The  main  difference  between  army  and  ordnance  officers  was  that  it  was 
possible for junior army officers to learn their trade under the supervision of 
more  experienced  officers  in  their  regiment.    An  ordnance  officer  would  be 
expected to know his trade when they were appointed and may not have had 
immediate access to other officers to provide advice and guidance.  Generally 
the syllabus achieved this aim and the variances of knowledge in leaving the 
Academy were caused by the demands of the wars.  Whilst the system was 
based  on  cadets  passing  examinations  before  commissioning,  the  state’s 
demand  for  officers  meant  that  examinations  were  suspended  from  1794  to 
1811.  In difficult circumstances, the Governor of the Academy and his staff Section 6. Conclusions. 
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tried to ensure that the cadets who were commissioned during this period still 
had sufficient knowledge to be able to carry out the basic functions of their role.  
In many cases the recently commissioned officers were placed in garrisons for 
a period to allow some practical experience to be gained.  The suspension of 
examinations is one of the commonest criticisms of the Royal Military Academy, 
but it should be remembered that these officers were still much better trained 
than a typical army officer.  It should also be noted that with the exception of 
Richard Fletcher all the well known Royal Engineer officers from this period 
passed  through  the  Royal  Military  Academy  when  examinations  had  been 
suspended.
2   
The syllabus at the Royal Military Academy had remained relatively static for 
many years when with hindsight it could be argued that there was some need 
for  change.    The  first  half  of  the  18
th  century  saw  a  reliance  on  European 
partners for providing specialist military engineering skills.  The second half of 
the  18
th  century  saw  Britain  primarily  involved  in  colonial  type  campaigns  in 
America and India where the need for formal siege skills was limited.   The war 
in Europe presented new challenges, which the campaigns of 1793 and 1799 
highlighted.  The senior Royal Engineer officers had not been called upon to 
undertake  major  sieges  and  had  limited  practical  experience  of  siege  work. 
They were slow to appreciate the possible need for change.  This applied even 
more so to the need to provide trained artificers to support engineer officers in 
the  field.    The  criticism  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  in  this  area  has  some 
justification, but it faced the same problem as the army in finding the funds to 
train and maintain such a body.  Up to 1811 the artificers had the sole purpose 
of  maintaining  static  garrisons  where  there  was  a  clear  need  and  budget 
available.  Efforts had been underway since at least 1809 to change the nature 
of the artificers and the change in the structure of the Royal Military Artificers in 
mid 1811 predates Wellington’s complaints by nearly a year.  The performance 
of the Board of Ordnance should be contrasted with the performance of the 
Horse Guards in their attempts to introduce training and education in the army.  
The  Royal  Military  College  was  nearly  sixty  years  behind  the  Royal  Military 
                                            
2 This included Birch, Squire, Burgoyne, Pasley, Jones and Elphinstone amongst many others. Section 6. Conclusions. 
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Academy  and  it  was  another  forty  years  before  it  was  fully  accepted  as 
necessary.  
 
Criticism of the training and education did not come only from outside of the 
Ordnance  department.    Several  officers  complained  that  the  training  they 
received did not prepare them for their duties.  These complaints were typically 
from those officers who came through in the period when demand was at its 
greatest, and reflect their concern about their capabilities.  The focus of these 
concerns was invariably on siege work.  It is difficult to see what the Board of 
Ordnance could have done at that time because it was under intense pressure 
to produce officers quickly.  In reality there were limited opportunities for officers 
to gain experience other than through the active operations.   One question to 
consider is whether the situation was different in the army.  There were similarly 
limited  opportunities  for  officers  to  gain  experience  in  operations  on  the 
European mainland.  Apart from the minor campaigns in 1806 and 1807 there 
were no opportunities prior to the outbreak of the Peninsular War.  Both groups 
were forced to learn the hard way. 
 
The officers involved in active operations in the early 19
th century worked hard 
to improve the situation.  This included Pasley’s tireless work in England to train 
artificers and subsequently to gain approval for the establishment of the School 
of Military Engineering.   In the field there was clear evidence of the officers 
helping each other. The new breed of engineer officer, recognised the need to 
improve  their  skills  and  in  the  absence  of  outside  help,  looked  for  ways 
themselves.  There is clear evidence of sharing of information both within the 
Royal Engineers and also with the Royal Staff Corps. 
 
In  a  wider  context,  there  were  educational  articles  published  in  the  Royal 
Military Chronicle and after the war in the United Service Journal. There was a 
significant  focus  on  engineering  work  both  for  static  and  field  defences.    In 
comparison  there  was  little  published  for  the  other  functions,  the  infantry, 
cavalry or artillery. 
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The focus of many writers on education within the Board of Ordnance has been 
on  the  negative,  the  suspension  of  examinations,  the  poor  discipline  at  the 
Academy, the perceived focus on theory rather than practical learning.  This 
has  overshadowed  the  positives,  which  whilst  not  perfect,  were  producing 
officers with a grounding of education that could be used to build competent 
officers when combined with practical experience.  It is unrealistic to believe 
that practising siege work at Chatham would ever make an officer ready for the 
brutal realities of a real siege.  It should also be taken into account that Royal 
Artillery officers were following the same syllabus at Chatham and there were 
few  complaints  about  their  competence.    The  main  difference  was  that  they 
were  present  in  larger  numbers  which  gave  the  junior  officers  more  time  to 
increase their experience. 
 
Did  the  training  the  engineers  received  make  a  difference?    The  evidence 
suggests  that  it  did.    The  formation  of  the  School  of  Military  Engineering 
benefited both artificers and recently commissioned officers.  In addition, the 
results of seven years of continuous war meant that there were many officers 
with substantial military experience.   The final stages of the Napoleonic wars 
and the American campaign of 1814-15 show a much more effective military 
engineering  organisation  in  place.    There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  Waterloo 
campaign, for the first time the British army had a proper military engineering 
establishment.   
 
One final comment on the professionalism and training of the Royal Engineer 
officer is that there were no engineer officers sent home from the Peninsula for 
poor performance.  There were no major complaints about their work.  This was 
a much better record than that in the army.   
 
OPERATIONS 
 
One  thing  that  has  become  apparent  during  this  research  is  how  little 
understood are the role and activities of the Royal Engineers. Haythornthwaite 
wrote as recently as 1988 that they ‘tended to be consulted only on special Section 6. Conclusions. 
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occasions’.
3  This is the common but mistaken view of the role of the Royal 
Engineers  in  the  Peninsular  War,  which  completely  undervalues  their 
contribution.    The  analysis  above  describes  the  other  work  they  did.    This 
includes the static and field based defensive work, the work on road and river 
communications, the surveying and reconnaissance work and their supporting 
work as unofficial staff officers.  This wider role has not been well understood 
and is where they made the major contribution to the Peninsular War.  Like the 
Royal  Navy  they  provided  often  unseen  support  to  Wellington’s  campaigns.  
This support did make a significant contribution to the final success.  Three 
areas  of  activity  that  are  typically  ascribed  to  other  groups  are  surveying,  
bridging work and field defences.  In each of these areas, the Royal Engineers 
played a larger role than has been previously thought.  Particularly in the area 
of bridging, the analysis demonstrates that the Royal Engineers performed most 
bridging work during the Peninsular War.  Although the formal responsibility for 
survey  and  reconnaissance  work  rested  with  the  Quarter-Master-General’s 
department, the journals, diaries and letters of the engineers show significant 
evidence of them being involved in this type of work.  There is also a consistent 
level of involvement through the war in constructing field works, which would 
normally have been attributed to the Royal Staff Corps.   
 
The comprehensive review of the sieges above shows a different picture from 
that normally found in history books. The typical complaints of poor decisions 
and  poor  execution  by  the  engineers  are  not  supported.    There  are  some 
common themes running through the sieges, which typically show limited time 
and limited resources as being the primary contributory factors to the failures.    
The limited number of Royal Engineer officers and artificers had an effect but 
were not the main cause of failures.  The criticism of the decisions made by the 
engineers appears to neglect the facts that invariably the senior army officers 
accepted the recommendations made.  Whilst it is easy to criticise decisions 
with the benefit of hindsight, the senior officers present at the time were not 
advocating the alternative suggestions put forward by the historians of the war.   
 
                                            
3 P. Haythornthwaite, Wellington’s Specialist Troops, p. 22. Section 6. Conclusions. 
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One common theme which has not been addressed fully by any writer is the 
progressive  degradation  of  discipline  in  the  army.    The  excesses  after  the 
assaults at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and San Sebastian along with the poor 
attitude  displayed  at  Burgos  do  no  credit  to  the  British  army.    With  the 
indiscipline shown after the battle of Vitoria, there is evidence that the behaviour 
of the troops put Wellington in unnecessary positions of risk.  It is probable that 
had the French Governor at San Sebastian made a counter attack after the 
town was taken, the French would have successfully evicted the Allied army.  
The  high  casualties  at  the  sieges  were  caused  by  two  main  reasons:  the 
assaults being made before the defences had been sufficiently weakened, and 
the  rash  behaviour  of  troops  following  through  attacks  which  served  no 
purpose.
4 
 
There is no doubt that Wellington and his senior commanders gained hugely 
from  the  education  and  intelligence  of  the  Royal  Engineer  (and  Royal  Staff 
Corps) officers. Apart from their engineering responsibilities, their contribution 
included : 
−  surveying and reconnaissance work; 
−  work as unofficial ADC’s in battle and as part of a general’s staff; 
−  work as staff officers; 
−  use  as    messengers  /  emissaries  particularly  in  the  early  part  of  the 
Peninsular War; 
−  liaison officers with the Spanish armies; 
−  providing engineering support to the Spanish armies; 
−  language skills for communication with Spanish, Portuguese and French. 
 
The evidence shows that the superior education of the engineer officers made a 
difference to the outcome of the war and that their education whilst not perfect 
did continue to improve through the Napoleonic Wars and after.   The Royal 
Engineers contribution to the war needs re-evaluating by many writers.  The 
research suggests that the lack of trained army officers available for staff duties 
                                            
4  I  am  particularly  thinking  of  the  counter-attack  on  San  Christoval  during  the  first  siege  of 
Badajoz and the attack on the convent at the first siege of San Sebastian.  Wellington lost 
several hundred men for no purpose. Section 6. Conclusions. 
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was masked by the availability of Ordnance officers (usually engineers) to carry 
out  these  roles  in  an  unofficial  capacity.    Their  role  has  been  consistently 
undervalued with them contributing more than has been previously understood.  
Consideration  of  the  trust  that  Wellington  placed  in  officers  like  Dickson, 
Burgoyne, Sturgeon and Jones to show that he greatly valued the contribution 
of the ‘Scientific soldiers’ although he never really accepted that the education 
should be completed before an officer received his first commission. 
 
The Napoleonic Wars were the first wars where the British army could field a 
number of officers who had received formal military training.  These officers 
from the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Staff Corps with a small 
number  of  trained  staff  officers  in  the  Quarter-Master-General’s  department 
made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  war  effort.    The  experiences  of  the 
Peninsular War convinced the Board of Ordnance that changes were needed in 
the  training  and  education  of  officer  and  artificer  and  these  had  been 
implemented  before  the  end  of  the  war.    The  Royal  Engineer  officers 
themselves recognised the need for improvements in their skills and the period 
following the Napoleonic wars saw the publication of many English language 
books and journals to encourage study in military engineering.   
 
Whilst it was still a small step the engineers who served in the Peninsula made 
a demonstrable improvement to the professionalism of the British army and one 
that would be built upon over the next forty years. 
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APPENDIX A – ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY SYLLABUS 1792. 
 
Source : WD Jones, Records of the Royal Military Academy. (Woolwich, 
1851).   
p. 45, Detail of Course studies, 11th Feb 1792  
 
The Lieut.-Governor transmitted the following detail of the course of studies, 
which a Gentleman Cadet is to go through, before he is reported fit for a 
public examination for a commission in the Royal Corps of Artillery and 
Engineers. 
 
FORTIFICATION 
 
1.  The definitions and explanations of the works of both Regular and 
Irregular Fortification, correctly wrote and understood. 
2.  The construction of the 1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd systems of M. De Vauban, 
described on paper. 
3.  The same of M. Coehorn’s system 
4.  The same of M. de Cormontaigne’s system 
5.  Irregular Fortifications described on paper. 
6.  The Attack and Defence of Fortified places 
7.  The art of Mining 
8.  The elements of Field Fortification 
9.  How to Trace on the ground, Permanent and Field Fortification, with 
and without mathematical instruments 
10. To take Plans with and without instruments 
11. Theory and practice of Levelling 
12. How to estimate the works of a Fortification, viz., Revetements, 
Ramparts, Ditches, Batardeaux, Powder Magazines, turned and 
groined arches 
13. To produce a fair copy of the book containing Calculations, Plans and 
Sections relative to the Estimates 
14. To produce a complete course of the above neatly drawn, containing 
the Plans, Sections and Geometrical Elevations, composed of 68 
plates. 
15. To produce the Field Book containing the practice on the ground, the 
Tracing of Works of Permanent and Field Fortification, Surveying and 
Levelling. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
−  The Course of Fortification from M. Landmann, comprised in 68 
plates, 
−  The estimates from M. Landmann’s manuscripts, 
−  Surveying and Tracing outworks on the ground, from M. Landmann’s 
Manuscripts, 
−  Pleydell’s Field Fortification. 
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ARTILLERY 
 
1.  The definitions and explanations of the several parts of Artillery; also, 
tables containing the general dimensions and construction of Guns 
and Mortars, correctly wrote and understood 
2.  The general construction of Brass and Iron Guns, Sea and Land 
Mortars and Howitzers, described on paper. 
3.  The general construction of Ship and Garrison carriages, Travelling 
carriages, Land and Sea Mortar beds, described as above 
4.  The same of the Iron Work for Ship, Garrison and Travelling carriages 
5.  The different kinds of wood made use of for the several sorts of gun 
carriages and Mortar Beds 
6.  How to find the weight of Guns, Mortars and Howitzers 
7.  To find the quantity of powder which a chamber contains 
8.  To find the diameter of Shot and Bores of guns 
9.  To find the weight of Shot and Shells 
10. To find the number of Shot and Shells contained in a pile 
11. To ascertain the number of horses necessary to draw the different 
natures of Ordnance 
12. The number of men required to construct a Battery in one night 
13. To produce a complete course of the above neatly drawn, containing 
the plans, sections, and Geometrical Elevations, composed of 57 
plates. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
−  The Course of Artillery from M. Landmann in 57 plates, 
−  The Construction of Artillery from Major Bloomfield, Inspector of Royal 
Artillery, 
−  Mullers Artillery. 
 
MATHEMATICS 
 
1.  Arithmetic, in all its parts, 
2.  Logarithms, their nature, use and construction, 
3.  Geometry, the theory from Euclid’s Elements 4 first books, 
4.  Algebra, from the first elements, to the solution of cubic and higher 
equations 
5.  Trigonometry, with heights and distances, 
6.  Mensuration, in Superfices and Solids, in Theory and Practice, with 
Surveying and Measuring of Artificers works, Buildings, Timber, etc, 
7.  Conic Sections, 
8.  Mechanics, including motions equable and variable, Forces, Constant, 
variable and percussive, Gravity, Sound and distances, Inclined 
Planes, Projectiles, Practical Gunnery, Pendulums, Centers [sic] of 
Gravity, Percussion, Oscillation and Gyration, Ballistic Pendulum, &c, 
9.  Fluxions, 
10. Hydrostatics and Hydraulics, including the pressure, motion, and 
issuing of Fluids, the filling and exhausting of Vessels, &c, Specific 
Gravities of Bodies, Syphons, Pumps and Diving Bells, &c.,  
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11. Pneumatics, including the nature, properties, and effects of the Air 
and the Atmosphere, with the Air Pumps, Syringes, Condensing 
Engine, Thermometer, Barometer, with the method of measuring 
altitudes by the Barometer and Thermometer, 
12. Practical Exercises, concerning these and various other branches, as 
the weight and dimensions, and piling of shot and shells, bulk or 
capacities of various vessels or figures to contain certain weights of 
powder, distances by the motion of sound, Concerning the effects of 
variable and constant forces &c., 
13. Resistance of Fluids, as water, Air, &c, with their action on bodies in 
motion, &c., 
14. Gunnery, Robin’s new principles of gunnery, Experiments, particularly 
with the ballistic pendulum. 
 
Printed and manuscript books made use of in the above course 
 
Books – Dr Huttons’s Arithmetic, Logarithms, Mensuration, Conic Sections 
and Select Exercises; Tracts; Mr Robin’s Gunnery; the 1
st volume of his 
works; Professor Simpsons (of Glasgow) Elements of Algebra; Rossignal’s 
Geometry; Bonnycastle’s Algebra; Simpson’s Algebra for Application to 
Geometry. 
 
The above course of mathematics is correctly wrote down by the Gentleman 
Cadets in their books, with Drawings, applicable to the several parts of it. 
 
DRAWING  
with the 2
nd Drawing Master 
 
Figure Drawing, the several parts of the human figure, from drawing by the 
Master. 
Perspective, in Theory and Practice, 1
st, Theory of Perspective, 2
nd, Putting 
Planes in Perspective; 3
rd, Elevations; 4
th, Measures and Proportions of 
figures at different distances; 5
th, Lights and Shadows; thus far with the 
Jesuits Perspective. 
 
with the 1st Drawing Master 
 
With Mr P Sandby, putting perspective in practice by copying from Drawings, 
which Qualifies them for Drawing from Nature, teaches them the effects of 
Light and Shade, and makes them acquaint also with Aerial Perspective; 
then to proceed to take views about Woolwich and other places, which 
teaches them at the same time to break ground, and forms the eye to the 
knowledge of it. 
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THE FRENCH LANGUAGE 
 
Grammar and Pronunciation,  thoroughly learned, and the practical 
application of it. 
Translation, from English into French, and from French into English, the 
translation wrote down and made correct. 
Exercises, particular exercises to be given them to perform in the language, 
chiefly on the subjects that have a military tendency. 
 
CHEMISTRY 
 
The Gentlemen Cadets generally attend two, and often three course of 
lectures in Chemistry, the theory and practice of it, they make notes during 
the Lectures, which are thirty-two in number, then they enter into fair books, 
which are given them for that purpose, and which are most copious on the 
heads relative to Artillery, as gun powder, the materials that compose it, 
metals, &c. 
 
The Gentlemen Cadets are also taught Fencing and Dancing, the exercises 
of small arms, and light field pieces. 
 APPENDIX B Royal Engineer Operational Experience prior to the Peninsular War
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Holland 1793 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
West Indies 1794 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Corsica 1794 0 0 0 3
Capture of Cape 1795 0 1
Minorca 1798 0 0 2
Holland 1799 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Siege of Malta 1800 0 0 0 3
Egypt 1800/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Surinam 1804 0 1
Cape 1805 0   0 0 0 4
Weser 1805-6 0 0 0 3
Naples Bay 1805-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Egypt 1807 0 0 0 0 0 5
Copenhagen 1807 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Buenos Ayres 1806 0
Monte Video 1807 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Sweden 1808   0 0 2
Walcheren 1809 0 0 0   0 0 0   0   0 0   0   0   0   0 0   0 0   0   0 0   0   0 0 0   0   0   0   0   0 28
No of Operations 3 6 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1  
NOTE : Only contains engineers who were alive at the commencement of the Peninsular War in 1808
Total 69    
0 campaigns 0
1 campaign 44  
2 campaigns 15
3 campaigns 7
4 campaigns 1
5 campaigns 1
6 campaigns 1
 
 262Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James          
Birch John Francis 0 0 0 0 0
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Boteler Richard   0 0 0 0 0 0
Burgoyne John Fox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cheyne Alexander 0 0 0 0
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K) 0 0 0 0
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard   0 0
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
English Frederick 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fanshaw Edward 0 0 0 0
Fletcher Richard (K)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Forster William Frederick (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fyers Edward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fyers Thomas 0 0 0 0
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K) 0 0 0 0
Harding George Judd
1808 1809 1810Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1808 1809 1810
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hulme John Lyon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel 0 0 0
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham 0 0 0 0
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas 0 0 0 0 0           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jones Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Landmann George Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse 0 0 0 0
Mudge Richard Zachary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mulcaster Edmund R (K)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William 0 0 0 0
Patton Peter (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piper Robert Sloper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhodes Charles SteechAppendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1808 1809 1810
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies 0 0 0 0 0 0
Smyth James Carmichael 0 0 0 0
Squire John (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stanway Frank 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tapp Hammond Astley 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave 0 0 0 0 0 0
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August 0 0 0 0
Total by month 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18 19 26 24 24 25 4 10 15 15 16 16 15 15 14 14 14 14 14 21 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22
Annual average 19 14 21
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the PeninsulaAppendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James
Birch John Francis
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles
Boteler Richard
Burgoyne John Fox
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant
Cheyne Alexander
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K)
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K)
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony
English Frederick
Fanshaw Edward
Fletcher Richard (K) 
Forster William Frederick (K)
Fyers Edward
Fyers Thomas
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K)
Harding George Judd
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
         
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Name
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert
Hulme John Lyon
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas
Jones Rice
Landmann George Thomas
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K)
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse
Mudge Richard Zachary
Mulcaster Edmund R (K) 
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William
Patton Peter (K)
Piper Robert Sloper
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William
Rhodes Charles Steech
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1812 1813 1811
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K)
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies
Smyth James Carmichael
Squire John (K)
Stanway Frank
Tapp Hammond Astley
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K)
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K)
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August
Total by month
Annual average
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the Peninsula
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1812 1813 1811
0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 23 29 31 31 32 30 30 29 29 29 30 33 30 33 33 27 26 28 30 33 32 32 37 37 41 42 43 43 43 45 45 42 40 39 44
29 31 42Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Barou Richard John
Barry Philip
Birch James
Birch John Francis
Blanshard Thomas
Bolton Daniel
Boothby Charles
Boteler Richard
Burgoyne John Fox
By John
Chapman Stephen Remnant
Cheyne Alexander
Collyer George (K)
Davy Henry (K)
De Salaberry Edward (K)
Dickens Thomas Mark
Dickenson Sebastian (K)
Ellicombe Charles Grene
Elliot Theodore Henry
Elphinstone Howard
Elton Isaac Marmaduke
Emmett Anthony
English Frederick
Fanshaw Edward
Fletcher Richard (K) 
Forster William Frederick (K)
Fyers Edward
Fyers Thomas
Gilbert Francis Yarde
Gipps George
Goldfinch Henry
Grierson Crighton
Hamilton George (K)
Harding George Judd
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
12
0 0 0 0 16
5
0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
0 0 0 0 0 0 69
5
21
25
1
4
11
0 0 0 0 8
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
26
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
0 0 0 0 0 0 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 48
0 0 0 0 0 0 13
4
56
31
7
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 19
0 0 0 0 0 0 38
0 0 0 0 0 58
0 0 0 0 10
4
0 0 0 0 0 24
1814Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Henderson George H
Holloway William Cuthbert
Hulme John Lyon
Hunt Richard (K)
Hustler Robert Samuel
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham
Jones Harry David
Jones John Thomas
Jones Rice
Landmann George Thomas
Lascelles Thomas (K)
Lefebure Charles (K)
Lewis Griffith George
Macaulay John Simcoe
MacCulloch William
Machell Lancelot (K)
Macleod George Francis
Marshall Anthony
Matson Edward
Melhuish Samuel Camplin
Melville David (K)
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse
Mudge Richard Zachary
Mulcaster Edmund R (K) 
Nicholas William (K) 
Ord William Redman
Parker Edward (K)
Pasley Charles William
Patton Peter (K)
Piper Robert Sloper
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt (K)
Power Robert
Pringle John Watson
Reid William
Rhodes Charles Steech
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
1814
0 0 0 0 0 21
14
0 0 0 0 0 0 51
4
0 0 0 0 24
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 28
40
36
23
10
6
6
7
12
8
13
32
0 0 0 0 17
0 0 0 0 35
3
4
15
43
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   33
0 0 15
4
35
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
0 0 24
11
0 0 0 0 0 0 40
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
13Appendix C - Engineers in the Peninsula 1808-1814
Name
Rivers Charles
Robe Alexander Watt
Roberts Thomas
Ross George Charles (K)
Savage Henry John
Scott Richard Evans
Skelton Thomas (K)
Slade William Henry
Smith Charles Feli0
Smith Henry Nelson
Smith William Davies
Smyth James Carmichael
Squire John (K)
Stanway Frank
Tapp Hammond Astley
Thackeray Frederick Rennell
Thomson Alexander
Tinling George Vaughan
Trench Samuel (K)
Vetch James
Victor James Conway
Ward William Cuthbert
Wells John Neave
West George Innes Perry
Williams John Archer (K)
Wortham Hale Young
Wright Peter
York Frederick August
Total by month
Annual average
Average length of time months)
Longest (months)
Note : This covers mainland and East coast campaigns, but does not include Engineers  in the Mediterranean, Cadiz and Gibraltar
(K) denotes killed in the Peninsula
J F M A M J J A S O N D
TOTAL 
(months)
1814
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
0 0 0 27
30
0 0 0 0 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 21
13
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29
6
0 0 0 0 14
6
4
34
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73
0 0 0 0 0 0 52
0 0 0 20
39
0 0 0 0 0 0 7
16
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 17
15
0 0 0 0 0 0 20
0 0 0 0 0 18
51
0 0 0 0 0 0 11
0 0 0 0 0 0   40
4
43 43 43 41 33 29 8 5 2 0 0 0  
21
20.7
73.0Appendix D – Pay and Allowances 
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APPENDIX D - PAY AND ALLOWANCES 
 
Source – Haldane H.  Official Letters written by Lieut-Col. Henry Haldane to 
the  Masters-General  of  his  Majesty’s  Ordnance  since  the  year  1802. 
(London, 1807), p. 125. 
 
‘We have therefore thought proper, and do hereby direct, that the following 
Allowances  of  extra  pay  shall  in  future  be  granted  to  the  officers  of  Our 
Corps of Royal Engineers, viz. . . . To each of Our Royal Engineers, who 
shall be employed with our armies in the field, or in any part of Our Foreign 
Dominions  ,  Gibraltar  excepted,  an  Allowance  equal  to  the  pay  which, 
according  to  his  Rank  in Our  Corps  of  Royal  Engineers,  he  is entitled  to 
receive on the establishment above ordered to take place’. 
 
At Gibraltar, or the UK or Ireland, or the islands of Jersey, Guernsey or the 
Isle of Man, an allowance equal to half of his pay. 
 
On  the  coast  of  Africa,  where  a  higher  extra  pay  than  usual  has  been 
commonly granted, and allowance of 20 shillings per day. 
 
Allowance start when an officer received his orders, subject to a certificate 
being signed saying that the officer ‘lost no time’ in proceeding to his station.  
Foreign allowance are paid until the officer returns to England.  Allowances 
are stopped when on leave of absence. 
 
Pay Rates 
 
  Royal Engineers 
1802 
Cavalry 1800 
(no change in 
1815) 
Infantry 1800 
(1815) 
2 Col-Comm  44s     
2 Colonel  24s  32s 10d  22s 6d 
2 Colonel  20s     
4 Lt-Colonel  17s  23s  13s 11d (17s) 
2 Lt-Colonel  15s     
20 Captains  10s  14s 7d  9s 5d (10s 6d) 
20 Capt-Lieut  7s     
40 1
st Lieutenant  6s  9s  4s 8d (6s 6d) 
20 2
nd Lieutenant  5s     Appendix E – Royal Engineer Commissions by year, 1758-1822 
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APPENDIX E – ROYAL ENGINEER COMMISSIONS BY YEAR, 
1758-1822 
 
Year  Still active  Totals  Year  Still active  Totals 
1758  1  8  1794  5  6 
1759  1  16  1795  3  5 
1760    4  1796  1  5 
1761    1  1797  4  9 
1762    3  1798  9  13 
1763  2  6  1799  4  5 
1765    3  1800  2  3 
1766    1  1801  13  13 
1769    2  1802  3  5 
1770    5  1803  6  6 
1771  3  6  1804  17  20 
1772    2  1805  6  7 
1773  1  1  1806  20  20 
1774    4  1807  13  14 
1775    3  1808  26  26 
1776  7  11  1809  18  18 
1777    1  1810  14  14 
1779  1  4  1811  19  18 
1780  2  6  1812  13  13 
1781  1  5  1813  24  24 
1783  0    1814  23  23 
1787  1  4  Total  279  391 
1788  2  2  1815    22 
1789  2  2  1816    23 
1790  2  5  1817    2 
1791    1  1820    1 
1792  1  3  1822    3 
1793  9  15       
 
NOTES 
1.  Nearly 60% were commissioned between 1800-14. 
2.  A  third of total were commissioned between 1808-14. 
3.  The figures are from the actual Corps Returns in have been used 
4.  ‘Still active’ means number who served during the Peninsular war. 
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APPENDIX F - TIME TAKEN TO REACH LIEUTENANT-COLONEL. 
     Avge 
(yrs) 
 RM 
(133) 
AM 
(145) 
GM 
(165) 
WT 
(168) 
JE 
(170) 
BF 
(180) 
CS 
(181)   
2L-1L  5.1  1.6  3.3  8.1  7.4  5.3  4.9  4.9   
1L-2C  7.7  3.7  8.8  5.9  7.7  8  9.5  10   
2C-C  8.2  12.6  8  8.5  7.3  7.7  6.7  6.6   
C-LC  6.6  7.3  8.4  8.3  6.3  5.7  4.8  5.1   
Total  27.5  25.2  28.5  30.8  28.7  26.7  25.9  26.6   
Age-LC    40   46e  46  49   41e   43e   45e   
Year LC    1783  1787  1793  1794  1794  1797  1798   
                   
   Avge 
(yrs) 
 TN 
(183) 
WF 
(188) 
WJ 
(194) 
 WK 
(195) 
CH 
(197) 
 JH 
(199) 
RD 
(203) 
 GB 
(206) 
2L-1L  6.8  2.9  5.5  7  7  7  7  8.7  9.3 
1L-2C  8.6  7.9  7.9  7.3  9.3  10  10  8.8  7.5 
2C-C  4.5  6.4  6.6  6.4  3.6  2.9  2.8  3.7  3.5 
C-LC  7.7  4.6  6.7  7.7  8.6  8.6  9.3  8  8 
Total  27.6  21.8  26.7  28.4  28.5  28.5  29.1  29.2  28.3 
Age-LC     49?   45e   44e   46e  55   47e   47e   47e 
Year LC    1797  1800  1802  1804  1804  1805  1805  1805 
                   
   Avge 
(yrs) 
STD 
(217) 
JM 
(218) 
RHB 
(223) 
JR 
(226) 
ADB 
(228) 
WF 
(229) 
AB 
(230) 
RP 
(231) 
2L-1L  5.9  9  8.7  8.4  4.7  4.3  4.5  3.8  3.5 
1L-2C  4.5  5.6  4  5.6  4.1  4.3  3.7  4.2  4.4 
2C-C  3.9  3.8  5.2  3.6  3.9  3.3  3.9  3.9  3.9 
C-LC  6.7  6.6  6.9  7  4.2  6  6.4  8.3  8.2 
Total  21.0  25  24.8  24.6  16.9  17.9  18.5  20.2  20 
Age-LC     43e  46  41   37e  36  37e  38e  44 
Year LC    1805  1805  1806  1806  1806  1807  1809  1809 
                   
   Avge 
(yrs) 
RF 
(233) 
HE 
(235) 
GH 
(239) 
FWH 
(241) 
FWM 
(243) 
WG 
(244) 
CWR 
(248) 
HE 
(254) 
2L-1L  1.4  2.5  2.5  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  1  2.3 
1L-2C  5.1  4.5  5.5  4.9  4.7  4.8  5.6  6.1  4.4 
2C-C  3.8  3.7  3.2  3.7  3.9  4  3.4  4.2  3.9 
C-LC  8.1  8  7.7  7.8  8.8  8.6  8.4  7.6  8.1 
Total  18.4  18.7  18.9  17.2  18.2  18.2  18.2  18.9  18.7 
Age-LC    40  37  36  36  39  36e  37e  40 
Year LC    1809  1809  1810  1811  1811  1811  1812  1813 
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   Avge 
(yrs) 
 EWD 
(255) 
GW 
(256) 
FRT 
(258) 
HAM 
(259) 
JFB 
(260) 
SRC 
(261) 
JH 
(263) 
GN 
(264) 
2L-1L  2.5  2.3  2.1  2.4  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.4  2.2 
1L-2C  5.0  5  5  4.8  4.4  5.6  5.6  4.6  5 
2C-C  3.1  3.9  4.1  3.3  3.9  0.7  0.7  3.9  4.3 
C-LC  8.1  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  7.8  7.2 
Total  18.7  19.5  19.5  18.8  19.5  17.5  17.5  18.7  18.7 
Age-LC    39  38  39e  39  38  37  34e  34e 
Year LC    1813  1813  1813  1813  1813  1813  1813  1813 
                   
   Avge 
(yrs) 
JCS 
(265) 
GL 
(266) 
CM 
(271) 
GW 
(278) 
JH 
(280) 
CWP 
(283) 
HG 
(285) 
JRA 
(287) 
2L-1L  1.8  2  2.1  2.5  0.9  1.5  1.3  2  2 
1L-2C  5.2  5.3  5.1  4.3  5.7  5.8  5.5  4.8  4.8 
2C-C  3.3  4  4  3.7  3.3  3.3  2.6  2.7  2.8 
C-LC  7.4  7.3  7.8  8.3  7.4  7.1  7  7  7 
Total  17.6  18.6  19  18.8  17.3  17.7  16.4  16.5  16.6 
Age-LC    34e  34  36   35e   35e  34  33  33 
Year LC    1813  1814  1814  1814  1814  1814  1814  1814 
                   
   Avge 
(yrs) 
JFB 
(288) 
BM 
(289) 
JTJ 
(290) 
GC 
(292) 
WG 
(293) 
JB 
(298) 
TF 
(300) 
HMV 
(302) 
2L-1L  1.7  2  2  2  2.3  2.3  1.3  0.9  0.8 
1L-2C  4.4  4.7  4.7  4.5  4  3.9  3.9  4.4  5.3 
2C-C  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.3  4.6  3.8 
C-LC  10.0  5.5  6.5  7.5  7.5  7.7  15.5  14.9  14.8 
Total  20.4  16.5  17.5  18.3  18.1  18.2  25  24.8  24.7 
Age-LC    32  35e  33  36e  37e  45  45e  52 
Year LC    1814  1815  1816  1816  1817  1824  1825  1825 
 
NOTE 1. Column references are officers initials and the Roll reference in Connolly & 
Edwards Roll of the Royal Engineers. 
NOTE 2. There were no appointments to LC between Feb 1817 and Dec 1824.  19 
were appointed in the next year (as part of the clear up of ranks).  The average time 
gradually increased from 25 years to 35 years for the last commissions during the 
Napoleonic wars. 
NOTE 3. Same for Captains.  No appointments between 1817 and 1825.  Then 25 
were appointed in 1825, with a further 2 in 1826. 
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As a comparison : 
 
Time to reach Lieut.-Colonel in the Army (years) 
 
  Horse  Foot 
1773  19.0  29 
1777  25.0  30 
1785  28.5  26.5 
1789  27.5  23 
1791  28.0  30 
 
Taken from J.A.Houlding , Fit for service. The training of the British Army, (Oxford, 
1981). 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Abbey Charles  01/02/1810  432 
Alderson Ralph Carr  14/12/1811  463 
Alexander Charles Carson  20/07/1813  496 
Arnold James Robertson  29/08/1798  287 
Baddeley Frederick Henry  01/01/1814  509 
Barney George  11/07/1808  402 
Barou Richard John  01/06/1810  441 
Barry Philip  10/02/1809  417 
Battersbee Thomas  20/03/1813  480 
Beague Charles Heard  01/08/1814  515 
Bennett William  20/12/1798  294 
Berrington Charles  07/10/1806  366 
Birch James  12/07/1809  424 
Birch John Francis  18/09/1793  260 
Biscoe Vincent Joseph  01/08/1814  520 
Blackiston Thomas Henry  01/08/1814  514 
Blanshard Thomas  28/09/1807  386 
Boldero Henry G  01/08/1814  517 
Bolton Daniel  14/12/1811  459 
Bonnycastle Richard Henry  28/09/1808  407 
Boothby Charles  01/01/1804  331 
Boteler Richard  01/01/1804  334 
Brandreth Henry R  20/03/1813  486 
Bridges George  01/12/1776  206 
Briscoe Henry  20/07/1813  494 
Brown Alexander  01/02/1808  389 
Bruyeres Ralph Henry  22/12/1781  223 
Bryce Alexander  12/03/1789  230 
Buchanan Gilbert  01/07/1801  305 
Buckeridge Henry Mark  01/01/1814  504 
Bugden Thomas  01/08/1814  518 
Burgoyne John Fox  29/08/1798  288 
Burt Charles  01/08/1814  512 
By John  20/12/1799  298 
Calder Patrick Doull  01/08/1806  361 
Cardew George  20/12/1798  292 
Cardew Henry  01/10/1808  408 
Catty James Patrick  01/07/1812  471 
Chapman Stephen Remnant  01/01/1794  261 
Cheyne Alexander  01/05/1806  360 
Clavering Rawdon Forbes  01/08/1814  521 
Colby Henry Augustus  12/07/1808  403 
Colby Thomas Frederick  21/12/1801  314 
Cole Pennel  01/02/1810  433 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Collyer George  01/11/1806  368 
Cooper Robert Henry Spencer  20/03/1813  481 
Covey Edward  20/03/1813  493 
Cox William N  21/07/1813  483 
Cunningham Thomas  02/07/1801  311 
Dalton George  01/01/1814  511 
D'Arcy Robert  17/01/1776  203 
Davy Henry  01/11/1807  387 
Dawson William Francis  01/04/1807  375 
De Butts Augustus  11/07/1788  228 
De Salaberry Edward  27/07/1810  442 
Dickens Samuel Trevor  15/03/1780  217 
Dickens Thomas Mark  15/03/1803  323 
Dickenson Sebastian  01/10/1804  344 
Dixon Charles  01/09/1806  363 
Dixon Matthew Charles  02/04/1806  359 
Douglas William  01/07/1801  310 
Duplat Gustavus Charles  01/08/1814  516 
Durnford Elias Walker  17/10/1793  255 
Duvernet William Henry  01/02/1810  434 
Ellicombe Charles Grene  01/07/1801  306 
Elliot Francis Edward  01/08/1814  523 
Elliot Theodore Henry  07/05/1810  437 
Elphinstone Howard  17/10/1793  254 
Elton Isaac Marmaduke  14/12/1811  453 
Emmett Anthony  16/12/1808  391 
English Frederick  08/09/1807  384 
Evatt Henry  01/07/1790  235 
Evelegh John  01/04/1771  170 
Eyre James William  01/07/1812  475 
Fanshaw Edward  01/07/1801  307 
Faris William  01/01/1814  506 
Fenwick Thomas Howard  21/07/1810  444 
Fenwick William  12/07/1788  229 
Figg Edward  21/12/1801  313 
Fisher Benjamin  17/01/1776  180 
Fletcher Richard  29/06/1790  233 
Ford William Henry  16/01/1793  241 
Forster William Frederick  21/07/1807  381 
Fraser Alexander  02/07/1804  343 
Fyers Edward  23/04/1808  396 
Fyers Thomas  02/05/1800  300 
Fyers William  11/11/1773  188 
Gilbert Francis Yarde  01/05/1811  450 
Gipps George  11/01/1809  416 
Goldfinch Henry  24/06/1798  285 
Gordon James A  11/07/1808  401 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Gosset William Matthew  14/12/1811  454 
Gossett William  20/12/1798  293 
Graham Charles  01/01/1797  275 
Grant John  20/12/1806  373 
Gravatt William  16/01/1793  244 
Graydon George  01/06/1804  341 
Gregory William  20/07/1813  495 
Grierson Crighton  01/06/1810  440 
Haigh William Preston  11/07/1808  399 
Halberton Richard Rosdew  10/05/1805  348 
Hall Louis Alexander  21/07/1810  445 
Hamilton George  07/05/1803  325 
Handfield John  09/10/1794  263 
Harding George Judd  01/10/1802  319 
Harper John  10/11/1806  369 
Harris John Brenchley  07/10/1806  365 
Hassard John  03/03/1797  280 
Hayter George  21/11/1792  239 
Hayter Thomas Baskerville  14/12/1811  462 
Head Francis Bond  01/05/1811  448 
Heath Macclesfield William  01/08/1814  519 
Henderson Alexander  20/03/1813  479 
Henderson George H  20/12/1799  299 
Henryson John  02/04/1806  357 
Hobbs Henry  01/01/1804  327 
Hobbs John  01/01/1804  328 
Holloway Charles  16/01/1776  197 
Holloway William Cuthbert  01/01/1804  333 
Hoste George Charles  20/12/1802  320 
Hughes Philip  25/09/1793  253 
Hulme John Lyon  24/06/1809  422 
Humfrey John  17/01/1776  199 
Hunt Richard  01/10/1808  411 
Hunt Robert  01/07/1812  468 
Hustler Robert Samuel  01/03/1806  355 
Hutchinson Thomas   15/01/1808  388 
Kitchingham     
Jebb Joshua  01/07/1812  476 
Johnston William  17/01/1776  194 
Jones Harry David  17/06/1808  406 
Jones John Thomas  30/08/1798  290 
Jones Rice  01/02/1806  354 
Jones William Herbert  06/04/1808  394 
Kay Arthur  20/07/1813  498 
Kelsall Roger  12/07/1809  426 
Kerr John  20/07/1813  492 
Kersteman William  17/01/1776  195 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Kilvington Henry Medley  01/07/1801  304 
Kitson John Sykes  01/02/1810  435 
Lancey Thomas Furbor  14/12/1811  456 
Landmann George Thomas  01/05/1795  266 
Lascelles Thomas  05/05/1807  377 
Lawson Hugh  01/08/1806  362 
Lefebure Charles  25/09/1793  252 
Lewis George Charles Degen  01/08/1814  513 
Lewis Griffith George  15/03/1803  322 
Lewis Thomas Locke  20/03/1813  487 
Longley Joseph  11/07/1808  400 
Luxmoore Thomas Coryndon  01/01/1814  503 
Macaulay John Simcoe  12/07/1809  425 
MacCulloch William  01/08/1805  349 
Machell Lancelot  21/07/1810  443 
Mackelcan John  15/03/1780  218 
Mackenzie Colin  20/07/1813  501 
Macleod George Francis  01/07/1801  308 
Mann Cornelius  05/02/1796  271 
Mann Gother  27/02/1763  165 
Marlow Benjamin  30/08/1798  289 
Marshall Anthony  01/10/1808  409 
Matson Edward  07/05/1810  438 
M'Donald Donald  12/09/1808  404 
Melhuish Samuel Camplin  25/04/1809  420 
Melville David  12/07/1809  427 
Mercer Alexander  17/03/1759  145 
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse  01/03/1805  342 
Minchin Charles Humphrey  01/01/1814  505 
M'Lauchlan James  01/11/1803  326 
Moody Thomas  01/04/1806  356 
Morse Robert  08/02/1758  133 
Morshead Henry Anderson  01/01/1794  259 
Mudge John  20/03/1813  489 
Mudge Richard Zachary  04/05/1807  376 
Mulcaster Edmund R  01/03/1804  337 
Mulcaster Frederick William  16/01/1793  243 
Nepean Thomas  01/04/1771  183 
Nicholas William  21/12/1801  312 
Nicolls Gustavus  04/01/1795  264 
Oldfield John  02/04/1806  358 
Ord William Redman  25/04/1809  421 
Page George Curry  20/07/1813  499 
Parker Edward  01/01/1804  332 
Pasley Charles William  01/04/1798  283 
Patten Edward Bullock  01/01/1814  508 
Patton Peter  01/04/1799  295 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Payne William Robert  01/04/1804  340 
Peake Loyalty  16/02/1808  390 
Phillpotts George  01/05/1811  449 
Phipps George William  21/04/1779  211 
Pilkington George  01/04/1805  347 
Pilkington Robert  05/06/1789  231 
Piper Robert Sloper  10/01/1809  414 
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt  21/09/1807  385 
Portlock Joseph Ellison  20/07/1813  491 
Power Robert  10/01/1809  415 
Prince Charles Edward  07/10/1809  431 
Pringle John Watson  23/08/1809  428 
Rawlinson Lawrence Rawstone  22/03/1808  393 
Reid William  10/02/1809  419 
Renny Henry Laws  20/07/1813  490 
Rhodes Charles Steech  01/07/1801  303 
Rivers Charles  01/07/1812  467 
Robe Alexander Watt  14/12/1811  461 
Roberts Thomas  02/11/1804  346 
Robertson Charles  21/03/1808  392 
Rogers William  01/01/1814  510 
Romilly Samuel  01/04/1804  339 
Ross George Charles  01/07/1799  297 
Ross John C  12/09/1808  405 
Rowley John  23/08/1787  226 
Rudyerd Charles William  14/06/1793  248 
Rutherford James Hunter  20/07/1813  497 
Salkeld William James  01/01/1814  507 
Sanders Christopher Knight  01/01/1814  502 
Sandham Henry  20/07/1813  500 
Savage Henry John  30/09/1809  429 
Scott Richard Evans  22/02/1811  446 
Selwyn Charles Jasper  01/05/1811  452 
Shipley Charles  01/04/1771  181 
Shipley Robert John  09/12/1806  371 
Skelton Thomas  01/10/1808  412 
Skene Philip Orkney  14/12/1811  455 
Slade William Henry  01/11/1806  367 
Smart Henry  15/03/1803  324 
Smith Charles Felix  01/10/1802  318 
Smith Henry Nelson  01/03/1810  436 
Smith John Marke Frederick  01/12/1805  353 
Smith Robert  21/12/1801  315 
Smith William Davies  10/08/1807  383 
Smyth James Carmichael  13/03/1795  265 
Smyth John  01/07/1812  477 
Sperling John  14/12/1811  457 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Squire John  01/01/1797  273 
Stanway Frank  01/06/1807  378 
Stewart Matthew  01/03/1804  338 
Stocker Ives  14/12/1811  464 
Streatfield Charles Ogle  20/03/1813  488 
Tait George  20/03/1813  485 
Tapp Hammond Astley  10/02/1809  418 
Thackeray Frederick Rennell  01/01/1794  258 
Thompson Arthur  01/05/1811  451 
Thompson George Forbes  01/10/1808  413 
Thomson Alexander  12/04/1808  395 
Thomson Francis Ringler  01/07/1812  469 
Thomson Robert  01/11/1804  345 
Tinling George Vaughan  01/07/1812  473 
Trench Samuel  10/05/1808  398 
Tweed James Thomas  01/08/1814  524 
Twiss William  01/11/1763  168 
Tylden William Burton  19/11/1806  370 
Vavasour Henry William  01/02/1804  336 
Vetch James  01/07/1807  379 
Vicars Richard John  20/03/1813  484 
Victor James Conway  01/06/1810  439 
Vigoureux Henry Mordaunt Gage  01/07/1800  302 
Wade Peter  01/07/1801  309 
Walker Archibald  21/07/1807  380 
Walpole Arthur  20/03/1813  482 
Ward William Cuthbert  10/05/1808  397 
Waters Marcus Antonius  30/09/1809  430 
Watson George  07/10/1806  364 
Watson George O  01/10/1808  410 
Wells John Neave  20/12/1806  372 
West George Innes Perry  01/05/1812  465 
Whinyates Frederick William  14/12/1811  460 
White Andrew Douglas  01/07/1812  474 
Whitmore George  01/01/1794  256 
Williams John Archer  01/01/1804  330 
Williams Montgomery  24/03/1815  525 
Williams Sherburne Hodgkinson  21/07/1807  382 
Willson Henry Hill  20/03/1813  478 
Worsley James White  01/07/1812  472 
Wortham Hale Young  01/07/1812  470 
Wright Charles  01/07/1812  466 
Wright George  27/09/1797  278 
Wright John Ross  01/03/1803  321 
Wright Peter  24/06/1809  423 
Wulff Henry Powell  01/08/1814  522 
York Frederick August  01/09/1805  350 Appendix G - Royal Engineers by Name. 
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 Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Young Richard Sparkman  14/12/1811  458 
Yule Patrick  01/05/1811  447 
 
NOTE : C&E reference is the position of the officer in Connolly and Edwards 
Roll of Officers in the Royal Engineers. Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
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Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Morse Robert  08/02/1758  133 
Mercer Alexander  17/03/1759  145 
Mann Gother  27/02/1763  165 
Twiss William  01/11/1763  168 
Evelegh John  01/04/1771  170 
Fisher Benjamin  17/01/1776  180 
Shipley Charles  01/04/1771  181 
Nepean Thomas  01/04/1771  183 
Fyers William  11/11/1773  188 
Johnston William  17/01/1776  194 
Kersteman William  17/01/1776  195 
Holloway Charles  16/01/1776  197 
Humfrey John  17/01/1776  199 
D'Arcy Robert  17/01/1776  203 
Bridges George  01/12/1776  206 
Phipps George William  21/04/1779  211 
Dickens Samuel Trevor  15/03/1780  217 
Mackelcan John  15/03/1780  218 
Bruyeres Ralph Henry  22/12/1781  223 
Rowley John  23/08/1787  226 
De Butts Augustus  11/07/1788  228 
Fenwick William  12/07/1788  229 
Bryce Alexander  12/03/1789  230 
Pilkington Robert  05/06/1789  231 
Fletcher Richard  29/06/1790  233 
Evatt Henry  01/07/1790  235 
Hayter George  21/11/1792  239 
Ford William Henry  16/01/1793  241 
Mulcaster Frederick William  16/01/1793  243 
Gravatt William  16/01/1793  244 
Rudyerd Charles William  14/06/1793  248 
Lefebure Charles  25/09/1793  252 
Hughes Philip  25/09/1793  253 
Elphinstone Howard  17/10/1793  254 
Durnford Elias Walker  17/10/1793  255 
Whitmore George  01/01/1794  256 
Thackeray Frederick Rennell  01/01/1794  258 
Morshead Henry Anderson  01/01/1794  259 
Birch John Francis  18/09/1793  260 
Chapman Stephen Remnant  01/01/1794  261 
Handfield John  09/10/1794  263 
Nicolls Gustavus  04/01/1795  264 
Smyth James Carmichael  13/03/1795  265 
Landmann George Thomas  01/05/1795  266 
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Squire John  01/01/1797  273 
Graham Charles  01/01/1797  275 
Wright George  27/09/1797  278 
Hassard John  03/03/1797  280 
Pasley Charles William  01/04/1798  283 
Goldfinch Henry  24/06/1798  285 
Arnold James Robertson  29/08/1798  287 
Burgoyne John Fox  29/08/1798  288 
Marlow Benjamin  30/08/1798  289 
Jones John Thomas  30/08/1798  290 
Cardew George  20/12/1798  292 
Gossett William  20/12/1798  293 
Bennett William  20/12/1798  294 
Patton Peter  01/04/1799  295 
Ross George Charles  01/07/1799  297 
By John  20/12/1799  298 
Henderson George H  20/12/1799  299 
Fyers Thomas  02/05/1800  300 
Vigoureux Henry Mordaunt Gage  01/07/1800  302 
Rhodes Charles Steech  01/07/1801  303 
Kilvington Henry Medley  01/07/1801  304 
Buchanan Gilbert  01/07/1801  305 
Ellicombe Charles Grene  01/07/1801  306 
Fanshaw Edward  01/07/1801  307 
Macleod George Francis  01/07/1801  308 
Wade Peter  01/07/1801  309 
Douglas William  01/07/1801  310 
Cunningham Thomas  02/07/1801  311 
Nicholas William  21/12/1801  312 
Figg Edward  21/12/1801  313 
Colby Thomas Frederick  21/12/1801  314 
Smith Robert  21/12/1801  315 
Smith Charles Felix  01/10/1802  318 
Harding George Judd  01/10/1802  319 
Hoste George Charles  20/12/1802  320 
Wright John Ross  01/03/1803  321 
Lewis Griffith George  15/03/1803  322 
Dickens Thomas Mark  15/03/1803  323 
Smart Henry  15/03/1803  324 
Hamilton George  07/05/1803  325 
M'Lauchlan James  01/11/1803  326 
Hobbs Henry  01/01/1804  327 
Hobbs John  01/01/1804  328 
Williams John Archer  01/01/1804  330 
Boothby Charles  01/01/1804  331 
Parker Edward  01/01/1804  332 
Holloway William Cuthbert  01/01/1804  333 Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
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Boteler Richard  01/01/1804  334 
Vavasour Henry William  01/02/1804  336 
Mulcaster Edmund R  01/03/1804  337 
Stewart Matthew  01/03/1804  338 
Romilly Samuel  01/04/1804  339 
Payne William Robert  01/04/1804  340 
Graydon George  01/06/1804  341 
Mercer Cavalier Shorthouse  01/03/1805  342 
Fraser Alexander  02/07/1804  343 
Dickenson Sebastian  01/10/1804  344 
Thomson Robert  01/11/1804  345 
Roberts Thomas  02/11/1804  346 
Pilkington George  01/04/1805  347 
Halberton Richard Rosdew  10/05/1805  348 
MacCulloch William  01/08/1805  349 
York Frederick August  01/09/1805  350 
Smith John Marke Frederick  01/12/1805  353 
Jones Rice  01/02/1806  354 
Hustler Robert Samuel  01/03/1806  355 
Moody Thomas  01/04/1806  356 
Henryson John  02/04/1806  357 
Oldfield John  02/04/1806  358 
Dixon Matthew Charles  02/04/1806  359 
Cheyne Alexander  01/05/1806  360 
Calder Patrick Doull  01/08/1806  361 
Lawson Hugh  01/08/1806  362 
Dixon Charles  01/09/1806  363 
Watson George  07/10/1806  364 
Harris John Brenchley  07/10/1806  365 
Berrington Charles  07/10/1806  366 
Slade William Henry  01/11/1806  367 
Collyer George  01/11/1806  368 
Harper John  10/11/1806  369 
Tylden William Burton  19/11/1806  370 
Shipley Robert John  09/12/1806  371 
Wells John Neave  20/12/1806  372 
Grant John  20/12/1806  373 
Dawson William Francis  01/04/1807  375 
Mudge Richard Zachary  04/05/1807  376 
Lascelles Thomas  05/05/1807  377 
Stanway Frank  01/06/1807  378 
Vetch James  01/07/1807  379 
Walker Archibald  21/07/1807  380 
Forster William Frederick  21/07/1807  381 
Williams Sherburne Hodgkinson  21/07/1807  382 
Smith William Davies  10/08/1807  383 
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Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt  21/09/1807  385 
Blanshard Thomas  28/09/1807  386 
Davy Henry  01/11/1807  387 
Hutchinson Thomas Kitchingham  15/01/1808  388 
Brown Alexander  01/02/1808  389 
Peake Loyalty  16/02/1808  390 
Emmett Anthony  16/12/1808  391 
Robertson Charles  21/03/1808  392 
Rawlinson Lawrence Rawstone  22/03/1808  393 
Jones William Herbert  06/04/1808  394 
Thomson Alexander  12/04/1808  395 
Fyers Edward  23/04/1808  396 
Ward William Cuthbert  10/05/1808  397 
Trench Samuel  10/05/1808  398 
Haigh William Preston  11/07/1808  399 
Longley Joseph  11/07/1808  400 
Gordon James A  11/07/1808  401 
Barney George  11/07/1808  402 
Colby Henry Augustus  12/07/1808  403 
M'Donald Donald  12/09/1808  404 
Ross John C  12/09/1808  405 
Jones Harry David  17/06/1808  406 
Bonnycastle Richard Henry  28/09/1808  407 
Cardew Henry  01/10/1808  408 
Marshall Anthony  01/10/1808  409 
Watson George O  01/10/1808  410 
Hunt Richard  01/10/1808  411 
Skelton Thomas  01/10/1808  412 
Thompson George Forbes  01/10/1808  413 
Piper Robert Sloper  10/01/1809  414 
Power Robert  10/01/1809  415 
Gipps George  11/01/1809  416 
Barry Philip  10/02/1809  417 
Tapp Hammond Astley  10/02/1809  418 
Reid William  10/02/1809  419 
Melhuish Samuel Camplin  25/04/1809  420 
Ord William Redman  25/04/1809  421 
Hulme John Lyon  24/06/1809  422 
Wright Peter  24/06/1809  423 
Birch James  12/07/1809  424 
Macaulay John Simcoe  12/07/1809  425 
Kelsall Roger  12/07/1809  426 
Melville David  12/07/1809  427 
Pringle John Watson  23/08/1809  428 
Savage Henry John  30/09/1809  429 
Waters Marcus Antonius  30/09/1809  430 
Prince Charles Edward  07/10/1809  431 Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
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Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Abbey Charles  01/02/1810  432 
Cole Pennel  01/02/1810  433 
Duvernet William Henry  01/02/1810  434 
Kitson John Sykes  01/02/1810  435 
Smith Henry Nelson  01/03/1810  436 
Elliot Theodore Henry  07/05/1810  437 
Matson Edward  07/05/1810  438 
Victor James Conway  01/06/1810  439 
Grierson Crighton  01/06/1810  440 
Barou Richard John  01/06/1810  441 
De Salaberry Edward  27/07/1810  442 
Machell Lancelot  21/07/1810  443 
Fenwick Thomas Howard  21/07/1810  444 
Hall Louis Alexander  21/07/1810  445 
Scott Richard Evans  22/02/1811  446 
Yule Patrick  01/05/1811  447 
Head Francis Bond  01/05/1811  448 
Phillpotts George  01/05/1811  449 
Gilbert Francis Yarde  01/05/1811  450 
Thompson Arthur  01/05/1811  451 
Selwyn Charles Jasper  01/05/1811  452 
Elton Isaac Marmaduke  14/12/1811  453 
Gosset William Matthew  14/12/1811  454 
Skene Philip Orkney  14/12/1811  455 
Lancey Thomas Furbor  14/12/1811  456 
Sperling John  14/12/1811  457 
Young Richard Sparkman  14/12/1811  458 
Bolton Daniel  14/12/1811  459 
Whinyates Frederick William  14/12/1811  460 
Robe Alexander Watt  14/12/1811  461 
Hayter Thomas Baskerville  14/12/1811  462 
Alderson Ralph Carr  14/12/1811  463 
Stocker Ives  14/12/1811  464 
West George Innes Perry  01/05/1812  465 
Wright Charles  01/07/1812  466 
Rivers Charles  01/07/1812  467 
Hunt Robert  01/07/1812  468 
Thomson Francis Ringler  01/07/1812  469 
Wortham Hale Young  01/07/1812  470 
Catty James Patrick  01/07/1812  471 
Worsley James White  01/07/1812  472 
Tinling George Vaughan  01/07/1812  473 
White Andrew Douglas  01/07/1812  474 
Eyre James William  01/07/1812  475 
Jebb Joshua  01/07/1812  476 
Smyth John  01/07/1812  477 
Willson Henry Hill  20/03/1813  478 Appendix H - Seniority in Royal Engineers 1808-1815 
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Name  Commissioned  C&E Ref 
Henderson Alexander  20/03/1813  479 
Battersbee Thomas  20/03/1813  480 
Cooper Robert Henry Spencer  20/03/1813  481 
Walpole Arthur  20/03/1813  482 
Cox William N  21/07/1813  483 
Vicars Richard John  20/03/1813  484 
Tait George  20/03/1813  485 
Brandreth Henry R  20/03/1813  486 
Lewis Thomas Locke  20/03/1813  487 
Streatfield Charles Ogle  20/03/1813  488 
Mudge John  20/03/1813  489 
Renny Henry Laws  20/07/1813  490 
Portlock Joseph Ellison  20/07/1813  491 
Kerr John  20/07/1813  492 
Covey Edward  20/03/1813  493 
Briscoe Henry  20/07/1813  494 
Gregory William  20/07/1813  495 
Alexander Charles Carson  20/07/1813  496 
Rutherford James Hunter  20/07/1813  497 
Kay Arthur  20/07/1813  498 
Page George Curry  20/07/1813  499 
Sandham Henry  20/07/1813  500 
Mackenzie Colin  20/07/1813  501 
Sanders Christopher Knight  01/01/1814  502 
Luxmoore Thomas Coryndon  01/01/1814  503 
Buckeridge Henry Mark  01/01/1814  504 
Minchin Charles Humphrey  01/01/1814  505 
Faris William  01/01/1814  506 
Salkeld William James  01/01/1814  507 
Patten Edward Bullock  01/01/1814  508 
Baddeley Frederick Henry  01/01/1814  509 
Rogers William  01/01/1814  510 
Dalton George  01/01/1814  511 
Burt Charles  01/08/1814  512 
Lewis George Charles Degen  01/08/1814  513 
Blackiston Thomas Henry  01/08/1814  514 
Beague Charles Heard  01/08/1814  515 
Duplat Gustavus Charles  01/08/1814  516 
Boldero Henry G  01/08/1814  517 
Bugden Thomas  01/08/1814  518 
Heath Macclesfield William  01/08/1814  519 
Biscoe Vincent Joseph  01/08/1814  520 
Clavering Rawdon Forbes  01/08/1814  521 
Wulff Henry Powell  01/08/1814  522 
Elliot Francis Edward  01/08/1814  523 
Tweed James Thomas  01/08/1814  524 
Williams Montgomery  24/03/1815  525 Appendix I - Key Engineer Officers during the period 1808-1815 
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APPENDIX I - KEY ENGINEER OFFICERS DURING THE PERIOD 
1808-1815 
 
Name  Involvement 
Burgoyne, John  Present for most of the war.  Trusted by 
Wellington.  Present at most of the sieges 
during the war, commanding at the siege of 
Burgos in 1812.  Commanded the engineers in 
the America campaign of 1814-15. 
Chapman, Stephen  Took initial command of building of Lines of 
Torres Vedras.  Went home in 1811 to take up 
position as Secretary to the Master General of 
Ordnance.   He was a friend of  Henry Torrens 
and was liked by Wellington. 
Chatham, Earl of  Master General of Ordnance, 1807-1810 
Dickson, Alexander  Organised much of the artillery for the sieges.  
Given command of the artillery in 1813, even 
though he was not most senior artillery officer.  
Trusted by Wellington.  
Elphinstone, Howard  Commanded briefly at the start of the 
campaign before being wounded at the battle 
of Vimiero.  Took command when Fletcher 
killed in 1813 
Fletcher, Richard  Commanded the Royal Engineers from August 
1808 until he was killed in August 1813. 
Fyers William  Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications 
Handfield, John 
 
Brigade Major for Royal Engineers – based at 
headquarters 
Jones, John Thomas  In Peninsula until being wounded at Burgos in 
1812. Took over final stages of the 
construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras after 
Chapman left.  Author of definitive journal of 
the sieges.  Engineer Brigade Major for much 
of the war. 
Mann, Gother  Inspector General of Fortifications from 1811-
1830 
Morse, Robert  Inspector General of Fortifications from 1801-
1811 
Mulgrave, Earl of  Master General of Ordnance, 1810-1819 
Nepean, Thomas 
 
Secretary to the Master General of Ordnance 
up to 1811 Appendix I - Key Engineer Officers during the period 1808-1815 
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Pasley, Charles  Served in Corunna campaign before being 
wounded at Walcheren.  Highly critical of the 
organisation of the Board of Ordnance. Pushed 
for establishment of the School of Military 
Engineering and was its first commander.  Kept 
up regular correspondence with officers on 
campaign. 
Rowley, John  Secretary to the Inspector General of 
Fortifications 
Squire, John  Present from 1810 until he died in May 1812.  
Commanded at the siege of Olivenza, present 
at all other sieges until his death.  Wrote many 
letters home which give an insight into the 
activities and feelings of the engineers. 
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APPENDIX J - TIME TO REACH BREVET RANKS - SAMPLE 
 
Name  Comm - 
issioned 
Major  Time to 
Major 
(years) 
Lt-Col  Time 
to Lt-
Col 
(years) 
Colonel  Time to 
Colonel 
Maj-Gen  Time to 
Maj-
Gen 
(years) 
Morse R  1758              1793  35 
Mann G  1763      1797  34  1797  34  1803  40 
Twiss W  1763  1794  31        1800  37  1805  42 
Fyers W  1773  1795  22  1800  27       1811  38 
D'Arcy  1776  1802  26        1813  37  1819  43 
Dickens ST  1780  1805  25        1813  33  1819  39 
Mackelcan J  1780  1794  14  1798  18  1808  28  1811  31 
Mulcaster FW  1793  1810  17            1825  32 
Elphinstone H  1793  1812  19            1837  44 
Thackeray FR  1794  1810  16            1837  43 
Birch J  1794  1811  17            1837  43 
Chapman SR  1794  1810  16  1812  18       1837  43 
Carmichael Smyth J  1795  1813  18  1813  18  1815  20  1825  30 
Pasley CW  1798  1812  14  1813  15  1830  32  1841  43 
Goldfinch H  1798  1812  14  1813  15  1830  32  1841  43 
Burgoyne JF  1798  1812  14  1812  14  1830  32  1838  40 
Jones JT  1798  1812  14  1812  14  1825  27  1837  39 
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APPENDIX K – SIEGES DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR. 
 
 Sieges during the Peninsular War 
 
Place  Besiegers  Besieged  Start Date  End date  Duration 
(days) 
Taken?  Outcome 
Almeida  French  Portuguese  15/8/1810  29/8/1810  14  Y  Surrendered after 
magazine exploded (Es, 
P323) 
Almeida 
(Blockade) 
British  French  7/4/1811  10/5/1811  34  Y  Blockaded, garrison 
escaped and blew up 
fortress 
Astorga  French  Spanish  21/3/1810  22/4/1810  30  Y  Surrendered after breech 
practicable. Assaulted and 
running out of ammunition 
Badajoz  French  Spanish  27/1/1811  10/3/1811  42  Y  Surrendered (too soon) 
Badajoz 1  British  French  6/5/1811  15/5/1811  11  N  Lifted, to fight Soult at 
Albuera 
Badajoz 2  British  French  29/5/1811  10/6/1811  12  N  Lifted after failed assault 
Badajoz 3  British  French  16/3/1812  6/4/1812  21  Y  Stormed, and sacked 
Burgos  British  French  19/9/1812  19/10/1812  30  N  Lifted 
Cadiz  French  Spanish/British  1809  1812    N  Lifted 
Campo 
Mayor 
French  Portuguese  14/3/1811  21/3/1811  7  Y  Surrendered, after breach 
practicable 
Castro-
Urdiales 
French  Spanish  4/5/1813  12/5/1813  8  Y  Garrison escaped 
Ciudad 
Rodrigo 
French  Spanish  26/4/1810  9/7/1810  75   Y  Surrendered,  when breach 
practicable 
Ciudad 
Rodrigo 
British  French  8/1/1812  19/1/1812  12  Y  Stormed. And sacked (new 
iron siege train) APPENDIX K – Sieges during the Peninsular War. 
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Place  Besiegers  Besieged  Start Date  End date  Duration 
(days) 
Taken?  Outcome 
Figueras  Spanish  French  9/4/1811  9/4/1811  0  Y  Taken; let in at gate 
Figueras  French  Spanish  10/4/1811  19/8/1811  130  Y  Surrendered, starved out. 
O.V.p538 
Gerona 1  French  Spanish  20/6/1808  23/6/1808  3  N  Lifted, insufficient 
resources 
Gerona 2  French  Spanish  22/7/1808  16/8/1808  25  N  Lifted, relief approaching 
Gerona 3  French  Spanish  24/5/1809  11/12/1809  200  Y  Stormed 
Hostalrich  French  Spanish  16/1/1810  12/5/1810  86  Y  Governor Estrada broke 
out and 800 of 1100 
garrison escaped after 
supplies exhausted. 
Lerida  French  Spanish  13/4/1810  14/5/1810  7  Y  Surrendered, after French 
bombarded civilian 
population 
Mequinenza  French  Spanish  15/5/1810  18/6/1810  34  Y  Surrendered after breech 
practical. 
Olivenza  French  Spanish  11/1/1811  21/1/1811  10  Y  Surrendered, after breach 
practical. 
Olivenza  British  French  9/4/1811  15/4/1811  6  Y  Surrendered, after breach 
practicable 
Pamplona 
(Blockade) 
British  French  25/6/1813  31/10/1813  128  Y  Blockade, surrendered 
when supplies ran out 
Pensicola  French  Spanish  20/1/1812  2/2/1812  13  Y  Surrendered (by Governor 
to obtain good personal 
terms)  
Rosas  French  Spanish  7/11/1808  5/12/1808  28  Y  Surrendered after breach 
made 
Salamanca 
Forts 
British  French  17/6/1812  27/6/1812  10  Y  Surrendered 
Santander  Spanish  French  14/8/1811  15/8/1811  0  Y  Stormed by Porlier APPENDIX K – Sieges during the Peninsular War. 
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Place  Besiegers  Besieged  Start Date  End date  Duration 
(days) 
Taken?  Outcome 
O.IV,p472 
Saguntum  French  Spanish  23/9/1811  26/10/1811  33  Y  Surrendered, walls 
crumbling 
San 
Sebastian 1 
British  French  14/7/1813  25/7/1813  11  N  Lifted after failed assault. 
Ran out of ammunition. 
San 
Sebastian 2 
British  French  26/8/1813  8/9/1813  12  Y  Stormed town 31 Aug; 
castle held out until 8 Sep 
1813. 
Saragossa 1  French  Spanish  15/6/1808  14/8/1808  60  N  Lifted 
Saragossa 2  French  Spanish  20/12/1808  20/2/1809  62  Y  Stormed 
Tarifa  French  Spanish/British  20/12/1811  4/1/1812  15  N  Lifted, insufficient 
resources. 
Tarragona  French  Spanish  3/5/1811  28/6/1811  56  Y  Stormed and sacked 
Tarragona 2  British  French  3/6/1813  15/6/1813  12  N  Abandoned by Murray 
Tarragona 3 
(Blockade) 
British  French  30/7/1813  15/8/1813  16  N  Blockade by Bentinck 
Tortosa  French  Spanish  19/12/1810  2/1/1811  14  Y  Surrendered, with no good 
reason 
Valencia  French  Spanish  25/12/1811  8/1/1812  14  Y  Surrendered, starved out 
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APPENDIX L - GLOSSARY OF ENGINEERING TERMS. 
 
 
Bastion 
Towers placed at regular intervals around a fortress 
 
Chevaux-de-Frize 
Large pieces of timber studded with blades and spikes, designed to block 
breaches in walls against attackers 
 
Curtain 
Wall connecting bastions in a fortress perimeter 
 
Fascines 
are rough bundle of small branches used for strengthening an earthen 
structure or marking out ground.  
 
Gabions 
are round baskets with open tops and bottoms, made from wickerwork and 
filled with earth for use as military fortifications. These were used to protect 
artillery batteries of troops in trenches.  
 
Glacis 
is an artificial slope of earth constructed to keep attackers under the fire of 
the defenders until the last possible moment. The glacis consists of a slope 
with a low grade inclined towards the top of the wall. This gave defenders a 
direct line of sight into the assaulting force right up to the walls of the 
fortress.  
 
Parallel 
Trenches dug by attacking forces near fortresses to protect themselves from 
defenders fire 
 
Platform 
Wooden flooring within a battery on which the artillery pieces were placed 
 
Sap 
Trenches dug forward from the main parallels to advance nearer the 
defenders position 
 
 
Note : with thanks to Wikipaedia and Fletcher’s In Hell before daylight, pp. 
129-130. Appendix M. British activities on River Crossings in the Peninsular War 1808-14
Name  Action BY Year Month Day Event Campaign Reference
Landmann George Thomas B RE 1808 12 0 Assisted in building boat bridges at Abrantes and Punhete and flying bridge 
at Villa Velha
Strategic RMC, v.5,  p. 27; REM, 4201-305,  10 Feb 
1809; ADD57544, f.204.
Davy Henry D RE 1808 12 10 Destroyed bridge at Betanzos. Killed in process. Retreat to Corunna Porter, p. 247
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1808 12 26 Blew bridge over River Esla at Benavente. Retreat to Corunna Wrottesley, v1, p. 30
Williams John Archer R RE 1809 4 0 Examined bridge across Vonga which had been destroyed by Portuguese 
milita.
Wrottesley,  v.1, p. 38
Fletcher Richard B RE 1809 5 12 Built bridge across the River Douro at Oporto Shore, p.22; Wrottesley, vol.1, p.41; 
Connelly, vol.1, p.165.
B RSC 1809 6 Built temporary bridge over River Tietar Talavera campaign Garwood, p. 83.
Stanway Frank D RE 1809 6 0 Mined bridge at Alcantara; blown 10/6/1809 when French advanced. Talavera campaign Shore, p. 29.
B RSC 1810 ??? Built flying bridge across River Tagus at Villa Velha Strategic Garwood, p. 85. See Wd, to Stuart, 31 Mar 
1811, suggests Portuguese made bridge not 
RSC
B NK 1810 ??? Built bridge of country boats across River Tagus at Abrantes Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
B NK 1810 ??? Flying bridge across River Tagus at Villa Velha replaced by bridge of 
country boats.
Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
B NK 1810 ??? Built bridge of boats across River Zezere at Punhete. Strategic Garwood, p. 86.
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1810 7 28 Destroyed bridges at Ponte de Murcella, Val des Pinos on the Alva, Foz 
d'Aronce and Espinhal.
Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras Wrottesley, v1, p. 97
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1810 8 0 Mined several bridges on likely routes of french advance Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne's diary 1810-11
Mulcaster Edmund R D RE 1810 9 19 Ordered to accompany Brig-Gen Pack to destroy bridges of Santa 
Combadao and Criz
Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras Wrottesley, v.1. p. 108
NK 1810 10 Removed bdridge at Punhete Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras
NK 1810 10 Removed bridge at Villa Velha Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras
Reid William D RE 1810 12 15 Mined bridge over Rio Gingo at Miahaldas Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras REM - JTJ MS Journal
Forster William B RE 1811 1 Built bridge of boats across the river at Benavente Retreat to Lines of Torres Vedras WD, To Beresford & Berkeley 18 Jan 1811
R RSC 1811 3 Repaired bridge at Pirnes Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
B RSC 1811 3 Built trestle bridge over River Ceira near Foz d'Arance[sp?] Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
B RSC 1811 3 18 Built flying bridge across River Alva at Ponte Murcella Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 86.
R RSC 1811 3 Repaired bridge over River Coa at Almeida Pursuit of Massena Garwood, p. 87.
1811 3 Replaced bridge at Villa Velha
1811 3 Replaced bridge at Punhete
Squire John B RE 1811 4 0 Constructed bridges across the River Guadiana at Jerumenha.  First 
combined trestle/pontoon bridge; second, flying bridges when river rose 
and swept away bridge; third,  bridge fo casks for infantry only.
First siege of Badajoz
B RE 1811 5 25 Flying bridge constructed across Guadiana near Badajoz Second siege of Badajoz Jones, vol. 1, p. 34.
B RSC 1811 5 5 Built two temporary bridges over Coa to provide retreat route for Wellington 
at Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro
Fuentes campaign Garwood, p. 89.
B OTH 1811 6 Col. Austin built bridge across Guadiana at San Lucar for Spanish force 
under Penne Villemur to cross
WD, To Liverpool, 11 Jul 1811.
Macleod George Francis R RE 1811 8 0 Repaired bridges at Val des Pinos and Ponte Murcella. Porter, p. 294; WD, 30 Jun 1811
Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1811 8? Laid Pontoon bridge over River Tagus at Almarez. Siege of Cidad Rodrigo Webber, p. 65.
Reid William D RE 1811 11 12 Mined bridges on the Veltes river to secure the flank of Don Carlos 
D'Espana.
REM, 5501-59-2
Sturgeon Henry B RSC 1811 11 18 Built trestle bridge over Agueda at Marialva for siege of Cuidad Rodrigo Siege of Cidad Rodrigo Garwood, p. 86.Appendix M. British activities on River Crossings in the Peninsular War 1808-14
Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1812 3 14 Laid pontoon bridge across River Guadiana above Badajoz.  Washed away 
22 Mar 1811 and eleven pontoon sunk.
Third siege of Badajoz Jones, Sieges, vol. 1, p. 148
B RE 1812 3 15 Flying bridge constructed across Guadiana using two Spanish boats Third siege of Badajoz Jones, Sieges, vol. 1, pp. 148, 168.
Lascelles Thomas P RE 1812 3 22 Sent to 're-establish' bridge of communication over Tagus at Villa Velha 
when pontoon bridge at Badajoz swept away by floods.
Third siege of Badajoz Porter, p. 297; 5501-59-3.
Burgoyne John Fox P RE 1812 4 10 Ordered to go to Villa Velha and take up pontoon bridge if French approach Third siege of Badajoz 4601-72 f. 1812/5
Sturgeon Henry R RSC 1812 4 Constructed suspension bridge across River Tagus at Alcantara Strategic Garwood, p. 91.
Squire John R RE 1812 5 0 Repaired bridge at Merida,  Two fallen arches of stone bridge replaced with 
timber.
BL, Add63106 ff. 57-8
Sturgeon Henry R RSC 1812 ??? Constructed suspension bridge across River Tagus at Almarez Strategic Garwood, p. 90.
Goldfinch Henry R RE 1812 10 0 Repaired bridge at Royal Palace, Madrid Webber, p. 84
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt D RE 1812 10 25 Destroyed bridge at Duenas Tariego (which had been mistaken reported as 
in French possession the previous day). First attempt failed due to being 
rushed by the French.  A later attempt  blew out 13 feet of the arch.
Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, pp. 241-2
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1812 10 26 Mined bridge on the River Piseurga at Cabezon . Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 242
Goldfinch Henry B RE 1812 10 27 Constructed temporary bridge across Tagus near Aranjuez Retreat from Burgos Webber, p. 98
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt D RE 1812 10 28 Blew bridge on the River Douro at Tordesillas. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Reid William D RE 1812 10 28 Blew bridge on the River Pisuerga at Simancas. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. . 243
Reid William D RE 1812 10 29 Mined bridge over River Douro at Quintanilla (above Tudela).  Wooden arch 
destroyed in the evening.
Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. . 243
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt D RE 1812 10 29 Mined bridge at Zamora Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Barney George D RE 1812 10 29 Destroyed bridge at Valladolid on Piseurga. Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Burgoyne John Fox D RE 1812 10 29 Destroyed bridge over River Piseurga at Cabezon Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 243
Jones Harry David D RE 1812 10 30 Destroyed repaired arch of bridge at Castronuno (near Toro) Retreat from Burgos RE JNL Jan 1890, p. 3
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt D RE 1812 10 31 Destroyed bridge at Zamora Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 244
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt D RE 1812 11 8 Mined bridge over River Tormes at Congosta Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 245
Barney George D RE 1812 11 8 Mined bridge over River Tormes at Barco de Avila Retreat from Burgos Wrottesley, v.1, p. 245
Slade William Henry D RE 1812 12 0 Went to destroy bridge at Merida WD, 20 Dec1812
Matson Edward R RE 1813 0 0 Repaired bridge over Toro Vitoria campaign Connelly, vol.1, p.194.
West George Innes Perry R RE 1813 0 0 Repaired bridge at Puente de Douro de Simancas and five other bridges Vitoria campaign Shore, p. 96
Wright Peter B RE 1813 2 0 Built bridge of trestles over River Alagon at ford of Las Campanas near 
Galisteo
REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne Bridges. P. 19.
P RE 1813 Laid a number bridges for passage of army, including over the Esla. RSC 
also present.
Vitoria campaign Connelly, vol.1, p.193.
Piper Robert Sloper P RE 1813 10 7 Laid pontoon bridge across River Bidassoa near Irun Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.197.
R RE 1813 10 Repaired wooden bridge at Irun Campaign in Pyrenees REM, 4201-68, Burgoyne Bridges. p. 14.
Dickens Thomas B RE 1813 10 Built trestle bridge over River Bidassos near Irun Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.197.
Pitts Thomas James Heblethwayt B RE 1813 11 11 Built trestle bridge over River Bidassos near Sarre Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
Hendersen B RE 1813 12 Laid  bridge of 11 bays? over River Nive at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
  B RE 1813 12 Built bridge of wine barrels and skiffs Campaign in Pyrenees Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
Boteler Richard P RE 1813 12 Laid Pontoon bridge over River Nive at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.228; Connelly, vol.1, p.198.
R RE 1813 12 Repaired old wooded bridge at Ustaritz Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.228.
P RE 1813 12 Laid pontoon bridge over River Nive at Villefranque. Campaign in Pyrenees Oman. Vol. 7, p.262.Appendix M. British activities on River Crossings in the Peninsular War 1808-14
B RE 1814 1 Built cask bridge across the River Nive near Cambo Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.202.
Tod Alexander B RSC 1814 2 Built bridge of boats over River Adour  Campaign in France Garwood, p. 90.
R RE 1814 26 Repaired bridge at Berenx Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.202.
P RE 1814 3 Laid pontoon bridge over River Garonne at ??? Campaign in France Burnham, pp. 266-269.
P RE 1814 3 formed several pontoon and flying bridges on march from Orthez to 
Toulouse
Campaign in France Connelly, vol.1, p.203.
INDEX 24 B Build bridge
21 D Destroy bridge
9 P Lay/move/lift Pontoon bridge
13 R Repair bridge
67
52 Carried out by Royal Engineers (RE).
11 Carried out by Royal Staff Corps (RSC).
5 Not known who carried out work
1 Built by other corps
69